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This thesis concerns the development of health policy-making 
in India, in the context of theories of the State in under- 
developed countries. In order better to understand the structures 
and processes which characterise health policy and implementation 
after Independence in 1947, a historical approach is used. The 
thesis falls into two parts. Part A (Chapters 1-4) deals with 
health status and health policy under British rule, and Part B 
(Chapters 5-11) covers the same topics for Independent India. 
Both Parts start by locating health policy in the context of 
levels, differentials and changes in morbidity and mortality, and 
looking at some of the 'non-health policy' factors which might 
contribute to the decline in basic levels of mortality since 
1881. Under the British, this relates particularly to famine 
relief policies, accompanied by commercialisation of agriculture 
and trade in food products; for Independent India, the role of 
welfare policies which provide a 'floor' to consumption seems 
important. In neither period can rising real incomes in them- 
selves provide a satisfactory explanation for mortality decline. 
The likely role of health services is considered in the following 
chapters, though the focus of this account is on the processes by 
which health policies emerge, rather than with their outcomes. 
Part A addresses a number of arguments which claim that the 
effect of Imperialist rule was to destroy local healing 
traditions (Chapter 2), and that Imperialist health services were 
narrowly conceived in terms of social control, in the provision 
of services for the Army and the protection of the health of the 
ruling elite (Chapters 3 and 4). Both arguments are criticised 
for being too partial. It is suggested that Imperialist interests 
did not totally dominate health activities, but nonetheless, the 
impact of services was restricted by their urban, curative focus. 
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Part B looks closely at the evidence for the pattern of 
health expenditures by the Central and State Governments since 
19 47, and suggests that there has been more space for preventive 
and public health measures than has usually been recognised 
(Chapter 6). Chapter 7 explores the national context of policy- 
making, noting the relatively weak role of the Indian Medical 
Association, and Chapter 8 provides an international focus, 
looking at pharmaceuticals companies, migration and foreign aid. 
Chapter 9 takes a close look at policy regarding medical and 
paramedical personnel, and Chapter 10 discusses the structures 
and processes of the Government medical bureaucracy. The 
Conclusion (Chapter 11) considers the 'new approaches' to health 
provisions, in the private sector and in Government, and suggests 
that their impact will be much less than has been claimed. 
In general, it is argued that populist health policies have 
increasingly replaced 'top-down socialist' ones. Neither have 
been particularly successful, because they have been permeated by 
clientelist political institutions. But an adequate account of 
these policies must give due weight to their achievements as well 
as their limitations. 
ix 
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The health services of India deserve extended treatment, 
for a number of good reasons. To begin with, they affect the 
lives of some 700 million people in one of the world's poorest 
countries, and this by itself would make it a worthy subject for 
study. But in addition, the literature on comparative health 
systems, or on the health systems of individual countries or 
regions, surprisingly does not include a good account of the 
Indian health system. 
A comparison with China is instructive. Far less is known 
about the detailed patterns of health care provision or its 
development in China than in India. This has stimulated almost 
every visitor to write an article describing what was shown to 
him/her, and a number of books surveying what is known and 
placing it into a perspective for a wider audience (e. g. 
Bowers, Ced. ] 1973; Quinn [ed. ], 1972; Sidel, 1972). There are 
also several more analytic accounts, of which those by Lampton 
(1977; 1974) are the most detailed (see also Hillier and Jewell, 
1983). In addition, of course, China is seen as a success story, 
with potential relevance for the rest of the world, whereas India 
is regarded as a failure. Thus, in the appendixes to the W. H. O. 
and U. N. I. C. E. F. books outlining alternative approaches to 
meeting health care needs, there is a case study on the Chinese 
system as a whole, whereas from India there are accounts of a 
small voluntary-sector project in Maharashtra and of Ayurvedic 
medicine (Newell Led. ], 1975; Djukanovic and Mach, 1975). 
Furthermore, several of the acounts which do exist are 
severely flawed. Jaggi's many-volumed history of medicine in 
India is little more than a compilation of reports and accounts, 
with no serious attempt to put these into a broader perspective 
(1972-6). On the other hand, Elling (1979) contains a short 
section on India which is so concerned with the context that very 
little emerges about the health services themselves. I would 
argue that most accounts of health and health services in India 
fall into one of two categories: 
- descriptive/uncritical accounts, essentially within the 
'modernisation' tradition, seeing health services moving towards 
a Western model through technological transfer and culture 
contact (e. g. Dutt, 1963); Qr. 
- radical/Marxist critiques, seeing health services being 
warped and made irrelevant (if not positively harmful) because of 
the imperialistic/dependency relationships within which 
technologies are transferred and indigenous elites retain power 
to control changes in their own interests (e. g. Doyal, 1978). 
Here I will argue that the former approach, when applied to 
India, is insufficiently critical but that the latter approach is 
too sweeping (ignoring variations between countries), too 
deterministic in simple economistic ways, and incapable of 
theorising change. In these pages, then, my concern will be first 
to provide some empirical evidence about changes in health 
services in India, and secondly to analyse the significance and 
causes of these patterns while avoiding the two extremes 
described above - that is, neither to exclude a political economy 
of health care services nor to make it the sole element in the 
account. 
Of course, this simple distinction between 'facts' and 
'theory' should not be read as a claim that the 'facts' are free 
from theoretical presuppositions. I have made a number of 
decisions which have guided what material to look for, and to 
present, and in the rest of this Introduction I shall spell out 
some of these theoretical concerns. To begin with, I decided to 
divide this work into two parts, one dealing with the period from 
the beginnings of health policy during British rule (particularly 
from the 1830's onwards) up to Independence, and the second 
looking at aspects of health policy after 1947. A second decision 
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was to focus on the State: to use the recent discussions on the 
nature of the State in 'developing societies' to provide a 
framework for the material I am considering. A third decision 
concerns the treatment of relationships between health services 
and 'health'. I have taken the view that for most purposes it is 
possible to 'bracket off' the issue, and not to try to assess 
whether particular health services improve the health of the 
population or not. Thus I have considered changes in 'health' as 
results of wider social changes (and not only the systematic 
attempts to heal or cure, or protect people from illness and 
disease), and have argued that it is worthwhile to investigate 
health policy in itself, rather than trying too hard to 
distinguish the effective from the dignified. Other decisions 
will become clearer as the material unfolds, but these three 
require some discussion here. 
The first two decisions are interrelated. I have split the 
analysis into two historical sections - 1800 to 1947, and 19+7 to 
the present. The starting point is largely set by my interest in 
health policy-making: there are few sources, and little evidence 
of such policy concerns prior to 1800. However, by taking this 
starting point it could be argued that I am too 'generous' to 
Imperialism, effectively ignoring the period of conquest and 
rapacious plunder. I will return to this point in the conclusion 
to Part A. The decision to break the account at 1947 is not just 
because the historical sources for the two periods are very 
different, nor just because it is traditional to divide modern 
histories of India at this point - the point at which two 
successor countries (India and Pakistan) replaced direct British 
rule for 3/4 of the population, and indirect rule through the 
Native States for the rest. It is also because the end of British 
rule does have some significance for health service provision, 
and this significance has to be assessed in part through an 
understanding of the nature of the pre- and post-Independence 
State. The division also reflects something of the natural 
history of my research into this topic, since I began by looking 
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at post-Independence policy and have come to believe that it is 
impossible to understand what happened after 1947 without 
locating it in its historical roots. 
Many discussions of the State in modern India are derived 
from the debates within Marxism on the character of capitalist 
States. In particular, they try to deal with the problems posed 
for Marxism by the different kinds of capitalist States, and the 
uncertain tendencies of these States, towards Fascism or not, or 
towards the conditions necessary for socialist transformations. 
As Urry (1980) has recently argued, much discussion of the State 
by Marxists has tended to be reductionist and attempts to deal 
with the State solely in terms of the class dominance of the 
bourgeoisie - in Marx's own phrase, the State as the executive 
committee for managing their common affairs. The difficulties 
with this position are enormous. It is clear that politics and 
ideology are not determined in a close way by the demands of 
capital; that social institutions (such as health services) vary 
quite dramatically between different capitalist States; and that 
the 'needs of capital' are rarely unambiguous, self-evident or 
followed with relentless logic. Althusser and others responded to 
this kind of problem by theorising degrees of autonomy from the 
economic base for political and ideological 'instances' (levels); 
an alternative response (such as that of E. P. Thompson) is to 
return to class struggle and the conscious aims of historical 
actors as the central element in an account (Althusser, 1981 ; 
Thompson, 1979). However, we cannot get very far in explaining 
the developments in social policy by referring to the twin 
concepts of 'capital's needs' and 'labour's demands' (Harris, 
1980). While these formulations may seem plausible, they do not 
explain well why welfare States developed when they did, at 
different times and in different ways in different countries, and 
in the State rather than the private sector in some countries but 
not in others (ibid. ). 
Marxists and others are also now pointing to the 
similarities in these discussions with those within orthodox 
sociology. Orthodox sociology has seen a long-running debate 
about the relationship between structure and action, which some 
have seen as underpinning 'two sociologies', of functions and 
systems on the one hand and processes on the other (Dawe, 1970). 
Urry argues that Marxist accounts are similarly polarised, 
between Marxist functionalists (those concerned with seeing the 
way that the State in terms of its functions for capitalism) and 
Marxist humanists (who focus on class struggles, without looking 
at the effects of these struggles)(Urry, 1980: 5; Harris, 
1980: 245). 
If we turn to discussions of the nature of the State in 
India, or more generally in the Third World, we can see two 
general categories of discussions. The first is a pluralist view, 
which sees power as exercised through alliances forged by groups 
on the basis of a number of common and competing characteristics 
- caste, language, religion, education, for example, all 
providing bases for common action as well as (and often over- 
riding) narrow economic interests. This literature discusses 
State bureaucracies, in terms which suggest that bureaucratic 
structures are central to an understanding of the chances of any 
policy being implemented - such as the accounts which came out of 
the school around Ralph Braibanti in the early 1960's (Braibanti, 
1961). The two strands in this kind of account are often poorly 
integrated. The issues for those who focus on the State involve 
the quality of recruitment policies, structure of control, or the 
quality of bureaucratic procedures, as if the bureaucracy is 
divorced from the every-day political world and just 'holds the 
ring'. Failures to maintain this divorce are then castigated by 
calling the result 'corruption', without posing questions about 
the interests of the bureaucrats, or the social groups favoured 
by these 'corrupt practices'. 
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The alternative view of the State draws on Marxist 
traditions, presuming that the State reflects or is an instrument 
of dominant classes: debate (as, for example, between the various 
Marxist parties in India) focusses on which classes are aligned 
together, and the attitude which should be taken over 
collaboration with the so-called 'national bourgeoisie', seen as 
particularly powerful in the Congress Party (Kurien, led. ] 1975; 
Hawthorn, 1983). Much of the recent Marxist discussion of the 
Third World State looks to the seminal work of Alavi (1972), in 
which he argued essentially that the State in post-colonial 
societies is over-developed because it inherited from the 
colonial State bureaucratic and military institutions designed 
largely with a concern to maintain order and control. Alavi 
suggested that these institutions are strong enough to be 
relatively autonomous of the propertied classes within post- 
Colonial societies, and of their metropolitan allies abroad. In 
Alavi's view, what distinguishes the colonial State from post- 
Colonial one was its 'alien' character, not its institutions or 
primary concerns. 
Alavi's formulation has come under attack from a number of 
quarters. For my purposes, the following points seem most 
crucial. To begin with, some writers have pointed out that Alavi 
seems to exaggerate the extent of the colonial State's control 
over civil society. Saul (1973), for example, argued that in the 
African context it is difficult to sustain the case, certainly 
without more clear-cut indicators of what might count as an 
'over-developed' State. In the Indian context, following the work 
of Frykenberg (1965), a number of authors have stressed the 
limits to State control over local politics (Bayly, 1979; 
Washbrook, 1978), local economies (Whitcombe, 1972) or local 
social structures (Kumar, 1965). Washbrook, for example, argues 
that if anything the British State in India was less 'developed' 
in the range of modes of control over civil society which it 
could exercise than were the States which preceded it in South 
India - to such an extent that land revenue collection became 
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almost the only connection between the State and the local 
population (Washbrook, 1977; see also Moore, 1981). It can also 
be argued that the reason why Indians were incorporated into 
positions of influence, and eventually power, from the 1880's 
onwards, was because the British recognised the limits to the 
control which their State apparatus could wield. Of course, this 
line of argument cannot be taken too far: in terms of the control 
of legitimate force, and the ability to coerce agreement in the 
last resort, the Indian Army (with the British Army in India), 
the Indian Police, and the Indian Civil Service, could still 
together forge an instrument of domination more efficient and 
flexible than any previously seen on the sub-continent. But since 
Alavi's case seems to be based on the ability to manage everyday 
politics and bureaucratic matters without reliance on landed 
classes, the objections have considerable validity. 
The second weakness in Alavi's account is his assumption 
that the Imperial State was fairly directly a tool of the 'Metro- 
politan bourgeoisie'. While there is obviously a sense in which 
the Imperial State ýg, ý alien, and answerable to its masters in 
Britain, it is also clear that the extent of that control was 
restricted by distance and lack of knowledge. Furthermore, the 
interests of the 'Metropolitan bourgeoisie' were rarely clear, 
unambiguous or unchanging. Even in the extreme case - 'ensuring a 
stable environment for trade, commodity production and revenue 
collection' (Wood, 1980) - by the 1920s this gave few guidelines 
to Indian bureaucrats attempting to cope with world recession and 
Japanese competition (Charlesworth, 1982). Further, there is 
little that can be gained from Alavi's formulation if we wish to 
understand not only the pressure on the State to provide for the 
needs of 'capital'; for example, in trying to understand the 
social policy innovations of the British, such as the suppression 
of LaLj, female infanticide, general education (but particularly 
female education) or in the field of health. Here, elements of 
imperial ideology (and variations in the form this took between 
7 
imperialists and at different times in different places) have to 
be considered seriously. 
The third difficulty with Alavi's formulation is the meaning 
to be attached to the transfer of power at Independence. It is 
relatively easy to characterise the Indian Congress Party as 
being 'step-in-your-shoes' nationalists - concerned to get access 
to the levers of power but without clear ideas of what to do when 
they were there (contra the Chinese Communist Party) (Maddison 
1970). It is also clear that both for the Chinese Communists and 
for Congress, in taking over the existing bureaucracy they were 
able to cope with the immediate problems of maintaining an 
administration in desperate times, but were also constrained in 
the policy innovations they were then able to take. Whereas the 
Communists did have an idea of the limitations they were facing, 
and developed ways of overcoming bureaucratic inertia through a 
policy of increasing political control at all levels, the 
Congress Party was largely content with what they had. But Alavi 
argued that this was because of their own ineffectiveness. The 
bureaucracy had developed ways of by-passing political leaders 
and Wood (1980) suggests that the main technique was to increase 
the complexity of bureaucratic routine as a way of coping with 
political pressures. 
Alavi is, of course, talking specifically about Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, where the very short periods of political rule have 
made his case more plausible. The bureaucracy and the military 
obviously can work well together in situations where 'political' 
interference is minimised. But the Indian case is more 
complicated, and Wood's willingness to carry Alavi's argument 
over is more difficult to defend. In particular, it is clear that 
ministerial office in the Indian States does give scope for the 
exercise of a number of controls which the bureaucracy is almost 
powerless to prevent - in, for example, the transfer and 
promotion of State (rather than all-Indian) civil servants. The 
Departments with the largest employment (such as Education and 
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Health) are often prized Ministerships, because they offer such 
scope for patronage and corruption (Wade, 1984). Yet they are 
also Ministries where policies change. In trying to understand 
this we do not get very far by referring to bureaucratic methods 
of coping with politicians, nor with the competing classes whose 
interests are (or are not) articulated by the post-Colonial 
State. 
Alavi provides some answers to these issues in a recent 
article (1982). Here he argues the case for distinguishing 
between four different levels of analysis of the State. The first 
draws on the so-called 'capital-logic' school and focuses on the 
role of the State in creating and reproducing a social order 
which permits the economy to function - in Alavi's terms, India 
is a 'peripheral capitalist' economy, so the minimal role the 
State must fulfil is to make it possible for capitalists to make 
a profit, to benefit personally, and to continue to invest. The 
second level relates to the questions Alavi raised in 1972, on 
the classes and groups who can be said to control the State: at 
this level issues of the actions of the State in specific spheres 
have to be considered. The third level is the analysis of the 
bureaucracy, its social origins and interests, and the extent of 
its autonomy, while the fourth level is that of the State as an 
arena for competing interests - party and pressure group 
politics. 
Alavi argues that State action (at the second level) is set 
by a context in which a "structural imperative" exists; in which 
the basic notions of profitability, calculation, and capital 
accumulation affect the consequences of State action but do not 
determine those actions in advance. Rather, aspects of the other 
two levels (the bureaucracy and the 'political') have a role to 
play, making for deviations from what might be considered the 
strict logical requirements of capitalist enterprises or capital 
in general. Of course it may still be very difficult to define 
what that strict logic might require in any particular historical 
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situation. This model of political and social life is very 
similar to models of equilibrium in economics - an equilibrium 
which is never reached but towards which the economy is believed 
to tend in the long run. 
The significance of Alavi's recent position is that it makes 
provision for the possibility that 'mistakes' can be made, and 
that not everything done by the State can be understood in terms 
of meeting the needs of dominant classes. In addition, it 
provides a space for sociological analysis of the ideas and 
interests of bureaucratic and other groups without making them 
seem either hypocrites or idiots - either consciously dissembling 
about the real reasons for policy, or unaware of the benefits to 
particular classes - which is all that tends to be permitted in 
classical Marxist analyses. Alavi's position also makes it 
possible to clarify some of the differences between the two kinds 
of accounts of health policy in India which I outlined at the 
beginning. In general, the uncritical accounts focus on Alavi's 
third and fourth levels, taking very much at face value what 
doctors and bureaucrats say they are doing and their reasons for 
doing so, and using a similar framework for looking at the 
pressure groups which try to influence policy. The critical 
schools, on the other hand, tend to look mainly at Alavi's first 
and second levels, the structural imperatives of capitalism and 
the class interests of powerful groups. Plausibly, a fuller 
account, encompassing all four levels, will be more satisfactory. 
The obvious problem is in how to relate the levels together, and 
(as I shall argue more fully later, for health policy) how to 
avoid seeming to argue that the links are unimportant. It is in 
this framework that I shall look at health policy in India. 
My third 'prior decision' was to look at health services and 
their relationship to health in a particular way. Health services 
in any country do not emerge solely in response to the diseases 
suffered by the population. To begin with, those diseases are 
experienced and interpreted as social events (illnesses), and the 
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demands people make of healers are on the basis of these cultural 
processes. The classic (and over-generalised) example from India 
is of the tendency to explain smallpox as a curse from a 
particular goddess, and thus to respond to a sufferer very 
differently from the way those with plague, or cholera, are 
treated. Some writers have argued that the cultural specificity 
of disease categories makes it impossible to use 'Western' 
categories in the discussion of other populations. However 
desirable it might be in principle to use Indian disease 
categories in what follows, there are considerable problems. 
Firstly, it is not clear that there is a uniform set of Indian 
disease categories, but variations at least regionally and 
culturally. Secondly, the sources I am consulting all use a 
version of Western categories, even if these change through time. 
Finally, I (and most of my readers) implicitly order their view 
of the world of health and illness using these categories, and 
any attempt to use an alternative set would be partial and not 
genuine. But it should always be remembered that for most Indians 
a 'humoral' view of health and illness, sometimes extended by the 
use of concepts derived from the classical Indian traditions, 
gives a closer approximation to how they see the world. 
Health services respond to the demands of some groups rather 
than others - men's complaints rather than women's or children's, 
town-dwellers' rather than villagers', ruling races', classes' or 
parties' rather than those of the ruled. These groups will 
probably experience different disease spectrums, and also 
interpret their experiences differently. Therefore, even if 
health services were to respond in a direct manner to the 
effective demands made on them, they would not necessarily 
reflect any 'real' disease pattern. But of course, there are 
other interests affecting health services. The interests of the 
State may be paramount. But they are likely to be mediated by the 
interests of the occupational group which dominates the medical 
division of labour, whose views of appropriate patterns of health 
services will be conditioned by their theories of disease 
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causation and treatment as well as their views of their own 
proper position in society. In a colonial situation, such as 
India before 1947, there may be considerable mismatch between 
indigenous and colonial views: and many would argue that this 
mismatch continues in the post-Independence world as a result of 
processes of neo-colonialism. However, State interests, and those 
of medical occupations, cannot be assumed once a particular 
country has been identified as 'peripheral capitalist'. There are 
considerable variations amongst such countries in the form health 
services have taken, and these forms have changed through time. 
There is, therefore, an historical and a bureaucratic 
context to be understood. Health services in India today are 
conditioned in important ways by the legacy of health services 
established under British rule. 'Incrementalism' is a major 
feature even of change in 'revolutionary' contexts, as Lampton's 
painstaking accounts of medical policy in post-Liberation China 
make clear (1977). Even workers near the bottom of a hierarchy 
have interests in restricting changes which may mean they lose 
their jobs, or have them radically redefined, or require 
retraining and uncertainty: those workers near the top are likely 
to have scarce skills (socially defined) which give them power to 
limit proposals which might reduce or change their positions. 
Finally, of course, these different elements are linked in 
ways which are usually mutually supporting, though occasionally 
contradictory. The model that I am using to attempt to understand 
these relationships is not very different from that of Roemer, 
who distinguishes historical determinants, economic levels, 
political policies and other cultural influences, as the 
'determinants of health care systems' (1977: 1). However, he 
classes all non-Socialist 'underdeveloped' health care systems 
together, solely on the basis of economic levels - but then 
places India in a 'transitional' category (ibid.: 198). By 
contrast, I want to discuss the extent to which India is unlike 
the patterns described for other countries in the 'capitalist 
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periphery', and this needs a more sophisticated discussion of the 
State than the 'political policies' and 'ideology' described by 
Roemer. 
In all this, there is no presumption that saying anything 
about health services will let us say very much about what 
affects health. The debates in Western Europe and North America 
concerning the causes of mortality decline in the 19th century, 
and the relationships between health services and the current 
level of life expectancy, are well known (McKeown, 1966; Powles, 
1972; Illich, 1976; Lalonde, 1975). Except for a few 
interventions directly under medical stimulus (such as clean 
water supplies, or one or two mass preventive campaigns) it can 
be shown that the major killers of the 19th century declined in 
significance well before specific remedies or protections were 
provided by medical science. The relevance of this debate for 
20th century changes in the rest of the world is more uncertain 
(see, e. g. Ruzicka, 1984). I shall discuss this issue in more 
detail, when I consider the impact of changes in living 
standards, the control of famine, and the role of good nutrition 
in reducing mortality. But in general I maintain an agnostic 
position: in most cases, we have little evidence that hospital 
attendances, vaccination campaigns, or town water supplies made a 
marked difference to people's health, and in general it will not 
be my concern to try to assess 'impact' measured in this kind of 
way. In other words, I would suggest that it is worth knowing how 
services were provided, at what cost, when and in what form, even 
if we do not know what benefit people received from using them. 
In these pages I hope to tease out some of these 
relationships in the Indian context, and in particular to throw 
light on how the current patterns of health services in India 
took the forms that they have. There is general agreement that 
these patterns are inadequate, both for dealing with the needs of 
the Indian population today and as a basis for any serious 
attempt to reach the goal of 'Health for All by the Year 20001. 
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Understanding better the historical roots of these patterns and 
their significance for present-day policy-making may help those 
trying to overcome these inadequacies. 
THE ORGANISATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
In what follows, I look at these arguments in two periods - 
pre- and post-1947 - and take a series of themes in each case. 
The four chapters in Part A address the issues of what were the 
health problems facing Indians in about 1800, and how did these 
change under British rule; what were the local forms of medical 
services in India at the time, and how did British rule affect 
them; who controlled medical policy in India under the British, 
and how much money was spent on health matters; and what were the 
dominant forms of British health care provision in India. These 
four chapters together argue that the major health problems of 
India predated British rule and were not substantially affected 
by British health policies, either negatively (the erosion of 
indigenous systems of medicine, or the 'diseases of development' 
- notably the spread of malaria) or positively (medical services 
or public health provisions). The limits to health progress under 
the British, it will be argued, were less the colonial structure 
of Government and racist/Imperialist goals than the very real 
constraints of resources and of the models of disease which were 
current at the time; and the major positive benefit of British 
rule on health was probably the changes in famine arrangements 
which had a dramatic impact on famine-related mortality despite a 
probable increase in the frequency of food scarcity. 
In Part B, chapters 5 to 10 focus on health services and 
health since 1947. Chapter 5 looks at health problems at 
Independence, and trends since then, with an assessment of the 
most common explanations for changes in observed morbidity and 
mortality. I will argue that the organisation of health services 
to deal separately with different diseases (the so-called 
'vertical' disease control programmes, notably in malaria) and 
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further progress in welfare systems (providing a floor of 
consumption at times of food scarcity) seem to account for most 
of the decline in mortality. However, the slow decline in 
mortality (especially child mortality) since 1970, despite record 
grain harvests and rising per capita real incomes, suggests that 
the health services are not contributing to further declines as 
they could. 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 discuss health policy-making in India at 
three levels of analysis. The first is the narrowly bureaucratic, 
and chapter 6 sets out the structure of health expenditures and 
the nature of public sector health provisions. This involves 
looking briefly at the role of planning and State-Central 
relationships in a policy field which is constitutionally the 
reponsibility of the State. It will be argued here that the 
Planning Commission has consistently pressed 'appropriate' 
policies on Ministries of Health, both Central and State, but 
that its inability to control expenditure has led to two 
unfortunate results: 
'slippage' from rural, preventive, primary care objectives 
but a tendency to achieve or over-achieve targets which directly 
affect urban medical care facilities; 
- an increasing significance of the Centrally-funded Family 
Welfare Programme (for other reasons as well) which has come to 
be the main channel by which the Central Government attempts to 
achieve changes in the primary care system. Some of the 
consequences of this pattern are explored in the following 
chapters. 
Chapters 7 and 8 widen the approach to policy-making by 
looking at the politics of medicine within India and in an 
international context. Chapter 7 looks at the policy context for 
the public-sector health services, and argues that there is no 
evidence of concerted lobbies by 'organised interests': the 
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medical profession is poorly organised and claims but little in 
the way of successes, and the major pressures on Ministers seem 
to relate to the health sector as employer (transfers, 
promotions, recruitment etc. ) These pressures have specific 
consequences, not actively sought by any of the actors involved. 
The empirical material is drawn from an analysis of the impact of 
the Indian Medical Association (I. M. A. ) on a number of policy 
issues in the 1960s and the 1970s - tracing the background of 
medical associations in India from the mid-19th century and 
looking at data on membership and on the mode of internal 
organisation of the I. M. A. This material on the politics of 
health is set in the context of material on the internal politics 
of India. 
Chapter 8 locates health policy internationally. To see 
health provisions as an entirely internal matter is obviously 
inadequate, but the potential scope of 'international effects' is 
enormous, ranging throughout the international agencies and the 
politics of the Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as 
the full range of multinational corporations. I have chosen to 
limit the discussion to three areas where the impact of the 
international context is most direct and identifiable: 
1. Foreign aid - its distribution by donor, by area 
supported, and changes through time, and the significance of 
overseas assistance in overall public sector health expenditures; 
2. Medical migration - to show the extent of such migration, 
its approximate direction, the changes through time, the impact 
of 'medical dependency' and the relationships with the General 
Medical Council from the 1920's through the impact of 1976 
'derecognition'; and 
3. Multinational corporations, especially pharmaceuticals 
companies - to show the scale of these companies within the 
commercial sphere, their mode of operation and any impacts on 
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decision- making. In addition, there will be a brief discussion of 
the argument that such companies take advantage of the laxer 
'environmental' controls in India to impose greater disease risks 
on the Indian population. 
In general I argue that the more sweeping criticisms of the 
international health economy, derived largely from naive 
dependency analyses, are inadequate to cope with the variety of 
Third World experience, and the particular Indian case. Medical 
emigration from India, while substantial on a world scale, has 
had little noticeable impact on Indian health care provisions; 
despite multinational control over drugs, Indian production 
capacity is almost unique in the Third World for its scope and 
size; and foreign aid has contributed in no small measure to the 
most 'appropriate' as well as the less 'appropriate' aspects of 
Indian health provisions. 
Chapters 9 and 10 are case studies of particular aspects of 
medical policy. Chapter 9 focusses on medical 'man'power policy. 
I argue that the Government was well aware of the weaknesses of 
the strategy followed in the 1950s and 1960s, which focussed on 
doctors and made no significant allowance for health assistants 
or village-level workers. In general, policy attempted to meet 
conflicting criteria: to ensure international acceptability for 
Indian qualifications (which demanded only one category of 
'doctor'); to provide within India the full range of 'modern' 
medical services; to incorporate 'indigenous' personnel within 
bureaucratic health service provision; and to extend health 
services as rapidly and effectively as possible to the mass of 
the rural population. The reforms of the late 1970's (multi- 
purpose health workers to replace uni-purpose, vertical programme 
workers; and community health workers with a revived programme of 
training traditional birth attendants) are shown to have been 
proposed and argued down several times since 1947, and some of 
the special reasons which led to their final success are 
discussed. 
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Chapter 10 deals with the development of medical 
institutions and programmes, and considers the evidence on their 
mode of working. I argue that the major problems with their 
organisation lie less in their ability to discriminate against 
the poor and the disadvantaged in the distribution of scarce 
resources (though this occurs) than in two other facts: they have 
very few resources to distribute; and they do so within a 
bureaucratic framework which offers no incentives for 
'appropriate' work and effort. 
Chapter 11 forms the conclusion, with an assessment of the 
new approaches in health provisions and their likely impact. 
Since 1977, in the context of changes in the rhetoric of world 
discussions (Health By the People; Alma-Ata; Illich etc. ), it 
might seem that past failures will be turned into future 
successes. Indian health provision in the voluntary sector, and 
new health sector aid policies, all point in the same direction. 
This chapter will argue that for most Indians, these 'new 
approaches' are unlikely to cause a break with the past. 
SOURCES AND METHODS 
The material reported here comes from a variety of sources, 
and has been collected over the course of the last 15 years or 
so. My interest in the topic was stimulated during a stay in 
Pakistan in 1970-71, when I carried out fieldwork in Lahore 
hospital casualty departments but also collected data on health 
policy and planning in Pakistan (Jeffery, 1973; 1974). I visited 
Punjab (India) in 1974, and made some preliminary analysis of 
Punjab Government materials available in Chandigarh, but more 
substantial data collection took place in 1975-76 when 
I was 
based in New Delhi. 
In this period I had to wait for research clearance from the 
Government of Indi a, because my application was recei ved soon 
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after the General Medical Council had 'derecognised' Indian 
medical degrees; at the same time a team from the Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex was refused 
research clearance. While I was waiting I collected material from 
the reports of the Central Council of Health, newspapers held in 
the Nehru Memorial Library, other documents from the National 
Medical Library in the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, 
and eventually, archival material from the National Archives of 
India, New Delhi. I also used sources provided by the Indian 
Medical Association at their national headquarters as well as the 
Delhi Branch, and interviewed office-holders. The terms of my 
research clearance did not permit me to interview current holders 
of office in the Ministries in Delhi, but I did interview one 
former Minister of Health (Dr Sushila Nayyar) and a former 
Director-General of Health Services (Dr K. N. Rao). I then created 
a listing of doctors in Delhi, and interviewed a 2% sample. 
After returning to the U. K. I consulted materials held by 
the India Office Library in London, and by the Edinburgh 
University Library, as well as undertaking several more shorter 
trips to India, to investigate conditions on tea estates in Assam 
and to advise on a U. K. health aid programme in Orissa. These 
visits widened my understanding of Government processes. Finally, 
in 1982-3 I spent a year carrying out a joint research project 
(with Patricia Jeffery and Andrew Lyon) on childbearing in rural 
Uttar Pradesh, providing a new perspective on health services as 
seen by a 'villager', however privileged and temporary. Material 
on various aspects of this research has already been published: 
the bibliography includes a complete listing. In particular, the 
data on foreign aid used in chapter 8 has appeared in the 
9f ýSS1j h SSýýISSS (Jeffery, 1985); some of 
the material in Chapters 2 and 4 have appeared in LSS1S. 1 LSiaSSý 
SS, a jý ýýýS1SS (Jeffery, 198 3) and in jý ýýSýS ýSý ýS S ys 1SS (Jeffery 
1979). 
19 
in what follows I shall be trans2ressin- a number cf 
disciplinary boundaries, most notably bet. -ieen sociolog; Y, isi, ory 
and health econor, ics, and I shall not satisfy specialists in any 
of these fields. In developing the material for this case stur aI 
have been restricted by the availability of sources. I 
particular, the material drawn fror. Orissa was available onl 
Because of my regular visits to that State in a se,, m i-o i icial 
capacity, and I did not select t 1e State on any theoretical 
grounds. Some of the aD S in the ar ur: tints ref _- ý_^:... 
problems; and some of my arguments may reflect the existence of 
souarces hich have been able to raý '., hcr th an ý.:. _ mýst 
'.: ich one mi ; ht want to ma : e. , one thelesS, 
I important arguments h 
hose these -F- Les will shed light on an area ii7"uc discussed, ou t 
not much studied. 
OTL 0:. TLR: I; GLCG 
In the fclloý, lin pales I have enerally re_ errec to ctor 
., rained in the . -: euc i cä 
1 cOlleý:, es and scý Dols estasIn e:: .; y 
ýritisrý as 'e estern doctorsarad the icine in ,: : ich 
7- 
L ey ýr 
educated as 'U estern , 
dicinet. iris is con tentious; Leslie, or 
ý. i ale, . as ur- er t 
he use o the . er.,. o of ita ,. ci 
to denote the r act tý ät t gis no 1on; fer has its roots solely in 
ý_ roc and or t:. .,. erica 
(Lesli 
., 
1.? ). it is also pro le tic 
India, since Unani ('tree<and o-L, oeepat zic r. ec: icine a- so _n 
me th ist. On the o t'. er han , it re ict: -_=... 
Inci ý, e pecially in the period 
before 1: 47 r.. ýn t . is ýe cj 
- the ri ý'i: ie vEiS ei: ýiil 1 
stripes en antic ýrtic ate. The alternative ter... y: 
`% v' leo 
1G1sG1V- vii v,.,. 
lý.  C: li ii, 
ii 
:j 
con, ested by '`: es teril' doctors as beine 'goo narrow. I co 
ncJ 
eel AJ 
e z; solution, at I fiel trat teere 
- 
J, L UScC 
t, 
tern medicine' and '; 'entern doctors' nd ^aVe 't r5 
i_fl this '; a. 
20 
INTRODUCTION TO PART A 
"It was and is a basic trait of imperialism that the 
capital it has invested in retarded areas develops them 
only in a very lop-sided and inadequate fashion. They 
have for the most part lingered in a broken-backed 
condition, a limbo between old and new, with a money 
economy but not an industrial one, and forming a passive 
appendage to the advanced countries. " (Kiernan 1974 11- 
12) 
"There is, however, no room for equivocation over this 
matter, over the results of imperialism's forceful 
incorporation of the bulk of humanity into the modern 
world. As Marxists we must accept the view that the 
epochal imperialist sweep was indeed a titanic step 
towards human unity (on the basis of the greatest 
cultural and material achievements so far attained by 
humanity). " (Warren, 1980,137) 
Many writers (not only Marxists like the two quoted above) 
have wrestled with the attempt to disentangle and evaluate what 
Marx called England's double mission in India - one destructive 
and one regenerative - and what others have regarded as a 
characteristic of industrial capitalism in general (Marx, 
1973: 320). The achievement of formal political control by the 
British over much of what we now call India undoubtedly 
facilitated the inclusion of India in a world economy: the State 
which oversaw the construction and operation of the new economic 
order was one which was finally responsible to political control 
outside India, and this undoubtedly had specific consequences. In 
the field of tarriff control and land revenue this may have been 
decisive. But in many other areas it becomes a hopeless task to 
try and assess how things might have been different had political 
control remained in India. It is notable that some Marxists have 
returned to themes which Weberian writers have stressed - the 
need for changes in social and political institutions and 
cultural patterns before economic changes can take hold (Worsley, 
1980; Warren, 1979). So there is support from many sides for the 
argument that the absence of colonial rule in India would not 
thereby have led to faster, more thorough-going, or more 
equitable processes of social and economic change. 
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Similarly, historians are increasingly stressing the extent 
of integration in pre-British India, the level of monetisation of 
the economy, or the extent of agrarian landlessness (Kumar, [ed. ] 
1982). Colonial rule was neither as all-encompassing nor as 
destructive as many early writers claimed; and the social and 
cultural impact was perhaps as important in the long run as the 
'drain' of booty to England in the 18th century, or the lack of 
protection for the hand-loom cotton industry in the 18th and 
early 19th centuries (Charlesworth, 1982). Warren, in his attempt 
to refocus Marxist thought on the generative side of imperialism 
and modern capitalism stresses the improvement in health brought 
about by the colonisers, indicated by rapid population growth and 
declines in mortality rates following within a few decades of 
colonial rule: this is a view which runs directly counter to most 
Marxist analyses, in which an expansion of misery and a decline 
in the quality of life are more usually associated with 
colonialism (1980: 113). 
But it would be a mistake to treat the whole Imperial period 
as if it were subject to little change, as Frank, for example, in 
some of his writings appears to do (Frank, 1967). In looking at 
the history of the Imperial State in India it is possible to see 
three main periods for analysis, with qualitative changes around 
1860, and 1920. -Prior to 1860, the State was a curious amalgam of 
commercial, administrative and military machines; from 1860 to 
1920 we can see the 'High Noon' of the British State in India; 
from 1920 onwards the process of Indianisation begins in earnest, 
and Independence in 1947 ushers in a further set of changes. 
These dates are of course only approximations: not only are the 
'stages' reached at different times in different parts of the 
sub-continent (Punjab often seeming to lead the way) but the 
turning points are often spread out over several years. Thus the 
changes of 1920 can be traced back to Curzon's attempt to 
partition Bengal in 1906, and to the Morley-Minto reforms of 
1907, which culminated in the new order established by the 
1919 
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Government of India Act. 
The history of the British annexation of India does not need 
much rehearsal: the main signposts of the political history are 
listed in the Timeline in the Appendix. From the founding of the 
trading company, the East India Company, in 1601 , roughly until 
the military campaigns of 1757, which included the Battle of 
Plassey and Clive's victorious march on Calcutta, British power 
was largely confined to control over different aspects of foreign 
trade. The European competitors - the Dutch and the French - were 
not obviously inferior in military strength or trading ability, 
and the ebb and flow of competition between the European powers 
was over-shadowed by the growth and decline of the Moghals, who 
reached their furthest geographical spread in the reign of the 
Emperor Aurangzeb, who died in 1707. But the events of 1757 
established the superiority of the British over the other 
European powers, and demonstrated their ability to intervene 
effectively in Indian politics, setting in train an almost 
irresistible chain of conquests and advances, culminating in the 
overthrow of the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab in 1847, and the 
takeover of Oudh in 1856. The Company developed into a 'ruling' 
body partly to defend and extend its commercial interests; but 
one result of conquering territory, or taking on the collection 
of land revenue, was to reduce steadily the relative significance 
of its trading activities. The problems and rewards offered by 
rulership and land revenues led the British Parliament, in Acts 
of 1833 and 1853, to begin to exercise increasing supervision of 
events in India. 
By 1800 (the starting point for much of what follows in Part 
A) the processes of territorial spread and institutional 
transformation were still under way; by the 1850's they were all 
but complete. This was symbolised by the British crown taking 
over formal control after the upheavals of 1857/8; and by the 
ending of the policies of aggressive conquests of new territory 
in the core of the Indian subcontinent. In the last half of the 
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18th century, the British in India had acted in a rapacious 
manner, looting and laying waste the lands of defeated enemies, 
using force to insist on unequal contracts or the payment of 
penal fines, and extorting very high land revenues. But the 
British Government of India was steadily bureaucratised (in 
almost the classical Weberian sense) over the first four or five 
decades of the 19th century: by 1860 the process was almost 
complete. Private functions and finances were steadily separated 
from public ones, efforts were made to establish recruitment 
procedures which were free from elements of purchase and sale of 
office, and clear lines of control were setup between London and 
Calcutta, and on down into the countryside. 
The events of 1857 (the Mutiny or Sepoy Rebellion) hastened 
the changes. The 1858 Government of India Act required regular 
reporting of Indian financial affairs, and efforts to promote 
'moral and material progress' in the country, which tended to 
regularise and systematise the organisational structure within 
India. The forms of Government established at this time dominated 
developments for the next 60 years. Most of the changes 
introduced - such as the increasing involvement of Indians at the 
higher levels of the Government - were brought in without 
changing the basic structure. Others - such as the establishment 
of local self-government after 1882 - only began to have a 
serious impact towards the end of the period. This 60-year spell 
saw British rule at its most self-confident, and typifies the 
image usually held, of racial pride, a concern for official 
superiority and efficiency, and mountains of paperwork. It is in 
this period that policy in India can be seen most clearly as 
stimulated by the changing context of ideas in England, with 
Liberal and Conservative Viceroys and Secretaries of State 
attempting to influence the course of action in the light of 
their ideas of the Imperial role (Moore, 1966, Stokes, 1959). In 
some respects, such as the growth of public education and public 
health provision, the State took a much more prominent role in 
India than in Britain, because of the absence of vested interests 
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and of alternative institutions in civil society already 
providing such services. But the scope of these innovations was 
always limited by the main demands on the State - the maintenance 
of law and order, protection of the external boundaries, and 
financial rectitude. 
The reforms associated with Montagu (as Secretary of State) 
and Chelmsford (as Viceroy) in 1918-19, mark a decisive shift in 
the pattern of events. They were heralded by the Morley-Minto 
reforms of 1907-09, which Moore (1966) characterised as the 
shadow of reform and the substance of repression'. The main 
elements of each reform package were the extensions of the 
principles of representation and Ministerial Government 
responsible to an elected legislature, but whereas the changes 
before the War had a minimal impact, those after it had much 
greater long-term significance. From 1919 can be dated the full 
flowering of the Provincialisation of most of the major arms of 
Government, especially education and public health, and the 
division of powers between the Centre and the Provinces. This 
division was left virtually unchanged by the reforms of 1935, and 
it is the basis of the Indian Constitution after Independence. 
The Government of India Act of 1919 drew on the reports of 
two Royal Commissions (on Decentralisation and on Public 
Services) and on a number of other proposals. It attempted to 
widen the spheres of 'Indianisation' and to extend the powers and 
autonomy of local government without undermining the basis of 
Imperial control. The solution included the establishment of two 
divisions of government activity: between the Central and the 
Provincial Governments; and between subjects 'transferred' to 
ministerial control, and those 'reserved' for official control. 
In spite of the fact that the Congress Party never fully 
committed itself to working the 1919 Constitution (largely 
because it was associated with repression symbolised by Dyer's 
massacre of unarmed Punjabis in Amritsar) the inter-War period 
I 
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saw real power exercised for the first time by Indian Ministers, 
and a dramatic growth in the Indian membership of all the elite 
bureaucratic 'services'. London's ability to control events in 
India steadily declined, so that Independence became increasingly 
predictable and well within the established patterns, despite the 
apparently chaotic conditions of 1946 and 19)47. Post-19)47 
policies in many areas followed the lines laid down while the 
British were still formally in charge. 
Part A, then considers the validity of some elements of the 
'critical' arguments about Imperial impact with specific 
reference to health and health services in India, produced both 
by nationalists and Marxists (eg Naoroji, 1901; Digby, 1901; 
Baran, 1958; Banerji, 1975). The 'critical' case against imperial 
rule, in its simple version, is that Imperial rule had a number 
of negative consequences for Indian society. In the first place, 
living standards were reduced (through the working of land 
revenue, trading patterns in which the 'surplus' was creamed off 
by European traders, and the 'drain' to London in particular). 
Following from this, it was argued, was a thwarting of 
development potentials, which limited the extent of technical and 
social change within India and lowered the technical level in 
certain key areas. 
What was the effect of British rule on health conditions in 
India? In part, this question can be resolved into a conundrum : 
what caused the rise in population (especially after 1920) if it 
was not an improvement in general living standards? but what was 
the result of that population increase, if it was not a decline 
in general living standards? It is relatively easy to discern two 
strands in writing on this subject. There are those, like Banerj i 
(1974), who follow the nationalist tradition dating from Naoro ji 
(1901) and Digby (1901). They argue that Imperialism destroyed 
existing balances between people and their environments 
(including coping mechanisms like indigenous healing traditions) 
and led to a decline in standards of living (indicated by such 
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variables as income per head, or by reference to reports about 
the rise of urban slums and rural distress). In addition, they 
argue, Indian healers were 'deskilled', because they were 
deprived of elite patronage, and local village-based society was 
destroyed by commercialisation and the creaming off of surplus to 
the State. In addition, in some respects, the developments which 
did take place had 'unhealthy' consequences, as for example in 
the conditions which were permitted in towns, and the spread of 
malaria (accompanying canal and road or rail developments) and 
the plague (introduced into Bombay along colonial trade paths). 
The critique would continue by arguing that the measures 
adopted by the Government in India were totally inadequate to 
deal with these problems. In part this is to be explained by the 
racist basis of rule: the interests of the European minority 
received undue concern, while the Indian majority received little 
more than the crumbs from the White table. Thus the Indian 
Medical Service (I. M. S. ) was designed to service the Indian Civil 
Service and the Army: only incidentally were services provided 
for the mass of the population. Hospitals and dispensaries were 
urban, and again designed with the interests of European civil 
servants as their highest priority; and the training of medical 
practitioners was designed to provide subordinates to Europeans 
in the I. M. S. Only the surplus was available to provide private 
medical services to the mass of the population, and their 
potential was limited not merely by the inadequacies of their 
training but also by the way in which medical training denied the 
relevance of the local culture, and systematically derided local 
medical traditions. The provision of health services was 
unwontedly 'medical' in character, with preventive and sanitary 
measures of low priority, concerned most with European troops and 
the European quarters of towns. In many ways, sanitary measures 
were restricted to attempts at social control, most obvious in 
the anti-plague measures. Thus what little was spent on health 
could have had virtually no benefit for the mass of the local 
population. Any improvements in the health of Indians would thus 
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have been no more than accidental, and to be explained as the 
unintended consequences of quite other policies. 
The major weakness of the critics is that they are too 
willing to generalise on the basis of very little material: in 
fact there are few good discussions of the impact of British rule 
on health in India. They are also likely to apply anachronistic 
standards - to blame colonial health services for their 
inadequacy, when, prior to the 1920's, medical services were 
inadequate everywhere, and even public health services had an 
uncertain impact on health, particularly on infant and child 
health (Powles, 1973; Oakley, 1985). 
On the other hand, the apologists for Empire, especially 
from the colonial period, focus on the benef its of Imperial ism, 
including the provision of health services, communications and 
peaceful conditions (Griffiths, 1952; Anstey, 1926; Davis, 1951). 
From this perspective, British rule brought peace to a sub- 
continent racked by many local wars and a decline in public order 
as the Moghal Empire collapsed. In addition, the provision of 
railways, roads, canals and trade was seen as leading to 
improvements in living standards and economic security. Social 
infrastructure included health services, based on 'scientific' 
medicine to replace what was seen as 'medieval' medicine or 
superstition. Famine policy - the provision of jobs and relief in 
times of scarcity - could also be seen as a major benefit of 
Imperial rule, leading to major savings of life. 
Many of the apologists are guilty of the opposite failings 
to those of the critics - assuming the significance of health 
services because they were provided at all, rather than assessing 
their real contribution. It is too easy to assume that health 
services are an unmitigated 'good', and that 'the natives' were 
living in benighted squalor before they received the benefit of 
such 'civilising' influences as education or medicine. The 
temptation to ignore both the positive aspects of existing 
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institutions, and the contribution made by foreign rule to the 
squalor, was one which few of the British avoided after the 
1820's or the 1830's. Prior to that period, there were 
influential 'orientalists', who made efforts to learn Sanskrit 
and to find valuable aspects of Hindu culture to preserve and 
pass on. The loss of their influence over British ruling ideology 
seems to have been almost total, and only isolated commentators 
(Leitner, 1882.; Digby, 190 1) stand out against the complacent 
assessments of British superiority. 
My response to this debate - an attempt to assess the 
validity of the two major viewpoints - will be provided by the 
following three chapters, by looking for answers to three 
interrelated questions: 
- what happened to the health of the population in this period? 
- how did British rule affect the indigenous ways of coping with 
illness, with local medical systems and their practitioners? 
- and how successful were attempts made by the British to provide 
medical care and public health services? 
Chapter 1 thus focuses on the history of the Indian 
population under Imperial rule, with a particular concern to 
isolate evidence about mortality and, where possible, morbidity. 
The next chapter will concentrate on the specific nature of the 
indigenous healing traditions and the way they were affected by 
Imperial rule. In Chapter 3I will describe the development of 
the Indian Medical Service, and patterns of financial 
expenditure, and more detailed discussion of the nature of health 
services provided by the British will be considered in Chapter 4. 
In each case I will focus on the period after 1800, when more 
information is available and reliable, and the impact of British 
rule (as opposed to trade or conquest) was more established. 
In the Conclusion to Part AI shall deal with the more 




HEALTH STATUS IN INDIA BEFORE 1947 
A. 
"Another by-product of British rule which served to 
worsen the position of the peasantry was the increase in 
population. .. In the years since (1880) the population has increased considerably. The amount of land available 
to the average peasant family has become less. Because 
of the competition for land, the landowners and money- 
lenders have been able to make the peasants agree to 
more and more onerous terms for the use of the soil and 
of credit" (Thorner and Thorner, 1962: 109-10) 
This chapter will consider the available information on the 
course of mortality and morbidity changes during Imperial rule. 
After a consideration of what can be said about the more direct 
indicators of health status - morbidity and mortality statistics 
and population changes -I will deal with indirect indicators of 
health status. ' The more important of these are patterns of life- 
chances and their distribution (changes in the class structure 
and the distribution of income and wealth); living patterns (the 
rise of towns, other changes in labour migration); environmental 
changes (the effect of the introduction of canals in particular); 
and the impact of general programmes and policies followed by the 
Government of India (in particular, to mitigate the effects of 
famine). These will form the topics of the following sections. 
My argument will be as follows. It is tempting to claim that 
the decisive shift in population dynamics can be dated from 1921 
(because the following decades have seen a steadily rising growth 
in population caused by a declining death rate). However, arguing 
in this way leads to two problems: firstly, the 1920s and 1930s 
are periods of recession, when almost all commentators agree that 
living standards fell; and secondly, it misleadingly suggests 
that medical services were an important contributor to the shift. 
I would argue one problem is caused by the focus on all-India 
patterns, and that the decisive shift probably occurred in stages 
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over the preceding 40 years. After 1880, there are three major 
disasters which disguise the extent of the shift: plague; the 
1896-1900 famine (which was affected by the plague epidemic); and 
the influenza epidemic of 1919-20. It is obviously not legitimate 
to 'ignore' these events, but the population history of some 
areas which did not suffer from them lends some support to this 
argument. If this argument is accepted, it would suggest that 
neither the 'Pax Brittanica' nor public health services played 
much part in the decline in mortality (as Davis, 1951, argued), 
but that the crucial factors were the control over famine-related 
mortality which British policy had mostly achieved by 1880, and 
the rising real incomes of the mass of the population in the last 
quarter of the 19th century. 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY BEFORE 1947 
The first substantial and reliable censuses in India were 
held around the middle of the 19th century, with the first 
attempt at an All-India census between 1869 and 1872. Decennial 
censuses for the whole country taken at one point in time date 
from 1881 , and while they provide outstandingly good information 
compared to many other countries they are only reasonably 
reliable. Their main weakness is underenumeration, usually not 
random but larger for some age-groups than for others, for some 
areas than for others, or of women more than of men: estimating 
the extent of this is a tricky and inexact art (Visaria, 1971). 
The other demographic sources are much less valuable: the 
registration of births and deaths, which started in the main 
cities at about the same time, has yet to reach an acceptable 
quality, so changes in recorded rates may reflect changes in 
coverage rather than changes in underlying processes. Not until 
1968 are there more reliable estimates of mortality and 
fertility, derived from the Sample Registration Scheme, 
instituted by the Government of India in the mid-1960's when the 
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inadequacy of the National Sample Survey became obvious. 
Similarly, for the period I am considering here, evidence about 
causes of death have to be inferred from small surveys or from 
special collections of figures during epidemics, for example of 
plague or cholera. Even now, the Model Registration Scheme, which 
is the main current official source of information about causes 
of death, provides estimates known to be seriously inadequate, 
and other sources of information (such as hospital in-patient 
statistics) report on a very small and atypical sample of deaths. 
For estimates of population totals, and of mortality and 
fertility levels prior to 1871 there is considerable dispute 
about the interpretation of sketchy information (Morris, 1974). 
For my purposes (to assess population changes in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries) I need an estimate of the total 
population, mortality and fertility rates in 1800. There are two 
basic methods used to do this: to extrapolate forwards from 1600, 
or backwards from 1871. The sources for 1600 are Akbar's revenue 
collection documents (the used by writers from 
Moreland (1920: 22) onwards. Habib (1982) has recently argued 
plausibly that Moreland's original figure for all-India (100 
million) was an underestimate, probably by as much as 50%. 
Habib's revised estimate of about 140-150 million seems a 
reasonable figure. But what happened to the population between 
1600 and 1800? 
Das Gupta and his colleagues (1972) produced an influential 
estimate of 154 million for the area of present-day India in 
1800, arguing that the growth in population was largely between 
1600 and 1675, with little growth from 1675 to 1800. Using 
Habib's revised 1600 figure, this would generate an estimate for 
1800 of 190-220 million. But there is little evidence to support 
this line of argument. It seems that there are no grounds for 
any particular set of assumptions. Others have argued that 
it is 
only possible to work back from 1871 , and to ensure 
that the 
implications for the period between 1600 and 1871 are reasonable. 
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Writers following this line of enquiry have produced a 
variety of estimates for 1800. Davis (1951) assumed a population 
in 1800 of around 125 million, by trebling an estimate for 
British territories then of 4l million. But as he notes himself, 
in order to make this compatible with his corrected 1871 Census 
figure of 255 million, it is necessary to assume quite dramatic 
increases in population from about 18+5. The estimates produced 
by Das Gupta (1972) assume less substantial population growth in 
the 19th century, of around 0.4% per year. This is the result of 
using the same regional growth rates for the area of present-day 
India as those which occurred between 1 871 and 1921 , and produces 
a figure for 1800 of 154 million for what is now India. Morris 
(1974) has used much the same technique for the whole sub- 
continent, extrapolating backwards from 1871 using the average 
annual rate of growth of population between 1871 and 1921 
(0.36%), giving an 1800 population of 197 million; and 
Mahalonobis and Bhattacharya (1972) by different methods produce 
an estimate of 207 million. 
As Cassen (1978: 3) notes, neither kind of estimate can be 
regarded as precise, and all should be treated sceptically. 
Visaria and Visaria (1983: 464) also note that more recent 
estimates of population in 1800 are much higher than the earlier 
ones. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the population of all- 
India in 1800 was between 190 and 210 million. This means that in 
the preceding 200 years, population might have grown only slowly 
and unevenly, by as much as one-third overall. The implication of 
the second kind of estimate is that 19th century population 
history mirrored that of 1871-1921, in which growth remained 
uneven but was at a higher average rate, rising by between 25% 
and 33% in only 70 years. 
It is usually argued that in populations like this, the key 
determinant of population changes is change in the mortality 
rate. There might be short-term fluctuations in fertility (caused 
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by famines and epidemics affecting the numbers of married couples 
in the reproductive age groups and so on) but it seems unlikely 
that there would have been a substantial rise in fertility. If we 
want to make estimates about mortality and fertility between 1800 
and 1870, we have only the data derived from the censuses after 
1871 (and more insubstantial material from 1851) to use as a 
guide (see Table 1). 
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TABLE 1 
POPULATION FIGURES FOR INDIA, 1871-1941 
Year Population Crude Birth Crude Death Life Expectancy (millions) Rate Rate a t Birth Gujral Davis Males Females 
1851 224 
1861 241 
1 871 253 255 
1881 258 257 
n. a. n. a. 24 26 
1891 282 282 
49 41 25 26 
46 44 24 24 
1901 285 285 
48 43 23 23 1911 303 
149 49 19 21 
1921 306 
46 36 27 27 
1931 338 
45 31 32 31 
1941 389 
Source: Gujral (1973); Davis, (1951: 36,62 & 69). 
These figures are for what is now India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
The general argument, then, is that from 1800 to 1921 India 
had high birth rates (fluctuating to a small extent but over 40 
per 1000 population in most years) and high death rates 
(fluctuating much more, sometimes above and sometimes below 40 
per 1000 population). The peaks in mortality are particularly 
associated with drought and famine conditions. In more 'normal' 
years, mortality was more affected by endemic diseases and poor 
living standards. 
In the years when mortality was exceptionally high there 
shortages of food interacted with disease: in many cases a famine 
was followed by an epidemic whose effect is magnified by the 
malnutrition suffered by vulnerable groups in the preceding year. 
Drought and famine rarely affected the whole of the country. 
Mitra (1978: 11,764-818) lists droughts and famines reported 
between 1729 and 1973. From the 1830s on (when reporting 
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improved) a famine, scarcity or drought is reported from 
somewhere in the country every three years or so. It has been 
argued for Bengal in particular, and for India as a whole to a 
lesser extent, that the frequency of famines in the nineteenth 
century was much higher than in the preceding period, with the 
worst experience being the fifty years after 1860 (Bhatia, 1967). 
Widespread and severe famines and droughts occurred in 1877 and 
1878; in 1897 and 1898 (accompanied by an epidemic of plague); 
and in 1919 and 1920 (preceded by the influenza epidemic). This 
seems to mark a watershed: after 1921 there is only the Bengal 
famine of 1943 to compare with these earlier disasters. 
Sen's recent detailed re-analysis of excess mortality after 
the Bengal famine clarifies the kinds of processes involved (Sen, 
1980). The famine, and deaths directly and obviously from 
starvation, were over by November 1 9L 3, but mortality from 
malaria, smallpox and to a lesser extent cholera continued at 
above normal levels for the next three years or so. Of the excess 
mortality registered between 1943 and 19 46,37% was attributed to 
malaria. Thus Sen argues that official estimates were little more 
than half the famine-related deaths, because people in the later 
stages of malnutrition may contract diseases from which they then 
are recorded as dying. The concept of 'excess mortality' is hard 
to define, but in general it would seem that famines expand 
mortality partly by helping to turn endemic diseases into 
epidemic ones. (The exception in India, but not apparently in 
Europe, is that tuberculosis deaths do not normally rise during 
and after famines. It is not clear why this should be so. ) 
Famines also affect sanitary arrangements and water supplies, and 
diseases spread more easily as desperate populations (usually the 
men) search the countryside for work, and public health services 
break down (ibid: Z05). 
These patterns account to some extent for the peaks of 
mortality, but the generally high level had more to do with 
malaria - possibly accounting for one death 
in five at the end of 
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the nineteenth century and after (Klein, 1973). A variety of 
respiratory diseases (pulmonary tuberculosis, pneumonia, 
bronchitis) may have been the next largest contributor to 
mortality, and then the digestive tract diseases, of diarrhoea, 
dysentery, cholera. Probably as many as 10 million people died 
from plague in the 20 years after 1896 when it spread from 
Bombay. 
As with other similarly poor populations, infants 
contributed most to the mortality levels and were particularly 
vulnerable to most of these diseases mentioned. The estimates of 
infant mortality suggest a figure over 250 per 1000 live births 
in the 19th century, falling to around 160 to 200 by 1941 
(Visaria and Visaria, 1982). In general, most estimates suggest 
lower infant and early childhood mortality rates for females than 
for males, even in North India (where female infanticide was 
practised amongst some groups until the 1870s, and where the 
neglect of female children remains more common than in South 
India). But of those who survived childhood, at each age women 
were more likely to die than were men (Visaria and Visaria, 
1983: 498-500). During the peaks of mortality, the reverse was 
often the case, for reasons not yet clear (Mitra, 1978; Sen, 
1980) . 
It is difficult to assess the variations in mortality rates 
by social groups. It is probable that, as usual, the poor 
suffered more than the relatively wealthy, but in India in this 
period records were kept (if at all) by caste or community not by 
wealth or income. In Bombay and Calcutta in the 1880's and 1890's 
(when mortality figures were kept with some degree of accuracy) 
in normal periods the registered crude death rates of the low 
castes were about 50% above those of the clean caste Hindus, or 
twice the European rates. But in the periods of famine and 
epidemic the lower castes suffered catastrophically. As late as, 
1920 low caste Hindus in Bombay had a registered crude death rate 
of 120 per 1000, compared with figures for other categories 
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ranging from 25 (for Europeans) to 41 (for non-Brahman clean 
caste Hindus) (Klein, 1973). Not surprisingly, the class most 
likely to appear for famine relief services was that of the 
agricultural labourer, often Harijan in caste, and some of the 
village artisans, especially weavers (Bhatia, 1967: 10-11). 
The evidence suggests, then, that in the Indian sub- 
continent as a whole, mortality levels were lower during the 
first century or so of British dominance than previously. 
However, any tendency for mortality to decline was halted during 
the 1890s (usually associated with the plague and famines of 
1896-1900) and the 1910s (usually explained by the influenza 
epidemic of 1919-20. Other factors have also been used to help 
explain the higher mortality at the end of the 19th century, 
notably the argument that the potency of some epidemic diseases - 
especially malaria - seemed to rise in this period. After 1921, 
by contrast, mortality falls quite dramatically. 
Before accepting this overall picture too easily, however, 
it is necessary to point out that the apparently straightforward 
national pattern is made up of quite varied local ones. Some 
local patterns are complicated by the results of administrative 
decisions - the siting of cantonments, or the choice of a railway 
route, might dramatically affect the population of one district 
as compared with another. In all cases, migration has a greater 
potential significance for total population the smaller the unit 
studied. It is now generally argued that there was considerable 
short-distance or short-term mobility from the eighteenth century 
onwards. After 1860 there was substantial longer-distance and 
longer-term mobility (e. g. to tea plantations, or as indentured 
labour abroad), which affected some regions (notably Chota 
Nagpur, Punjab, Gujarat, South India) more than others (Tinker, 
197-) . 
Census commissioners dealing with provincial variations in 
population histories often failed to discern any clear pattern: 
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in some cases the districts which grew in population were the 
most densely populated to begin with, while elsewhere there was 
an expansion of cropped land to account for population growth. 
The attempt to distinguish changes from other 
demographic changes in smaller areas is almost hopeless. Some 
long-term studies of individual districts or villages give an 
idea of the range involved. In Indapur taluka, near Poona, the 
population rose steadily between settlements of land revenue in 
1835-36,1865-66 and 1895-96, showing a rise of 65% in the 60 
years (Kumar, 1968: 302). Yet this area was particularly badly hit 
by the influenza epidemic, and the population which had risen by 
almost a further 20% by 1911 was recorded at the same level in 
1931. Vilyatpur, in Punjab, was relatively densely populated even 
in the nineteenth century, and the population rose steadily from 
1855 to 1891 before falling until 1931 and rising again 
thereafter. Kessinger (1974: 85-93) suggests that the population 
decline was largely accounted for by emigration, though there 
were also epidemics of cholera in 1892, plague in 1897-98,1903 
and 1915, and influenza in 1918. 
These local variations are not restricted to the area of 
British India. In the Princely States, those parts of India left 
under indirect rule, population changes seem roughly comparable 
with the surrounding British areas. There are, however, major 
exceptions, especially in the States of Travancore and Cochin - 
an exception with particular current interest since in this part 
of India (roughly the modern state of Kerala) mortality and 
fertility rates are currently much below the levels in the rest 
of India. As Table 2 shows, one of the two other sizeable South 
Indian Princely States - Mysore - and part of Hyderabad (the 
Eastern Telengana) show similar patterns. The other part of 
Hyderabad (the Southern Mahratwara) has population changes closer 
to those of India as a whole, declines in population between 1891 
and 1 901 , and again between 
1911 and 1 921 . 
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TABLE 2 
POPULATION GROWTH IN PRINCELY SOUTH INDIA, 1871 TO 1941 
State Population in millions 
1 871 1 881 1 891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 
Cochin *0.60 0.60 0.72 0.81 0.92 0.98 1.21 1.42 
Hyderabad -_ Telengana 4.3 5.2 5.4 6.7 6.4 7.5 n. a. Mahratwara 5.5 6.3 5.7 6.6 6.1 6.9 n. a. 
Mysore 5.1 4.2 4.9 5.5 5.8 6.0 6.6 7.3 
Travancore *2.3 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.4 4.0 5.1 6.1 
Sources: Decennial Census reports. 
*The Cochin and Travancore census was held in 1875 not 1871. 
It would seem that the transition to declining mortality 
patterns took place much earlier in Mysore, the Telengana region 
of Hyderabad, Travancore and Cochin than it did in the rest of 
India. After making allowances for under-enumeration Rayappa and 
Prabakhara, (1 981 : 2018-3 1) estimated that the population of 
Travancore rose by over 1 0% in every decade after 1 881 , and by 
nearly 25% in the decade 1921-1931. They attributed only a small 
part of this rise to net immigration. The Cochin rises are only 
slightly less dramatic, while for Mysore the steady overall 
increase is held down by population decline in some areas in the 
forested hills in the West of the State - the 'malnad' - where 
malaria and continuing poverty made recovery from famines a slow 
affair. Over the 60 years from 1891 to 1951 , total population 
growth in this area was only about 2%, compared with over 50% in 
the rest of the State (U. N., 1961: 13-14) 
The idea of a 'national' pattern to population change is 
thus suspect. This is partly due to ecological variation - 
different impacts of epidemic diseases such as plague or 
influenza depending on climate or distance from the source of its 
introduction into India. But there are also sources of variation 
which seem more social in character, and it is some of these that 
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I shall now consider. 
THE EFFECTS OF BRITISH RULE ON INCOME LEVELS 
This is one of the most contested areas in modern Indian 
economic and social history, and there was a major debate on the 
issue in the 1960's which left the question unresolved (Morris et 
al. 1972), and has given rise to a further substantial debate 
(Heston, 1982). There are several necessary elements in the 
analysis, all of which are difficult to assess and all show 
considerable regional variation. Firstly there is total output 
(in particular, agricultural output) over the period, affected by 
the growth of industry, changes in productivity, changes in 
cropping patterns and extensions of cropped area and so on. Then 
there is the distribution of the income generated by this output 
-a distribution between the State (which transmitted some of its 
share to Britain) and the local population, and within the local 
population, affected by changes in patterns of rights and 
obligations with respect to the land. Then there 
_are 
changes in 
the form of the output - the rise in cash crops, changing exports 
and imports, shifts between different sectors of the economy and 
between rural and urban settings, or between the different 
regions, for example. In one shorthand, we would need to 
comprehend the changes in the forces and relations of production 
in India over this period of 150 years in order to begin to 
assess their likely impact on the health of the Indian 
population. Thus per capita income is a crude indicator of 
changes in levels of living, but it is still potentially the 
indicator which allows for the most useful comparisons between 
the beginning of the 19th century and the early 20th century, and 
is perhaps the place to start. 
The 'classical' view (as Morris terms it) of changes in per 
capita income in the period 1800 to 1947 is that it was stagnant 
or declined (Morris, 1970). One example is Mukherj i's pioneering 
work, which goes back no further than 1857: while it cannot be 
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regarded as a final statement, his conclusions appear to have 
some general validity. They are that real incomes did rise 
between about 1860 and about 1885, with some decline thereafter 
until around 1900, when a further rise took place until about 
1925, followed by stagnation and a further period of decline from 
about 1940 to 1950 (Mukher j i, 1965: 700-02). 
However, the main problem of this form of estimate is that 
it relies on crop statistics provided by officials who had little 
interest in the subject, little support and no training. Blyn's 
work depends heavily on these figures, from which he derives a 
series for the gross availability of foodgrains which rises 
during the 1890's but is stable from then until Indian 
Independence - thus implying a steady decline in per capita 
availability from 1921 onwards (Blyn, 1961: 285). It is not clear 
whether these estimates can be regarded as varying randomly, or 
whether there might be consistent tendencies for which allowances 
could be made (Dewey, 1978: 304; Chaudhuri, 1979). Dewey, perhaps 
the harshest critic of the use of these figures, nevertheless 
suggests that the regional variations disguised by the national 
figures can be meaningful, in drawing attention to deteriorating 
conditions in Bihar and steady expansion in Punjab, for example 
(Dewey, 1978: 314; see also Charlesworth, 1982). Some have argued 
that the harshness of the criticism is unwarranted, at least in 
certain regions for certain purposes: thus Islam (1978) uses 
these sources for his study of Bengal, and Mishra (1983) argues 
that the statistics for Bombay are more reliable than Dewey and 
others have suggested. Blyn's figures in Table 3 must therefore 
be used very cautiously, but they suggest the extent of the 
possible regional variation. 
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TABLE 3 
AVERAGE CHANGE IN PER CAPITA ALL CROP OUTPUT FROM 1896/7-1906/7 TO 1936/7-1946-7 IN BRITISH INDIA AND REGIONS 
Average 
Region 1896/7 1936/7 
-1906/7 -1946/7 % change Rs Rs 
Greater Bengal 41.6 32.5 -22.0 
United Provinces 37.1 36.7 - 1.0 
Madras 37.0 37.6 + 1.5 
Greater Punjab 34.4 42.3 +23.0 
Bombay-Sind 38.7 40.7 +10.5 
Central Provinces 58.0 42.9 -26.0 
BRITISH INDIA 41.5 32.5 -21.7 
Source: Blyn, 1961: 309. 
Greater Bengal includes Bihar, Orissa and Assam; Greater Punjab 
includes North West Frontier Province and Delhi. 
However, once again this aggregated picture needs to be 
looked at more carefully. Thus for Bengal, Islam agrees with Blyn 
that most of the decline in per capita output described above was 
attributable to declines in Bihar and Orissa (1978: 201). Within 
Bengal, very different patterns of per capita crop output seem to 
characterise the area round Calcutta, and Rajshahi region, (where 
official figures indicated there was an increase from 1920/24 to 
1940/44 of over 20%), from the patterns which affected the 
Burdwan and Chittagong regions, (where there were declines of 
about 20%)(ibid: 52). Islam revises these figures and reduces 
them by about 20% in each case, giving a picture of stability in 
the Calcutta and Ra j shahi regions, and around a 40% decline in 
Burdwan and Chittagong (ibid. ). 
These changes in average income need to be complemented by 
an account of changes in its distribution. One well established 
view is that processes of polarization took place during the 
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nineteenth century , impoverishing the small landholders and thus 
expanding the rural proletariat. This process was assisted by the 
destruction of handicraft manufacturing under competition from 
Lancashire textiles and Birmingham metalworks. It is also argued 
that the State took an increasing share of the output of the 
land, and that the share remaining with actual cultivators was 
further reduced by larger shares going to those groups with a 
variety of higher rights in the land. Landlord classes were 
protected by a legal and State system which buttressed their 
position and led to a great growth in intermediate holders of 
rights in the land, with the position of the cultivator 
stagnating and the number of landless labourers growing where 
there were few before (Thorner and Thorner, 1962: 109). 
The alternative view which Morris propounded in 1963 and 
which has found increasing support in different ways, is that 
regional variations were considerable; that there is evidence of 
considerable numbers of landless labourers in the pre-British 
periods and little sign of a proportional increase in the 
nineteenth century; and that during that period the rise in total 
output and the increasing commercialisation of the economy 
suggests a rise in real per capita income which was not 
restricted to the landholding classes (Morris, 1963). In the 
early twentieth century it is more likely that stagnation in real 
levels of output and a rise in the population after 1921 did mean 
that real incomes fell, and the condition of the lower groups 
deteriorated markedly (Heston, 1982). Thus Islam suggests that in 
Bengal, yields for subsistence crops hardly changed, nor did the 
acreage devoted to them, whereas there was considerable 
fluctuation in the acreage devoted to cash crops (which adjusted 
to profitability) and substantial increases in their yields. One 
implication of his conclusion is that the population dependent on 
these subsistence crops saw its living standards stagnate or 
decline, and only landlords able to take advantage of the land 
pressure and the uncertain urban markets were likely to have 
experienced a rise in real incomes (1978: 201-3). 
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Similarly, in one area where per capita agricultural output 
seems to have risen (Bombay), it seems likely that these benefits 
went largely to the landed peasants. Kumar (1965: 318-30) 
describes how, under the Peshwa rule which the British overthrew 
in 1818, differences in levels of living were rare, at least 
among the clean castes. Under British rule, processes of 
differentiation developed, and the landed peasants came under the 
dominance of urban moneylenders. However, after the Deccan Riots 
of 1875 the State increasingly protected their position, but in 
ways which only the relatively wealthy could take advantage of - 
restraint on land transfers, new co-operative institutions, and 
so on. The rising real output of the 20th century could thus be 
seen as a result of the final establishment of substantial 
farmers with access to credit, security of tenure and so on - 
probably the group who in turn benefited most from this growth. 
Charlesworth has recently suggested that patterns of 
inequality in rural India could show rises in the early period of 
commercialisation (as the Leninist model predicts) but that the 
increasing labour demand for crops like cotton or sugar could 
keep rural wage rates rising in real terms. This pattern, he 
suggests, characterises the Bombay Presidency, with the heyday of 
the rich peasant in the period from 1880 to 1914, and equalising 
tendencies becoming more dominant in the 1920's (1977: 19) But in 
some areas (notably Punjab) per capita incomes may have continued 
to rise, in a society with a relatively egalitarian distribution 
of resources and sufficient mobility that the really poor were 
likely to have benefited as well - as in Vilyatpur (Kessinger, 
197+). On the other hand, using data on the distribution of 
landholdings, Dharma Kumar suggests very little change in 
inequality in South India over a longer period, from 1880 to 1951 
(1965) 
. 
Most of the historical discussion has been concerned with 
changes in agricultural, or agriculturally-dependent, incomes 
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under British rule. We know much less about the non-agricultural 
workforce of pre-British times, nor what long-term impact was 
created by British rule. Habib (1982) argues that under the 
Mughals in North India, the urban population was considerable, 
perhaps as much as 15% of the total, and that this declined 
relatively little until British rule was established. But one 
effect of stable British rule was to reduce the population which 
had depended on the urban nobility. He thus argues that the urban 
proportion probably began to decline about 1800, till it reached 
the 9% recorded in 1891. Dharma Kumar (1965) accepts that in 
South India too there may have been a decline in the numbers of 
non-agricultural workers, and that they were forced back into 
agriculture. However, since there was still an uncultivated 
margin of land at the time, they did not necessarily become 
landless labourers. 
Within this urban population some categories did begin to 
grow earlier than 1 891 , despite the overall decline. While the 
industrial workforce of India has still not reached more than a 
very small portion of the labour force, there was some steady 
growth in numbers from about 1860 onwards, with the establishment 
of cotton and jute textile mills. Morris (1970) argues that even 
before this an expansion in the domestic market for textiles may 
have been sufficient to compensate for the loss of export markets 
and the intrusion of Manchester textiles. Material on real wage 
rates for the industrial workforce in these new industries 
suggests stability over a fairly long period, but as in Europe, 
conditions for the new urban labour force were often appalling 
(see further below). 
The problems of attempting to assess changes in real income 
are considerable. However, there is one feature which stands out 
about the conflicting accounts. In the period (1860-1920) when 
per capita incomes were either declining (as Mukherji, 1965, 
argues) or rising (as Morris, 196 and Heston, 1982 argue) 
mortality rates appear to have been fairly stable. But in the 
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period (1 920-1 950) when even the latter authors accept that 
income levels probably fell, mortality rates also, apparently, 
fell rapidly. A regional analysis is not much more helpful, 
partly because output data for the Princely States is not 
available. But areas like Central India, where per capita incomes 
were falling, grew as fast in the 1920s and 1930s as did Western 
India (Bombay-Sind, in Table 3 above), where per capita incomes 
were rising (Visaria and Visaria, 1983: )490; 505). We therefore 
have to look elsewhere to understand how this might have 
occurred. 
CHANGES IN LIVING PATTERNS 
The main change in living patterns which accompanied British 
rule was the changing nature of the urban centres, and (after 
about 1900) their increasing significance. At some times British 
policy inhibited urbanisation - in the aftermath of the Mutiny, 
for example, they operated a deurbanisation policy in Delhi as 
ferocious as that attributed to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 
(Klein, 1973). But the colonial cities - Bombay and Calcutta are 
the prime examples - grew steadily, as did the new industrial 
towns like Kanpur, Ahmedabad, or Howrah. Here mortality rates 
were high, not only because of the crowded, unhygienic conditions 
where workers lived and worked, but also because of the problems 
of water supply and sanitation. Filtered water was introduced 
from the end of 1869 in Calcutta, and made a steady impact on 
mortality from cholera, dysentery and diarrhoea. Similar water 
works were introduced into other large Indian towns during the 
next few decades, spurred on by the acceptance of the 
relationship between water supply and cholera which occurred 
during the 1890's (ibid: 650). However, as Klein also points out, 
drainage systems were slower to improve, and for many towns urban 
death rates rose after water supplies were improved, as malaria, 
plague and respiratory diseases flourished in the conditions 
supported by surplus water and polluted subsoil (ibid: 651; see 
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also Chapter 3 below). 
Under British rule, the population also became more mobile: 
not only did people travel on the railways, to fairs and 
religious festivals, but they were also transported some distance 
to work - and often tr ansported bac k again. The short-term 
movements were generally held to have increased the problems of 
controllin ga number of communicable d iseases, of which cholera 
and plague were the most notable. 
Of the longer term movements, the most notable and sizeable 
was that of workers to the new tea estates of Assam and 
Darjeeling, and to a smaller extent, South India. 'Coolie labour' 
was hired in Chhota Nagpur or other parts of Central India, taken 
to Calcutta and thence up river to Assam in conditions which 
ranged from little short of murderous in the 1860's and 1870's to 
merely hazardous by the 1920's (Griffiths, 1968). Conditions on 
the estates themselves were little better: conditions were 
appalling, even by local standards, and mortality rates were high 
at least until the 19140's (Rege, 1945). Similarly horrendous 
losses of life in coal mining (another industry dependent on 
migrant labour in the early period) made it and tea the 
industries in which the State first intervened to insist on the 
provision of adequate medical facilities; but there is little 
evidence that this did much to reduce mortality before 
Independence (ý" O. L., 1946). 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES INTRODUCED BY IMPERIALISM 
The major impact of Imperialism on the face of India came in 
the construction of roads and railways for communication, and 
canals for irrigation. In each case the goal was at least partly 
developmental, though railway construction was also affected 
strongly by strategic considerations. In some parts of India the 
effect of these improvements was to increase agricultural 
production dramatically, and to make some areas habitable where a 
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shortage of water or poor drainage had made cultivation otherwise 
impossible - as in the Canal Colonies of the Punjab or the Terai 
in the foothills of the Himalayas. 
But canals and improved communications also probably had 
negative effects on health and population size - an early case of 
the 'development diseases' discussed by Hughes and Hunter (1970) 
for Africa but first systematically described by C. A. Bentley 
between 1907 and 1925 (Klein, 1972). Bentley, the Director of 
Public Health for Bengal, noted that areas which had been known 
for their healthy environment in the early 19th century were 
infamous for being malarious by the end of the century. His 
argument was that canals and roadworks obstructed normal surface 
drainage, leaving pools of stagnant water after the monsoon which 
were ideal for the breeding of mosquitoes. In addition, the 
labour gangs who constructed these engineering works were a 
concentrated susceptible population large enough to take the 
disease with them as they moved on. For the United Provinces 
(U. P. ) Ira Klein takes this argument further and suggests that 
the deterioration in water supply and drainage laid the 
foundations for plague and cholera which ravaged the area in the 
latter part of the 19th century (ibid. ). Indeed, Whitcombe notes 
that canal construction in Western U. P. was halted for a while in 
the early 1850's because of the dramatic increase in 'fever' 
which accompanied them. Although preventive measures were taken 
before starting again, the districts watered by the Upper Ganges 
Canal experienced higher mortality for many years than did 
neighbouring districts which remained unirrigated, probably 
because the canals produced waterlogging and stagnant pools where 
mosquitoes bred easily. These costs were not foreseen to begin 
with, though they were increasingly understood, but the appeal of 
the benefits of higher productivity seem to have overcome the 
caution of those who stressed the costs. 
In general, the changing geography of malaria is by far the 
most striking example of a 'development disease' in the Indian 
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context. Malaria followed the march of the canals into Punjab in 
the 18140's as well as in the later developments after 1890; it 
made several districts in western and central Bengal lose 
population in the fifty years between 1 871 and 1 921 , as did 
several districts in U. P., and most of these districts had some 
villages almost totally destroyed by the scourge. Klein (1972) 
summarises this pattern as follows: 
"The spectacle of a great swathe of territory, highly 
organised economically, traversed by modern 
communication, suffering no local wars, and experiencing 
an extremely high birth rate, yet remaining static in 
population, reveals compellingly the British inability 
to effect any dramatic change in the balance between 
life, economic conditions, and nature. " (p. 13) 
South India did not apparently suffer in the same way. Here 
canals were less important, and they took different forms. The 
canals in the Madras Presidency were on a much smaller scale, 
leading to far less water-logging, and there is little evidence 
of changes in the location of malaria. Population growth in the 
South may have been hindered more by emigration (to Ceylon, 
Burma, the West Indies, and Malaya) than by continuing high death 
rates. 
SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS TO CONTROL FAMINES 
Over and above the general attempts to improve agriculture, 
especially through canal-building, the Government of India and 
the provincial governments made specific attempts to mitigate the 
impact of harvest failure. This took a variety of forms: land 
revenue assessments could be reduced or set aside when crops 
failed (though they may have been less willing to do this than 
were the Moghuls); foodgrains were imported from surplus areas; 
and there were other attempts to minimise social disruption and 
maintain services. In addition, the growth of communications, 
especially the railways, helped to provide market mechanisms 
which minimised the impact of food shortages. On the other side 
of the coin is the possibility that in some areas pauperisation, 
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commercialisation and increasing revenue demands from the State 
were helping to generate the very problems which these provisions 
were supposed to mitigate. 
Perhaps the most significant move was the use of public 
works as a famine relief measure, in which the poor were offered 
work at rates which were reckoned to be sufficient to sustain 
them until the return of normal employment prospects, or until 
their usual patrons were once again in a position to support them 
(Kynch, 1985). In general, official policy was to limit the 
numbers and classes of people on relief works, to restrict the 
beneficiaries to the 'really' needy (Klein, 198+; McAlpin, 
1983: 178). The one major exception was the Bihar and Bengal 
famine of 1873, when an attempt was made to prevent all famine- 
related deaths; the cost of this attempt was the main argument 
used against a repetition (Klein, 1984). In addition, gratuitous 
relief was provided, to varying degrees and of varying 
quantities, to those unable to work. Governments were under 
pressure to limit their total expenditure and were wary of the 
'demoralising' effects of charity. A third strand in famine 
relief was the granting of takavi loans, at low interest and easy 
repayments, to allow peasants to employ labour on improvements to 
their farms (well-digging, etc. ). There was a general 
unwillingness to intervene in the market for grains, after the 
expense involved when this was done in 1873, but officials noted 
how the spread of railways tended to permit private marketing 
arrangements to reduce local shortages (McAlpin, 1983: 184-5). 
There is some uncertainty about the demographic consequences 
of these changes. Davis estimates 19 million excess deaths in 
1891-1901 due to famine, by comparing actual population growth in 
the decade with the average growth of the 1880s and 1900s. 
However, he admits that official estimates of famine deaths in 
1896-1901 (the famine years in this decade) were only about 5 
million; and even recalculating crude death rates to allow for 
underenumeration only raises this figure by a million or so 
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(Davis, 1951: 39; Klein, 1984: 211-2). The famines of the 1870's 
and the 1890's do not seem to have received the same degree of 
careful reconstruction of likely mortality which Sen has provided 
for Bengal, but McAlpin's figures for Bombay for 1891-1901 
suggest that famine and plague together account for a populatidn 
loss of about 1 million (in a total population of 15 million) 
with famine accounting for 80% of the reduction (1983: 80). Since 
Bombay accounted for between 15 and 25% of the population 
affected by famine in this decade, Davis' estimate of 19 million 
deaths seems extreme. On the other hand, there was a general 
tendency for British officials to underestimate the impact of 
famines by using too early a cut-off date and by ignoring the 
excess mortality in epidemics which followed most famines (see 
above). 
McAlpin (1983: 218) produces, for Bombay, the most 'positive' 
account of the effect of Imperial rule on the control of famines. 
She argues that by the end of the 19th century, famines were 
indeed a result of abnormal weather conditions (rather than the 
pauperisation resulting from British rule); that it was 
Government arrangements to prevent foodgrain shortages, to 
encourage better transport and irrigation, and then to limit 
famine-related deaths, which had the most substantial claim to 
have caused this improvement. If the experience of Bombay can be 
generalised, it would suggest that the famines of the late 1890s 
and the influenza epidemic and famine of 1919-20 were indeed 
'abnormal' disasters, and should be separated analytically from 
the earlier ones. 
SOCIAL CHANGE UNDER THE BRITISH 
The final area I want to consider is that of changes in 
behaviour which could have had health impacts. Much has been made 
in the British and European contexts of changes in such factors 
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as how often, and how well, people washed themselves; or of 
changes in human habitation patterns which meant that individuals 
had a more distant relationship with animals - no longer sharing 
houses and diseases. What evidence is there of similar changes in 
India? 
The main conclusion has to. be that for rural areas there is 
very little information; what there is must be used with care; 
but there is little sign of major changes in living patterns of 
this kind. Cassen (1978) argues that Indian levels of personal 
hygiene were probably well above those of medieval Europe, but 
there seems to be no attempt to assess how changes in the kinds 
and prices of soap or its use might have played any part in 
mortality' decline in India. Similarly, for housing, Islam 
(1978: 138) discusses the early 20th century, and notes that 
figures on occupied houses say nothing on their size, type or 
use. He assumes that in a stagnant economy with fast population 
growth there would be considerable changes in the types of houses 
over a 25 year period, to cope with higher densities of 
population, but he has no evidence for this claim, nor to suggest 
the ways in which change took place. 
Slightly more information is available for urban areas. The 
urban proportion of the population probably fell during the 19th 
century, as old-established towns (Dacca, Murshidabad, Lucknow) 
decayed and new ones (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras) grew too slowly 
to outweigh the decline elsewhere. The urban proportion in 1800 
was probably 9-10 per cent or more, and it did not exceed that 
level until 1931 or 1941 (Gadgil, 1959; Habib, 19]2). As in 
Europe, towns have a reputation for being more insanitary than 
the rural areas, and for having worse housing and diet. Mortality 
rates were probably higher in urban areas, despite having a 
population concentrated in the 'productive' age-groups, and 
relatively few females (Davis, 1951). But in some ways, the 
differences from the rural areas have been exaggerated. The 
residential densities of villages in some parts of the country 
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are nearly as high as those of urban slums, and rural 'slums' can 
be as insanitary as urban ones. 
Overall, then, it is difficult to argue that British rule 
worsened living conditions by the creation of unregulated towns. 
The towns grew only slowly, depending mostly on immigration to do 
so. While they had high death rates and bad conditions, the 
differences from the rural living conditions of most of their 
immigrants was probably minimal. Far from suggesting that urban 
conditions were bearable, this merely draws attention to the 
appalling conditions for the rural poor at the time. Since the 
contrasts in living styles between urban and rural areas are 
difficult to locate and evaluate, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that we cannot look to urbanisation for any evidence of changes 
in patterns of living during the 19th and early 20th century. 
CONCLUSION 
I started this chapter by pointing to the conundrum of 
a population rising because of declining death rates, when most 
estimates suggest not only no improvement in living standards but 
indeed a decline, caused in part by the rise in population 
itself. The answer seems to be that mortality decline should be 
seen as taking two forms: a decline in the underlying mortality 
rate (that applying in normal years); and in the peaks of 
mortality, in years when famine and epidemic diseases operated 
together. 
The decline in the mortality rate probably dates 
from the middle of the 19th century, and can be understood in 
terms of rising real incomes. The benefits provided by this 
higher standard of living was possibly sufficient to outweigh the 
income declines of the 1920s and 1930s, thus allowing for an 
increase in population growth rates from 0.3 or 0.4% per year in 
the 19th century to 1 or 1.5% per year by the 1920's and 1930's, 
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with almost all of the change accounted for by a decline in the 
death rate. The most plausible explanation for the cuts in peak 
mortality is the operation of famine policies which ensured a 
minimum income for the poor in times of scarcity. These famine 
policies, and other changes (such as the role of railways in 
moving grain) did not become fully developed until the lagt 
quarter of the 19th century. This probably helped to reduce the 
mortality rate in peak years, except for the unusual late famines 
and epidemics of 1896-1901 and 1919-20. The two processes working 
together help to explain why areas which were unaffected by these 
disasters saw unhindered population growth from the 1870s. 
However, I have not so far considered the impact of social 
arrangements specifically designed to deal with health and 
disease, which Davis (1951: 38) saw as controlling epidemic 
diseases at the same time as public disorder and famines were 
being brought under control. Chapter 2 will therefore look at the 
nature of so-called 'indigenous' medicine, and assess the 
arguments which suggest that it lost its ability to contribute to 
the control of disease as a result of British rule; while Chapters 
ama 
3/, will assess the nature of the medical services introduced by 
the British, and supposed (by colonial apologists) to have 
caused the decline of epidemic and other diseases. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INDIGENOUS MEDICINE AND THE STATE BEFORE 1947 
Every society has some healing techniques, some explanations 
of health and illness, and some members who know more about these 
things than do others. But the form these medical systems take 
are very variable. The kinds of treatments, the classifications 
of diseases, the forms of the division of medical labour, are all 
subject to social and other forces which produce very different 
results in different parts of the world. These forms, and their 
historical development in particular, are imperfectly understood. 
Medical anthropologists have developed complex ways of drawing 
links between medical and other symbolism, showing parallels 
between the structure of religious and medical belief systems, 
for example, and ways of distinguishing healers and their inter- 
relationships. These give us some understanding of the 
integration of medicine in culture now, but similar evidence for 
the past is rarely available. 
The major world literary medical traditions are those of 
Greece, India and China - all three coming from the Eurasian 
cultural systems described (by Boserup, 1970, and Goody, 1976, 
among others) as complex stratified structures, and radically 
different from African or tribal societies. This is not 
surprising, since one defining characteristic of Eurasian 
societies is the development of literacy among the elite. Many of 
the accounts of the history of medicine have been concerned only 
with the comparative assessment of these literary traditions. 
Attempts to decide which tradition borrowed from others, and 
which generated ideas; to assess which tradition has claims to 
'science'; or to decide how far core ideas spread, have been most 
prominent. 
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For Indian medicine, there are two main traditions to be 
considered - Ayurveda, associated with Hinduism, written in 
Sanskrit, and practised by vaids; and Unan-i Tibb ('the medicine 
of Greece'), associated with the Muslims, written in Persian, 
Arabic or Urdu, and practised by hakims. The major Ayurvedic 
sources consulted by historians of medicine have been the 
compilations of medical principles and therapies known as the 
Caraka-samhita and the Susruta-samhita; a third text (the 
Astanga-sa®hita, associated with Vagbhata) is often regarded as 
of less significance. Most commentators suggest that these texts 
emerged over the course of several centuries, and received a form 
which remained fairly fixed during the first 500 years A. D. For 
Unani medicine, the Qanun of Avicenna has been the main textbook, 
with commentaries and elaborations published in India in the 13th 
century A. D. and frequently reproduced and elaborated (Ullmann, 
1978: 52). These texts are primarily concerned with diagnosis and 
treatment, much like a modern medical textbook. The multitude of 
commentaries, drawing to a greater or lesser extent upon these 
classical sources, have similarly been concerned to demonstrate 
an individual author's skill and breadth of learning. Any 
indicators of the social context within which medicine was 
practised have to be winnowed very carefully from sources such as 
these. 
The major questions for a sociologist of medicine in India 
are what treatments were available for different groups of the 
population and which kinds of practitioners provided them in what 
insitutionalised ways. But the literary sources only provide a 
way of looking at the practice of high-culture, or learned 
medicine. Alternative practitioners are dismissed in these 
writings. Thus, in Susruta there are comments that the king's 
carelessness has led to quacks being able to practice; and in 
Caraka there are several sections which complain of "cheats who 
wander about on the streets boasting in the garb of physicians" 
(Kutumbiah, 1962: liii). 
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Ullmann (1978: 49), dealing with Islamic medicine, also notes 
that the names which have survived are those who doctored rulers, 
or were perhaps employed in academies. Only the large cities had 
resident doctors of this class. Yet, if current patterns are 
anything to go by, 'unofficial' practitioners, or others who did 
not claim a high status, were the major sources of medical advice 
for the mass of the population. They cannot be dismissed, as so 
often happens, as 'quacks or very ignorant doctors' (ibid. ). 
I assume that medical practice in a stratified society is 
also stratified, as well as distributed along the kind of 
continua described by Leslie (1976). Healers may be located on a 
learned-folk continuum, and on a religious-secular dimension. 
Individual careers may move some healers from one category to 
another, and clientele will tend to have different kinds of 
relationships to the different kinds of healers. The elite sector 
will include those who serve the centres of economic and 
political power, and they characteristically join the 'courts' of 
local, regional or national rulers. The rulers thus become 
patrons, with healers maintaining their positions by 
accommodating their advice to the demands of the patron, and 
defending their own positions at court by denigrating the claims 
of others (Johnson, 1972). It is the writings of these healers 
which have been collected and transmitted, often by their 
students and families when they have inherited their positions, 
but the picture they give of medical practice is inevitably 
restricted and partial. Leslie (1976: 3) argues that the complex 
reality of bone-setters, midwives, shamans and so on was 
'ideologically simplified by the distinction elaborated in the 
texts between quacks and legitimate practitioners. ' But he quotes 
no evidence to support his plausible view. Indeed, there seems to 
be very little material available for the period before the mid- 
20th century. 
In this chapter I will be less concerned with the techniques 
of Ayurvedic or Unani physicians than with attempting to portray 
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their position (and those of folk practitioners of various kinds) 
in Indian society from the early-19th century onwards. Most 
healers, especially in the literate traditions, have been assumed 
to have been male, but I will deal with female healers and 
women's access to medical care in a separate section. I will then 
look at the impact of British rule on these practitioners. Since 
the 'revival' of ®yurveda (and to a lesser extent, of Unani Tibb) 
after 1900, its supporters have claimed that a major cause of its 
decline in status and scientific standing was its loss of 
official patronage under British rule. More recently Banerjee 
(1974) has argued that village medicine was similarly destroyed 
with the collapse of village economy and society under the impact 
of commercialisation and alien rule. Assessing the validity of 
these arguments will form the conclusion of the chapter. 
INDIGENOUS MEDICINE: THE CLASSICAL TEXTS 
Ayurvedic medical thought is based on a principle of three- 
fold humors, dosas or dhatus, often translated as wind, fire and 
water or as wind, bile and phlegm. Life is in a state of health 
when these humors are balanced, and diseased when they are 
imbalanced. But individuals at different stages of the life-cycle 
are also characterised as being dominated by different humors, as 
are different times of the day, and the seasons (Jolly, 1977: 49). 
Each humor has five kinds, according particularly to where it is 
found: and much diagnosis and treatment consists in determining 
which kinds of humor are in excess or insufficiency, and in 
remedying this. For example , foods have their characteristic 
qualities, of which the most important are 'hotness' and 
'coldness', 'wetness' and 'dryness', and can thus be used to 
counteract imbalances. Other remedies include blood letting, 
inducing vomiting, using enemas, or taking in medicines by nose, 
or in the form of eye-drops. Susruta also contains sections 
describing surgical treatments. 
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The causes of humoral imbalances are manifold: not just 
errors in diet but also excesses of everyday life - too much, or 
too energetic, sexual intercourse, anger, or exertion, for 
example. Diagnosis, therefore, should cover all these possible 
causes in taking a history, or making a medical examination: but 
pulse-taking is the most prominent diagnostic tool described. The 
pulse may be taken in particular places for particular kinds of 
patients, and not just its speed but many other characteristics 
should be noted by the skilled practitioner. Prognosis is also of 
some concern, since practitioners should not treat incurable 
patients (a position scorned by late-19th century British doctors 
as unethical) : the signs for prognosis often seem more mystical 
(depending on reading omens such as the time the physician is 
called, by what kind of messenger, etc. ) than the apparently 
practical concerns of etiology and diagnosis. 
There are considerable similarities between Hindu and Greek 
medicine, and there have been a number of discussions of the 
possible means by which one might have derived from the other, or 
how they might have developed through mutual interaction 
(Baner j ee, 1 981 ; Kutumbiah, 1962). Indeed, Filliozat (1964) 
subtitles his work on Indian medicine 'Its origins and its Greek 
parallels'. From the 7th century A. D. onwards the possible 
sources of interaction are complicated by the rise of Arab 
medicine, (which provided an additional channel of 
communication), and increasing contacts with the Chinese. The 
Muslim invaders of North India from the 12th century onwards 
brought their own physicians with them, and established secular 
healing traditions as well as healers associated with the shrines 
of Muslim saints. The history of the spread of these healers, and 
their typical practices, is less well recorded than that of 
Ayurveda, but the idea of humoral balance, and the kinds of 
intervention to restore and maintain this balance, are not very 
different from those of the vaids. It is probable that both the 
pharmacopoeia and the therapeutics of Ayurveda and of Unani Tibb 
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changed as a result of the interaction between them, during the 
Mughal Empire in particular (Metcalf, 1985: 5). 
The final category of medicine often now included as 
'indigenous' is homoeopathy. This was introduced by British and 
other European doctors in the course of the 19th- century, and it 
excited strong passions: the Bengal Medical Association split and 
foundered on opposition to the reading of a homoeopathic paper. 
Homoeopathy seems to have appealed to the new urban elite as a 
'modern' system of medicine which nonetheless did not demand too 
great a break with traditional ideas, referring (as Hahnemann 
does) to vital forces and to moral powers (Bhardwaj, 1931). The 
extent to which Indian homoeopathic practitioners practised a 
'pure' version of homoeopathy, or have adapted to other dominant 
medical ideas, is unclear. By the 1960's it would seem that many 
'homoeopaths' merely used the title and the correspondence 
training as a route to registration, before using a variety of 
medical traditions in their practice (Montgomery, 1976). 
MEDICAL PERSONNEL 
'The science of life was to be studied by Brahmans, 
Kshatriyas and Vaisyas. Brahmins were to learn it for 
doing good to all creatures, Kshatriyas for self- 
preservation, and Vaisyas for gain. Susruta asserts that 
some say a Sudra of good family and character may be 
admitted as a pupil. ' (Kutumbiah, 1962: xliv) 
It is not clear how far these general statements of Caraka 
were important in defining who was admitted as a student of 
Ayurvedic medicine. Apart from scattered references to monastic 
or university education in medicine, most texts assume that the 
study of medicine involved being attached to a teacher as an 
apprentice and living as a member of his household (Kutumbiah, 
1962: xlix). This must have placed great pressure on teachers to 
admit only students of the same, or a closely related caste, 
since there would otherwise have been difficulties in the 
arrangements for eating and other close contact. Perhaps for this 
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reason, different regions tended to have dominant medical castes 
(vaidyas, a vaisya caste in Bengal, a Brahman sub-caste in Kerala 
[Zimmerman, 19781). Education, according to the classic texts, 
involved memorising a text and its comprehension, alongside 
practical experience, and it would take several years before 
students would be permitted to establish themselves separately. 
It would seem that training in Unani medicine was also carried 
out in the "personalistic, informal settings of family homes and 
apprenticeship" (Metcalf, 1985: 4), and again, quite apart from 
the need to learn Arabic, this would have tended to restrict 
Unani education to Muslims. 
Successful practitioners were those who served successful 
rulers, and either through their regular service or because of 
some special healing act, were granted an area of land (under the 
Mughals, a jagir) to support them and their families. It is not 
clear how often these grants were supposed to fund specifically 
medical activities -a dispensary, or small medical school - or 
were grants to the man and his heirs even if they ceased 
practising medicine. The British, on taking over an area, were 
prone to try to reappropriate these grants unless there were 
special circumstances which warranted their remaining. Leitner 
(1882: 152-3) campaigned on behalf of indigenous educational 
institutions in Punjab, and mentions a family of hakims in 
Kalanaur who had previously run a medical school. On the loss of 
their jagir they were reduced to a mere 4 or 5 private students. 
A family of vaids in Amritsar who had lost their jagir still ran 
a dispensary. 
Not surprisingly, the Ayurwedic texts discuss the 
appropriate behaviour of practitioners towards their king. Basham 
(1976: 31) suggests that to serve a king would have been the 
highest ambition of an enterprising vaidya. Both Susruta and 
Caraka discuss the proper status of a vaid in a king's household, 
and set out what vaids owed their king (to work for his health 
and longevity, and to refuse to treat those who hate the king or 
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are hated by him) and what they were entitled to in return 
(protection from competition by quacks and charlatans) (Wise, 
18+5: 19). 
WOMEN'S ACCESS TO ELITE MEDICINE 
It is generally assumed from historical accounts that all 
these practitioners were male. As Leslie (1976: 3) puts it, "Women 
were not educated in medicine, and the perspective of the classic 
texts was masculine". Learning the secrets of the medical art 
required a high level of literacy and usually only males were 
supported in education long enough to acquire the necessary 
facility in Sanskrit or Arabic; apprenticeship as a chela to a 
learned vaid or hakim was almost inevitably a relationship for 
young men; and the accounts of practitioners are entirely about 
men. Apart from isolated examples (one female vaid reported by 
Leitner [1882] in Ambala District, Punjab, for example) the 
earliest exception to this pattern seems to be the appearance in 
the early Census volumes of women recorded as vaids or hakims. 
Unfortunately, the Indian Census is not to be relied on when it 
comes to occupation, especially not for women's occupations. Thus 
in 1881 and 1891 it is clear that widows were recorded as 
following the occupations of their late husbands. These cases 
were apparently excluded by 1 901 , so later examples might be more 
significant. However, little credence can be given to the 
absolute totals. Women doing such work were likely to be missed 
from the returns, because they, or their husbands, might be 
ashamed of their need to work, or their association with 
pollutions such as those of death; or because their work was only 
part-time. On the other hand, others may still be recorded with a 
family occupation. Later Censuses record women in different 
medical categories, but these figures are 'contaminated' by those 
who have received training in the new institutions of modern 
medicine, as nurses as well as doctors, and the social process of 
recording their occupations remains variable and opaque. The 
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fascinating question of the extent to which the wives of 
indigenous practitioners were also practising medicine in 
association with their husbands or separately), is an almost 
totally closed book. 
How far were these male 'learned' medical practitioners in 
India able to deal with 'women's diseases'? Kutumbiah (1962) 
notes that the 'mythical' Ayurveda (before the main texts were 
written) did not apparently contain discussions of either 
obstetrics or gynaecology, and he infers that obstetrics was at 
that time handled entirely by midwives, with women not readily 
seeking the help of physicians. Charaka and Susruta do include 
sections on childbirth, but largely confine themselves to 
instructions for the preparation of the labour room. It seems to 
be regarded as necessary for a Brahman to be present (to carry 
out purificatory procedures) as well as experienced women who are 
to act as midwives, but there is no specification of the role of 
a physician or surgeon. The argument that Ayurvedic medicine was 
never able to throw off the superiority of Brahmanic control 
suggests that the link between Ayurveda and childbirth was never 
a strong one (Chattopadhyaya, 1977). The impurity associated with 
childbirth, may have inhibited both women's willingness to 
consult male healers, and the healers' willingness to be 
involved. It may thus be necessary to distinguish obstetrics 
(suitable only for unclean women) from some aspects of 
gynaecology: even this distinction may break down when it comes 
to disorders of menstruation. 
There are descriptions of the diseases of menstrual flows in 
the classical Ayurvedic texts, and several sources list 20 
diseases of the female organs. But this evidence is inadequate as 
a guide to the significance of physicians following these systems 
in actually treating female illnesses. We can say even less about 
the practice of Unani medicine (probably more widespread in much 
of North India than Ayurveda). It could be that there were 
thriving male practitioners whose clientele included substantial 
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numbers of women, though it seems likely that they would not be 
consulting for gynaecological or obstetric reasons. There are 
very few accounts of the clientele of vaids and hakims; they 
themselves left only codifications of the state of the art as 
they knew it, while observers' accounts are sparse and only 
develop towards the end of the 19th century. It does seem that 
hakims and vaids were largely urban-based, and probably the fees 
they expected were high enough to restrict their clientele to the 
relatively wealthy. But Western observers were not unbiassed, 
since those most concerned to comment on the state of medical 
practice in India were British doctors and officials who wanted 
evidence to limit the role of indigenous medicine and promote 
cosmopolitan medicine. 
There is really no evidence to suggest that the high-culture 
medical systems had much to offer women, especially for 'women's 
illnesses'. The texts are not well-developed, the practitioners 
were male, and women would have been inhibited in their access to 
them. This does not mean that a sub-world of 'female' medicine 
did not exist, but it seems unlikely. 
The other major source of 'learned' advice on medical 
matters were religious healers, and there are some reports about 
the extent to which women approached religious sites for medical 
care. Shrines and temples in India are still prime consultation 
sources, women usually seeking cures for infertility or the 
absence of male children, or for illnesses which may have a 
strong psychological component (Kakar, 1982). Muslim divines 
(maulvis or mullahs) offer Ta'weez (amulets) at madrassah 
(religious schools) or mosques; there are also bhagats (spiritual 
healers) who operate in a variety of traditions; and shrines and 
temples also attract religious and secular healers who practice 
in the courts or surrounding areas (ibid; Pfleiderer, 1981). In 
general, South India seems to have a stronger tradition of 
healing associated with temples (perhaps because of the absence 
of Muslim rule). These patterns which exist today are probably of 
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long standing; but of course we have no real evidence of the 
extent of consultations nor their distribution by sex or illness 
category. It does, however, seem that women use these sources 
more than men do: it may be that women's illnesses are more often 
regarded as of spiritual origin, but this also raises the 
question of why women are able to consult religious practitioners 
more than medical ones. The most obvious explanation is that of 
panda, or seclusion practices, which not only inhibit women's 
access to the public sphere where their modesty might be 
compromised, but also limits their access to cash, and to 
legitimate reasons for leaving their home. 
Parda is more developed in North India than in the South, 
and a graphic description of its effects on women's access to 
male medical care is provided by one Lala Luchman Narain, who 
funded a midwifery class in Bareilly (U. P. ) in 1867: 
"It is considered indelicate and indecent by us to 
allow a doctor to look into a woman's private parts: 
most of us would rather let their dear wives and 
daughters die than allow them to be examined by a 
male. " (N. A. I. Home, Public, 1 872 , 266-7A) 
Thus parda probably seriously restricted the access of 
'respectable' women to medical care: male practitioners could 
diagnose and treat them at a distance but could not do much more, 
though this may have excluded relatively few of the traditional 
diagnostic techniques. Poverty, high fees, and more general 
barriers were more important for the great majority of women. 
Probably only female practitioners would be apprached with any 
ease by women, but this is the category we know least about. 
MALE FOLK MEDICINE 
Leslie distinguishes between 'folk' healers (bone-setters, 
snake-bite healers and so on, usually part-time); 'popular 
culture medicine', using patent drugs, popular astrology and 
religion as well as faith in modern science; and 'homoeopathy', 
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which has, in Bhardwajfs (1973) term, become 'naturalised' in 
India. But it is impossible to draw clear lines between the 
different kinds of male practitioners and these distinctions 
break down when faced with individuals and groups who not only 
straddle these categories, but also merge into the 'learned' 
categories, whether indigenous or Western, religious or secular. 
Thus as early as 1839 an Indian observer in Bombay described 
'English doctors' who were from families of vaids but 
administered English medicines, on the basis of no formal 
education (Leslie, 1974: 97). After 1912, the Medical Registration 
Acts produced a clear way of marking off 'registered' doctors, 
and forbad the registered from collaborating with the rest. 
Indeed, these Acts probably gave indigenous practitioners more 
sense of unity than they had before, especially when they were 
used to penalise Western doctors who collaborated with indigenous 
practitioners, or to withdraw assistance from indigenous clinics 
(Steinthal, 1984: 77). 
There is no account of changes to the position, number or 
type of these kinds of practitioner during British rule. Some of 
them seem to have been included in the general category of hakim 
or vaid. Thus Wise (1 845: V) suggested that only 4 or 5 vaids in 
Bengal outside the cities were acquainted with the Sanskrit 
texts. Similarly, the official who began schemes to use hakims in 
Punjab in the 1860's, T. W. Mercer, included in this term those 
who seemed to own no pharmaceutical texts, could not read Arabic, 
and were 'profoundly ignorant, superstitious and unscrupulous' 
(quoted in Hume, 1979). Professionalising and modernising 
practitioners referred to these groups merely to disparage them, 
and British reports are little better. 
Two points seem crucial in assessing how the positions of 
these groups might have changed. Firstly, whatever happened to 
the village economy, (i. e., whether or not there was 
polarisation) their traditional clientele would have remained, 
providing either the small payments of large numbers of the 
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relatively poor, or the more substantial fees of the landed 
peasantry. Secondly, competition to these groups was limited, and 
controllable. Thus few villages had resident allopathic 
practitioners before 1960 or had easy access to towns where they 
were available; the increasing numbers of commercial sources of 
drugs and other remedies would be circulated as much through 
these practitioners as by their allopathic competitors; and 
village practitioners seem to need a social base within the 
village to be successful. Any claim that the condition of these 
male folk practitioners was undercut by British rule must remain, 
at best, not proven. 
FEMALE FOLK MEDICINE 
If the Census can be believed, most of the female medical 
personnel were midwives (dais). (For more elaboration on the 
material in this section, see Jeffery, Jeffery and Lyon, 1985. ) 
Reports about dais appear in official documents in the later part 
of the 19th century, and they all argue that the dai was never 
anything other than an illiterate, usually middle-aged or old 
woman, whose only qualification was her experience. Furthermore, 
because of the pollution associated with childbirth, they were 
predominantly drawn from the untouchable castes. British doctors 
were adamant that the dais, even those prepared to take courses 
in what passed at the time for modern midwifery, were a danger to 
their clients, and the records abound in comments on their lack 
of intelligence, their dirty habits, and their incapability of 
learning new methods. 
This evidence about the quality of midwifery is, of course, 
inadequate as a basis for much generalisation, but it represents 
almost the only kind available. We just do not know the extent to 
which the dai offered additional services, such as abortions, 
advice and treatments for menstrual problems, massage, or any 
other similar services for reproductive disorders. Nor do we know 
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much about the efficacy (however defined) of their services. 
However, three arguments can be stated. One view would be that 
women's knowledge and referral systems would by their very nature 
escape the kind of male enquiry which would yield historical 
data, and that it is wrong to assume that an oral tradition 
cannot develop valuable skills. A second argument would be that 
some information would surely have survived, and that the women 
involved were drawn from such disadvantaged castes and themselves 
regarded midwifery as so dirty, that it would be surprising if 
women took up the occupation willingly, or if they were capable 
of developing a strong chain for transmitting skills handed down 
by mothers or mothers-in-law. A third argument (arguably the most 
plausible) is that female healers in stratified societies are 
likely to be stratified themselves, and more sophisticated 
support would be available to wealthier women than to the rest. 
None of these arguments, of course, leads to the conclusion 
that most women suffered and died without any assistance. The 
issue is really about the extent of their access to public 
sources of medical advice, and the quality of the advice they 
were able to receive. There are, of course, household medicines. 
These are not, of course, insignificant resources, but it seems 
likely that both men and women had access to these household 
remedies, whereas men also had much better access to the public 
sphere when home remedies were felt to be inadequate. 
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS INDIGENOUS MEDICINE 
Before the 19th century, there is little evidence of a fixed 
British policy towards indigenous medicine. This is partly 
because of the main aims of the East India Company: trade and 
later the collection of land revenue. Policy, in a wi der sense, 
only developed as the Company reali sed that it had to govern 
increasing numbers of people as a result of its expanding 
territorial control. Not until the end of the 18th century did 
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the Company establish hospitals in the Presidency towns; and only 
in the course of the 19th century did it establish educational 
and medical policies aimed at the wider population (see Chapter 
4). 
However, the actions of some of its employees give some 
evidence of the kind of direct impact that they might have had on 
indigenous medicine. It took three main forms. Firstly, some 
Company officials consulted indigenous healers: Crawfurd (1914) 
notes that there seemed a general view in the late 17th century 
amongst British officials that the diseases of the country were 
best taken to the doctors of the country. Secondly, European 
doctors were employed as consultants by some members of the 
Indian elite, either displacing or competing with indigenous 
healers. Thirdly, some Indians were given training in European 
medicine, either as part of a deliberate expansion in medical 
services for the Army, or in a more informal way. Thus 'native 
doctors' attended informal classes at the civil hospital in 
Calcutta at the end of the 18th century (Leslie, 1976) 
These patterns began to coalesce at the start of the 19th 
century. In 1812 the Court of Directors in London encouraged its 
employees to find out more about local medicines and medical 
texts, on the grounds that these might prove very useful (Basu, 
1936). The informal training scheme at Calcutta was 
established on much more substantial grounds in 1822, as a 
'Native Medical Institution', teaching indigenous and European 
medicine. The Muslim Madrassa and the Hindu Sanskrit College 
(both established with European patronage) had already 
incorporated some European medicine and anatomy into their 
courses. But these processes of common involvement were disrupted 
by the change in policy in 1835. This was the year of Macauley's 
on educational policy, where he argued that European 
culture should provide the curriculum of schools and colleges. 
This strengthened the opposition to schemes which attempted a 
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mixing of European and Indian cultures, or were designed to 
restore Indian culture to its presumed glory. In medical educa- 
tion it meant that the N. M. I. ceased teaching as pects of Ayurveda 
and of Unani Tibb. The whole institution was remodelled as a 
medical school, teaching only European science, for a while only 
in Engl ish. 
While this move had obvious significance, it did not mean a 
total ban on such teaching, nor on co-operative relationships 
between the British Raj and indigenous practitioners. As Hume 
(1 977) has demonstrated, for example, in Punjab the Provincial 
Government employed hakims (Unani practitioners) in the 1860's 
and 1870's, 'usually as vaccinators and health extension workers. 
In addition, the Lahore Medical College had taught some hakims 
and vaids as part of the courses in Ayurveda based in the 
Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College, and Unani Tibb at the Islam is 
College, from 1887-98; the University of the Punjab continued to 
validate these courses until 1907, when there were very few 
students (see also N. A. I. EE. H. L. ], 1919: July: 26-51 A). 
One reason for the tolerance displayed by the State is that 
its own services reached a very small section of the population, 
and there were very few practitioners who had been fully trained 
in its medical schools and colleges, before the end of the 
nineteenth century. The graduates from the first four medical 
colleges (Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Lahore) were mostly 
employed in the growing State bureaucracy - in the army, the 
jails, the railways and so on (anon, 1866). The 1872 Census of 
Bengal, for example, enumerated only 3,769 physicians, surgeons 
and doctors, but over 23,700 'Gobaidyas' and IKabiraj esI 
(vaids)and over 400 'hakeems'; and the 1871 Census of Madras 
reported virtually no Indian doctor trained in European medicine 
in private practice in the city. The medical bureaucrats were 
aware of the strength of the indigenous groups in the 1880s: 
plans to introduce medical registration were dropped because the 
graduates from the Government colleges and schools were thought 
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too weak politically to overcome the expected hostility from the 
vaids and the hakims (Seal, 1968). 
A change to more self-confident hostility to indigenous 
medicine within the medical bureaucracy can be dated from about 
the end of the 19th century. By this time the cream of the 
Western doctors in India - the Indian Medical Service - was more 
conscious of its claims to a scientific legitimation; the number 
of Indian medical graduates and licence-holders was substantial, 
and they were offering a real challenge to the primacy of 
indigenous healers in the major towns; and the growth of a new 
middle class provided new financial opportunities for both groups 
(Jeffery, 1979). The early twentieth century saw considerable 
political conflict over medical issues as the rising bourgeois 
nationalist movement embraced the cause of Indian cultural 
renaissance as well as the idea of science. Indian practitioners 
responded to threats to their position (such as the Medical 
Registration Acts passed in all the Provinces between 1912 and 
1919) with more assertive claims to their own scientific status, 
and the Indian National Congress included leading indigenous 
practitioners in its ranks as well as modernisers like Nehru 
(Brass, 1972; Croizier, 1972). 
The Imperial Government was not united in its views: some of 
its memb ers wanted to maximise the distance between themselves 
and the 'superstitious mumbo- jumbo' of indigenous medicine; 
others were willing to lend their prestige to new private medical 
schools, some of which combined indigenous and Western techniques 
in 'integ rated' courses, as a way of bringing up their standards. 
The hostile position was clearly expressed by the Provincial 
Governments' medical advisers (senior members of the I. M. S. ) at 
the end of the First World War. They argued that the Indian 
systems of medicine were archaic, incapable of advance, and based 
on unsound principles. The adviser to the U. P. Government argued 
"there is no reason to run away from a frank declaration 
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of our conviction that Western science includes all that is of any value in the Ayurvedic and Unani systems; that it is progressive where they are stationary; and that its popularity and prestige are continually on the increase". (N. A. I. [ E. H. L. ] 1919: July : 26-51 A. ) 
Most of these administrative doctors equated the Indian 
systems with quackery and imposture; but they appreciated that 
there were political reasons why this could not be said. The 
Director-General of the I. M. S. at the time noted that the 
indigenous systems had an advantage in cheapness, with low fees 
and low-cost education: but that this should not be regarded as 
sufficient grounds to divert funds away from 'scientific 
medicine'. However, he recognised the nationalist support for 
these systems; and argued the need to counter the view that the 
only reason for the decline of the Indian systems was the effect 
of European rule, by asserting the greater efficacy of Western 
medicine (ibid. ). 
The more supportive viewpoint was expressed by Sir Pardey 
Lukis, (Director-General of the I. M. S. from 1911-17) speaking on 
behalf of the Government of India, in 1916: 
'The improvement of the training of hakims and vaids is 
a part of the present policy of Government .. (because) 
.. for many years to come, they will constitute the 
medical attendants of by far the largest portion of the 
Indian community. ' (N. A. I. [E. H. L. ]1 91 9: July : 26-51 .) 
A clearer view of how these divisions affected policy 
towards indigenous medicine can be seen from the responses to 
attempts between 1910 and 1920 by vaids and hakims to gain 
sponsorship from the Imperial State, and to minimise what they 
saw as the negative effects of Government policies such as the 
Medical Registration Acts (N. A. I. [E. H. L. ] 1919: July: 26-51 A). In 
1910 vaids in Calcutta unsuccessfully asked for State support for 
a new Ayurvedic college, but Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy, agreed 
to open the Unani Tibbia College in Delhi in 1916, against the 
wishes of his chief medical adviser. This College's moving 
spirit, Ajmal Khan, asked for a meeting with the Home Member of 
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the Viceroy's Council in 1914, to discuss the Medical Acts, the 
employment of vaids and hakims by the Government, and aid to 
their institutions. The medical adviser's opinion was expressed 
forcefully: he saw the schemes of integrated teaching of European 
and Indian medicine as 'farcical'. But Hardinge addressed the 
College in 1916, and laid a Foundation stone, largely because of 
Ajmai Khan's personal position as a leading Muslim (Metcalfe, 
1985: 7-8). Much to the embarrassment of many of his medical 
advisers, he said that the rural poor would have to be reached by 
a modernised indigenous system of medicine; and a resolution in 
the 1916 Legislative Council meeting calling for the scientific 
investigation of the indigenous systems was enthusiastically 
welcomed by Pardey Lukis and later quoted by Ajmal Khan in 
support of his position (ibid. ) 
The reforms of 1919 meant that the nationalists were given 
positions where they would, in theory, be able to implement 
policies in opposition to the views of their medical advisers. 
Indians became Ministers of Health and of Education. The British 
expected them to try to implement policies based on nationalist 
views. However, in practice, their scope was limited by severe 
financial restrictions, and their impact was further reduced by 
pressures from the Indian Medical Service, with overseas 
pressures being orchestrated by the British Medical Association, 
the General Medical Council, and the medical advisers to the 
India Office in London. The new Legislative Councils supported 
the 'Indian' systems of medicine on both patriotic and economy 
grounds, but Ministers in several Provinces (Punjab and Bombay, 
for example) resisted this and used their limited funds to 
attempt to bring 'modern scientific medicine and surgery within 
reasonable reach of all', spending only small sums on research 
into the indigenous systems and for improved training (Indian 
Statutory Commission, 1928: 256-67). As a result, relatively few 
indigenous medical colleges were given State patronage; the 
schemes of medical registration continued to exclude those who 
had not received Western medical training; and the Government of 
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India restricted its activities to an investigation into the 
pharmacopeia of indigenous drugs. 
The Medical Registration Acts drove a wedge between 
indigenous and Western doctors after the First World War. Western 
doctors who offended the imported British ethical codes and 
collaborated with indigenous practitioners, either in the new 
colleges or in daily practice, were threatened with 
deregistration. The wedge was driven deeper by the disputes over 
the recognition of Indian medical degrees by the General Medical 
Council in London, which occupied much of Indian medical politics 
in the inter-war period (Jeffery, 1979). When the Indian Medical 
Association was established in 1928 the early leaders, also 
prominent in nationalist politics, called for the admission of 
indigenous practitioners (if they were 'sincere'). By the mid- 
1930's, when these leaders were being incorporated into the new 
Indian Medical Council and other positions of influence, they had 
already drawn back from this support because policies of 
integration would have led to a loss of international recognition 
for Indian Western doctors. 
As a result, when indigenous practitioners were first 
registered in Bombay in 1938 they were on a separate register 
from that of the Western doctors. They were initially accepted on 
the basis of experience or apprenticeship. Only after a four year 
delay was qualification to become the sole means of registration 
(though an amendment in 1949 made exceptions and led to the 
admission of some new practitioners on the basis of experience). 
The Bombay Act was held up as the model for legislation after 
19147. 
THE IMPACT OF BRITISH RULE ON INDIGENOUS MEDICINE 
As I argued in the Introduction to Part A, it is useful to 
divide the British period into three phases in order to assess 
the course of developments. In the first period (before 1860) the 
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main impact of British rule on indigenous medicine would have 
come through the disruption and eventual disintegration of much 
of the structure of the ruling elite and its courtly life. Here 
the most successful indigenous healers could have expected to 
earn substantial sums, and to have been rewarded by economic 
security during their own lifetime through the grant of land 
rights. The British greatly reduced the size and income of these 
groups, and elite practitioners would have suffered along with 
other occupations dependent on them; in addition, competition 
from European doctors might also have affected their position. In 
the 19th century, it seems unlikely that they would have received 
any patronage from the British rulers, so there was probably a 
substantial decline in their position. Official policy towards 
these healers, beyond their exclusion from official positions, 
probably made little difference. The position of folk healers 
probably fluctuated more closely with local economic conditions, 
benefiting from increasing commercialisation where the new 
settled order led to an expansion of output, and suffering when 
enhanced revenue demands reduced the surplus held locally. 
In the period from about 1860 to 1920, the loss of elite 
patronage was steadily compensated by the growing middle class 
market for medical services. Indigenous healers seem to have 
been able to hold their own against competition in this market 
from Western-style doctors, European and Indian. The growth of 
this market made possible and also lent support to moves to 
institutionalise training and provide a clearer pattern of 
requirements and standards than was possible under the older 
system. Thus elite practice began to emulate British models not 
merely because the British institutions had higher prestige, and 
State backing, but also because the market conditions for 
indigenous medicine permitted this kind of occupational 
organisation (Johnson, 1972). Official policy, while increasingly 
hostile, and based on growing arrogance amongst medical 
bureaucrats, was probably limited in its impact. Once again, we 
have little information about folk healers, though if (as I 
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suggested in Chapter 1) agricultural incomes generally rose in 
this period, there is little reason to believe that they would 
have suffered. 
The inter-war period showed gains and losses for indigenous 
practitioners. On the one hand, colleges were established, 
beginning to replace the less respectable guru-chela form of 
apprenticeship which had previously been the sole training 
method. Several of these colleges were well-funded, especially in 
Delhi, Madras, and the Princely States of Mysore and Hyderabad, 
for example. Indigenous practitioners also had the support of the 
reports of special Government committees set up to consider 
policy towards them (summarised in the Chopra Committee Report, 
1948). On the other hand, their subordinate position relative to 
cosmopolitan medicine was reinforced by registration patterns. 
Previous strategies of raising status (e. g. through joint 
teaching and practice with cosmopolitan doctors) had received a 
severe blow, and the nationalist Health Ministers proved 
incapable of channeling substantial public funds in their 
direction. Official policy now lost most of its coherence, with 
the muting of criticism because of the strength of nationalist 
political groups. But one of the underlying principles of medical 
policy - to spread 'scientific medicine' to the mass of the 
population - continued to operate. There were increasing numbers 
trained in the medical colleges and schools, and they found 
employment and income in private practice as well as in the 
growing State bureaucracy, as hospitals and dispensaries spread 
and were used by more and more people. 
REASONS FOR THE DECLINE OF INDIGENOUS MEDICINE 
The 'fact' of decline seems to be relatively well 
established, but only in a social sense. It seems to be highly 
likely that the average social position of the more successful 
vaids and hakims deteriorated during British rule. This may be 
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correlated with a decline in the 'quality' of care and services 
offered, but this link is not so clearly established. Three main 
reasons can be advance for the decline: the lack of unity of 
indigenous practitioners; the active policy of the State; and the 
fact that indigenous treatments were seen by their clientele to 
be less effective than the Western alternatives.. 
The weakness of the indigenous practitioners was partly a 
result of their own internal divisions. Not only were the two 
main groups separated by linguistic, theoretical and religious 
differences, but there was also the newer group of homoeopaths, 
established particularly strongly in Calcutta and Bengal. With 
the rise of communal politics in the 1930's it was increasingly 
difficult for the vaids and hakims to act together. There were 
also tendencies within each group leading to divisions. Each 
elite group had a variety of career patterns, usually locally 
specific, with little agreement about diagnosis or techniques. 
Often, a noted local teacher would prepare his own commentary on 
the traditional texts, and the school which grew up around one 
teacher would deride and vilify that around another (Leslie, 
1978: 412). In addition, the process of professionalisation led 
the elite groups to attempt to distance themselves from the 
others - the practitioners of unsystematic folk medicine or 
partly-trained Unani and Ayurvedic healers. Finally, there was 
the growing ideological split between those who wanted 
teaching of cosmopolitan science and indigenous therapeutics, and 
those who considered the j;. jj, Lg indigenous training sufficiently 
scientific. This divide dominates the post-Independence debates 
(Brass, 1972). 
The modernising nationalists used one main argument to 
attack British rule and to defend their own position: that the 
withdrawal of State patronage led to a decline in the 
'scientific' level of most Indian healers. As Leslie (1 974) 
notes, this is poor history, since there is little evidence of a 
consistent pattern of hostility to indigenous medicine on the 
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part of the British, nor much evidence of a more 'scientific' 
indigenous medicine being practised in the Princely States, where 
patronage was not lost. However, given the relationships which 
existed between elite practitioners and their patrons, the loss 
of patronage would have had a considerable impact on 
practitioners' ability to maintain their traditions -a large 
household of students or assistants, substantial fees from a 
relatively small number of clients, and a generally 'cultured' 
lifestyle. This kind of establishment may have been necessary for 
a healer to maintain the full range of herbs and more 
sophisticated treatments. Many British doctors in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries wanted to deprive indigenous healers of 
this kind of status, but the damage was probably done much 
earlier, in the course of the establishment of British rule. 
It is difficult to assess the 'efficacy' of these sources of 
medical or semi-medical advice. It is relatively easy to argue 
that high rates of morbidity and mortality, indicated by the data 
discussed in Chapter 1, mean that indigenous treatments were not 
very powerful. But it is likely that 
. 1ý, g medical 
treatments would 
have made much difference to mortality rates so closely linked to 
poverty, famine and environment. On the other hand, it is 
possible to argue (with Young, 1976) that efficacy should be 
judged not in terms of any impact on morbidity or mortality, but 
in social terms - does the ceremony work to reintegrate a society 
and help it to cope with disaster. Young's position lends itself 
to a functionalist account, in which (for example) beliefs and 
practices which reinforce the subordination of women by excluding 
many of their illnesses from the medical domain, are nonethless 
judged 'efficacious'. But following this viewpoint, there are few 
plausible indicators of 'efficacy' defined in this way: two might 
be the willingness of patients to consult, or of candidates to 
apply for training as cosmopolitan doctors, since there was no 
form of compulsion involved. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, there was 
a steady increase in patients attending Government dispensaries 
and hospitals, and it seems at least plausible that indigenous 
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practitioners were not adequately meeting the medical demands of 
the mass of the population. But this tells us little about why 
this might be so. 
CONCLUSION 
British rule had a complex impact on indigenous medicine, 
and probably had different effects on the different sectors. The 
elite practitioners probably suffered most through a loss of 
patronage and the associated status they used to derive from 
servicing the courts; a decline in their social status may well 
have affected the more general efficacy of their practice. The 
impact on the folk sector is more difficult to assess. Most 
arguments tend to shade into arguments about the impact of 
British rule more generally, in the absence of specific evidence 
about any impact on healers. For example, Baner j ee (1974), quoted 
above, depends solely on claims about what commercialisation, 
polarisation and pauperisation would have done to folk medical 
practice, without any evidence. We do not know how many folk 
healers there were before 1800, in which categories, how they 
earned their living, were recruited, nor how well they lived. We 
know very little more about their condition in 1947. 
In one case, that of dais, we know at least that the State 
attempted to train them and to use them as agents in the delivery 
of maternity services. As I shall argue in Chapter 4, these 
schemes all seem to have had a limited impact, perhaps because of 
the ritual pollution of many of the tasks involved, and because 
membership of the category 'midwife' was restricted to low caste 
women, was fleeting and generally unwanted. There is no evidence 
to suggest that State training either materially improved the 
quality of maternity care for the mass of the population, nor 
that these attempts (or other changes under colonial rule) 




PUBLIC SECTOR HEALTH PROVISION UNDER THE BRITISH 
"The peaceful and civilising influence of the work done 
in the dispensaries and by regimental surgeons on the 
frontiers of India has been in political-importance 
equivalent to the presence of some thousands of 
bayonets. .. It is because of such unexpected 
philanthropy that, as conquerors, we hold a position in 
the minds of the people which would not otherwise be 
possible. " (General Sir Neville Chamberlain in 1887, 
cited by Crawford, 1914: 134-5) 
The provision of 'modern' health services is a cardinal 
plank of the arguments which focus on the benefits of British 
rule in India, and some authors have believed these services to 
be a major explanation of the decline in mortality after 1921. 
However, this claim has not been based on a detailed examination 
of what actually was provided, for which groups in the 
population, at what cost, and with what likely effect. In 
addition, there has been little discussion of the principles 
which seem to have underpinned health policy, derived either from 
statements about its purposes, or from an analysis of patterns of 
expenditure and provisions. 
The chief architects of medical policy under the British 
were the doctors, all male, of the Indian Medical Service 
(I. M. S. ). This chapter will therefore start with a discussion of 
the origins of the I. M. S. and how it developed, with particular 
reference to the social origins of its recruits, their medical 
training, and the formal organisation of the service. I will then 
consider the patterns of public health expenditure, especially 
after 1860, and show how the Provinces and the towns became 
increasingly important elements in the total. The following 
chapter will deal with the three main areas of health policy 
controlled by the I. M. S. and financed by these expenditures: 
medical and paramedical education; curative medical services 
(including the attempts to provide separately for women); and 
preventive medicine, known as sanitary work, with special 
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reference to plague control. 
I shall argue here that there were three main elements in 
the development of health policy. The first was that of social 
control, in three senses. Health policy for the masses was used 
(in Punjab, for example, as quoted above) to forestall and to 
respond to demands of new subjects for some tangible benefits of 
British rule. But the I. M. S. was primarily a" military service, 
with the maintenance of the health of the fighting forces a major 
concern. The I. M. S. also provided services for European civil and 
military servants to help maintain their morale and their 
strength in a hostile environment. The second underlying 
principle was the desire to spread 'enlightenment', or scientific 
medicine, as a virtue in its own right. The third source of 
dynamism was 'charity', part of the 'muscular Christianity' of 
many British officers in India in the 19th century. But these 
latter pressures were subordinate to the structural imperatives 
of Imperial rule: the maintenance of order and revenue. Only when 
this straitjacket was loosened by nationalist politics and more 
democratic institutions was there a serious effort to expand 
services. This effort was hamstrung by new imperatives for the 
protection of capitalism in Britain and in India - the financial 
controls retained by the Imperial Government and reinforced by 
the austerity measures by which the British and Imperial 
Government attempted to cope with the inter-War Depression. 
THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE 
The I. M. S. dominated the official medical hierarchies and 
played significant roles in private medical provision as well. 
Its history falls into three sections. Before 1860, the I. M. S. 
recruited men with a wide range of medical experience and 
training, and ad hoc arrangements slowly gave way to a more 
formal bureaucratic organisation. From 1860 to 1914 the I. M. S. 
was a structured organisation, drawing recruits from the medical 
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colleges and schools established as medicine in Britain developed 
its professional status. After 1914 there was a considerable 
growth in the subordinate services, while the overall strength of 
the I. M. S. declined. Recruitment of Europeans also declined, and 
the I. M. S. 'Indianised' rapidly. 
The origins of the I. M. S. were humble in the extreme - in 
the provision of ship's surgeons by the East India Company on its 
vessels bound for India. By 1614 the Company had a Surgeon- 
General (John Woodall, a leading London surgeon) who chose, 
instructed and equipped men as surgeons for the following 30 
years, in spite of frequent complaints that he was corrupt and 
sent untrained men on the ships (Crawford, 19144, Vol. I: Ch. 3). 
Men were employed to work on one particular ship for one voyage 
at a time: at a later date, some of the doctors were asked to 
remain in India at one of the Company's 'factories' (warehouses) 
if there was a special request from the merchants (ibid: ch. 6). 
By the 1670's, surgeons were hired expressly for service in 
India, and over the following century there was a steady increase 
in the numbers of medical men employed by the Company to tend to 
their civil employees. By 1749, it would seem that there were 30 
medical men known to the Company in India. It was about this time 
that the Company began to employ a standing army, and medical 
officers to accompany the troops into the field. 
The growth in the numbers of medical officers led to the 
establishment of a bureaucratic structure in India to organise 
their appointments and to create a graded hierarchy of 
appointments. From this time on, the civil posts, especially 
those in the three Presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and 
Madras, were reserved for the senior doctors, but all of them 
were liable to recall to military employment if the need arose 
(see further below). The Bengal Medical Service, established in 
1763, began with 12 full Surgeons and 28 Mates, but by 1783 there 
were apparently 1 40 altogether (ibid: ch. 14). The surgeons in 







SIZE OF THE MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENT FROM TIME TO TIME 
Period 
Category c. 1780 1835 1854 1882 c. 1910 1928 1938 
I. M. S. military 
European 608 191 207 
Indian 0 205 149 
civil - 
European 172 264 196 
Indian 0 90 115 
Total 216 677 780 684. 731 750 667 
of which European 216 677 780 645 694 455 403 
Indian 0 0 0 39 37 295 264 
Subordinate: military - 
Asstt. Surgeons 695 381 
565 
Sub-Asstt. Surgs. 883 600 
: civil - 
Asstt. Surgeons 1159 
Sub-Asstt. Surgs. 3126 
Total 729 990 5256 
TOTAL 1 406 1818 5923 
Notes: The names of the subordinate categories changed from time 
to time, starting as assistant surgeons or surgeon's mates, and 
finishing as sub-assistant surgeons. These figures are not always 
strictly comparable, sometimes being based on the establishment 
(i. e. total number who could be employed), and sometimes on those 
actually in post on a particular date. 
Railway doctors, and those employed by local boards, are excluded. 
Sources: for 1780 and 1882: Crawford, 1 91 4, Vol I: Ch. XIV; for 
1835 and 1850: $ oLL rl 9. f 1ý. 2 
C 533,1852: 408; for 1910 
1921: 1: 115, and Craw ford, op. cit.; for 1928, N. A. I. File 52- 
96/33-H; for 1938, Bradfield, 1939: 3-4. 
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establishment had risen to 30 full Surgeons and 19 Assistants. In 
Bombay, there were apparently 27 members of the Medical Service 
in 1779. These relatively small establishments expanded 
dramatically over the following forty years - partly through 
local recruitment of Europeans and Eurasians, and partly by 
recruitment in Britain. By 1823 there were 630 officers holding a 
'covenant' (or a commissioned post) in the medical departments of 
the three Presidencies. The number of medical officers seems to 
have-stayed at about that level until the First World War, though 
the various sources are not complete nor entirely comparable (see 
Table 1). 
Some idea of the complexity of employment patterns is 
provided by a survey of staff employed in the Bengal Presidency 
in 1876. In the seven Provinces of the Presidency (Bengal, North- 
West Provinces, Punjab, Oudh, Central Provinces, British Burma 
and Assam) there was a total of 229 medical officers in civil 
employ (though 12 of these were military doctors holding 
'collateral charge' of the civil station where they were posted. ) 
At least 56 of these were not actually covenanted I. M. S. 
officers, being retired doctors, or temporary or Warrant 
Officers. These 229 controlled a staff of 245 Assistant Surgeons, 
and 1131 'Hospital Assistants', who included 92 'native doctors' 
and 6 called 'passed medical pupils' (Papers, 1881). 
The bureaucratic nature of the service was reinforced by a 
number of changes in the course of the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The Medical Boards, consisting of the two or 
three most senior surgeons in each Presidency, controlled 
appointments, discipline and general policy. They were 
established between 1785 and 1787, and over the next seventy 
years, amendments were made in attempts to improve the efficiency 
of this system and to, reduce conflicts between the members. 
In spi te of formal commitments to make appointments to the 
Boards on merit, whenever the most senior surgeon was not 
86 
appointed, controversy ensued. By the 1820's fixed lengths of 
tenure were introduced. But Dalhousie, Governor-General from 1848 
to. 1856, was dissatisfied with the state of the service, and on 
leaving office he made a number of recommendations which were 
followed over the next few years. In particular, the Medical 
Boards, with their unclear precedence and responsibilities, were 
abolished and replaced with posts of Director-General in each - 
Presidency, assisted by Inspector-Generals. 
Until the 1850's, someone employed as a surgeon did not 
necessarily either have any medical competence or spend most of 
his time in medical activity. The early reports are clear that 
claims to competence were not necessarily investigated, and 
surgeons who had served on several journeys were allowed to 
continue in employment even if they had originally been hired in 
dubious circumstances. Since the post was a commissioned one, it 
depended on nomination by a Director, which was either expensive 
(the sale of nominations undoubtedly occurred) or dependent on 
some personal link to a Director, thus limiting recruitment to 
the relatively well-to-do. Not until 1809 was the purchase of 
appointments made an offence. The Court of Directors was 
unwilling to allow local recruitment on more than a temporary 
basis, because the Directors did not want to lose the rights of 
nomination, and this created problems in rapidly expanding 
medical services during local wars. Nevertheless, local 
appointments were made, including men who had served some kind of 
apprenticeship in the Company's hospitals in India. 
The beginnings of the expansion of the medical services, and 
the establishment of a clear hierarchy, led also to more formal 
arrangements for examining the men appointed as surgeons. In 
London an examining Board for the East India Company was 
appointed in 1773, and in the 1760's and 17'70's the Bengal and 
Madras Governments resolved that all assistant surgeons should be 
examined on appointment, though they were unable to reject men 
duly appointed by the Court in London. The London Corporation of 
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Surgeons and its successor bodies granted certificates of 
competence which were a basic qualification for service with the 
Company from 1745 onwards, but the first clear statement of 
regulations for admission date from 1822. The first competitive 
examinations for entry to the I. M. S. were held in 1855, and 
continued (with a break of five years from 1860 to 1865) until 
after the First World War. 
One attraction of service in India was the income that could 
be made outside the formal job of surgeon to the Company. The pay 
of the surgeon was not high, relative to that of the other civil 
appointments, and the surgeons had to supplement their incomes in 
other ways if they were to retire handsomely to Britain. This 
could come through supplementary incomes from work in the Company 
hospitals (in the 18th century soldiers had to pay for hospital 
services, and surgeons were paid for each patient they treated, 
over and above their salary); from private medical practice; or 
from non-medical activities. Private medical practice included 
the treatment of 'native gentlemen' or members of the Moghal or 
other Indian courts, but probably mainly involved the treatment 
of 'non-official' Europeans and the families of officials. 
Non-medical work was potentially very valuable, though also 
risky if it involved trade and speculation. The range of non- 
medical work was large. It would seem that surgeons often held 
other positions (notably that of Post-master) in the early 19th 
century. Crawford notes several surgeons who made (and sometimes 
lost) small fortunes in banking, trade or land ownership and 
management; as late as 1838 a leading surgeon took it for granted 
that surgeons in civil posts would spend a large part of their 
time in commercial activities. I. M. S. officers in military posts 
were barred from commercial speculation in 1824; from 1841 the 
surgeons in civil posts were also barred, though it would seem 
that it took at least ten years before the pr ohibition was 
enforced (ibid: ch. 25). 
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The I. M. S. was a military organisation: its members had 
military rank, and could serve as regimental surgeons or in a 
civilian positions. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
a new recruit to the I. M. S. spent at least the first two years as 
a subordinate doctor with a regiment or in an army hospital, 
except in unusual circumstances. The rest of his career would 
involve moves into and out of military service, depending on 
choice and the balance of posts available. It was always clear 
that officers of the I. M. S. were liable to recall from civil 
duties if the Army required them, but in the relatively quiet 
circumstances until 1 91 4, this power was rarely used. 
The balance between civil duties and military obligations 
was one which continually taxed the administrative mind, with 
various schemes for the division of the civil and military 
services, or the amalgamation of the Army Medical Department (for 
British troops) and the I. M. S. (for European and 'native' 
soldiers employed by the Government of India). From the first 
time that the issue was seriously discussed (in 1766) to the last 
(in 1935) the considerations remained the same, even though the 
work required of the two parts of the I. M. S. varied considerably 
during this period. The primary concern was with the need for 
European medical officers for service in case of war; the 
secondary concern was to ensure that recruitment of Europeans to 
the 'ruling' services - the Indian Civil Service, the police and 
the Army - was not inhibited by the absence of European medical 
advice, especially for service wives. 
The first of these meant that enough doctors had to be 
available in India for calling-up at short notice. Even in 
Britain, with all its doctors of various kinds, there were 
difficulties in meeting war needs in this way, and in India the 
authorities were convinced of the need to provide the war reserve 
by having far more doctors available under their control than was 
needed for normal military work in peacetime. But the only way to 
employ such doctors, and to make the service attractive, was to 
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allow them civil opportunities - trading, etc. in the early 
period, or work amongst the civil population (official and 
unofficial) after the middle of the nineteenth century. Before 
the 18240's and 1850's, civil work was reckoned to be less medical 
than commercial or administrative, and medical experience was to 
be found primarily in military work. In the latter part of the 
century the balance swung the other way, and the civil work _ 
included the management of district, police, and jail hospitals, 
provision of medico-legal services, the organisation of 
vaccination and other sanitary work - and the superintendence of 
the local jail (Crawford, 1914 vol I: 293-4). And there was an 
increasing possibility of private medical practice to supplement 
the various sources of official income. Not surprisingly, most 
doctors applied for a transfer to civil employment as soon as 
possible, and looked forward to steady progression through the 
more distant districts up to the Provincial headquarters, or into 
the clinical positions in the medical colleges and schools. 
How significant was the 'military' nature of the I. M. S.? 
Nationalist critics of the I. M. S. could point to the fact that 
the numbers of doctors transferred to civil duties reflected the 
state of military, and not civil, needs: this became important 
politically after the First World War, when the balance between 
European and Indian doctors on each side became a delicate issue. 
Furthermore, the careers of individual doctors might be seriously 
upset by military concerns: thus Ronald Ross's researches into 
the role of mosquitoes in the spread of malaria were interrupted 
by postings away from his laboratory. But this was a general 
feature of official employment, not confined to the military, and 
in looking for limitations to the role and effectiveness of the 
I. M. S. its character as handmaiden to the Imperial State (as an 
inducement to recruits to the other services) and the orientation 
characteristic of 'western' medicine in general at this time are 
more important than its military origins or hierarchy. In 
particular, it is probably the case that most members of the 
I. M. S. did see their careers in terms of their likely access to 
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lucrative private practice, and providing medical services to the 
Imperial services as a prime function; it would be surprising if 
these men took public health or sanitary reform very seriously. 
By 1860, then, a Medical Service had been established in 
India which had most of the characteristics of -a formal medical 
bureaucracy. Appointments were made on merit, and the 
examinations were open to Indians as well as Europeans - though 
because they were only held in London access by Indian candidates 
was restricted and only 55 had entered by 1913. Several of the 
early Indian recruits resigned after a short career, and some of 
them felt that they were not welcomed by other members of the 
I. M. S. or by other officers -a criticism increasingly voiced 
during the 1920s and 1930s. For the European doctors, at least, 
promotions were based on seniority, and (as Table 4 below shows) 
most doctors remained in the service until they retired. 
Positions were well defined, and were expected to take up most of 
the time of the employee, whose recompense was largely fixed in 
the form of a regular salary, though it could still be 
supplemented by private medical practice, especially in the 
larger towns. By this time, too, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, the 
responsibilities of the members of the I. M. S. were much broader 
than merely the treatment of sick employees of the Crown. 
Some idea of the changing nature of the I. M. S. in this 
period can be seen from the summaries of qualifications and 
medical schools attended, derived from Crawford's 'Roll of the 
I. M. S. ' (Tables 2 and 3) and information about the heads of the 
medical services in each Presidency at different periods. In the 
early years, the men who reached the top (usually with few formal 
qualifications) often remained for many years, but by the 1860s 
seniority rules, and promotion to higher positions partly by 
qualification, meant that senior men occupied the top positions 
for only a few years before retiring. As the century went on, 
more 'top' positions were created, as new Provinces were 
established, Sanitary Commissioner posts added to those of 
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Inspectors-General of Hospitals, and posts of Professor at the 
major Medical Colleges were regarded as of equal status. The 
character of the I. M. S. thus changed quite substantially, and the 
threatened loss of some of these senior positions under the 1919 
Reforms was a major reason for the problems of recruitment of 
Europeans to the I. M. S. after the First Worl-d War (Jeffery, 
1979). 
The impact of changing patterns of medical education in 
Britain after about 1820 is fairly clear, though complicated by 
lack of information on the earlier recruits and by the years used 
by Crawford for grouping his data. Those recruited after 1800 
were most likely to have qualifications from the Royal College of 
Surgeons in London, usually gained before joining the service but 
sometimes acquired during leave in England. Edinburgh, and the 
other Scottish medical faculties and colleges, have always played 
a substantial part in the training of members of the I. M. S., but 
their position had declined from one of dominance by the 1860's, 
with the establishment of the London and Irish medical schools. 
This is also reflected in the changing birthplaces of 
recruits; in the first half of the 19th century, one-third of all 
recruits were born in Scotland, one-third in England, and nearly 
10% in India (with European surnames). In the last half of the 
century the Irish-born recruits (22%) outnumbered the Sc ots 
(18%), the share of the English-born remained about 30%, but 25% 
of recruits were born in India, including 6% with 'Indian' na mes 
(Crawford, 1930: 648-9). Other information on the backgrounds of 
the recruits is very limited, though throughout this period, for 
those where information is available, roughly one in six were the 
sons of doctors, one in seven the sons of clergymen, and the rest 
largely drawn from the military, other professions, business and 
trade, or from the land (1 3%)(Crawford, 1914 , 
Vol. 2: 650-1). 
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TABLE 2 
ANALYSIS OF DEGREES AND DIPLOMAS HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE I. M. S. 
Year of entry 










36.6 51 .1 63.5 39.3 31 .1 
0 1 .8 11 .5 24.1 36.6 
0 4.2 17.9 15.0 1 .5 
5.0 16.8 19.2 15.4 17.2 
1 .8 4.4 14.3 31 .1 18.0 
4.3 6.9 17.2 16.7 16.2 
0 0 0.6 4.7 7.3 
0 1 .5 12.9 50.0 44.2 
Total (N) (935) (1680) (1119) (995) (1049) 
Notes: Percentages are of total recruits, but in the early period 
some have no recorded qualification, and in all periods some had 
several. 
Row 1 includes all qualifications granted by the London 
Corporation of Surgeons and the Royal College of Surgeons of 
London and later England; 
Row 2 includes all qualifications from the Royal College of 
Physicians of London; 
Row 3 the Licentiate of the Society of Apothecaries of London; 
Row 4 the MB and MD qualifications from Edinburgh University; 
Row 5 the qualifications granted by the Edinburgh Colleges of 
Physicians and Surgeons; 
Row 6 includes degrees from the other Scottish Universities and 
qualifications granted by the Glasgow Faculty of Physicians and 
Surgeons. 
There were no recruits between 1860 and 1865. 
Source: Crawford, 1930. 
93 
TABLE 3 
ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL SCHOOLS ATTENDED BY I. M. S. RECRUITS 
Year of Entry 
Medical school 176 4-1 800 1801-1838 1839-1 860 1865-1896 1 897-1 930_ 
Edinburgh 5.2 16.3 18.3 17.4 17.1 
Other Scottish 1.4 4.9 7.0 12.6 11.1 
London 0 1.1 13.5 32.8 39.0 
Irish - 0.4 4.0 20.2 15.1 
Provincial English - - 0.6 4.4 7.1 
Indian - - 1.3 7.4 17.1 
Other 0.1 0.1 2.2 6.0 10.2 
TOTAL (N) (935) (1686) (1119) (995) (1049) 
Source: Crawford, 1930: 643-7. 
Unfortunately we do not know how far recruits to the I. M. S. 
differed from those who established themselves in practice, or 
who joined the growing Poor Law medical service, in Great 
Britain. It would appear that in the later nineteenth century 
service in India was preferable to service with the British army, 
since those qualifying in the common competitive examinations 
chose the I. M. S. over the Army Medical Department, when they had 
a choice. This probably reflected the attractions of private 
practice possibilities in India which would not be available to 
doctors serving in the British army or navy (ibid., Vol 1: 527-9). 
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TABLE 4 
ANALYSIS OF 'FINAL RESULTS' 
Year of recruitment 
? Final result' 1652-1763 1764-1800 1801-1838 1839-1860 1865-1606-`- 
01 of m r. -- o /0 iý 
A. Service ended by death 
or injury 
Killed in action 3.0 1.0 1.2 2.2 0.4 
Suicide or violent death 1.4 2.0 1.1 0.7 2.5 
Died while serving 49.8 59.7 51.8 40.2 214.5 
Invalided out 0.0 1.7 1.9 0.3 0.7 
TOTAL GROUP A 54.2 64.4 56.0 43.4 28.1 
B.. Resigned or dismissed 
Resigned 12.8 3.7 2.7 4.1 3.3 
Dismissed etc. 7.3 6.2 6.2 3.0 0.7 
TOTAL GROUP B 20.1 9.9 8.9 7.1 1.0 
C. Retired 25.7 25.7 34.7 4*9.5 67.0 
TOTAL .:: '0 CASES (') ( 240) 
(784) ( 1639) ( 1108) ( 99'1 ) 
Unknown (N) 119) (88) (7) (0) (0) 
Source: reworking of he analysis in Cra,: rfcrc (190: 62-3) . 
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A final indicator of the changes in the I. M. S. around 1860 
is in the 'hazards of membership'. For those recruited before 
1838, and for whom information is available, more than half had 
their careers ended by death (usually from disease) or by 
illness; another 10% or so resigned or were dismissed, and only 
one-third or less reached normal retiring age still in service. 
For those recruited in 1839-60 a half retired in the 'normal' 
way; and two-thirds of those recruited in the thirty years after 
1865 reached 55 or 58 and retired (Table 4). 
There was a 'decline' of the I. M. S. during the twentieth 
century, as opportunities in India became less attractive, and 
employment prospects in Britain improved. In India there was 
pressure to open the civil posts of the I. M. S. to the 
'independent' medical profession - those trained in the Indian 
medical colleges and schools who had not taken up official 
employment. Considerable political pressure was applied in London 
on behalf of Indian doctors to this end in 1907. That year also 
saw the extension of the involvement of Indians in the management 
of the Indian Government, with the recruitments to the Imperial 
councils under the Morley-Minto reforms. Although fierce rear- 
guard actions were fought in India and in London to reduce the 
impact of these changes, they created a climate of uncertainty 
about long term prospects. A third factor affecting medical 
employment prospects was the establishment under Lloyd George of 
improved Health Insurance schemes in Britain. The number of 
British applicants to join the I. M. S. declined very rapidly. 
The overall size of the I. M. S. declined after 1919; the 
number of senior medical positions which it held by right was 
steadily reduced as a result of the devolution of power to 
elected Ministries in the Provinces; and the proportion of its 
recruits who were Indian rose both as a result of policy (a 
minimum quota for Indian recruits was established in 1919) but 
also, and more importantly, because of a shortage of European 
applicants. The main drawback of this situation, as the Indian 
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Government saw it, was the deleterious effect this might have on 
European recruitment to the key military and civil services. 
Lloyd George reflected this view during Parliamentary discussions 
of the I. M. S. in 1922, and there was considerable evidence that 
Europeans would be unwilling to serve in small district towns if 
the only medical advice available for their wives was from an - 
Indian doctor (Jeffery, 1979). The I. M. S. was easily cast as a 
willing accomplice of the attempts to retain control over 
medicine in European hands as part of wider Imperial concerns: as 
an 'Imperial' service, the I. M. S. remained under the control of 
the Government of India, not the more democratically responsible 
Provincial Governments. Their consequent unpopularity in 
Nationalist political circles undoubtedly accounted for the 
decision in 1947 to abolish it as an independent service, and to 
give to the local Governments in Independent India full control 
of their medical civil servants. 
The history of the I. M. S., then, can be seen in three 
stages. In the first, prior to 1860, the service was organised in 
an ad hoc way, recruiting its members (some with very little 
medical training) from a range of backgrounds. Its formal 
organisation was unclear, and the careers of its members were 
as much non-medical (in trade etc. ) as medical. This pattern 
changes around the middle of the century, as medical training was 
institutionalised in Great Britain and recruitment depended on 
recognised medical qualifications. The organisation became highly 
bureaucratic, and its members increasingly self-confident about 
their medical abilities and concerned to spread their knowledge 
and services to the Indian population. This pattern gave way at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, as the number of Indian 
recruits began to rise, the service was involved in political 
disputes, and the power of its members was increasingly 
threatened by doctors who were outsiders - in private practice 
and in official employment. In the next sections I will consider 
in more detail the changing patterns of medical expenditure 
heavily influenced by the members of the I. M. S. 
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PATTERNS OF EXPENDITURE 
It is difficult to establish a clear picture of health 
expenditures prior to the 1860's. Indeed, one indicator of the 
way the Indian government became more fully 'bureaucratic' around 
this time is its reform of accounting practices in 1867. Before - 
this time, most health expenditures were classified as military 
the employment of doctors by the Indian Medical Service and their 
hospital subordinates, primarily for European and later for 
'native' troops. However, some European civilians were allowed 
access to-these services free (members of the senior Services) 
and others used them on the payment of fees; and increasingly, 
Indians outside the armed forces were allowed access to medical 
services of one kind or another, often for overtly political 
reasons, as the quote at the head of this chapter demonstrates. 
Nonetheless, even as late as the 1900s, military medical 
expenditures took nearly 40% of all health expenditures (see 
Table 5). 
Control over these expenditures was increasingly 
decentralised as the 19th century went on. Until the 1860's the 
Presidency governments in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were, with 
the Government of India, the only significant financial bodies. 
The Mayo reforms of 1870 established municipalities on a firmer 
footing, and district and other local boards for rural areas date 
from the end of the 1880's. These bodies saw health matters as 
one of their major concerns, and spent much larger proportions of 
their very small budgets on sewage removal ('conservancy'), water 
supply, dispensaries and so on, than did the Provincial and 
Imperial Governments (see Tables 6& 7). 
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TABLE 5 
CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
Decade 
Category 1870-9 1880-9 1890-9 1900-9 1910-9 1920-9 1930-9 
Rs millio ns (Annual avera ges) ,- 
Civil Medical 35.1 39.4 
} 6.2 7.3 11.6 14.1 23.0 { 
Civil Sanitary 17.0 17.6 
Military 4.2 5.5 7.1 8.2 6.3 n. a. n. a. 
Total Health 10.4 12.8 18.7 22.3 29.3 n. a. n. a. 
Gross Revenue 
Expenditure 560.0 760.2 938.5 1131.3 1440.8 2175.6 2104.9 
(% Health) (1.8%) (1.7%) (2.0%) (2.0%) (2.0%) n. a. n. a. 
(% Civil Health) (1 . 1%) (1 . 0%) (1 . 2%) (1 . 2%) (1 . 6%) (2.4%) (2.7%) 
Sources: Lc ladjja, relevant years. 
Military medical expenditures are not separately recorded after 1919. 
'Health' includes medical and sanitary expenditures. 
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TABLE 6 
MUNICIPAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
Decade 
Category 1870-9 1880-9 1890-9 1900-9 1910-9 1920-9 1930=9. 
Rs Millions (Annual Averag es) __ 
Water supply 1.1 3.5 5.1 5.7 10.4 23.0 17.2 
Drainage 0.8 1.4 2.2 4.2 6.3 9.8 8.3 
Conservancy 4.5 4.4 7.4 10.9 14.8 25.8 24.7 
Hospitals etc } 
Vaccination } 1.7 1.2 2.2 3.3 4.5 8.2 9.5 
Sanitary } 1.8* 3.1 3.8 
Plague - - 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 
Other - - 0.4 1.8 2.7 5.3 3.8 
Total 8.1 10.5 17.3 26.9 40.3 75.5 67.7 
Grand Total 29.7 38.6 59.2 91.0 165.4 367.7 385.1 
% 'Health' (27.3) (29.2) (29.2) (29.5) (24.4) (20.5) (17.6) 
Notes: * 'Sanitary' appears as a separate category from 1915/6 and 
the figure for the period 1910-9 is an average of five years only. 
The periods covered in the other cases are financial decades 
beginning 1st April 1880 etc and ending on 31st March 1890 etc. 
'Health' includes medical and sanitary services. 
Source: ýýýýýýýr relevant years. 
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TABLE 7 
DISTRICT AND LOCAL BOARDS HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
Decade 
Category 1890-9 1900-9 1910-9 1920-9 1930-9 
Rs . Millions (annual averages) 
Sanitation, 
Hospitals etc 2.8 4.3 6.7 15.8 20.6 
Total 29.0 42.9 73.4 134.6 161.4 
(% 'Health') (9.3) (10.0) (9.1) (11.7) (12.8) 
Source: aIzjxgLj Lc ZLdja, relevant years. Note: 'Health' includes medical and sanitary services. 
It would be misleading to see these institutions of local 
government as particularly democratic; civil servants often 
constituted a sizeable proportion of the membership of the 
councils, and they nominated a number of the other members. The 
process of democratising these institutions followed policies at 
provincial and national levels - the reforms of 1907 (Morley- 
Minto), 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford) and 1935. These changes were 
accompanied by steady increases in the number of provincial units 
- from the original three Presidencies to over a dozen 
substantial units by the 1930's. Only after the turn of the 
century did nationalist politicians bring municipal politics into 
prominence in the larger cities, and for most regions it was the 
1919 reforms which were crucial in widening the area of 
participation. But even in the 1930s, the chief medical advisers 
to all these levels of Government were most likely to be members 
of the I. M. S. - the District Medical Officers or Civil Surgeons 
for the District or Local Boards, and for most municipalities, 
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Tables 5,6 and 7 suggest that civil health expenditures 
prior to 1919 increased steadily in money terms, but remained a 
fairly constant share of the revenue expenditures of the 
different levels of government. After 1919 Central, Provincial 
and Local or District Boards health expenditures rose 
substantially in money terms, and more rapidly than the growth of 
other revenue expenditures. In the municipalities, the growth in 
health expenditure was slower than that of total expenditures. 
Taking all the levels of Government together, it would seem that 
health expenditures as a proportion of public expenditure rose 
from about 4.2% in the 1910s to 5.5% in the 1930s. 
Table 8 attempts to summarise these changes, taking account 
of changes in prices and the growth of population. There are 
problems with some of these calculations: there may be some 
double-counting (Provincial Governments subsidised local 
government institutions, but this probably came from a separate 
budget head); the price index used may not reflect changes in the 
costs of items in the medical budget; and the population deflator 
used is that of the total population, when for some purposes 
(e. g. for Municipalities) the population covered by that form of 
institution might be more meaningful. 
One additional factor complicating an assessment of changing 
priorities is that the 1920's and 1930's were a period of world 
recession. The dominant economic philosophy demanded that budgets 
be balanced, and this placed the most severe restrictions on any 
expansion of expenditures and also led to a decline in prices. It 
is thus difficult to assess the extent to which democratic 
participation changed expenditure priorities towards health 
matters, since price changes may exaggerate the impact. But the 
changes seem large enough to suggest that they reflect real 
increases, so that 'real' per capita expenditure rose about 50% 
between the 1910s and the 1920s, and by the same amount again by 
the 1 930s. 
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It seems most likely that the new form of Government 
introduced by the 1919 Government of India Act had a major effect 
on the size of public expenditure and its distribution. Under 
this Act (and over the objections of the medical civil servants) 
large areas of health policy were made the responsibility of the 
Provincial Governments, and transferred to the control of elected 
Ministers. The British Government argued that had to be 
transferred to the Ministers, and there was little chance that 
ministerial control of public health could threaten Imperial 
interests. The political disputes generated by this decision were 
focussed on the attempts by the I. M. S., the B. M. A. and the G. M. C. 
to stop Ayurvedic and Unani medicine getting any official support 
(see Chapter 2 above) and to establish an Indian Medical Council 
to ensure a continuing powerful role for the Imperial Government 
(Jeffery, 1979). However, it is also probable that these reforms 
had some financial impact, increasing public sector health 
expenditures, in money, real and proportionate terms. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that the I. M. S., as a fully 
bureaucratic institution, was clearly established by the 1860s 
and dominated medical policy-making without any challenge until 
the First World War. After the 1919 Reforms, and with a much 
enlarged Indian membership, the collective character of the 
I. M. S. changed, but it retained most of its influence. Major 
constraints on the way it was organised were its roles as a 
military reserve and as part of the welfare services provided for 
European civil servants and military officers - and these were 
its main bargaining counter. Take away the lucrative civil 
medical positions, and recruitment from Britain would wither 
away; take away British doctors from India and the Indian Civil 
Service, the Indian Army and the Indian Police would complain; 
and these were the backbone of Imperial rule. The orientation of 
the I. M. S. reflected these priorities: there was little interest 
in expanding medical services for the mass of the civilian 
population, and public health measures ('sanitary work') played 
no part in career advancement for ambitious doctors. But this 
does not mean that these were the only concerns affecting medical 
policy. Chapter 4 looks more closely at the implications of 
I. M. S. domination in the three main areas of medical policy - 





MEDICAL EDUCATION, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES UNDER THE 
BRITISH 
"The munificence of this Government charity [dispensaries], conferring such tangible and widespread 
advantages, will doubtless be appreciated by our new 
subjects. "(General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories for 1851-2 and 1852-3,200) 
The three legs of medical policy in India under the British 
were education, public health and medical services. By 1860 the 
general outlines of provisions in each sector were established in 
a formal bureaucratic pattern, which was to last for 60 or more 
years and retains significance today; but after 1920, changes in 
each sector made the greatest impact on post-Independence 
provision. I shall deal with the three sectors in turn, first 
with medical education, which provided the personnel for public 
health and medical services. 
MEDICAL EDUCATION 
In this section I shall deal only with the education of 
doctors. It is much more difficult to provide any kind of picture 
of the development of training for other kinds of medical staff. 
It is clear from the early reports that classes were not only 
held for several grades of doctors but also for compounders 
(pharmacists), sanitary inspectors (from the end of the 19th 
century in Madras, later elsewhere) and for indigenous midwives, 
or dais (see further below). Nurses, of various kinds, and later, 
Health Visitors, were also trained: these categories will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. Information on these 
courses in the British period, the numbers attending, and the 
destination of the students, is scarce, and reflects the strength 
of the assumption that medical education was the most 
significant, at a time when few doctors were assisted by more 
than one or two trained staff. Despite the risk of reinforcing 
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this 'doctor-dominant' view of health care, therefore, I have 
little choice but to focus on the doctors. 
The pattern of medical education in India under the British 
reflects quite clearly the periodisation mentioned earlier. 
Change in this pattern responded not only to changes in Britain 
(in the organisation of medical knowledge, the social interests 
_ 
of different groups in Imperial government etc. ) but also to 
wider political changes in India (the growth of Indian 
participation in government, and the rising involvement of 
Indians in higher education, in particular). Prior to 1860, 
medical education in India, as in Britain, differed little from 
apprenticeship systems, outside one or two centres where a 
scientisation of medicine had been undertaken. Between 1860 and 
1914 medical education was 'controlled' - the student body was 
drawn from restricted social origins, and the I. M. S. had 
virtually unchallenged sway over the terms of the education it 
provided. In this period Indian medical schools and colleges were 
probably not too different from those of Europe: the timelag 
between the education of the I. M. S. man and the education he 
passed on to his Indian students was probably of little 
significance. By the 1920's medical education in India was caught 
between conflicting pressures - of nationalism on the one hand 
and the demands of a swiftly-changing, increasingly scientised 
European medicine on the other. This was the period when student 
numbers expanded dramatically, and control over the kind of 
education offered became a significant political issue (Jeffery 
1979). Key decisions were taken in this period, with considerable 
influence on post-Independence decision-making. The two main 
examples are the decision to phase out the training of a 
subordinate level of doctor, and to exclude 'indigenous' medicine 
from the medical education of cosmopolitan doctors, and I will 
discuss the circumstances of those decisions at the end of this 
section. 
In what follows, I will distinguish between medical 
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and medical although this distinction really only 
applies clearly after about 1860, when the Indian universities 
were established. At that time, recruitment to the medical 
establishment was regularised, giving formal qualifications a 
central place, so that the distinctions between grades were more 
marked. Thus my usage will follow that of the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and afterwards. 'College' will refer to 
institutions preparing students for the university qualifications 
which qualified for entry to the I. M. S. or (after 1892) to the 
Colonial List of the General Medical Council in London. College 
graduates thus had rights to practice in the U. K. and to register 
for the examinations held by the British Royal Colleges. 'School' 
refers to institutions providing only shorter courses, aimed more 
closely at employment prospects in the subordinate medical 
services. At some periods, some medical colleges and schools 
shared premises, and the 'college' staff may have been involved 
in teaching the junior classes. By the 1930s, those with college 
degrees were called 'graduates' and the holders of school 
qualifications were called 'licentiates', and this is current 
usage. However, this is confusing for the period before 1914, 
when the most common University medical degree was the Licentiate 
in Medicine and Surgery (L. M. S. ), so I will not use these terms. 
Through their support of the Sanskrit college, founded in 
Banaras in 1788, and the Madrasa in Calcutta, founded at the 
beginning of the 19th century, the British in India supported 
some classes in the indigenous systems if medicine, though 
without any practical training (Hartog, 1931). But the Portugese 
in Goa were probably the first to have taught medicine and 
surgery of the 'Western' kind in a systematic way in India 
(Jaggi, 1972: 24-6). They established a three year course in 1801 , 
and extended it to four years in 1821. Until 1812, the only form 
of medical education in British India was the training by 
surgeons of assistants on an apprenticeship basis. Some of these 
were later recruited to the subordinate (uncovenanted) medical 
service (Crawford, 1914 Vol. 2: 103-5). In 1812 these schemes were 
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extended and formalised, by attaching European and Eurasian boys 
to the Calcutta Presidency General Hospital, a garrison hospital 
and the General Dispensary, for training as compounders and 
dressers (ibid: 106-8). Similar arrangements dating from the same 
time were made in Madras. Both arrangements were designed 
explicitly with the aim of providing recruits to serve- in 
paramedical positions for the Company's Army, both 'native' and 
European. 
In 1822 medical education in Calcutta was raised in status 
and changed in quality by the establishment of a Native Medical 
Institution (N. M. I. ). There was some general expansion of 
educational provisions by the Company at this time. The members 
of the Court of Directors in London seem to have had no great 
enthusiasm for the N. M. I., expressing hostility to the extra cost 
of paying for a Supervisor, and comparing the new arrangements 
unfavourably with the system still in operation in Madras, where 
the Company merely 'permitted' an apprenticeship system (Asiatic 
Journal, 1826). The number of students at the N. M. I. was 
originally limited to 20, but this limit was raised to 50 in 
1826; they received a stipend during training; they were taught 
in Urdu or Sanskrit, and European texts were translated into 
these languages and also used at the Sanskrit College and the 
Madrasa (Jaggi, 1972: 28-9). Only one European doctor worked at 
the Institution, assisted by a Bengali pandit and other 
assistants, and dissection - the touchstone of 'modern' medical 
education at the time - was carried out not on human but on 
animal bodies. 
The N. M. I. was one of the educational institutions caught up 
by Bentinck's reforming zeal, when, as Governor-General, he was 
responsible for introducting 'utilitarian' principles into 
aspects of Company rule (Stokes 1959). He established a committee 
which argued that the N. M. I. was not properly organised, because 
students were not admitted at a single standard, the tuition, 
period of training and examination were inadequate, and the 
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practical anatomy was non-existent. A dispute between the 
'orientalists' and the 'Anglicists' on the committee was resolved 
in favour of those who insisted that English be the medium of 
instruction in future, and that only 'European' science be 
taught. The N. M. I. and the medical classes at the Madrasa and 
Sanskrit College were abolished at the end of January 1835, being - 
replaced with a Calcutta Medical College. Here the new 
orientation was made clear: the course would cover "the 
principles and practice of the medical science in strict 
accordance with the mode adopted in Europe" (Crawford 1914 Vol. 
2: 436). However, it did not mean the end of medical education in 
local languages: vernacular medical education (without 
instruction in indigenous theories of medicine) restarted in 
1839, with teaching in Urdu and later in Bengali. Education on 
similar principles was introduced in Madras in 1835 and in Bombay 
in 1845, including vernacular classes for the training of 
compounders and 'native doctors', or subordinate medical staff 
(ibid : 446-50) . 
The process of removing the training of the inferior grades 
from the medical college was slow. The Calcutta Medical College 
transferred the Urdu classes to Agra and to Lahore in the 1850's, 
and the Bengali classes to Sealdah in 1873. Madras Medical 
College removed the vernacular classes three times, for short 
periods after 1857 and 1882, and finally in 1903. Bombay 
transferred its vernacular classes in 1878-81, to Poona, 
Ahmedabad and Hyderabad (Sind). The colleges used these transfers 
to gain respectability in the eyes of the British medical 
authorities: Calcutta Medical College had already been 
reorganised in 1845 to meet the requirements of the London 
authorities, and Madras courses were recognised by the Royal 
College of Surgeons from 1856 (Crawford 1914 Vol. 2: Ch. 43). With 
the establishment of Universities the raising of status went one 
step further - Calcutta, Madras and Bombay Universities, founded 
in 1857, made the medical colleges their medical faculties. In 
1892 the Indian universities giving medical qualifications 
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(including Punjab after 1882) all received recognition from the 
General Medical Council in London. The G. M. C. did not insist on 
inspecting the medical colleges but were apparently persuaded 
that there was little difference between the Indian and British 
standards at this time. In order to maintain comparability with 
British medical education, the Indian colleg-es periodically 
raised their entrance requirements. When this happened, 
recruitment to the medical schools was increased, and by the end 
of the 19th century there were several medical 'colleges' in 
Calcutta, usually homeopathic in orientation, who also began to 
expand with those excluded from the official colleges. 
University status did not make an immediate difference to 
the organisation and nature of the medical colleges. To begin 
with, the numbers taking the university qualifications was small: 
only 99 passed the final L. M. S. examination at Calcutta in the 
ten years from 1857-67, and two passed the B. M. degree 
examination in the same period (Reports, 1870: 58). In Bombay two 
or three students passed the final L. M. examinations each year in 
the mid-1860's, while only two candidates received Madras 
University medical qualifications between 1857 and 1868 (ibid: 61; 
100). In addition, considerable tensions remained between the 
military medical authorities (who controlled the appointments to 
the senior medical college and medical school posts) and the 
educational authorities. For example, the Education Department in 
Bombay complained in the 1860s about the poor state of the Grant 
Medical College because the senior appointments were made to suit 
the requirements of the medical administration, not the 
scientific criterion of ability - and the medical storeskeeper 




STUDENTS REGISTERED AS ATTENDING MEDICAL COLLEGES, SELECTED YEARS 
University 1866/7 1876/7 1886/7 1896/7 1906/7 1916/7 1926/7 1936/7 
Calcutta 139 176 172 468 425 1100 1616 1470 
Bombay 18 286 276 279 679 703 618 1244 
1,1, adras 8 143 138 82 195 207 586 1016 
Punjab - 47 68 238 243 232 488 545 
Allahabad - - - - - 137 254 504 
Delhi - - - - - 30 67 138 
Patna - - - - - - 154 266 
TOTAL 155 652 654 1067 1542 2511 3783 5183 
of which: 
European/Eurasian 26p 95 10% 14% 2'1', 3% 
Native Christian 10% 6% 8% 6% 6% 6% 
Muslim 2% 6a 4% 7% 12, 11% 
Hindu - Brahman } 43N 72% 23% 25% } 75n 72% 
Non-Brahman } 37% 50% } 
Parsi 17% 6% 16% 6% 2% 2% 
Other 2% - 1% 3% 3% 6% 
Final university qualifications: 
Candidates 30 154 404 512 1525 15+9 
Passed 22 76 168 329 558 566 
Notes: 'Students' excludes those attending other classes attached to the 
medical college. Final university examinations were predominantly for the 
L. m., or L. M. S., until 1914, when most students took the M. B. B. S. examinations ; Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery). 
Sources: Lf relevant years; 1870; GLrZI Lad 1876-7. 
In 1876/7 and 1886/7 Madras figures may include some school pupils. 
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TABLE 2 
PUPILS AT MEDICAL SCHOOLS, SELECTED YEARS 
Province 1866-67 1876-77 1886-87 1896-97 1906-07 1916-17 1926-27 1936-37 
Bengal 278 862 793 1482 1845 1119 2282 2409 
Bombay ? ? 1 203 307 512 441 - - 8- 0 
Madras 113 ? 204 423 318 600 881 920 
U. P. - 76 125 253 314 679 351 420 
Punjab - 84 143 333 394 513 772 1324 
Assam - - - - * 178 
Bihar - N. Jr- 257 387 212 
Orissa - * T * 7 150 
Central P. - ? 55 247 266 
Sind - E E @ 147 
Other - 296 301 




Central India ? 
Final examinations: 
Candidates 690 1693 3547 
Passed 540,898 1961 
Sources: 
, , "ie. WL Q relevant years, except 
for 1866/67 
figures, from 1870; and 1876/77 figures, from 
1878. 
Notes: These figures sometimes include pupils registered in courses at private 
aided and unaided institutions, in some years including homoeopathic, 
Ayurvedic and Unani schools. Burma is excluded throughout. 
- totals included in Bengal. 
- total included in Bihar. 
ý' - total included in Bombay. 
113 
During the nineteenth century the numbers of medical 
colleges and schools and their pupils grew, but not steadily. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the figures for the most accessible years 
(those of the Quinquennial Reviews of Education) but they do not 
show the extent of fluctuations in numbers. Schools were opened 
in Agra (1853), Lahore (1860), Nagpur (1867, closed about 1883), 
Sealdah (Campbell, 1873), Patna (1874), Dindigul (1874, 
transferred to Madura 1885, amalgamated with Tanjore 1887) Dacca 
(1875), Cuttack (1876), Nellore (1876, closed 1897) Indore 
(1878), Poona (1878), Ahmedabad (1879), Hyderabad (Sind) 1881, 
Tanjore (1883), Ludhiana (Mission, for women, 1894), and 
Dibrugarh (1900). Of these, Lahore became a medical college with 
the founding of the Punjab University in 1882, and the inferior 
teaching was transferred to Amritsar in 1920. King George's 
Medical College, Lucknow, opened in 1912, was the other addition 
to the ranks of the full-fledged medical colleges before the 
First World War. A period of rapid growth during the First World 
War was followed by decline in the 1920's, partly in response to 
the pressures exerted by the General Medical Council in London 
(Jeffery, 1979). Figure A shows the trends in total students 
graphically. 
However, the figures of those passing the final examinations 
seriously underestimate the impact of medical education. The 
heads of the medical schools and colleges addressed this as an 
issue of the 'quality' of their students: in Madras in 1867, for 
example, while 32 passed out from the 'inferior' departments, 16 
were 'dismissed for incompetence' (which suggests the military 
character of the institution); and in Calcutta, 124 passed the 
Ist L. M. S. examination between 1860 and 1868, out of 317 
candidates (ibid: 55,444,417). Inspection of the number of 
candidates from year to year suggests that many of those who 
failed at one attempt did not succeed at later attempts. But it 
is clear that these 'failures' are only part of the story. Many 
students attended for a few sessions but did not complete the 








































others left for other reasons. For example, during the 1870s the 
Principal of the Madras Medical College complained that of the 
small number of students studying for the L. M. S. or M. B. B. S., 
several left without attempting to complete the course, some to 
go to England to complete their studies (Sanitary Commissioner's 
Report, 1876). Similarly, in Calcutta in 1872 it was estimated 
that only 8% passed the examinations, the remainder leaving to 
practise without any formal qualification (Indian Medical 
Gazette, 1872). In other words, the numbers of successful 
graduates is probably the lower limit of an estimate of those who 
gained enough medical education to establish a medical practice, 
either directly or after more training elsewhere. An upper limit 
of this can be provided by dividing the number of college 
students registered in each year by five; and of school students 
by four. The two limits are indicated graphically in Figure B. 
Those who left without passing the final examinations had a 
variety of career options, since at this time there was no bar on 
their taking up appointments in Princely States, or setting up in 
private practice, and no constraints on what they might prescribe 
nor on what operations they might carry out. Unfortunately, we 
know nothing about the careers of these 'M. B. B. S. failed'. 
Thus, despite the main expressed intention behind the 
establishment of medical education (to supply subordinate medical 
staff for Government service), the impact of the training was 
much broader. This was true for both the colleges and the 
schools. The medical colleges had, almost from the start, 
interpreted their role much more widely than just 'providing 
subordinate medical staff'. There were two main reasons for this. 
To begin with, from the beginning, medical colleges had accepted 
substantial numbers of privately-funded students in addition to 
those on stipends and bound to serve in the subordinate medical 
services if requested. As early as the 1880s, they established 
practices in the major towns and began to compete with European 
doctors for the private market. Thus, of 142 graduates of the 
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were in private practice in 1882 (Gumperz, 1965: 234). 
Secondly, the medical college Professors encouraged their 
better students to gain British qualifications or to compete for 
entry to the I. M. S. In 1845 one of the Professors at Calcutta 
Medical College took four students to England to complete their 
medical training, and one of them joined the I. M. S. at the first 
competitive examination in 1855. Graduates from the medical 
colleges were likely to go to Britain for higher qualifications, 
if they wanted to make a mark in their careers, and the medical 
colleges seemed to be proud of such achievements, however 
unpopular the Indian member of the I. M. S. might be with European 
civil servants or, (especially just before the First World War) 
with the British Medical Association. 
The medical schools also saw the training of private 
practitioners as part of their role. More of their students, of 
course, were on stipends and were bound to work in Government 
service (military or civil) for a period after completing their 
course. In some periods the expectation that school graduates 
were destined for public employment did affect policy. Entry was 
cut back when a 'surplus' appeared likely, as in Punjab in 1871 
(Kerr, 1979: 296). But even so, private students were common, 
especially in Calcutta. The Bengali department of the Calcutta 
Medical College was regarded as a source of 'independent medical 
practitioners' from about 1865, which may explain why the share 
of 'fees' in its financing was much greater than that of the 
English or Hindustani departments - and why less was spent on the 
Bengali classes than on the other two, in spite of the fact that 
the Bengali department was the largest (Reports, 1870: 65,452) 
By the end of the nineteenth century, if not before, the 
spread of employment of those leaving medical schools was as wide 
as of the college graduates (Quinquennial Review, 1908: 160). 
Substantial numbers of Indian graduates had established 
themselves in private practice in the main Indian towns, and were 
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regarded as posing a real threat to the hakims and vaids and 
also taking patients from the Government hospitals and 
dispensaries. This latter was undoubtedly unintended, but at 
least some senior members of the I. M. S. accepted it as an 
inevitable (and desirable) result of their policy of medical 
education: 
"The object (of medical education) was not merely to 
secure a constant supply of subordinate medical officers 
for the Government service but also to raise the 
standard of medical knowledge and encourage the practice 
of medicine and surgery on established scientific 
principles. That private practitioners, possessing the 
necessary qualifications, should be able to compete 
successfully with public medical charities, is a 
satisfactory result. " (Bengal Administration Report, 
1885: 306-7) 
When these same men began to take clients from the private 
practice of I. M. S. members as well, the objections were more 
substantial, and the I. M. S. jealously guarded its control over 
the major hospitals, in order to prevent Indian doctors from 
claiming the prestige associated with being attending doctors 
there. Until the early twentieth century, of course, the I. M. S. 
had admitted very few Indians into full membership, but during 
the First World War considerable numbers were inducted on 
temporary commissions and stayed on afterwards. Whereas in 1913 
only 5% of the service was Indian, by 1938 their share had risen 
to 37% of the civil posts. Thus the Nationalist claim (expressed 
in the 1930s) that the I. M. S. was unwilling to train Indians to 
its own standard seems overstretched. It seems more likely that 
teachers would prefer to encourage their students, for the 
intrinsic rewards that this would bring them, but also because of 
the social composition of the college students. As Table 1 shows, 
the student body before 1914 was heavily weighted towards those 
social groups seen as closest, in 'ethnic' terms, to the British. 
The 'race and creed' data show that medical college students 
were recruited from a relatively narrow social background, with 
Christians (often European, and later, Anglo-Indian) and (in 
117 
Bombay) Parsi students providing a large proportion of the 
student body. Prior to the 1880s only sporadic evidence is 
available about the ethnic origin of medical students. In the 
18'40's roughly one in three or one in four of the Calcutta 
Medical College students were Christian (Commercial Tarriffs 360- 
4; Returns, 1852). In the 1860's one in four of the Calcutta 
students were Christian, and a proportion of these were either 
European or 'Eurasian'. As Table 1 shows, these groups were still 
substantial as late as 1916/17, with a peak around 1911/12 when 
they amounted to 15% of the student body, with 'Native 
Christians' accounting for only 3% and Europeans or Eurasians 
making up 12%. Parsis were heavily over-represented (in terms of 
their share in the general population), with one in six students 
in the 1880s and again in the early years of the twentieth 
century. The dominance of these groups in the medical schools was 
never so marked. In the colleges and the schools, while Hindus 
were the largest group, but those classified as 'Brahman' were 
much fewer than the rest, unlike the situation in the other 
sectors of higher education in this period. The share of Muslims 
only began to approach a due proportionate level in the 1920's 
and 1930's, when the reservation of places for Muslims began to 
have some impact. It would seem that the over-representation of 
Indian Christians and of Parsees was stable until the First World 
War, and more marked than for other forms of higher education. 
This suggests 'both the strong symbolic value of the degree as an 
index of Westernization and the strong identification of these 
groups with Westernization in this particular form' (Gumperz, 
1965: 228). 
As medical education expanded rapidly, during and after the 
First World War, so the proportion of the 'ethnically similar' 
groups dropped dramatically, and this may have been one of the 
reasons behind the changing attitudes of British medical 
authorities to the issue of 'Indian medical standards' in the 
1920's and 1930's. The G. M. C. in London began to take more 
interest in the quality of the qualifications it registered after 
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1907, when it warned of a need to improve midwifery training. In 
1920 the Indian universities were asked for more details of their 
own arrangements, and the unsatisfactory nature of the replies 
was used in 1921 as grounds for a threat to remove recognition. 
This threat was used by the I. M. S. to maintain their control over 
the medical colleges, to reduce the number of students admitted, 
and to toughen up the conditions for passing the examinations. 
The Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 had given the area of 
medical education to the Provincial Governments, for elected 
Ministers, though retaining control of 'medical standards' for 
the Central Government. The assistance of the G. M. C. enabled 
members of the I. M. S. to retain more of the lucrative medical 
college jobs than they might otherwise have done, and to control 
Ministers who wanted to change the pattern of medical education 
in their Provinces. The number of medical undergraduates, which 
had nearly trebled between 1908 and 1922, dropped steadily until 
1927, only rising above the 1922 level in 1934. The pass rate in 
the M. B. B. S. examinations dropped from over 50% in the period 
1915-1921 to under 40% from 1925 up to the War. 
In spite of the fact that midwifery training remained 
inadequate (the basic problem was a shortage of midwifery cases 
in the medical college hospitals) the G. M. C. continued to 
recognise the Indian colleges (with the exception of Calcutta for 
a few years after 19214) until 1930. It then refused recognition 
until an Indian Medical Council was established (in 1933) and 
was able to negotiate retrospective recognition (in 1936) for 
most graduates in the intervening period. While the rhetoric of 
the dispute was cast in terms of the acceptability (or otherwise) 
of Indian graduates who wished to practice in Britain, the 
implications were to affect the whole pattern of medical 
education in and for India. The medical schools were excluded 
from the terms of the Indian Medical Council, and this 
recognition of their second-rate status fuelled campaigns for 
them to be abolished or for them to be up-graded into colleges. 
It was decided to do this in 1939, and this decision was 
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reasserted after Independence and implemented in the 1950's. 
There were other factors affecting the nature of medical 
education after 1919. The effect of the world recessions 
immediately after the War, and again after 1929, had severe 
impacts on Government expenditure as the Government of India 
attempted to balance its budget, and called in notable 
businessmen (in this case, Lord Inchcape) to advise how this 
might be achieved. This affected not only employment 
opportunities in the public sector but also increased competition 
in the private sector: reports on unemployment in Punjab and in 
U. P. in the 1920's and 1930's claimed that only 15-20% of doctors 
in private practice were making a decent living. Graduates began 
to take jobs for which only a licentiate qualification was 
required, and the clinching example came in 1938 when 995 
licentiates and 428 graduates applied for two poorly paid posts 
in Aden. 
As a result of these trends, the 1930s saw a major attempt 
to dismantle the 'two-tier' system of medical education in India 
by phasing out the medical schools. Where possible, it was 
proposed that facilities should be upgraded, courses lengthened, 
and schools turned into colleges; elsewhere, schools might be 
closed. This policy was supported by the representatives of the 
school-educated doctors, who hoped thereby to be able to gain the 
benefits enjoyed by the college graduates; by British members of 
the I. M. S., who saw this as a means of blunting criticism from 
London of the ambiguous position of Indian medical education; and 
by nationalists who felt that the second tier implied that those 
receiving their care were second-class citizens. It was opposed 
by those who felt that the school-educated doctors were more 
suitable for a poor country, being cheaper to train and more 
willing (because of their lower social origins) to work in rural 
areas or in unpopular specialities such as public health 
(Jeffery, 1979). As I shall show in Chapter 9, these debates have 
recurred in the post-War period as well. By 1938, the decision to 
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destroy the medical schools had been taken in principle; the 
intervention of the War prevented its full implementation for 
another 15 years. 
The doctors trained in these medical colleges and schools 
were the backbone of the Government medical services, and, by 
1900, they also provided a substantial number of private medical 
practitioners. We know very little about the nature of the 
services they offered. It is too simplistic too assume that they 
practised what they were taught, or what their orders dictated. 
Some of them collaborated actively with indigenous practitioners, 
until the 'ethical codes' of the Registration Acts made that a 
dangerous activity (Steinthai, 1984). Others were accused of 
ceasing to practise Western medicine, under the stress of making 
a living. However, those in Government service were part of a 
structure which, nominally at least, was to provide curative 
services and (after 1865) preventive ones. I shall now turn to 
consider the nature of these provisions. 
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SANITARY POLICY 
Prior to the 1860s there was little dicussion of sanitary 
matters except in a sporadic way. Thus in 1810, when a group of 
Dacca citizens proposed local improvements (such as the removal 
of filth, or the repair of wells and drains) the Governor-General 
rejected the proposal out of hand (Ahmed, 1980: 134-5). The 
Magistrate was supposed to carry out improvements, but in fact 
spent most of his time on judicial and police work. By 1823 the 
Governor-General was prepared to permit the surplus from town 
taxes to be spent on urban improvements, but in Dacca at least, 
most effort went into road-widening, the draining of marshes, and 
into the clearance of land for (amongst other things) a race- 
course (ibid: 147-8). Efforts depended on the energy of individual 
officials appointed to the improvements committees: but they were 
all abolished in 1829 as a measure of economy (ibid: 159). 
However, one measure of preventive medicine was already 
commonplace: vaccination against smallpox, with over one million 
vaccinations a year being carried out by the 1860s. 
The beginnings of preventive health measures in India are 
usually dated from the Royal Commission appointed to enquire into 
the sanitary state of the Army in India, which reported in 1863. 
This Royal Commission was established, in part at least, because 
the deaths of British soldiers during the Mutiny from disease 
greatly exceeded those from injuries received in fighting. It 
reported that it was impossible to separate the health of the 
army from 'the sanitary condition of the "native" population' 
close by, and that 'well-considered measures of water-supply, 
drainage, paving, cleansing and general constitution in these 
towns would be attended with most beneficial results to the 
health of the troops quartered near them'. All the "native" towns 
had some system of cleansing and dealing with human excreta and 
other nuisances; and vaccination was already a part of the 
general medical activities; nonetheless, the Commission 
concluded, there was much more to be done (Sanitary Commission, 
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1863: 77 , 
81 ; Statistical Abstract, 1870: 53). 
The Royal Commission report thus used a military argument to 
raise the priority of sanitary work, and this gave sanitation the 
official basis which it retained during the rest of the 
nineteenth century. This left sanitary policy restricted to the 
towns and military areas. This was foreshadowed in the report 
itself, which reflected the terms under which it had been 
established. Its proposed improvements were for the towns "in 
proximity to military stations" (ibid: para. 35). The Government of 
India, after quibbling about the estimates of military mortality, 
accepted the report and implemented the proposal to establish 
Sanitary Commissions in each Presidency, with advisory but few 
executive powers. The Sanitary Commissions were replaced after 
two years by a single Sanitary Commissioner each, and by 1868, 
one for each of the Provinces. In the following twenty years 
there was little evidence of real achievement, partly because of 
the subordination of sanitary officers to medical ones, and 
partly because of the restriction of sanitary concerns to 
official circles. In addition, there was still considerable 
technical dispute about the relationship between sanitary 
measures and medical science. The relative importance of 
different sanitary proposals was hotly debated, especially 
(before 1880) with respect to the role of clean water in 
preventing cholera 1973-; Hume, 1984). 
The I. M. S. was by no means convinced of the necessity of 
separating sanitary from medical work. Gordon argued in 1866 that 
the Sanitary Commissioners would unnecessarily limit the 
functions of the army medical officers, and the Indian Medical 
Gazette waged a fierce war against the appointment of Major G. B. 
Malleson (a layman) to be head of the Bengal Sanitary Department 
in 1866 (Jaggi, 1973: 98-9). It was clear that the Indian 
authorities had little training in epidemiology, as understood in 
Britain at the time, and this helped to render the sanitary 
commissioners' work almost valueless. For example, in the 1870's 
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the Bengal Sanitary Commissioner was attacked in the London press 
for apparently doing little beyond collating vital statistics 
which he was unable to analyse to any effect. Nonetheless, the 
Commissioner claimed that there was no evidence linking the 
spread of cholera to polluted water supplies, in spite of the 
evidence which had by now convinced most doctors in Britain 
(ibid: 102-3). K. Macleod, editor of the Indian Medical Gazette in 
the 1880's and Professor of Surgery in Calcutta, was a staunch 
supporter of the claim that clinical practice was the best 
training for epidemiological and sanitary work, thereby 
justifying the subordination of sanitary matters to the control 
of doctors whose training in public health was non-existent. 
The main effort of the Sanitary Commissioners was focussed 
on the towns close to military stations - they were excluded from 
any concern with the cantonments and the European 'civil lines' 
themselves, which remained the responsibility of the army 
(Harrison, 1980: 173). Increasingly these towns had local 
Municipal committees with formal responsibility for conservancy 
and town improvements, with some of their members elected. Much 
of the early focus of these committees was on conservancy - the 
removal of faeces from residential areas. In Allahabad in 1870, 
280 sweepers were employed to collect sewage, and 90 drivers to 
take it out to be buried; in Calcutta in 1867 a municipal railway 
had been built to deal with the transport problem (ibid: 182-3). 
But the financial limits of these committees stopped them from 
making a substantial impact on sanitation. Thus the proposals 
made by Ranchodlal Chhotalal, the first non-official Indian to be 
made Chairman of the Ahmedabad Managing Committee, were greeted 
with considerable opposition. In 1883 Ranchodlal proposed better 
water supplies and drainage, better hospitals and more planning 
controls over housing; his vehement opponents attacked the 
increased taxation needed to ppy for them (Gillion, 1968: 136-8). 
Eventually, in 1 891 , an improved water-supply scheme was 
implemented, but it was only in 1903, after the Municipality had 
been ordered (by the Bombay Government) to take the advice of 
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experts, that the drainage scheme was completed. Similarly, in 
Allahabad, the water-supply scheme first mooted in 1883 was in 
operation by 1891 but a drainage scheme to deal with the extra 
water entering the city was not started until 1913 (Harrison, 
1980: 186). 
This delay in the provision of drainage systems (common 
throughout Indian towns, because of the extra expense involved) 
meant that the introduction of clean water supplies actually 
seems to have increased mortality rates. For six north Indian 
towns, recorded death rates in the five years following the 
introduction of filtered water supplies were higher than in the 
five years before (Klein, 1973: 651). The most likely explanation 
is that the surplus water formed stagnant pools, ideal breeding 
grounds for mosquitoes, thus increasing the spread of malaria, 
though cholera deaths, and those due to dysentery and diarrhoea, 
probably did decline. 
Pressure from Britain was a major reason for the reopening 
of sanitary issues in India in the late 1880's. Florence 
Nightingale was a key influence in the pressure on the Indian 
Government to improve sanitary arrangements in the villages, 
which by common consent had been almost totally ignored up till 
then. There was, at the time, no agency to implement the rules 
which had been established for village sanitation. 
Decentralisation had only really reached the Provinces in 1872, 
under Lord Mayo's reforms, and the larger towns were given some 
autonomy in 1882, with the Ripon reforms. A new extension of 
local Government was set in train, with Acts in Bombay (1889) and 
in other parts of the country, designed to promote district 
authorities who would have sanitary measures as one of their 
primary concerns. Training courses in Hygiene and Sanitation were 
expanded, and graduates were brought into sanitary work over the 
next ten years. But the extent of activity was severely 
restricted, not merely by the shortage of funds available, but 
also by the limitations which policy-makers believed were set by 
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the "ignorance, prejudices, callousness, and superstitions of the 
people" (Harvey, 1895: 5). 
It is possible to regard this view as a way of blaming the 
poor and the sick for their own conditions, in order to escape 
the responsibility for ameliorating the situations which were 
accepted as the real causes of the high rates of morbidity and 
mortality. But some doctors advanced more sophisticated arguments 
to the effect that European methods of disease control were 
inapplicable in India, because of social (e. g. caste) and 
environmental (e. g. the monsoon) barriers (Arnold, 1985: 6). It is 
clear that the medical administrators were uneasy about their 
record in the santary field, particularly when challenged in 
international settings with responsibility for the cholera 
epidemics which attacked Europe from time to time, and emanated 
from Bengal (Jaggi, 1973: 103). On the other hand, they were 
undoubtedly correct in asserting that the cost of implementing 
sanitary improvements throughout rural India would be beyond the 
financial limits of Britain, let alone of the Indian Government. 
Funding problems were probably exacerbated by the policy of 
linking sanitary reform so closely to local governments with even 
more inadequate sources of finance than the towns had. 
There were also good grounds for supposing that attempts to 
intervene in the provision of water supply, the control of 
sewage, or other aspects of the everyday life of villagers, would 
lead to great hostility and little success. There was the 
experience of vaccination as a guide: frequent rumours of the 
danger of the treatment, and general hostility to vaccinators, 
was a recurrent feature of the life of the medical department. 
This was partly the fault of the vigorous campaigns which tried 
to eradicate inoculation, which was much better established as an 
indigenous form of smallpox prevention, but which may have 
increased the risk of transmission to the unprotected (Arnold, 
1985: 8). The experience of the response to plague measures (see 
below) after 1896 reinforced this view. As alien rulers, with 
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little understanding of the ways of life of their subjects, it is 
likely that their sanitary measures would be unsuccessful, though 
in moral terms this might not justify the pathetic attempts which 
were actually made. Expenditures on preventive medicine were 
always small, as a percentage of overall public expenditure or 
relative to medical expenditures, and probably only wa-ter 
supplies and some vaccination programmes made any serious impact 
on morbidity and mortality before the Second World War. 
This was despite the awareness of links between sanitary 
provisions and the health of a population, especially in urban 
areas where collective arrangements for waste disposal, water 
supply and drainage were major concerns. As in Europe, the 
history of town planning until 1900 was almost entirely a matter 
of sanitary provisions, fuelled by the demand from the wealthy 
that they not be infected with the diseases of the poor. In 
India, this distinction took on a racial form, with the attempts 
to protect the European, civilian and military, from 'native 
diseases'. This lay behind the concern of the Sanitary Commission 
and was manifest in the organisation of the reports of the 
Sanitary Commissioners. But it achieved its most notable result 
in the separation of city from cantonment, or the attempt to 
place physical barriers between Indian and European, which had 
been specifically deplored by the Royal Commission (Sanitary 
Commission, 1863: 79), but which accorded with theories of 
contagion through bad 'air' (Harrison, 1980: 174). Thus conditions 
in the European areas were much better than in the Indian ones: 
roads were paved and swept, water supply and drainage was 
improved to a higher standard, and much earlier, and the degree 
of crowding was infinitely lower. But in the European areas, 
sewage removal arrangements differed little from those in the 
rest of the city, at least during the 19th century, and 
provisions for the Indians living there (servants, traders etc. ) 
were possibly even worse than in the towns (ibid: 182). 
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After 1900, Improvement Trusts were established in many of 
the larger towns, and (among others) Patrick Geddes was asked to 
give advice on the development of the urban areas. While these 
developments were prompted by the experience of the plague, and 
out of a concern for the appalling conditions in the slums, they 
only had power to control new building beyond the city limits. 
Any attempts to improve working class housing ran into 
overwhelming opposition, and had little support from the 
municipal committees, since they were so expensive. Despite 
Geddes' propaganda, only in Hyderabad (where the Nizam gave 
considerable support) was there any substantial attack on 
insanitary conditions (heller, 1979: 3L7). 
Sanitary reform in India thus has to be seen as a qualified 
failure. Even in the towns most directly amenable to British 
influence and action, the conditions of life of most inhabitants 
remained appalling, with very high mortality and morb idity rates 
in the worst areas, and only the areas where most Euro peans lived 
showed the benefits of civic concern. It is this racial 
distinction, and the much higher significance of State activities 
in many Indian towns, which provide the main points of difference 
between Indian and British experience in this fiel d. Despite 
having a more centralised, active and interventionist Government 
than in Britain, and one which attempted to draw on British 
experience, India gained remarkably few benefits. Capitalist 
development, and the rapid unplanned increase of the urban 
population, led to slums, over-crowding and urban squalor in 
India just as in Europe. 
PLAGUE 
Plague was probably fairly common in India before the coming 
of the British, and its association with rats was known (Anstey, 
1936: 72). But it seems to have disappeared from India in the 
early nineteenth century, before being reintroduced from China 
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through Bombay in 1896. Since its signs are fairly distinctive, . 
and it generated such horror and official inquiry, deaths from 
plague might well have been fairly accurately recorded. If so, 
the estimates of some 15 million plague deaths in British India, 
and 18 million in the Princely States, between 1 896 and 1 921 , 
cannot be far off the mark (Census, 1921: 350). The disease spread 
quickly, to most parts of the country, helped by the railways and 
the growth of trade and commerce. The urban poor suffered most, 
and then, panic-stricken, escaped into the rural areas, taking 
the disease with them. 
The special point to note about the treatment of plague by 
the British derives from the fact that plague was reintroduced 
into the country at a time when measures for its control and 
prevention were understood, yet the response of the authorities 
was almost totally ineffective. The immediate response of the 
Bombay authorities was drastic: sufferers were compulsorily 
removed to hospital, the infected were segregated, premises 
evacuated, a sanitary cordon was attempted around affected areas 
and travellers were medically inspected. These measures were 
inadequately explained and few people accepted the rationality of 
what was proposed. Some attempted to resist these measures 
openly, either as traders rejecting bans on exports or the 
movement of goods, as mill-owners rejecting steam-cleansing, or 
as Jains and others destroying rat traps. Others merely avoided 
the control measures, by concealing infected people and then 
dumping their dead bodies anonymously in the street, escaping 
around cordons, or refusing to leave infected areas for fear of 
theft from their unprotected houses (Klein, 1973). When pushed 
too far, they rioted. 
The clash between Western medicine's arrogant self- 
confidence and its failure to deal with the plague is well 
indicated by the extent to which the medical authorities had to 
compromise with Indian opinion. Originally, the authorities 
demanded that all patients be treated by Western doctors, but 
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they were forced to accept that patients could use hakims and 
vaids, and to deny any claim that plague inoculation would be 
made compulsory (Arnold, 1985: 10-11). By 19009 the Sanitary 
Commissioner noted, the plague epidemic was treated as a 
political emergency, not a matter of public health, and he argued 
that this was due to the fact that the idea of public health was 
alien to the sympathies and traditions of the people (Sanitary 
Report, 1902: 117-21). Dealing with the threat to trade and social 
order became paramount: treatment and control measures had to 
follow behind these imperatives, and the Imperial Government 
withdrew from active attempts to intervene in the spread of the 
disease, and merely 'responded' to calls for medical services 
(Klein, 1973). 
MEDICAL SERVICES 
The Company began to set aside special houses for its sick 
employees in the 17th century, but it was not until the end of 
the eighteenth century that separate provision was made for the 
'native' indigent sick, in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay (Jaggi, 
1973: 75-88). The practice of separate provisions was generally 
maintained, though in some places non-official Europeans might be 
allowed access to the hospitals designed for civil servants. In 
the general hospitals, there were some wards for Europeans and 
Eurasians separated from those for the rest of the population. 
Medical theory in the early 19th century stressed the 
desirability of removing the sick from their homes and 
localities. Those in hospitals were more obviously under medical 
control and observation (Arnold, 1985). But dispensaries were 
cheaper, and more popular. They were often attached to the new 
hospitals. The Calcutta Medical College had a hospital of its 
own, and used several of the other Calcutta dispensaries for 
teaching purposes in the 1830's. 
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TABLE 3 
USE-RATES OF HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES BY PROVINCE, SELECTED YEARS 
Year 
Province 1 881 1 891 1901 1911 -1 921 1931 1939 
Bengal 1.4 2.0 4.9 £ 6.1 +12.2 +13.0 15.0 
Madras 4.6 7.9 11.7 13.6 17.5 27.6 39.6 
Bombay 7.6 9.5 7.8 10.0 11.7 16.5 24.4 
Punjab 8.0 12.2 14.6 20.1 23.5 51 .9 56.2 
U. P. 3.5 6.4 7.7 9.0 12.4 14.2 14.9 
C. P. and Berar 5.6 8.6 13.5 12.8 13.5 18.9 25.4 
Assam 1.1 5.9 11.9 *10.9 21.3 25.0 20.8 
Bihar n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. } 8.6 16.3 18.5 
Orissa n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 23.2 
N. W. Frontier' n. a. n. a. n. a. 19.7 14.7 27.5 46.4 
Baluchistan' n. a. n. a. n. a. 27.7 39.8 69.7 78.5 
Total (British India) 3.7 6.0 8.6 10.8 14.1 22.0 26.3 
(N in millions) (7.3) (13.4) (19.9) (26.3) (34.9) (58.7) (77.7) 
Note: Use-rates are reported hospital and dispensary out-patient 
attendances (N) per 100 population recorded in that Province in the 
Census of that year, or (for 1939) the closest year. British India 
excludes Burma in this table. 
£ Bengal figures in 1911 exclude the area of East Bengal, included 
with Assam (*). 
+ Bengal figures in 1921 and 1931 include East Bengal but exclude 
Bihar and Orissa. 
1. In the case of N. W. F. P. and Baluchistan, the population used as 
denominator is that of British territory jgj;, j the associated Agencies 
and Tribal Areas, whereas for the other Provinces only the 
population within British-ruled areas is assumed to use these 
facilities. 
Sources: For 1881 and 1891 , Reports of the Sanitary Commissioner, 
relevant years; for 1901 onwards, Statistical Abstracts, relevant 
years. 
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The extension of these facilities beyond the Presidency 
towns was slow: not until the 1830's was there much development. 
Dispensaries, primarily for out-patients but with some inpatient 
beds and operating facilities, preceded hospitals proper. In 1838 
Lord Auckland, then Governor-General, sanctioned an increase in 
Government dispensaries in Bengal and established them on a more 
formal basis, specifying the grade of doctor to be in charge and 
the total cost (Rs250-300 per annum) which Government was 
prepared to bear, any excess to be found from 'native' 
contributions (Sykes, 1847). By the early 18140's there were 17 
dispensaries, in most of the major towns in the Bengal 
Presidency, treating approximately 100,000 cases annually. Madras 
was slightly slower to act: apart from two dispensaries in Madras 
Town (one dating from 1828, the second from 1837) there was 
little growth before the mid-1820's, and in 1848 less than 50,000 
out-patients were seen, with a Goverment expenditure of Rs29,000 
(Medical Reports, 1850). 
However, growth in the following years was much faster in 
Madras and Bombay than in Bengal, and the Punjab Government acted 
even more decisively to establish medical facilities for the 
general population. In Punjab, the Government was "deeply 
sensible of the benefits which dispensaries are likely to confer 
on our poorer subjects" (Punjab, 1849-50 & 1850-51: 151) and 
opened 33 dispensaries, treating over 70,000 cases a year by 1855 
(ibid., 1 85 L-5 & 1855-56: 113). This pattern continued throughout 
the period up to 1939: Table 3 shows that use rates per 100 
population apparently differ fairly dramatically between the 
Provinces, with Punjab rates (and later, those for Baluchistan 
and the North West Frontier Province) usually well above the 
others. Some caution must obviously be expressed about these 
figures. Use-rates tended to rise in times of epidemic or famine, 
and since these were not national calamities they will affect the 
inter-Provincial comparisons. In addition, it would seem that in 
some periods numbers were inflated, either to keep a dispensary 
in existence or to demonstrate the assiduous work done by the 
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dispensary doctor -(Bengal Sanitary Report, 1880). Nevertheless, 
these patterns seem fairly stable, and do seem to represent both 
different levels of provision and different degrees of 
'use' of Western medicine. They say nothing whatever, of course, 
about any benefit which might have been gained from a visit, and 
it is not possible to distinguish between multiple visits by a 
small number of people, and occasional visits by a much larger 
number. 
To begin with, these facilities were restricted to the major 
towns, but a spreading of dispensaries occurred with the 
devolution of government after 1880. Thus in 1881 one quarter of 
all out-patients attendances in Bengal were accounted for by the 
Calcutta hospitals and dispensaries; this had declined to 13% by 
1 891 , and to 6.5% in 1 901 , though Calcutta still dominated the 
in-patient totals. As municipalities were established after 1870, 
and district and local boards after 1890, there was a steady 
increase of expenditure on medical matters, and the creation of 
more dispensaries. 
STATE INTERVENTION IN MEDICAL CARE FOR WOMEN BEFORE 1947 
There are at least two ways to see the attempts by the State 
to provide medical care for women and children and to explain 
the relative failure of these attempts in India. The first 
stresses the desire by the State to overcome the gross 
inequalities in access to health care, as part of a humanitarian 
attempt to reduce mortality and morbidity rates amongst the most 
disadvantaged groups in the population; the failings to do so (in 
this perspective) are usually explained by the resistance of the 
local society to change in the desired directions. This view is, 
of course, the one held by apologists for Empire, and appears 
regularly in health reports and discussions by Government per- 
sonnel. An alternative view suggests that the extension of health 
services is used by the State to gain access to the family, as 
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part of an attempt to control the reproduction of the labour 
force and the physical 'quality' of labour, and thereby to in- 
crease its degree of social control; failure is to be explained 
in economic terms, on the grounds that there are insufficient 
benefits to the ruling classes from such interventions except in 
the case of the skilled working class and the members of the 
State apparatus itself. 
Under the British, it seems clear that elements of both 
accounts are necessary. Once it was clear that women and small 
children were indeed suffering high levels of morbidity and 
mortality which the existing clinics were unable to deal with, 
the consciences of prominent members of the British community in 
India were sufficiently upset for several moves to be made to 
overcome the situation. Viceroy's wives seemed to feel it their 
duty to raise funds for the amelioration of the position of women 
in India. Lady Dufferin established a fund in 1885 to provide 
medical aid to the women of India; Lady Curzon established a fund 
to pay for the training of indigenous midwives, in 1903; Lady 
Chelmsford established a League to train Lady Health Visitors and 
fund maternal and child health work, in 1920; and in 1924 Lady 
Reading established a fund for the Women of India, which paid for 
a hospital in Simla and a training college in Delhi. 
The proposals for improving medical services for women took 
the following major forms: the employment of women doctors and 
the training of women medical students; the establishment of 
women's hospitals and wards, staffed by women; and the training 
and employment of subordinate female staff, notably health 
visitors and indigenous midwives. The first two of these were 
seen as of particular benefit to the respectable classes: (N. A. I., 
Home, Medical, 1887: 32 A) 
"having regard to the social habits and customs of this 
country, where the seclusion of females among the 
better classes is the rule, the need of trained female 
native doctors and nurses is manifest and urgent. " 
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The respectable women were also expected to benefit from 
schemes such as those introduced in U. P. in the 1890s, in which 
female doctors visited parda-nashin women in their homes (though 
since European and Eurasian women were also visited in this way 
it is not clear how the scheme worked in detail). By the turn of 
the century there were about 3750 of such visits a year in U. P.; 
twenty years later this had risen to over 7000 (Civil Hospitals 
and Dispensaries, U. P., relevant years). This scheme was 
obviously designed for the relatively wealthy in urban areas; for 
the poor there were female dispensaries, and the attempts to 
train the dai, both of which depended upon women doctors. 
The employment of female doctors in India dates from 1869, 
when the first American woman missionary doctor, Clara Swain, 
arrived. Other missionary doctors arrived in the 1870s, and some 
women returned to Britain to complete their medical training as 
soon as this was possible. The first female doctor to be employed 
by Government seems to have been Elizabeth Beilby, asked to 
establish a woman's hospital by the Lahore Municipal Committee in 
1885. More substantial hospitals under women doctors were opened 
in Bombay (the Cama Hospital) in 1886, and in 1884 in Madras 
(Balfour and Young, 1929: ch. 2). After 1885, the Dufferin Fund 
brought in European female doctors on a more regular basis, and 
began to organise the building of hospitals and the employment of 
staff. The numbers employed grew very slowly, and it was clear by 
about 1907 that more support was needed from the Government if 
salaries were to be increased and careers were to be properly 
organised. In 1914 a Women's Medical Service was established, 
with the assistance of an annual grant from the Government of 
India. Salary scales and other conditions of service remained 
much below those of the I. M. S. By 1928 there were 44 doctors in 
the Women's Medical Service, compared with the 750 men in the 
I. M. S. at the same time. 
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The admission of women to medical training in India dates 
from 1875, when Mary Scharlieb and three others were admitted to 
the Madras Medical College, and gained a school diploma three 
years later. In Bombay and Madras, women were admitted to the 
medical colleges in 1883, over the objection of the medical 
college staff (Jaggi, 1972: 93-110). In Calcutta, all women 
students were provided with scholarships, and the Dufferin Fund 
also prompted municipalities to provide scholarships for women to 
be trained in medicine. The numbers of women in medical schools 
and colleges rose steadily, though it is difficult to provide a 
clear picture because the sources on the sex of medical students 
are not always consistent. In some years, figures are tabulated 
by institution, possibly meaning that women attending the 'male' 
medical colleges, were classified as men. But the proportion of 
women was always very low. The scope of female medical education 
was boosted in North and South India by the opening of female 
medical schools and the Lady Hardinge Medical College for women 
in Delhi in 1916, but as late as the 1920's fewer than 20 women a 
year were receiving the higher medical qualifications (MB BS or 
LMS) in the whole of India, and less than 50 were passing out 
from the medical schools with the lower qualification 
(Quinquennial Reviews, relevant years). Growth in the 1920s was 
faster: in 1928 there were 253 women studying in medical colleges 
(121 at Lady Hardinge College) and 445 at medical schools or 7.6% 
of the total. In 1937 the figures were 475 and 964 respectively, 
and the proportion had risen to nearly 12% (Balfour and Young, 
1929: 121-2; Quinquennial Review, 1936/7). The dominance of Indian 
Christian and European or Eurasian women was overwhelming until 
the 1930s: thus in 1926/27 nearly 2/3 of those at female colleges 
and schools were from these groups, though this had declined to 
1/3 by 1936/37 (Quinquennial Reviews, relevant years). Throughout 
this period it seems to have been accepted that the proper work 
of female doctors was solely concerned with women and children: 
they were not expected to challenge the dominance of men over 
provision for males or many areas of general surgery and 
medicine, and Balfour and Young tactfully discuss some of the 
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disputes over prcedence which emerged as members of the I. M. S. 
attempted to control the women's hospitals as well as their own 
(1929: 43-5) . 
Female dispensaries, staffed only by women, began to be 
established in North India in the 1890's. A major limitation to 
the speed at which they could be expanded was the number of 
female doctors. By 1920 there were 76 medical women employed by 
different levels of Government for the whole of U. P., and 35 for 
Punjab; there were 108 in U. P. in 1930 (Balfour and Young, 
1929: 168; Civil Hospitals and Dispensaries, U. P., 1930: 13 ). 
Female attendances at dispensaries and hospitals, throughout the 
period for which data are available, show much lower consultation 
rates for women than for men, not only as in-patients (well below 
male levels) but also as out-patients. As Table 2 shows, at the 
beginning of this century consultations by women at hospitals and 
dispensaries were rarely above 50% of the level of consultations 
by men. Where figures are available for children, they suggest 
that girls (aged 12 or less) were taken for consultations about 
60% as often as were boys. These figures exaggerate the access of 
women to dispensaries, since some women would be represented at 
the clinic by a male relative, who would consult on her behalf 
(Balfour and Young, 1929: 34). Consultations at female 
dispensaries raised consultation rates by women, but the number 




FEMALE PATIENTS TREATED IN HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF MALE PATIENTS, SELECTED PROVINCES AND CITIES 
Province/City Years 
1881-1890 1901-1910 191 1-20 
. 
1921-30 1 93 1-40 
Bombay City n. a. 58 87 62 42 
Rest of Bombay n. a. 45 46 43 46 
Calcutta 25 49 50 47 57 
Rest of Bengal n. a. 32 30 32 38 
Madras City 50 74 71 63 n. a. 
Rest of Madras 43 43 40 45 n. a. 
Punjab 31 47 54 64 n. a. 
North-West P. /U. P. 34 
Source: Kynch, mimeo; for 1881-90, Administration Reports, 
relevant years 
Note: These figures are not all for the full decade, but are 
annual averages for at least 7 years in each case, and exclude 
children. 
It is difficult to keep track of all the various attempts to 
improve midwifery in India by training local midwives in improved 
techniques. The earliest example from North India is reference to 
a course held in Amritsar from 1866, still in good shape in the 
early 1 880's when 9 or 1C were being trained every year. A class 
was established in Bareilly in 1867, and a Lahore class, founded 
in 1876, was expanded with scholarships etc. in 1883, and a new 
lady doctor, appointed in 1885 (N. A. I., Home, Medical, 1887: 76-83 
A). These attempts were not widely copied; in Bengal there was 
little support from the medical establishment, and the classes 
(run by men) could have little practical instruction because of 
the total absence of maternity ('lying in') cases in the 
hospitals and dispensaries. Interestingly, the Civil Surgeon in 
Bareilly argued in support of midwifery training on the grounds 
that it might help to reduce infanticide; the passing of the 
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Infanticide Act three years later heralded a far more intensive 
intrusion into matters regarded locally as private, family 
affairs, than was ever considered for purely medical purposes. 
The closest to an attempt to get more direct access to maternity 
cases was a proposal to pay women who were prepared to attend 
hospitals to have their babies: this was not in order to reduce 
the neo-natal mortality rate but to provide teaching cases for 
the dai classes and for medical students (U. P., 1881: 31Z). 
Two points should be made about dai training. Firstly, the 
scale of such training ebbed and flowed, along with the length of 
the courses and the financial attractions offered. Thus before 
the First World War between four and five hundred dais every year 
were receiving certificates for successfully attending courses in 
U. P. but in the 1920's less than 50 a year were under training 
(U. P., relevant years). Secondly, even its proponents admitted 
that they had little success in training, and even less success 
in supervising the trained dai (Balfour and Young, 1929: 128-40). 
The impetus for the development of much of the maternal and 
child welfare work done in India came not from the State 
apparatus but from private funds raised by leading British women. 
The State did respond by contributing funds to these schemes, but 
it was not really interested: witness the fierce rearguard action 
needed for women to save the grant to the Women's Medical Service 
from financial cuts threatened by the Inchcape Committee in the 
1920's (Balfour and Young, 1929). The limits of State concern for 
maternal and child health can also be seen in the debates 
surrounding the attack on the quality of Indian medical 
education, mounted by the General Medical Council in response to 
nationalist pressures and the Indianisation of the Indian Medical 
Service (Jeffery, 1979). The G. M. C. complained that even the 
medical college hospitals were not seeing enough maternity cases 
to allow the medical students to gain practical experience, and 
it was this, rather than any other consideration, which increased 
attempts to attract women to hospitals for their deliveries. 
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Thus by the time the British left there was an infra- 
structure of health services directed specifically at women: 
female dispensaries, staffed entirely by women, existed at least 
in the District Headquarters towns, and there were also some 
women trained to nursing positions, again largely staffing - 
clinics in the larger towns. There had been no concerted effort 
to improve the availability of medical services to rural women: 
the attempts to train dais were obviously sporadic, again urban 
biassed (since they depended on female staff to do the training) 
and they had little noticeable impact on the way in which 
children were delivered in most of the country. Given the small 
number of medical graduates practising in the rural areas, the 
smaller number of female graduates, and a probable absence of 
women providing Western drugs as pharmacists, Western medicine 
made little impact on women under the British. 
CONCLUSION 
In none of the areas of medical provision was there a 
coherent policy designed to attack the major causes of disease 
and premature death. The nearest to such a policy comes from the 
vacination campaigns which, if thoroughly pursued with the 
confidence of the mass of the populatio-n, might have made a 
substantial difference to the extent of smallpox. The British 
felt themselves to be hamstrung by cultural barriers, local 
prejudice, and financial constraints, but equally significant 
were the dominant concerns of European and Imperialist medicine. 
Surgery had the highest profile - it offered most possibilities 
for private practice, and was the section where indigenous 
medicine had least to offer. But it probably had the least impact 
on the conditions of health and disease for the mass of the 
population. I shall consider the overall impact of Imperalist 
medicine in the Conclusion to Part A. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART A 
It makes little sense to see Imperial medicine in India in 
terms of CtbCr social control Qr humanitarian concern for an 
ignorant and diseased populace. The picture is more complex. Both 
aspects are important, and were often closely intertwined. Thus 
some of the ways in which medical services contributed to social 
control depended on humanitarian concerns: it is difficult to 
attract people to hospitals and dispensaries if the services they 
offered were irrelevant to people's perceived needs, or if the 
services were offered in a hostile and disparaging manner. 
Issues of social control were paramount in setting the 
structural context within which the I. M. S. was working. 
Undoubtedly, when issues of wide policy were discussed, the 
I. M. S. referred to its role in keeping the troops healthy, the 
civil servants content and the masses convinced of the benefits 
of British rule. But these arguments were based on some weak 
premises. Thus the troops were not particularly healthy, and it 
was the British Army in India, served by the Army Medical 
Department under the War Office, not the I. M. S. under the India 
Office which was crucial to the defence of British interests in 
India. The masses were not, in fact, desperate to 'accept' 
Western medicine, and their use of dispensaries, or acceptance of 
training in Western medical schools and colleges, was more a 
matter of enlightened self-interest than a commitment to Western 
science or Imperial rule. The problems with vaccination and 
plague control brought home the extent to which Western medicine 
remained alien to most of the Indian population. 
But the structural context, and the alien nature of British 
rule and provisions, do not explain why medical services were 
chosen as part of the symbolic justification for Imperial rule, 
nor why they took the form which they did. They form a set of 
shifting limits within which members of a bureaucratic structure. 
acted according to their view of the purposes of Imperial rule, 
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the proper role of medicine, and their own preferred careers and 
activities. Thus while it is inconceivable that medical services 
could have been designed in such a way that they threatened 
Imperial stability, this still left considerable leeway. A 
successful rural health service, after all, could have 
contributed far more to social order than the inadequate, almost 
non-existent, structure which was provided. 
In addition, there was considerable disagreement about what 
should be done. None of the policy innovations went unchallenged, 
nor were policy statements ever applied rigorously. In 
particular, the relationship with indigenous medicine was one 
over which uncertainties remained until the end of British rule, 
Attempts were being made to find common ground at the same time 
as official policy was to exclude indigenous practitioners 
entirely from the Government ambit. 
Another example was in the training of personnel, especially 
for rural services. The Medical Degrees and Medical Registration 
Acts from 1912 to 1919 seem designed to force India into a 
'professional' model for the delivery of health services. But the 
1920s saw a flowering of attempts to use a range of local people 
as the bottom tier of the medical and sanitary services. Within 
British India, schemes for village nurses and for schoolmasters 
as medical workers were not merely proposed, they were 
implemented by British doctors working within the Government 
( McGuire, 1929; Hooton, 1928). Experiments like this were 
welcomed by the Indian Medical Gazette in an editorial in 
December 1924, where it was made clear that a number of 
experiments were also taking place, with Government assistance, 
in the voluntary sector; and Rockefeller Foundation support 
helped a similar project in Travancore (Tampi, 1931). 
The Imperial impact on health in India was thus contra- 
dictory. On the one hand, it seems that changes in famine policy 
and food distribution helped to reduce mortality; increasing 
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numbers of men (and later, women) were trained in medicine to the 
international standards of the time; hospitals and dispensaries 
attracted considerable numbers of patients; and issues of disease 
prevention and public health provision were addressed. On the 
other hand, many of these measures were restricted in their 
impact to a relatively small sector of the population, firstly 
the European civil and military servants and their families, 
later the wealthier Indian inhabitants of cities and towns: if 
19th century medical services were 'beneficial', then the mass of 
the Indian population could not have benefited. The preventive 
campaigns were never pushed fully through, and their impact was 
limited. Both vaccination and, more powerfully, plague control, 
demonstrated the failure of British health policy to come to 
terms with local society. It seems unlikely that health measures, 
, Cr Zg 
had any marked influence on mortality and morbidity; but 
they established a framework (of personnel, ideas, institutions) 
which permitted more substantial post-Independence provisions, 
whose impact is more noticeable. 
Ramasubban argues that this pattern can be defined as a 
'colonial mode of health care', characterised by segregation, and 
by provisions for the enclave sector which kept pace with 
'metropolitan' developments. The rest of the population "missed 
going through the period of sanitary reform which swept through 
most of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" 
(1984: 107). There is a danger that this picture seriously over- 
estimates a number of elements in the story. Firstly, it was 
recognised that segregation could not be complete, and the 
interests of colonialists were linked with those of the Indians 
who surrounded them. Thus the most substantial urban improvements 
(in water supply and drainage) were designed to improve the 
living conditions of Indians. Secondly, provisions (in terms of 
hospitals and dispensaries, or places in medical schools and 
colleges) soon out-ran the needs of the Army and the European 
civil population, and this was regarded with satisfaction, not 
alarm. Thirdly, the most effective elements of European sanitary 
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reform were also largely urban phenomena: many rural areas in 
Europe are without centralised water supply, drainage or refuse 
disposal, for example. To blame the colonial government for not 
transferring urban solutions to a largely rural India is to 
under-estimate the extent of the problems involved. And fourthly, 
the role of public health itself in Europe is overstated by this 
view, since rising living standards and changes in personal 
hygiene were largely independent contributors to the changes in 
the level and kind of morbidity and mortality experienced by the 
European population. 
The failure of the colonial Government to make a substantial 
impact on morbidity and mortality in India, then, did depend on 
factors outside their control as well as the constraints imposed 
by the nature of that Government. We should not dismiss these 
arguments as self-interested excuses merely because they were 
made by the Imperialists themselves. Most prominent amongst the 
problems faced by health policy-makers was the poverty of the 
Indian population (not all caused either by the depradations of 
British conquest in the eighteenth century, or by 
commercialisation and the sustenance of landlordism in the 
nineteenth). Not only did this mean that the diseases which they 
suffered were (and are) difficult to treat, and (with the 
technology of the time) difficult to prevent. In addition, it 
meant that the tax base for raising revenue to implement public 
solutions was also limited. The Imperialist Government did not, 
of course, place sanitary reform or medical services high On its 
list of priorities; but in some ways they were higher in India 
than in Britain. The British Government was inclined to leave 
medical provision to charitable or voluntary hospitals; medical 
education to independent medical schools; and sanitary reform to 
urban councils. All these in India were seen as the proper 
concern of the Imperial Government. 
A further problem was provided by the radical differences in 
understanding the causes of disease and the consequences of 
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some aspects of the environment, held by the rulers and the 
ruled. This was most marked in the case of plague, but was also 
true for issues of 'conservancy', or water supply, or antisepsis. 
Some, or even all the views on these issues put forward in the 
nineteenth century may now appear to us to be wrong, without 
altering the fact that it was and still is very difficult to 
implement policies based on them in the face of uncomprehending 
hostility. 'Health education' still labours to persuade, quite 
apart from the technical problems of the solutions which were 
offered (e. g. for water closets, or water purification). The 
commitment to implement such policies may have been weak; and the 
constraints (financial, political, or administrative) set on 
health policies were undoubtedly considerable; but it remains an 
open question how much difference would have been made by any 
conceivable alternative structures or commitments, given the 
extent of the changes in living and thinking patterns which were 
necessary. 
In the period after Independence, the 'alien' rulers were 
replaced by Indian ones, albeit ones often rebuked as no less 
alien in thought, speech and action than many of the British. 
Part B will consider how medical policy after 1947 has changed 
the inheritance of services left by the Imperialist power. 
6 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART B 
The political impact of Independence in 1947 was much less 
substantial than Nehru's rhetoric suggested. There were two main 
reasons for this. Firstly, nationalist policies were focussed on 
gaining power and removing the British, and there was no agreed 
programme for social and economic change beyond *this. There were 
ideologues in Congress, both Gandhians and socialists, with ideas 
about creating a new society. But most of the Congress leadership 
were more interested in operating the levers of power in a 
Government not radically different from that being operated by 
the British in the decade or so before they left - as Maddison 
(1 972) puts it, Congress were 'step-in-my-shoes Nationalists'. 
Secondly, the circumstances of Independence, associated with 
Partition, made it difficult to consider long-term goals. 
Congress politicians gained power, in the Provinces in 1946 and 
nationally in 1947, but the normal problems of making policy and 
implementing it were made much worse by the conditions in which 
Independence was gained. There were massive upheavals caused by 
Partition which diverted resources and attention to dealing with 
the refugee problems, and the maintenance of public order. Not 
until 1950 did Patel (the Home Minister) manage the accession of 
the Princely States to the Indian Union, and deal with the major 
rebellion in Telengana and minor uprisings elsewhere. Inevitably, 
the new governments were thrown back to relying on the 
essentially colonial civil service - sometimes the very 
individuals who had been responsible for imprisoning their new 
leaders during the Quit India Movement five years previously. 
Here I want to sketch out three key features of the post- 
Independence State in India: the changing role of the world 
economy; the management of the federal political structure; and 
the role of the State in the economy and in planning. 
A 
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INDIA IN A WORLD ECONOMY 
There was no sharp break with British economic interests 
after 1947. The British had dominated those parts of the Indian 
economy most closely linked to export markets and imported goods, 
and there was neither wholesale nationalisation of those 
interests nor a massive disinvestment, though there was a little 
of both (Lipton and Firn, 1976). Furthermore, there was not much 
new investment, either by British or by other companies, prior to 
the 1960s. In part, this reflected domestic economic policy, 
which was designed to protect Indian industries by, for example, 
high tarriff barriers. But it was also due to Indian foreign 
policy, which stressed balanced links with the dominant world 
powers, and left some American companies uncertain whether to 
trust the climate for investment in India. However, India's 
international position weakened dramatically in 1958, when its 
foreign exchange reserves ran very low, and again in 1964-5, when 
a combination of bad harvests, the 1962 War with China and the 
1965 War with Pakistan depleted stocks still further. The U. S. 
Government used this latter opportunity to encourage a 
devaluation of the rupee, and shifts in policy with respect to 
foreign investment, agricultural policy, and population control 
programmes. 
As Kidron (1 966) and Alavi (1965) argued, the new patterns 
of foreign investment took very different forms from the older, 
Imperialist patterns. The new investment was in industrial 
manufacturing, in the expanding areas of the economy, 
technologically more advanced, more profitable, and serving the 
internal market rather than an export market. Companies leapt 
over the tariff barriers and est-ablished production operations 
within India. New controls on foreign companies introduced in 
1972 (the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act) have served to reduce 
the equity shares of foreign companies, so that some companies 
(I. B. M. and Coca-Cola, for example) withdrew. In general, 
multinational corporations have preferred collaboration 
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agreements with Indian companies, with little foreign capital 
input, since the early 1970s. 
Indian academics have been relatively loath to explain these 
changes in terms of the dependency analyses derived from Latin 
American writings (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984). Discussions of 
the State have been more concerned to delineate local class 
alliances, and the implications of the changing production 
relationships in agriculture (Thorner, 1983). In part this has 
been because the Communist Party of India has muted its 
criticisms of Congress in order not to damage Moscow's 
relationship with the Delhi Government. But it also probably 
reflects the relative unimportance of foreign trade, foreign 
capital, and foreign aid, compared to many other 'peripheral 
capitalist' societies. There have been short periods of crisis 
when the Indian Government has been particularly weak, but India 
is not an 'export-oriented' economy; the policy of import- 
substitution has kept imports to about 10% of national income or 
less. The indigenous capitalist sector was relatively well 
developed at the time of Independence, having benefited greatly 
from the War economy, and it maintained strong links with the 
Nationalist movement which protected it from attack after 1947. 
Even after the growth of foreign investment described above, in 
1 981 -82 only about 10% of total value added in manufatlu ring and 
mining was accounted for by foreign firms (Bardhan, 1984: 44). And 
while foreign aid in some years has accounted for a substantial 
share of Plan expenditure, India has rarely had to borrow from 
the I. M. F., and now has a relatively low level of international 
public debt, with substantial reserves created by foreign 
remittances. 
THE MAN AGEMEý1T OF A FEDERAL POLITY 
The Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 established a 
federal system of Government which the new Government of India 
accepted, and amended very little. The structure was altered 
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slightly by the inclusion of the old Princely India, and then (in 
1956 and the early 1960s) the States were reorganised largely 
along linguistic lines and their number was reduced. But the 
Constitution of 1950 made little change to the division of 
functions and financial powers. Running this system, however, has 
left the formal struture unchanged but has led to a concentration 
of power in the hands of the Central (or Union) Government. 
The financial implications of this are exhibited in the 
control exercised by the Central Government over State Government 
finances. This has taken place through the workings of the 
Finance Commissions (which have made 5-year distributions of tax 
revenues); through Central Government control over the Reserve 
Bank of India (the lender of last resort to State Governments); 
and through the working of the Planning Commission (see further 
below). In each case, the relative weakness of State Governments 
has been a cause of complaint by them, and the final arbitration 
of awards has been a matter of Central control. 
The political aspects of these relationships have changed 
through time. Prior to 1965, Nehru ran a Congress Party which 
held power in almost all of the States, almost all of the time. 
Within this party, the core of nationalist politicians from the 
Independence movement, dominated by Western-educated groups, 
especially lawyers, had a considerable degree of local autonomy. 
Since then, a number of changes have concentrated more power in 
the hands of the Central Prime Minister. Indira Gandhi, in 
particular, used her patronage in the course of her disputes with 
the Congress 'old guard', which split the party in 1969-70 and 
again in 1975-76. While the political 'Emergency' of 1975-77 
represents an extreme form of centralised power, or 'emergency 
regime' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1981) it should not be regarded as 
an aberration. Chief Ministers of States have become aware that 
they can not expect to remain in power unless they have the 
support of the central Government and the Prime Minister, nc 
matter what local support they might think they control. 
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These processes have had two consequences. The first is the 
increased pressure on the State governments to meet the demands 
of local pressure groups. Patrons within the party press claims 
for resources to go to certain areas or for benefits (jobs, 
contracts etc. ) to be distributed in particular ways. The Chief 
Minister who causes local resentments will find that his 
opponents will approach the Prime Minister for his or her 
removal. The Central Government, by contrast, has relatively 
little patronage of this kind (posts, or contracts) to 
distribute, and is less likely to be the target for concerted 
pressure f rom w ith in the country, than to be the focus of 
persuasion from foreigners wishing to gain contracts and support. 
The second consequence has been that in general policy terms, the 
Central Government has been less willing to tolerate political 
and administrative diversities (Dua, 1981: 272-3). 
The resulting pattern has been seen as increasingly 
populist, in that policy-making has progressed with an eye less 
to ideological coherence or overall rationality than to a desire 
to meet interest group demands, often through an expansion in the 
role of the public sector. Myrdal (1968: 895-900) called this a 
'soft' State - one which places few demands on the mass of its 
citizenry, and attempts to offer services, employment and other 
benefits without, for example, establishing a tax system or a 
political structure which can call upon individual resources in 
the kind of centralised way epitomised by Communist China. None 
of the policies envisaged by the political campaigns to 
'eradicate poverty' (Mrs Gandhi's 1971 slogan) or by the '20- 
point programme' (evolved to legitimate the Emergency and revived 
by Mrs Gandhi when she rerturned to power in 1980) involve a 
direct attack on class privileges or call for the mobilisation of 
individual resources. Land reforms are the obvious example of 
this tendency: despite the fanfare of the abolition of zamindari 
(the largest landholders) very little land has been appropriated 
or distributed to the 'tillers of the soil'. 
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THE CENTRALITY OF THE STATE 
The third aspect of changes in the nature of the State in 
India since Independence relates to the role it has taken in 
economic decision-making. This has taken two interrelated forms: 
the attempt to manage the economy through detailed controls; and 
the use of Plans to provide an overall coherence to the economy. 
Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 placed the State 
at the centre of the commanding heights of the economy, reserving 
key areas (power, heavy industry, capital goods) for the public 
sector. Later decisions led to the nationalisation of financial 
centres - the banks and the insurance companies. As a result, 
there has been a massive rise in the numbers employed in the 
public sector, not only in the organs of Government but also in 
industries, services and financial institutions. These have been 
the main means by which the Government has attempted to achieve 
the goals set out in the five-year Plans. 
Prior to the Second World War, there was really very little 
conscious planning by the Imperial Government. Hanson (1966) 
usefully describes the variety of planning proposals put forward 
before the War, usually by academics and industrialists outside 
the Government machinery. But in 1942 the Government, as part of 
its programme to convince Indians both that the British expected 
to win the War and that things would be better for the Indians if 
they did, established a Reconstruction Committee to make plans 
for coping with the situation they predicted when the War was 
over. This grew into a Planning and Development Department, with 
specialised committees drawing up plans for the five years 
following the War in the context of a fifteen year perspective 
plan (never actually produced). The topics covered by these 
committees covered a wide range, and included discussions on the 
role of the State in reducing glaring inequalities of wealth, and 
in the control of major industries. Hansen argues that by 1945 
this activity had produced a statement of intent - the 'Second 
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Report on Reconstruction Planning' - which foreshadowed all the 
fundamental objectives and methods used in the five-year plans of 
the 1950's (Hanson 1966: 38). 
The Planning Commission has provided the Central Government 
with a powerful agency for affecting health (and other) policy in 
areas which were constitutionally matters solely for the States, 
because the Planning Commission has controlled the most 
substantial part of uncommitted funds. In recognition of the 
power that this control provides, the Planning Commission was 
under Nehru's direct control. It has remained at the centre of 
Indian political life ever since, except for a few spells when 
planning fell into disfavour - especially the 'Plan holiday' 
years 1966/7 to 1968/9, and under the Janata Government of 1977- 
79. 
Although the First Plan (1951-2 to 1955-6) was really little 
more than a listing of existing projects, and was not adopted 
until after two of the five plan years were already over, the 
other Plans have played a substantial role in public sector 
expenditure patterns. The First Plan explicitly rejected the idea 
of total nationalisation, but the Second Plan, with its emphasis 
on heavy industry, also stressed that the public sector should 
grow faster than the private sector, in line with the Industrial 
Policy Resolution of 1956, and the nationalisation of life 
insurance companies and the Imperial Bank of India. The Second 
Plan ran into difficulties in 1958, as a result of a poor harvest 
and a balance of payments crisis, and was only rescued by 
considerable foreign assistance. The Third Plan continued most of 
the emphases of the second, but was more heavily dependent on 
foreign assistance. However, the planning process was challenged 
during the Third Plan by the revelation through the 1961 Census 
that the population growth rate estimates which underlay much of 
the Planning framework were considerably below what actually 
happened - 1.2% assumed against 2.1',, 'o actual growth rates 
(Maddison 1972: 114). 
152 
By 1965 the planning process was knocked completely out of 
step by a combination of the war with Pakistan (and a consequent 
cut in U. S. assistance) and a severe drought. For the next three 
years only Annual Plans were produced, and the Fourth Plan 
(1969/70 to 1974/5) was much lower in profile and gave more 
emphasis to rural development. The third 'crisis of planning' 
arose in 1972/3, when the rising price of oil imports and another 
poor harvest raised the rate of inflation dramatically. The Fifth 
Plan was delayed, only existing in draft form for several years, 
and towards the end of the Plan period (1977/8) the new Janata 
Government attempted to replace the five year planning sequence 
by a set of rolling plans in a longer perspective. Mrs Gandhi's 
return to power in 1980 restored the Planning Commission to a 
place nearer the centre of power, and the five-year planning 
process was resumed. The Sixth Plan for the years 1979/80 to 
198+/5 was finally published in 1981. 
Most discussions of the planning process in India have 
focussed on the overall context, and on the problems dramatised 
by the crises of planning (see, for example, Streeten & Lipton, 
1968; Bhagwati & Desai, 1970; Cassen, 1978; Frankel, 1982). It 
has been argued that the Planning Commission has been dependent 
on its closeness to the Prime Minister for its power - Nehru took 
a considerable interest but his successors have been less 
involved. The raising of the resources for the Plans has been out 
of the hands of the Planning Commission and in the hands of 
ministries of finance at the centre and the States, so that even 
in the public sector there have been limits to the ability of the 
Planning Commission to determine the patterns of expenditure, 
while its planning for the private sector has been much more 
difficult to implement. In general, the Plans have been 
optimistic about the volume of resources which will be raised, 
and about the external environment. In particular, the estimates 
of a growth in National Income have almost always been 
exaggerated and the major determinant of the growth of the 
153 
economy - the productivity of agriculture - has received less 
attention than it deserved. 
The catalogue of criticisms is almost endless. One more 
which has specific relevance to health sector planning is the 
failure (before the Fifth Plan) to be concerned with 
distributional aspects of development. Until about 1970, planning 
was based on the premise that the benefits of increased economic 
output would inevitably flow (or trickle) down to benefit the 
mass of the poor. This assumption has come under increasing 
attack (e. g. Chenery et al, 1974), and alternative planning 
strategies have been proposed. One alternative strategy (a 
concerted attack on those institutions which generate poverty, 
especially in rural India, through land reform) has not been 
seriously considered either by the Planning Commission or by the 
rest of the Government of India. Instead, the response since 1971 
has been to follow a 'basic needs' strategy; that is, to raise 
the importance of programmes designed to provide basic services 
to the mass of the population, the so-called Minimum Needs 
Programme. This has potentially raised the importance of 'social' 
expenditures (health, education, social welfare and so on) in 
contrast to the earlier Plans for which the 'core' sectors were 
always defined as those of heavy industry, power and minerals. 
THE CONTEXT OF HEALTH POLICY-MAKING AFTER 1947 
There are two major influences on health policy-making after 
1947 which set a context of structures affecting how this 
developed, and I shall describe them briefly here. The first is 
the Report of the Health Survey and Development Committee, known 
by the name of its chairman, Sir Joseph Bhore, established in 
19+3 as part of the reconstruction planning discussed above. The 
second is the Central Council of Health. 
The Bhore Com mittee published its four-volume report 
(G. O. I., 1946) in the tradition of Briti sh committee reports -a 
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detailed analysis of the available data, the evidence of expert 
witnesses, and recommendations produced by a secretariat in a 
clear and consistent pattern. However, this was not the only plan 
for public health work available at the time. There was an 
alternative set of proposals, emanating from the Congress Party 
itself, which had established a National Planning Committee in 
1938, much under Nehru's prompting. Nehru's socialism was 
essentially Fabian, in spite of his visits to the Soviet Union in 
the 1930's, and involved national planning for a mixed economy. 
His more radical ideas were ground down in the intense 
politicking of the first years after Independence, but still 
retained enough vitality to lead to the establishment of the 
Planning Commission in 1950 as the main institution for 
implementing his vision of the future. But his interest in the 
National Planning Committee (N. P. C. ) seems to have evaporated. 
Its reports, issued in 1938 and edited and published after the 
War by its Secretary, K. T. Shah, were largely ignored. By 
comparison with the Bhore Report, the N. P. C. report on Public 
Health (N. P. C. 1946) was shorter, less well argued and costed, 
and drew on far less detailed analysis of the existing situation. 
Without the support of a secretariat, or any political powerbase 
within the Congress Party, the N. P. C. Public Health report 
disappeared with very few traces, and it was the Bhore report 
which provided the framework for most health decision-making. 
In many areas the two reports overlap. Both look towards a 
socialised system of health services, in which the public sphere 
dominates health provisions and eventually replace private 
medical practice. Shore expressed this in terms almost identical 
to those of the Beveridge Report which foreshadowed the National 
Health Service in the U. K. - that "no individual should be unable 
to secure adequate medical care because of inability to pay for 
it" (G. O. I. 1946, Vol. 11: 17). The Bhore and N. P. C. reports also 
support the development of insurance-based services for 
industrial workers, but accept that this is impractical for the 
mass of the Indian population in the foreseeable future. 
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Both reports pointed to the significance of nutrition and 
general living standards as the major determinants of health, and 
argued that preventive measures should be most important. Both 
saw the integration of preventive and curative services, provided 
by a full-time salaried cadre of workers, as the way to achieve 
this, and they also called for Government doctors to lose their 
rights to private practice. Bhore argued for this on unusual 
grounds which came close to advocating a new medical police: 
"Medical supervision of work and play, of the food that 
people eat, of public provision for rest and 
recuperation as well as periodical medical examination 
and the rectification of faulty modes of life will be 
some of the many new duties that the physician of the 
future will be called upon to undertake. Our view 
therefore is that the national health organisation will 
tend to become a whole-time salaried service devoting 
itself to the development of the health of the people. " 
(G. O. I. 1946 Vol. 11: 28) 
The crucial position of rural provision was also common 
ground: in Bhore's words, "it is the tiller of the soil on whom 
the economic structure of the country eventually rests" (ibid: 
41). Bhore also accepted that services should be as close to the 
people as possible. Both proposed a system of health centres in 
the villages, linked to larger units at district level, though 
they differed in the details of how many were to be provided for 
a given size of population. The Bhore report specified in much 
more detail not just desirable staffing levels over a 30-40 year 
period, but also suggested a strategy for the shorter-term, the 
first 10 years. Both reports called for a substantial increase in 
the amount of public money allocated to health matters, but 
stressed that a shortage of trained personnel would be a major 
constraint. 
Finally, both reports saw the need for health education - to 
change the habits of mind and ways of life of the mass of the 
population - and the need to engage the co-operation of the 
villagers in the work which was needed. The example of Soviet 
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health committees was cited by the Bhore report, based on an 
article by Henry Sigerist on the Soviet health service, and 
suggested that pioneer work at Singur, in Bengal, was proof of 
the possibility of it working in India. 
The differences appear particularly in the topics which 
Shore covered and the N. P. C. did not; and in one key area, that 
of medical manpower, which both discussed. Bhore urged the 
establishment, of special campaigns against specified diseases, in 
particular malaria, tuberculosis, V. D. and leprosy, whereas the 
N. P. C. report was silent on these 'vertical' campaigns. The area 
of dispute was over who were the priority categories of personnel 
for training, and what was the proper role of semi-trained 
villagers and indigenous medical practitioners. These manpower 
issues will be addressed directly in chapter 9: here I will only 
note that although Bhore was willing to float the idea of 'health 
assistants' to relieve medical men of some of their curative and 
preventive duties, he saw no role for part-time health workers, 
who were the 'cornerstone' of the N. P. C. proposals. 
THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF HEALTH 
Both sets of proposals, then, envisaged a much higher degree 
of conscious planning of the future pattern of health services 
than had been characteristic of the British period. But the 
framework for health policy-making after Independence was 
constrained by essentially the same Federal structure as that 
created by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, amended to a 
small extent by the 1935 Government of India Act. This structure 
gave primary responsibility in health matters to the States. The 
Centre kept control over international aspects - quarantine etc. 
- and over a limited range of all-India matters, including the 
regulation of standards of medical education (to permit medical 
personnel to practise throughout the country) and the control of 
communicable diseases. 
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There were two mechanisms by which the Central Government 
could hope to integrate health policy in the States: through the 
financial incentives it could offer through the Plans, and by 
persuasion through the Central Council of Health (C. C. H. ). The 
C. C. H. (and, in Family Planning matters, for a while in the 1970s 
the Central Council of Family Planning, later combined with the 
C. C. H. into a C. C. H. and F. W. [Family Welfare]) consists of health 
officials and ministers which meets annually to discuss health 
policy. It grew out of less formal meetings of a body established 
in 1937, called the Central Advisory Board for Health. This did 
not meet very often, and was replaced in 1946 by a Conferences of 
Health Ministers. After the third Conference, in 1950, the 
Central Council of Health was established, with membership of the 
Central Government and all the States, chaired by the Central 
Minister of Health. The States are usually represented by a 
contingent including a Minister, some generalist civil servants 
from the Health Ministry, and their main technical advisers from 
their Health Directorates. They are supplemented by a changing 
body of observers, usually including representatives from other 
cognate Ministries, the President of the Medical Council of 
India, a representative from the Planning Commission, someone 
from the major International agencies (W. H. O.; U. N. I. C. E. F. ) and 
during the 1950's and early 1960's, people from the U. S. aid 
agencies, not only from the U. S. Government but also from Ford 
and Rockefeller Foundations. The agenda is largely set by the 
Central Health Ministry, though States can propose items, but it 
was made clear at the second meeting of the Council that, as far 
as the States were concerned, the conclusions or motions passed 
by the C. C. H. were only advisory and could not be binding on the 
States (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 1954). The weakness of Central control 
which this exposed led some (including the Health Survey and 
Planning Committee [G. O. I. 1962: 46-7 & 463-476]) to reiterate 
calls for an All-India cadre of medical administrators to replace 
the I. M. S. 
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The next six chapters are concerned with health policy- 
making after 1947. Once again the guiding themes will be drawn 
from the critical literature on health services in the Third 
World -a literature which is concerned to explain the 
'inappropriateness' of health services through a political 
economy of policy-making. The criticism of inappropriateness is 
one which has been levelled for many years within aspects of 
nationalist critiques of colonial rule, and since 1965 it has 
become increasingly common in discussions of health service 
delivery in the Third World (e. g. Bryant, 1969; Morley, 1972). 
Since 1975 it has been the formal orthodoxy of the international 
health establishment (e. g. Djukanovic and Mach, 1975; Newell 
led-] 1975; World Bank, 1980). However, the arguments I shall 
mostly be concerned with have taken these criticisms one stage 
further, by claiming that this mismatch between health 'needs' 
and health services can be explained through an understanding of 
class structures and the world economy (e. g. Navarro, 1975; 
Doya1,1979). 
Essentially, the argument I will be confronting is as 
follows. Health services in India, as in other parts of the Third 
World, are poorly articulated with the health needs of the people 
because they received a colonial heritage of health provisions 
which was racially skewed and focussed on curative services in 
the interests of larger colonial interests - particularly social 
control. In addition, the dependency relationships established 
under colonialism entailed wholesale borrowings of models of 
health care which were unsuited for local conditions, often 
making health a 'commodity'. The class structure within medicine, 
and which medicine served, did not disappear overnight with the 
end of colonial rule but continued to subvert attempts to change. 
An established medical profession used its power to maintain its 
own rewards and its access to a world market, and its class links 
helped to recreate the same imbalances which characterised 
colonial medicine. International 'aid' and the operations of 
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multinational companies (especially in the pharmaceutical 
industry) reinforced these tendencies, leaving a contemporary 
situation in which, while the rhetoric changes, the reality is 
one in which mortality and morbidity experiences for the mass of 
the population are little different from what they were at 
Independence. 
To a considerable extent, these arguments rest on material 
gathered from Africa and Latin America (e. g. Frankenberg and 
Leeson, 1974; Navarro, 1974; Segal, 1972; Doyal, 1979). But 
several authors have been prepared to extend these critiques to 
the Indian case. Thus critics of the patterns of public 
expenditure on health services in underdeveloped countries have 
not only argued that relatively little is spent on health, but 
also that urban, curative, tertiary services have received undue 
support. The chorus of criticism has swollen since 1970, and 
received the support of international institutions from 1975 
onwards. For example, the U. N. I. C. E. F. / W. H. O. joint study 
(Djukanovich & Mach, 1975) argued 
'Owing to the high cost of sophisticated equipment and 
other requirements, it tends to absorb, for the benefit 
of a minority of the population, a substantial share of 
limited resources ... curative services, and, more 
generally, personal services, tend to receive undue 
emphasis .. In many developing countries over 
half the 
national health budget is spent on health care in urban 
areas, the home of no more than a fifth of the total 
population. ' (pp. 15 & 18) 
Writers on the Indian pattern of public health expenditures 
have tended to assume that this picture also applies there. Thus 
Lassen, in the most substantial discussion of India's population 
in a social and economic context which has yet appeared, argues 
'India's health system shares several features of the 
pattern of health services in other developing countries 
(including) a large share of health budgets devoted to 
major hospitals in urban centres and a consequent 
relative neglect of the rural health infrastructure. ' 
(Cassen, 1978: 201) 
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As I will argue in chapter 6, the evidence for this claim is 
very poor. But other aspects of India's health services have been 
vigorously attacked by senior Indian commentators; indeed, it is 
hard to find anyone with a good word to say about them. Only the 
Government and official publications dwell on the positive 
aspects of what has been achieved by the expenditures and 
personnel described in Chapters 6 and 9. One example which gives 
more credit than most is the report of a joint study group of the 
Indian Councils of Social Science and Medical Research 
(Ramalingaswami, 1980: 5): 
It is obvious that there are several achievements to our 
credit such as reduction in mortality rates or increase 
in expectancy of life at birth; the expansion of medical 
research and education; the expansion of the health care 
services including especially the establishment of the 
Primary Health Centres; the excellence of our 
specialised institutions; the control of communicable 
diseases like smallpox, cholera, plague and malaria; the 
provision of MICH services on a larger scale; the 
initiation of a family planning programme; and the 
investment of far larger funds than at any time in the 
past. ' 
However, the report goes on to argue that the weaknesses are 
greater still, and in Part BIw ill be looking at the evidence 
for these failings. In general, there is a shortage of good 
research on what happens in health service institutions in India: 
we are rather better served with anthropological accounts of how 
people organise their own health care in the absence of health 
services, or when they are seen to be irrelevant (e. g. Carstairs, 
1956) . 
Nonetheless, the following criticisms are often levelled at 
health institutions and their workers: 
1. Health services are not integrated with wider economic 
and social development; 
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2. Virtually no impact has been made on basic aspects of 
disease prevention and health maintenance, such as nutrition and 
environmental sanitation; 
3. The most vulnerable social groups remain largely excluded 
from health services provisions, whether vulnerability is 
indicated by poverty, age, sex, geographical isolation or other 
factors such as occupation which increase the levels of disease 
and illness; 
4. Health education is virtually non-existent; and 
5. The goal of participatory involvement remains a chimera. 
These points can be summed up in the words of the joint study 
quoted above (ibi d: 6): 
'The imported and inappropriate 
in top-heavy, over-centralised, 
approach, urban and elite 
dependency creating. The serf 
model cannot be cured by small 
reforms. ' 
model of health services 
heavily curative in its 
oriented, costly and 
ous shortcomings of the 
tinkerings or well-meant 
As I have argued elsewhere (Jeffery, 1982), some of these 
views stem directly from the perspective usually associated with 
Ivan Allich, in the attempt to promote a move away from a 
'doctor-centred' approach to health services and to return 
'health' to the 'people'. Other criticisms are based on the 
presumption that the health services being offered are, in 
principle, desirable, but they are not reaching the groups who 
need them most. It is possible to develop the distinction further 
and argue that for some people, (Illich, 1975; Srivastav, 1975) 
modern medicine itself is the culprit, while for others (Navarro, 
1972; Baner j i, 1983) it is the capital ist nature of Indian 
society which distorts the potentially scientific contribution of 
medicine. The Ramal ingaswam i report cited earlier attempts, not 
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very successfully, to bridge these divisions, while remaining 
within an administrative framework which calls for yet more 
'programmes' without providing an account of how the failures of 
past programmes are to be avoided. 
The following chapters are designed to illuminate these 
arguments as they apply to India. Chapter 5 complements Chapter 1 
by looking at the evidence for changes in health status over the 
period since 1947, and the different patterns which have emerged. 
Chapter 6 is concerned to establish the patterns of public sector 
expenditures in health. This picture is complicated by different 
financial heads under which the expenditures take place - Plan 
and non-Plan, Central and State - and by varying treatment of 
health-related expenditures such as family planning, water supply 
and sanitation. My underlying assumption is that these 
expenditures are meaningful - that money is spent in the ways in 
which accountants say it has been spent. As with all such 
discussions, however, we cannot assume that the expenditures 
achieve what they are supposedly designed to achieve - declining 
birth rates may result more from educational expenditures than 
from family planning, for example. But the purpose of the chapter 
is to establish the framework of what has been spent. 
Chapters 7 and 8 will look at two aspects of the politics 
of medical policy-making - the role of internal pressures, 
particularly the impact of the Indian Medical Association, and 
the impact of international pressures, mediated in particular 
through foreign aid, pharmaceutical companies, and medical 
migration. 
Chapter 9 focusses in more detail on policy with respect Co 
medical and paramedical personnel, on the grounds that decisions 
about who to train and employ produce major constraints on 
policy. In a sense, the different models of health care proposed 
imply certain balances of personnel - 'appropriate' models 
implying a broad-based pyramid, 'inappropriate' ones a top-heavy 
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pyramid. Training decisions, while not always taken with these 
models in mind, thus do tend to generate one or other model or 
some balance of them: when the sacking of staff is difficult, and 
salaries take a substantial part of the budget, (as in India) 
then decisions about personnel take on a central significance. 
Chapter 10 looks at evidence on processes within health 
sector institutions - what goes on in the hospitals, medical 
colleges, and health centres, and in the 'field'. In other words, 
to assess the impact and significance of health services it is 
not enough to know how many health centres have been built, how 
many staff have been employed, or how much money has been spent, 
but we also need to have some idea of the social organisation of 
these resources. The most common distinctions made here relate to 
the extent to which the health services are active or merely 
reactive - to what extent do they search for disease, or do they 
merely wait for it to reach the health unit? The second kind of 
question involves the differential access of different social 
groups. Particularly in conditions of severe shortages, and where 
there are no formal rationing mechanisms, resources flow to some 
groups and away from others. This chapter describes the limited 
evidence on these two issues. 
The final chapter will consider some of the possible impacts 
on the health of the Indian people of the matrix of policy which 
has emerged, and evaluate the significance of the new 




HEALTH AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA AFTER 1947 
Many societies in the Third World ha. ve experienced _- 
substantial declines of mortality since the Second World War (if 
not before) and these have come at much lower levels of living, 
and much more quickly, than was predicted on the basis of the the 
historical experiences of developed countries. It tends to be 
assumed that mortality decline in poor countries responds more to 
improvements in living conditions than to other changes: yet over 
this period, living standards, at least as measured by 
conventional indicators of economic growth, have not improved 
dramatically and in some cases have been stable or have declined. 
The most frequent explanation for this pattern is the 
availability now of powerful techniques to attack the 
transmission of many of the common diseases of poverty, such as 
malaria, cholera, or smallpox, whereas in the case of the 
industrialised countries, these diseases gave way to the more 
general improvements in living standards, hygiene, or in 
environmental health provisions such as protected water supplies. 
However, it has also been argued recently that there is a limit 
to the possibilities provided by disease-specific health policies 
-a limit set by poverty (Ruzicka and Hansluwka, 
1982). 
This chapter will argue that the available evidence does 
suggest a steady decline in mortality in India since 1947, 
despite the slow fall in a major component, infant mortality. The 
expectation of life at birth has risen throughout this period, 
and life expectancy at age 5 has risen more decisively still. 
There seems little evidence that mortality might not continue 
to 
fall over the immediate future. Yet this has happened when 
poverty indicators show no overall decline (despite a rise in 
the 
per capita national income); the degree of inequality in 
consumption has not noticeably fallen; unemployment has risen and 
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so has landlessness; and indicators of nutritional status 
continue to show a very poor general level. Because indicators of 
specific infectious diseases show dramatic declines (especially 
in malaria and smallpox, but also in plague and cholera) there is 
a temptation to conclude that it is the specific programmes to 
control these diseases which have caused the decline in 
mortality. Yet this conclusion flies in the face of most 
assessments of the pattern of Indian public health provisions, 
which have pointed to their urban, curative bias, and to the 
inadequacies of single-disease programmes in improving public 
health. 
To begin with, I shall consider the evidence on changes in 
mortality in general, and on infant mortality in particular (as 
the best available proxy for morbidity) for different groups in 
Indian society. I will then consider the evidence for social and 
economic development in India since Independence in 1947, w ith 
particular emphasis on evidence for the differential impact of 
such changes on men and women, on different regions, on urban as 
against rural populations, and on different economic grou ps. 
Finally, I will briefly assess some explanations for th ese 
patterns. Material will be drawn particularly from the per iod 
since 1970, the years in which statistics of mortality, nutrit ion 
and living standards have become available in more reliable and 
detailed forms. The general model behind this account is the s ame 
as that for Chapter 1- that health services not only respond to 
a (distorted) disease reality but also modify that reali ty, 
though rarely in a direct and clear-cut way. An understanding of 
patterns of health and illness cannot be based on the impacts of 
health services alone, but must be seen in terms of changes in 
the social and physical environment, living standards and 
patterns of living. 
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MORTALITY SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
Most commentators agree that mortality rates have continued 
to decline in India since Independence. The major debates are 
about whether the timing of this decline is accurately 
represented by the official estimates; whether the decline in 
infant mortality follows that of general mortality or not; 
whether the position of females has deteriorated, relative to 
that of males; how mortality has declined in different parts of 
India; and what can reasonably be held to explain the different 
patterns of mortality decline. 
The simplest measure of mortality, the Crude Death Rate, as 
estimated from Census returns, has declined about 40%, from about 
27 per 1000 population in 1941/51 to about 16 or 17 in 1971/81 
(Ruzicka, 1984: 14; Jain & Adlakha, 1984: 51). Figures for Infant 
Mortality Rates also suggest a decline, but a less rapid one, of 
about 25%, from 183 in 1941/51 to 132 in 1970/75 (Visaria and 
Visaria, 1981 ). A more sophisticated indicator of mortality 
decline is life expectancy at birth; official estimates suggest 
that this has risen from about 32 years in 1941/51, to 50 years 
in 1970/75. Table 1 lists a number of alternative estimates of 
changes in crude death rates and life expectancy at birth; table 
2 lists official figures for infant mortality rates. 
These estimates (and others like them) were derived from the 
censuses of 1941 , 1951 , 1961 , and 1971 , and 
(for 19170-75) from 
the Sample Registration Scheme (S. R. S. ), and they have different 
weaknesses. All calculations using the Census make a number of 
assumptions about how people may have wrongly stated their ages, 
or those of their children or parents. Use of the 1941 and 1951 
Censuses is additionally problematic because assumptions have to 
be made about who died or migrated during Partition. Visaria 
(1969) argued that the life expectancy figures based on the 
1951/1961 censuses overestimated life-expectancy at birth by as 
much as 4 years; Dyson (1 979) similarly cast doubt on the 
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apparent decline in infant mortality implied by the 1961/1971 
calculations. These uncertainties affect the estimates of 
mortality decline, and account for the different figures in Table 
1. The major component in high mortality rates in India has 
always been the high level of infant mortality, and considerable 
doubt has been cast on the rates predicted from the inter-censal 
comparison (see Table 2). 
TABLE 1 





196 1/ 70 to 
1971/80 
Changes in Crude Death Rate 
Registrar-General -17% 
Visaria (1969) -5% 





Changes in Life Expectancy at birth 
MALES 
Official life tables +9.4 years 
Visaria (1969)/Dyson (1979) +5.3 years 
FEMALES 
Official life tables +8.9 years 





Source: Ruzicka (1984: 14); for 1961/70 to 1971/80 the figure is 
derived from the S. R. S. average for the 9 years 1970-78, reported 
in Visaria & Visaria (1981), and excludes Bihar and : Nest Bengal. 
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TABLE 2 
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF INFANT MORTALITY RATES 
Rural Urban Combined 
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
1941/50 - n. a. - - n. a. - 190 175 182 
1951/60 - n. a. - - n. a. - 153 138 146 
1 961 /70 n. a. n. a. 130 128 129 
1 97 2/ 73 141 152 1 46 86 87 87 132 141 136 
1977/78 133 144 138 75 76 76 123 133 128 
Source: Ruzicka, 1984: 18; Visaria & Visaria, 1981. The first 
three rows are derived from intercensal calculations, possibly 
using survey data from 1958-59 and from the S. R. S. data for 1968 
onwards; the fourth and fifth rows are averages for the two years 
quoted, and are derived entirely from S. R. S. estimates. 
Dyson (1 979) and Visaria and Visaria (1981 ) all argue that 
the estimates of I. M. R. for the 1960's are too low; Dyson, for 
example, suggests figures of 146 (male) and 156 (female). There 
are two main points at issue. In the first place, the inter- 
censal estimates produce higher male I. M. R. s than female ones. 
This is implausible, since all the other evidence (from careful 
studies such as the Khanna project in Punjab, or from the S. R. S. 
figures from the 1970's) is that female death rates up to age 10 
are higher than male rates, especially in the populous North 
Indian States which dominate the all-India figures. Secondly, if 
the S. R. S. estimates are reasonably accurate (as seems likely on 
the whole) then they imply a rise in I. M. R. between 1961/71 and 
1970-75. However, the Crude Death Rate in this period seems to 
have fallen, which is surprising since the I. M. R. is a major 
contributor to the overall death rate in India. 
But if the Crude Death Rate has not fallen very much since 
the mid-1960's, there is something wrong with either the Census 
results or estimates of fertility. The Censuses seem to show a 
similar population growth rate between 1961 and 1971 as between 
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1971 and 1981 - yet there is considerable evidence that the other 
side of the equation (fertility) has declined. Jain & Adlakha 
(1984) estimate that the Crude Birth Rate fell by between 8 and 
14% between 1972 and 1978 (using two national surveys) and the 
S. R. S. shows a decline in rural C. B. R. over the same period of 
11% (Sample Registration Bulletin, 1982). If fertility declined 
and mortality did not, population growth must have been lower 
after 1971 than before it. The only ways to square this circle 
are by arguing either that mortality rates were higher in the 
1960s than official estimates suggested, or that the 1971 census 
under-counted the population by more than either the 1961 or 1981 
Censuses did, or both. Thus population growth was probably higher 
in 1961-71 than previously thought (not 2.2% but perhaps 2.4% per 
year) and population growth between 1971 and 1981 was less than 
previously thought (not 2.2% but perhaps 2.0% per year)(Jain and 
Adlakha, 1984: 52). (They note an additional complication: if the 
number of births has dropped then the relative significance of 
infant mortality in total mortality will also have declined. ) 
Taking all these points together, it seems likely that 
mortality declined between 1945 and 1955 at much the same rates 
as during the previous 20 years, but that there was an 
acceleration between about 1955 and 1965, followed by ten years 
when mortality may not have declined at all. There is evidence 
that mortality decline has resumed since then, with 19$1 C. =. 
rates recorded by the S. R. S. Z, 0`ß lower than those of 1975-7. 
But these patterns of mortality decline are not common to 
all parts of the country, to both sexes, or to all ages. In 
general, mortality decline seems to have been faster in areas 
with already low mortality rates (particularly in the south of 
the country), faster in rural areas than in urban ones, more 
rapid for men than for women, and for urban children (especially 
boys) than for rural children, or for other age groups. All these 
generalisations need qualification. 
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REGIONAL PATTERNS 
The patterns of mortality and mortality decline by States 
for the 1970s, the earliest period for which reasonably reliable 
figures seem to be available, show considerable variations. In 
general, Table 3 shows that the States of the Centre-North (U. P., 
Bihar, M. P. and Rajasthan) are ones where poverty and other 
features of the social organisation (low literacy rates, and 
poorer general social infrastructure) go together and help to 
explain high mortality rates which are declining slowly. Much 
lower mortality rates can be found in the relatively affluent 
north-west (Punjab and Haryana), in Maharashtra, and in some of 
the southern States (Kerala and Karnataka). But these States with 
low mortality rates include some very wealthy ones (Punjab, 
Haryana and Maharashtra) as well as Karnataka and Kerala, which 
are much poorer. In addition, Maharashtra, Kerala and Karnataka 
have high levels of inequality, indicated by their high 'poverty' 
proportions, compared with Punjab and Haryana, and other health 
indicators (such as nutrition data) do not seem to correlate very 
closely with levels or speed of decline of mortality, at least in 
the 1970s. In general, very little of the variation in the 
decline in mortality rates by States can be understood in terms 
of conventional measures of income and inequality. It is also 
clear from Table 4 that there is considerable stability in the 
ranking of States: ranks at the beginning of the 1970's are much 
the same as those at the end, and the range of variation about 
the All-India mean changes relatively little. 
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TABLE 3 
ESTIMATES OF CRUDE DEATH RATES, PER CAPITA INCOMES, POVERTY AND 
NUTRITION, FOR MAJOR STATES 
Crude Death Rate Per Capita Income Poverty Nutritional 
1971-3 %age Decline 1971 %age Rise Percentage Ranking 
to 1978-80 to 1979 1977-8 
SOUTH 
Andhra 15.8 21 . 5% Rs628 87% L2p 3rd Karnataka 12.4 14.5% Rs698 82% 48% 1st 
Kerala 8.9 21.3% Rs55L 97% 47% 8th 
Tamil N. 14.5 17 . 2w Rs651 107 % 52% 6th 
EAST 
Assam 17.3 32.4% Rs550 75% 51p n. a. Orissa 17.9 19.6% Rs480 76% 66% 4th 
W. Bengal n. a. n. a. Rs789 69% 53% 2nd 
WEST 
Gujarat 15.7 19.7 Rs830 96% 39 % 5th 
Mahar- 
ashtra 12.9 20.2% Rs850 1 24% 48N n. a. 
CENTRE-NORTH 
Bihar 15.7 7.6% Rs1415 99111? 1 57 ä n. a. M. P. 17.1 11 .1ö Rs534 55% 58% n. a. Rajasthan 16.2 14.2% Rs561 63% 34% n. a. 
U. P. 21 .7 18 .4ä Rs497 97% 50% 7th 
NORTH-WEST 
Haryana 11 .3 (+3.5%) Rs928 97 % 25% n. a. Punjab 11.7 15.4% Rs1080 111p 15% n. a. 
Sources: L,;. WD1g I Vol XVI, No. 1 , June 19 82, for Columns1&2; 1eQ 1aýýLa,. 1 
.2 
$2 ,for 
columns 3-5; C. Gopalan, 'Development and Deprivation', ,,, 
Vol XVIII, No. 51, December 1983, for column 6. 
Note: Per capita incomes are in current prices; nutritional 
ranking is based on the percentage of households with diets 
inadequate in calories, protein or both, and is only available 
for the eight States ranked. 
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TABLE 4 
CHANGES IN CRUDE DEATH RATES FOR MAJOR STATES, 1970/72 to 1978/80 
C. D. R. 1978/80 as % 1978/80 as 
1978/80 of 1970/72 of all India 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
SOUTH 
Andhra 13.5 7.9 82 74 105 92 
Karnataka 12.0 7.1 91 97 85 83 
Kerala 7.0 6.6 85 85 49 77 










M. P. 16.3 
Rajasthan 14.9 
U. P. 18.6 
NORTH-WEST 
7.2 67 73 85 84+ 
9.3 84 83 105 108 
7.0 n. a. 74 90 81 
10.1 77 80 95 117 
7.8 83 82 80 91 
7.8 94 82 108 91 
9.3 91 87 115 108 
9.3 85 97 105 108 
11 .5 79 95 131 134 
Haryana 12.4 8.3 89 95 
Punjab 10.5 8.0 85 91 
ALL-INDIA 14.2 8.6 83 85 








Similar patterns appear if States are compared with respect 
to changes in infant mortality, though Dyson's estimates show 
some very surprising features, such as the low estimates for 
Bihar and the very high ones for Gujarat. As Table 5 shows, the 
rate of decline of I. M. R. varies substantially, with decline in 
Kerala being the fastest, from an already low level. 
DIFFERENTIALS BY SEX 
It has been argued (I. C. S. S. R., 1975) that females have not 
benefitted as much as males from the decline in mortality since 
the 1940s. Here the evidence from different indicators, such as 
the inter-censal estimates of life expectancy at different ages 
(Table 6), the sex ratio (Table 7), and from S. R. S. estimates of 
mortality at different ages (Table 8) is inconsistent. The sex- 
ratio figures suggest a deteriorating relative position of 
females, but the S. R. S. figures suggest that females, at least 
those who reach the age of 10, are improving their relative 
position. Sex differentials vary regionally. Table 5 shows the 
variation in sex differential in infant mortality. The southern 
and western States generally show male rates only slightly below 
female ones, or above female rates, whereas the northern States 
show female rates considerably above the male ones. These figures 
are not strictly comparable, since Dyson's figures are estimated 
using a variety of sources and making a number of assumptions 
about model populations, and he notes that figures for some 
States seem to be unusual. However, the overall picture is 
probably fairly reliable despite raising yet more problems of 
consistency. It would seem that the decline in infant mortality 
for females is almost exactly the same as the decline in the rate 
for males over the 10 year period, yet most States (including the 
largest ones) show greater proportionate declines in female rates 
than in males. 
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TABLE 5 
INFANT MORTALITY RATES FOR MAJOR STATES, 1968 to 19 78 
c1968 1 972 1978 1978 /68 
Male Female Male Female Male Female M F 
SOUTH 
Andhra 133 113 123 108 129- 93 97 82 
Karnataka 117 106 107 88 82 67 70 63 
Kerala 75 62 64 61 38 40 51 65 
Tamil Nadu 142 128 122 121 107 99 75 81 
EAST 
Assam 149 125 149 124 130 105 87 84 
Orissa 192 179 126 136 128 139 67 78 
West Bengal* 78 79 n. a. n. a. 83 73 106 92 
WEST 
Gujarat 193 222 134 1 22 114 1 23 59 55 
Maharashtra 119 123 100 103 81 69 68 56 
CENTRE-NORTH 
Bihar* 88 93 n. a. na. 92 95 105 102 
Madhya Prades h 151 151 152 161 141 128 93 85 
Rajasthan 199 229 111 137 124 134 62 59 
Uttar Pradesh 210 259 186 220 154 180 73 69 
NORTH-WEST 
Haryana 79 86 80 111 101 119 128 138 
Punjab 110 125 108 130 104 101 95 81 
ALL-INDIA 146 156 132 148 120 131 82 84 
Source: 1968 figures are by Dyson, 1979; 1972 and 1978 figu res 
are from Registrar-Ge neral, 1983. 
* Bihar and West Bengal fi gures are regarded as particula rly 
unreliable, both fo r 1972 (S. R. S. ) and for the 1978 spec ial 
survey. 
The last two columns express the 1978 figures as a perce ntage of 
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SEX RATIO FOR MAJOR STATES, CENSUS YEARS 
STATE 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 
SOUTH 
Andhra 980 986 981 977 975 
Karnataka 960 966 959 957 963 
Kerala 1 027 1028 1 022 1 016 1034 
Tamil Nadu 1022 1007 992 978 978 
EAST 
Assam 886 877 876 901 900 
Orissa 1053 1022 1001 988 982 
West Bengal 852 865 878 891 911 
WEST 
Gujarat 941 952 940 934 942 
Maharashtra 949 941 936 932 939 
CENTRE-NORTH 
Bihar 996 990 994 954 947 
Madhya Pradesh 970 967 953 941 941 
Rajasthan 906 921 908 91 1 921 
Uttar Pradesh 907 910 909 879 886 
NORTH-WEST 
Haryana } 867 877 
Punjab 850 } 858 864 865 886 
ALL-INDIA 945 946 941 935 930 
Source: Mitra, 1978: 372-3; Tata, 1982. 
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TABLE 8 
AGE-SP ECIFIC MORTALITY RATES IN RURAL INDIA 
Age Year 
19 68/9 1 973 1 978 197 8/ 1 96 8 
M F M F M F M F 
0-4 59 68 53 61 49 58 83 85 
5-9 6 7 5 6 4 5 66 71 
10-14 3 3 3 3 2 2 66 66 
15-19 2 4 3 4 2 3 100 75 
20-24 3 5 3 5 3 5 100 100 
25-29 3 6 3 6 4 5 133 83 
30-34 4 6 5 6 4 4 100 66 
35-39 6 6 6 6 5 5 83 83 
40-44 8 8 8 7 8 7 100 88 
45-49 13 9 12 9 11 8 85 89 
50-54 18 15 18 13 18 13 100 87 
55-59 25 19 26 21 27 21 108 111 
60-64 42 39 45 36 44 33 105 85 
65-69 56 52 57 54 58 49 104 94 
70 & over 118 115 117 112 110 107 93 93 
All ages 18 20 17 18 15 16 83 80 
Sources: Cassen 1 978: 1 1 5; XVI, 1, 
12, June 1982. 
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If the information on trends in mortality is confusing, that 
on morbidity and the causes of death, and how they have changed 
since 1947, are even poorer. I shall first discuss the levels and 
changes in infant and child morbidity and mortality, and then 
deal with adult morbidity and mortality. 
INFANT AND CHILD MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
Infant and child mortality is by far the most important 
source of death. In the 1970s about 30% of all deaths recorded by 
the S. R. S. were of infants, and another 20w of children under the 
age of 5 (G. O. I., 1983: 43). This varies somewhat by State, with 
Kerala at one extreme; where only 18% of all deaths are of 
infants, and Uttar Pradesh at the other, with infant deaths 38% 
of all those recorded. 
Infant and child mortality can be divided into two major 
groups - neo-natal (within the first month of life) and post-neo- 
natal mortality (after the first month but within the first 
year). In very simple terms, most neo-natal mortality is a result 
either of genetic defects (so that some analysts prefer to 
combine them with still-births) or to infection or injury 
received at the time of delivery. There are limits to the extent 
that neo-natal mortality can be reduced, but in poor countries 
most impact can be made by improving the mother's health during 
pregnancy and the quality of midwifery services. In India, 
evidence about neo-natal mortality is derived from the special 
local studies (such as at Khanna, and at Narangwal, in Punjab) or 
from the less reliable (but national) S. R. S. The latter source 
suggests that in the early 1970s, neo-natal mortality was the 
major part of infant mortality, taking over 50/0 in both urban and 
rural areas in each year (ibid: 39). The one exception was Punjab, 
where only 20 % of infant deaths were recorded as neo-natal. It is 
not clear whether this means that the Khanna and Narangwal data 
are entirely inapplicable to the rest of the country. 
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The Khanna study suggested that neo-natal deaths were 
largely a result of tetanus or septicemia, received because the 
instrument used to cut the cord was not sterile (Wyon and Gordon, 
1971). A study in Eastern U. P. in 1973 also concluded that 
tetanus was likely to be a major cause of neo-natal deaths 
(Simmons et al. , 1982). The main ways of preventing this are 
either to inocul ate the mother against tetanus before she gives 
birth (the child is then protected) or by ensuring more hygienic 
conditions at de livery. Both strategies have been attempted, but 
there is really no evidence of their success, since they have 
been introduced with some effort only since 1977, and the 
available S. R. S. and comparable data only go up to 1980. The 
S. R. S. data show no trend for 1970 to 1977, but a decline in each 
of the following years (Gopalan, 1985: 160). 
A secondary cause of early infant mortality is the poor 
nutritional status of the mother. Gopalan (1985) summarises some 
of the scanty information concerning maternal nutrition. Risks of 
complications during pregnancy and delivery, and of delivering 
low birth weight babies who are less likely to thrive, are 
closely related to maternal weight and height. Using a weight 
cut-off band of 38 kgs. (83 lbs. ), and a height cut-off of 145 
cros. (just under 4 ft. ), he presents data which suggest that 
around 207, of women in the reproductive age-groups are badly at 
risk in pregnancy. The variations by State do not conform with 
expectations however: Kerala, with low infant mortality rates, 
has more 'at risk' women, calculated in this way, than does U. P. 
The explanation for this seems likely to be that U. P. women give 
birth more often, and higher parity children are generally at a 
greater risk. One reason for this increased risk is that older 
women, in all States, are lighter than younger women. Some of 
this may be accounted for by nutritional improvement over the 
past 30 years, since older women are also shorter, but this only 
accounts for some of the difference. The experience of 
childbearing is a significant nutritional drain on women who 
start the process under-nourished. In part, this is because they 
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seem able to breast-feed their babies relatively successfully, at 
the cost of their own long-term survival. Again, there is some 
regional variation - smaller, lighter women in the Calcutta 
region were less able to breastfeed successfully than were those 
around Bombay, in one study. 
Factors like these would be expected to lead to high 
maternal mortality rates. The evidence for this is very poor, but 
a commonly-accepted estimate is that of a rate about 400 per 
100,000 live births in 1970-72 (ibid: 164), around 40 times the 
level in Western Europe. There are no estimates of regional 
variation or of variations by age or parity or social class. The 
best proxy is differential age-specific mortality rates. During 
the reproductive years, female rates are higher than male rates, 
and for some States and some years, are twice male rates (e. g. 
in 1980, in U. P. and M. P., ages 15-30)(ibid: 162). Kerala is one 
of the few States where female rates are below male rates at all 
ages, which is the pattern in most of the rest of the world. 
Maternal nutrition, then, has an impact on infant and child 
mortality, not just in the first month of life (small babies are 
less likely to survive the traumas of birth) but also after the 
first month, when mortality tends to relate closely to infection 
and nutrition - often both working together. The most common kind 
of fatal infection among infants is pneumonia, or 
bronchopneumonia, which account for up to 25% of all infant 
deaths in some years (Mitra, 1978: 176-7; Arora et al., 1979: 296). 
The link with nutrition is most obvious in some of the other 
causes of death - especially diarrhoeal and parasitic diseases, 
which may account for another 15% of infant deaths, and a larger 
share of deaths of children aged 1 to 5 (ibid. ). 
The proper measures of nutritional adequacy, and therefore 
the most accurate estimates of the extent of malnutrition, have 
been hotly debated in India in the past 10 years (Payne 1984). 
This debate has considerable policy significance, since the 
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Indian estimates of poverty level are based in part on the income 
required in order to buy a diet which is nutritionally adequate. 
(See further below. ) One of the points at issue is whether or not 
mean figures for nutritional requirements (in, for example, 
calories) should be used. By this process at least 40% of the 
Indian population is in 'absolute poverty', apparently unable to 
get access to enough food to maintain themselves. Yet it is clear 
that people do stay alive in these circumstances, and so it has 
been suggested that the mean figures are unrealistic. There seems 
to be considerable variation in people's ability to maintain 
themselves on given food intakes; and nobody receives the 'mean' 
amount, if only because food is not distributed 'fairly' within 
the household. 
The extent of individual variation is obviously crucial, 
and there seems to be considerable evidence that individuals of 
similar age, height, weight and patterns-of activity may have 
very different nutritional needs. If this individual variation is 
recognised, and estimates of 'minimum requirements' are reduced, 
then estimates of 'absolute poverty' can also be reduced, since 
some of those 'absolutely poor' under the first procedure are 
actually able to get enough food for their own metabolism to 
maintain them in a relatively stable position. That is, some 
people may be 'naturally small', and this can be seen as a 
beneficial pattern of adjustment rather than an unhealthy result 
of inadequate nutrition which weakens people and makes them more 
vulnerable to infection and early death (Cassen, 1978: 98). But 
this alternative procedure underestimates the numbers not 
receiving a nutritionally adequate diet, since some of those in 
wealthier households will nevertheless not receive enough food to 
eat; and others with enough food will not be well-nourished, 
either because disease weakens their ability to use the food they 
eat, or because they eat an unsatisfactory diet, or they may be 
well nourished at some times of the year and not at others. 
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This debate is, finally, rather arid. Nobody denies that 
very many, perhaps most, Indians do not have enough to eat. As 
Baner ji argues, it is perhaps worth asking people to assess their 
nutritional position in these terms (Banerji, 1982). Attempting 
to refine estimates of malnutrition from the kind of data 
currently available (household, or per capita) seems to be wasted 
effort (Cassen, 1978: 104). However, two points do emerge from the 
more detailed evidence. The first is that children under the age 
of two are likely to be under-nourished even in families with 
adequate purchasing power: Cassen cites studies in Tamil Nadu, 
Punjab, Kerala and Calcutta which provide evidence supporting 
this conclusion. A combination of late weaning, unsuitable 
weaning foods, and weanling diarrhoea probably accounts for this' 
finding. The second point is that a large proportion of Indian 
babies have birth weights low enough to suggest that they start 
their lives malnourished (about 25 ö below 2500 grams); and that 
this is because their mothers are undernourished, and do not eat 
enough in the last few months of their pregnancies to allow their 
babies to grow adequately in the womb (ibid: 104). 
There is dispute about the appropriate nutritional standards 
to use in assessing the weights of Indian children. Some argue 
that international standards are too strict, while others argue 
that affluent Indian children can grow according to those 
standards and they should thus apply to India. But whichever 
standard is chosen, it is clear that under-nutrition of children 
is widespread in India, with one estimate of 85% of all children 
under 5 (Gopalan, 1985: 160). The extent of ;, ý, ygý. g undernutrition 
varies by State: U. P. seems to be one of the worst, with one 
study showing 14% of all children 'severely malnourished' 
(ibid. ). In general, Gopalan argues that this undernourishment is 
a result of the inadequacy of breast-milk: there is little 
evidence that poor Indian women outside the major cities and 
their surrounding areas are using commercial alternatives. The 
main explanation of poor breastfeeding is the nutritional status 
of the mother. 
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Female babies and young children get even less, 
proportionately, than do boys. The greatest differences are 
usually to be found in North India, where sons are valued much 
more highly than daughters. Thus in U. P., one study found 42% of 
boys only mildly malnourished or better (by an international 
standard), compared to only 30% of girls. Even in Madras, where 
son-preferences are usually reckoned to be weaker than in North 
India, a recent study showed 30% of boys normally nourished (by 
an Indian standard), but only 20p of girls (ibid. ). 
The major consequences of poor nutritional status come from 
interactions with infection (Scrimshaw et al., 1968). The 
specifically childhood illnesses which can lead to death in 
poorly-nourished children are diarrhoea and dysentery, and 
diseases such as measles. Donoso (1979) suggests that 'weanling 
diarrhoea' (that which accompanies the shift from a breast-fed 
existence to a mixed diet) reaches its peak in the second six 
months of life but continues at a high rate until about the end 
of the third year. Using Khanna and Narangwal data, he suggests 
that most mortality from weanling diarrhoea occurs in children 
aged from 6 to 18 months, and that about 1 million children in 
India die every year in this way (ibid: 105). While malnutrition 
does not directly cause these deaths, malnourished children are 
more likely to become ill (especially those in unhygienic 
conditions) and having fallen ill, to die. 
ADULT MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
Adult mortality is usually discussed in terms of a few major 
specific infectious diseases, though it is worth remembering that 
some 60%o of adult deaths could well be from violence or accidental 
injuries (Cassen, 1978: 108). The format in which 'cause of death' 
is returned from States and Union Territories has reflected this 
focus: as Mitra (1978: 148) points out, the 'meaningful, 
operational and classificatorily significant' categories are 
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cholera, smallpox, plague, dysentery and diarrhoea, respiratory 
diseases, fevers, accidents and injuries, and all others (which 
are occasionally further classified to distinguish whooping 
cough, diphtheria and maternal deaths). As some of these diseases 
(such as smallpox) reduce in significance, so one would expect 
causes such as cancer or heart disease to become more prominent, 
but information on the epidemiology of these diseases in India is 
much more difficult to find. The Model Registration Scheme, which 
reports on a sample of some 20,000 deaths a year, is more 
sophisticated, but considerable numbers of deaths are not 
classified beyond a very general category ('fevers', 'cough') and 
some of the distinctions seem implausible, given the problems of 
data collection involved (Cassen, 1978: 108). 
The problem of high mortality in India has been seen in 
terms of separate major infectious diseases, and this perception 
played a dominant role in the planning of preventive health 
campaigns in the 1950s. The major killers of the British period 
were seen as plague, cholera, smallpox, malaria, and TB - with 
influenza an occasional mass killer, as in 1918-19. Of these, 
plague had virtually disappeared as a cause of mortality before 
1947, and influenza has not received special attention, but each 
of the others has formed the focus of single-disease campaigns. 
Similar single-disease campaigns were used by the British (most 
notably for smallpox). But it was the campaigns against malaria, 
particularly those run by the W. H. O. U. S. A. I. D., and the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s and the 1940s, which provided 
more substantial models, since these agencies were crucial in 
providing funding and technical support to the Indian campaigns. 
The literature describing these diseases in India assumes a clear 
relationship between the patterns of mortality and morbidity of 
the disease and the progress of these individual disease-control 
programmes, and I shall briefly describe these in turn, though a 
more general discussion will be provided later on. 
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Cholera has historically been particularly concentrated 
in certain parts of India - West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar and 
Eastern U. P. in the East, Tamil Nadu and Andhra in the South- 
East, and Assam in the North-East. This pattern hardly changed 
from 1900 to 1965, with 12 districts in these areas being 
responsible for nearly 40% of all reported cases between 1954 and 
1964 (Mitra, 1978: 152-3). In the late 1960s some new focal areas 
developed - especially in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Kerala, with 
some declines in the older focal areas. Some mechanisms of the 
spread of cholera from its 'home' in the Ganges delta have been 
much reduced since 1947, partly by strong controls over pilgrims 
attending religious fairs (vaccination is nominally compulsory, 
and water supplies have been greatly improved). The numbers 
reported dying from cholera are now much reduced (possibly under 
0.5% of all deaths, or less than 60,000 per year)(Cassen, 
1978: 84), and there seems to be some support for Mitra's 
suggestion that the virulence of cholera has declined, without 
any clear picture of why this might be. However, because cholera 
can be transmitted from individuals who may have harboured the 
disease fora month or more with no symptoms, it cannot be easily 
excluded from an area, and often returns in flood or famine 
situations. The basic conditions for its transference - 
insanitary water supplies and food-handling conditions - remain, 
unaffected by the cholera control programmes, though now perhaps 
being affected by the rural water supply schemes which have been 
a feature of the 1980s. 
The level of smallpox mortality was lcw by 1947, though 
the disease was still common. Smallpox came in periodic waves, 
and during the early 20th. century the peaks of these waves became 
further and further apart, and lasted for shorter periods. After 
1947 the same general trend continued, with only 1950-51 and 
1957-8 recording relatively high incidence. Vaccination 
operations continued to reduce the incidence of the disease, but 
vaccination was not compulsory nor sufficiently widespread (e. g. 
for children) to prevent new outbreaks. Vaccination was stepped 
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up after 1962-63, when a Smallpox Eradication Programme was 
established, but this too had only an indifferent record until 
much more substantial international assistance was provided 
through W. H. O. after an outbreak of smallpox following the 1971 
War with Pakistan. The new strategy involved focussing all 
efforts at surrounding the areas where smallpox was common and 
achieving a much higher coverage of the population there, rather 
than spreading the effort throughout the country (Basu et al. 
1979). At this point there was an apparent increase in the 
numbers of cases, though this probably reflects the improvement 
in the reporting mechanisms, with over 30,000 deaths recorded in 
1974, as against only 2,700 in 1971 (Mitra, 1978: 160). This seems 
to have been- the last flourish, with no new cases reported since 
July 1975. 
juý'J. 3. rjz In the 19 40s it was estimated that there were about 
75 
million sufferers from malaria every year, with about 800,000 
deaths a year (or perhaps 5 per 1000 population). This excluded 
those who died from its associated complications, such as 
pregnant women, or for those weakened by the disease who more 
easily succumbed to something else (Dutt et al., 1 980: 320). 
Pyrethrum had been used to spray breeding areas and house sites 
before the I'ýar, and after 1946 this changed to the use of D. D. T. 
An early example was in Bombay State, where by 1949 an estimated 
500,000 cases a year were being prevented. W. H. 0. ran 
demonstration projects in other parts of the country, an d in 1953 
a national organisation was provided, with W. H. O. and U. S. A. I. D. 
assistance, for malaria control. The apparent success of these 
campaigns, and changes in W. H. O. strategy, led to a greater 
effort in 1958, and a new goal, of eradication. 
These programmes increased the amount of reporting of fever 
cases, and provided a mechanism for assessing how many of these 
were due to malaria; and they also collected other data on 
malaria morbidity. These data suggested a steady decline in the 
numbers with malaria, a decline which continued until 
1965, when 
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very few cases were reported, and hardly any deaths. Since then 
reports of cases of malaria have risen steadily, and more rapidly 
since 1975. Until recently, mortality from malaria has risen much 
more slowly, but there are increasing reports which suggest that, 
for a variety of reasons, more cases of malaria are leading to 
death (Gill, 1985). 
The usual reasons proposed to explain the apparent failure 
of the eradication programme are as follows. In 1965 (the year 
when lowest morbidity was reported) D. D. T. supplies were 
interrupted. There was a shortage of foreign exchange, caused by 
the reduction of aid from the U. S. as a result of the Indo- 
Pakistani War of that year, and two poor harvests. Supplies were 
further disturbed by the cut in the health budgets while defence 
expenditure rose over the next few years, and by the disruption 
to trade through the Suez Canal after 1967. 
But there were also problems internal to the Health 
Ministry. The emphasis on preventive campaigns was difficult to 
sustain in the face of apparent success, and the policy focus 
shifted to population control. In addition, by 1965 most parts of 
the country were in a 'consolidation phase'. This meant that the 
special campaigns were wound down, and anti-malarial work was 
passed to the normal health services. But the rural health 
programme was lagging well behind the desired pattern (Dutt, 
1980: 321; Sinha, 1 976: 946-7). Harrison (1978: 241-6) graphically 
describes the problems of maintaining the quality of work from 
the lowest category of staff. Spraying had to be done 
conscientiously, problems were posed by locked houses or 
unwilling villagers, or villages were inaccessible just at the 
time of year when spraying was most required. Blood-slides had to 
be collected routinely, and accurately assessed in time for new 
cases to be treated before they had a chance to spread the 
disease to others. But the programme was funded to very tight 
constraints, so that all workers had large areas or populations 
to deal with, there was no allowance for staff illness, desertion 
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or recalcitrance, and managers were always under pressure to wind 
down the campaign for budgetary reasons. While the control of 
malaria has probably quite wide margins of error, considerations 
such as these probably meant that there were several areas where 
pockets of malaria remained, some on the borders with Pakistan, 
where comparable anti-malarial campaigns were not being waged. 
There were other areas where malaria returned, but was not 
recorded, and remedial measures were not undertaken. In 1965 
there were three substantial areas - one, the Rann of Kutch, a 
scene of fighting - which still contained untreated areas, and 
the disease has spread out from these areas since then. Anti- 
malarial activity since 1970 has been additionally hindered by 
problems of resistance to D. D. T., exacerbated by the use of 
D. D. T. for agricultural purposes: D. D. T. resistance was not the 
cause of malarial resurgence (Chapin and Wasserstrom, 1983). 
In 1947, tuberculosis was probably second only to 
malaria as a cause of death, and while malaria mortality has 
dropped sharply, there seems little evidence for changes in the 
level or virulence of T. B. It is mainly an adult disease, and for 
age groups over 15 it may cause as much as 507o of the deaths 
attributed to 'cough', or at least 10 % of all adult deaths, 
according to the Model Registration Scheme data (Mitra, 1978: 178- 
9; Cassen, 1978: 107-9). Khanna Study data suggests that T. B. was 
the third most important separate cause of death after diarrhoea 
and pneumonia, which are more important for children (Wyon and 
Gordon, 1971). 
The decline of T. B. in Europe was probably a result of both 
improved nutrition and spreading immunity, but it is unlikely 
that either of these is yet having any impact in India (Cassen, 
1978: 88-9). T. B. thrives in areas with poor nutrition, dense 
housing, and migration patterns which help to spread the disease 
- and none of these have been affected by the single-disease 
campaigns which have dominated public health in India since 
Independence. The National Tuberculosis Control Programme has 
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been able to show no signs of success. One reason is that B. C. G. 
vaccination may be almost totally useless - and this has been the 
mainstay of the preventive and protective activity. But in 
addition, T. B. control requires that cases are discovered, 
complete a long course of treatment, and that the treatment is 
effective. However, there is a tendency for most T. B. sufferers 
to receive general treatment for 'cough' in the first instance. 
They often fail to complete the full course of treatment, because 
they feel much better long before the treatment is completed. As 
a result they relapse and pass on the infection to others. They 
can be treated at home as well as in a sanitarium, however 
crowded or insanitary the home, as Fox demonstrated in the 1950s, 
but the problem of ensuring completion of treatment remains 
intractable. Finally, the treatment itself is probably only about 
75% effective. It seems unlikely that the control of T. B. in 
India is imminent. 
9lß. g, C The other diseases with a significant contribution 
to mortality are probably the other digestive diseases 
(diarrhoea, dysentery, gastro-enteritis) and other respiratory 
diseases (pneumonia, bronchopneumonia and bronchitis). The Khanna 
study reported heart disease and cancer among the 'top ten' 
causes of death, but national estimates, or ones more recent than 
the 1950s, are absent. It is very difficult to get any assessment 
of quantitative significance of these other causes of death. The 
most important point to note is that the main causes of mortality 
in India remain those infectious and water-borne diseases 
characteristic of poverty. The factors which have reduced the 
significance of some diseases (like smallpox and malaria) as 
causes of death have not altered the broad outlines of morbidity 
and mortality in any marked fashion, because they have 
contributed very little to changes in the living conditions of 
the mass of the Indian population. It is to an assessment of 
these conditions that I will now turn. 
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CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF LIVING 
The living standards of Indians is a topic which has been 
much discussed, on the basis of relatively poor data. It is 
possible to conclude with qualified optimism, from the kind of 
data presented in Table 9, that average income levels are rising, 
that the amount of food available in the country per head is 
rising (if the 'right' years are used for comparisons) and that 
the inequality of income in India is less than in many comparable 
countries. On the other hand, a slightly different set of 
indicators will show that the proportion of the population living 
'below the poverty line' is stable or increasing, that 
unemployment, poor housing, and other indicators of poverty show 
no improvement, and that the lot of India's poor is deteriorating 
in other ways as well. 
One way of reconciling these two extreme views is by looking 
at regional variations, since much of the improvement in income 
levels can be accounted for by rises in a few States - notably 
Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat and Maharashtra - whereas in the Hindi 
heartland of U. P., Bihar, Rajasthan and M. P., per capita income 
levels in the 1970s probably declined by about 35% (Bardhan, 
1934: 93). The mechanisms of changes in levels of income or wealth 
inequalities are, however, poorly understood, (ibid: 914). There is 
little agreement , for example, about the impact of new 
agricultural technologies on income inequalities or the level of 
poverty, particularly in wheat-growing areas, let alone the 
likely changes suggested by any emerging trends. I do not intent 
here to resolve these issues, but to present the major elements 
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Table 9 summarises some of the key indicators of changes in 
national levels of living. National Income has risen rapidly (in 
historical terms) with growth in five-year periods not less than 
2.2% per annum, which is roughly the growth rate of population. 
At constant prices, national income in 1982 was about three times 
its level in 1950, and even per capita incomes were over 50% 
higher. The economy is still heavily dependent on agriculture, 
with successful crop seasons leading to higher economic growth, 
and vice versa, and within agriculture output has risen, rapidly 
in some crops (notably, wheat), more slowly in others (such as 
rice), and has shown no growth trend for others (like the 
pulses). Taking all sources of foodgrains together (making 
allowance for changes in Government stocks, imports and exports, 
but not changes in private stocks), per capita availability has 
risen by about 12% between 1950 and 1982, but the situation has 
fluctuated, and the peak levels reached in 1 961 , and again in 
1978, has not been sustained. More importantly, the share of the 
pulses (which are nutritionally very significant in the diets of 
the poor) has declined to little more than half its earlier 
level. Other indicators, particularly of urban consumption, 
suggest more steady increases, as in electricity use or in man- 
made fabrics, but the latter has been at the cost of cotton 
goods. 
Estimates of the distribution of increased incomes and 
comsumption are derived largely from the successive rounds of the 
National Sample Survey. The classic studies using this source 
date from 1970, and draw on survey results from 1956-57 onwards. 
The most recent figures are from t'he 1977-78 survey. 
In 
principle, then, it should be possible to describe what has 
happened to the Indian population over this 20 year period and 
answer three questions: has the distribution of income become 
more or less equitable? has the population below an appropriate 
poverty line increased or fallen? and have the incomes of the 
poorest groups risen or fallen in absolute terms? 
(Cassen, 
197 8: 237) . 
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However, using this material seems to pose more problems 
than it solves. Firstly, collecting income information by survey 
is never very reliable; then there are problems with the 
representativeness of the sample at the top and bottom of the 
ranges in particular; the estimates in current prices need to 
take account of price changes, and these have affected different 
income groups differently; and different indicators tend to give 
different results (ibid: 238-41). Thus only relatively large 
changes in indicators can be accepted as convincing evidence to 
answer the questions posed above, but most changes seem to be 
small. For example, the poorest 20 17 of the population seem to 
have about 7-8% of incomes and consumption in 1956-57 and in 
1975-76 (ibid: 240; Bardhan, 1984: 1-2). An indicator of the degree 
to which rural consumption is concentrated amongst the relatively 
wealthy, using N. S. S. data in current prices, is that the Lorenz 
ratio fluctuates between 0.28 and 0.32 between 1956-57 and 1977- 
78 (Cassen, 1978: 240; Gupta and Datta, 1984: 635). Similarly, some 
estimates suggest that 40% of the population was below a fairly 
low poverty line (Rs15 per head per month in 1960-61 prices) in 
1 960-61 , 1972-73, and 1977-78 (Cassen, 1 978: 241 , 243; Bardhan, 
1984: 2). The only simple conclusion is that there is no clear 
evidence of change one way or another, for the whole country. 
Slightly more complex pictures emerge from a consideration 
of regional variations. If the States are compared in any 
particular year, then areas which have experienced relatively 
fast agricultural growth tend to have lower poverty rates than. 
the more agriculturally stagnant ones. On the other hand, 
poverty rates in States with faster rates of agricultural growth 
are not falling faster than in those with slower rates of growth 
(Bardhan, 1984: 5). Thus Punjab and Haryana have poverty 
proportions of only 12% and 23% respectively in 1977-78, but 
these rates are not tending to decline (Tata, 1982: 11). In 
general, Cassen's conclusion seems as valid now as it was in the 
mid-19701s: 
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'It seems that wherever one looks it is difficult to 
find any evidence of a trend of improvement for the 
poor. Their fate in rural areas .. is bound up most importantly with the magnitude of the harvest and in 
urban areas .. with the slow progress of manufacturing 
and service trades employment. The data on expenditure, 
income distribution, wages, prices and employment do not 
show any very distinct trend. ' (Cassen, 1978: 2+9) 
This conclusion is derived largely from estimates of income 
and consumption. However, it is possible that in some respects, 
the poor are now better off because they have benefited from 
infrastructural investment, or from special Government 
programmes. Since 1971 , when Mrs Gandhi's Congress Party won an 
election campaign on the promise to 'eliminate poverty' there 
have been claims that Plan expenditures have shifted towards 
providing the population with the ability to meet their Minimum 
Needs. There has undoubtedly been considerable progress in the 
provision of physical amenities in Indian villages. Thus the 
First Economic Census, carried out in 1977 in most of India, 
lists the number of villages with basic amenities within, or 
close to, their borders. In India as a whole, some 93% of 
villages have drinking water within the village for at least part 
of the year, 33p have electricity for at least some of the time, 
and banks, credit co-operatives, fair price shops, buses and 
schools, roads and post offices are increasingly available to 
villages (E. P. W. 1985: 615-6). Some of the benefits offered by 
this 'overhead consumption' (as Cassen calls it) will have gone 
to the poor, and while we know that they are relatively 
disadvantaged (for example in access to schooling) we do not know 
whether this disadvantage has increased or declined over time. 
The special programmes designed particularly to benefit the 
poor date from the 1970s: the Small Farmer Development Agencies, 
projects for Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers, the 
Crash Scheme for Rural Employment, and the Drought-Prone Areas 
Programme, all come into this category. They were either short- 
lived, or replaced in 1980 by the Integrated Rural Development 
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Programme. These programmes were designed to increase incomes or 
production and their impact should have shown up in the N. S. S. 
data. There is one additional programme which might have an 
additional impact on the poor not measured by income or 
consumption expenditure data - nutrition programmes which put 
food into the mouths of small children and their mothers. The 
amount of food which has been imported and transported to feeding 
centres throughout the country since 1947 is impressive, but 
again, it is only since 1970 that nutrition programmes have been 
an integral part of the Plan process. 
The Government of India has recently claimed that poverty 
has decreased, as a result of its anti-poverty programmes, 
concluding in the Mid-Term Appraisal of the Sixth Five Year Plan 
that it could anticipate the results of the 1983 National Sample 
Survey and that 57 million people had crossed the poverty line in 
two years, 1980-82 (G. O. I., 1983; 8). The basis of this claim was 
that the expenditure on special poverty-alleviating schemes would 
have all accrued to the poor, but this conclusion has been 
strenuously denied (Sundaram and Tendulkar, 1983; 1984). As with 
other schemes supposed to benefit the poor, there are 'leakages'. 
Much of the expenditure never reaches any supposed beneficiary, 
but stays in the pocket of the bureaucrats able to control access 
to these benefits, or is diverted into the pockets of those who 
are not really poor. Thus one estimate is that in the country as 
a whole about 15% of those affected by the Integrated Rural. 
Development Programme were above the poverty line, with the 
figures for some States (notably Assam and Punjab) being above 
33p ( Rat). -,,, 1985: 241). 
What is the net result of the increases in national income, 
the spread of social infrastructure, and the Government 
programmes designed specifically to relieve poverty? Most 
indicators of income and consumption suggest a picture of 
fluctuations, with no discernible trends. Indicators of 
unemployment suggest some deterioration; while those o. f 
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productive wealth in its most common form (land holding) would 
also suggest that larger numbers of people are landless or own 
insufficient land to sustain themselves now than at Independence. 
Thus it would seem that poverty, in the strict sense of the 
ability to purchase a defined basket of goods, has probably not 
increased. But insecurity of access to the resources necessary to 
do so probably has increased, and dependence on the State for 
subsidised employment or credit has become increasingly common. 
CONCLUSION 
What this material seems to suggest is that mortality has 
continued to decline since Independence. It has not fallen 
steadily, with the decade after 1965 probably a period when 
mortality fell relatively little, if at all. It has not fallen 
equally for all age groups, though if official estimates of 
infant and child mortality before 1970 are corrected upwards, 
then the variation by age becomes less significant. Mortality has 
fallen more in the States which already had low mortality rates 
than in those with higher ones. Male-female differantials are 
inconsistent, with the decline in the sex ratio unaccounted for 
by indicators of sex differentials in mortality decline or life 
expectancy. It is difficult to account for these declines by 
reference to the increases in per capita income, since there is 
no evidence of this having benefitted the poorest sectors of the 
population. 
Two factors might help to explain the apparent paradoxes of 
substantial declines in mortality, stable or declining per capita 
foodgrains availability, no change in the proportion of the 
population below poverty levels, and little reason to believe the 
general health services provided by the State have been very 
effective. The first is that protection from famine has continued 
to be effective. There is a variety of measures, all of them 
flawed because they 'leak' and leave the very poor in vulnerable 
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and insecure positions. But they probably do prevent the poor 
starving to death. The second factor is that public health 
measures have been more effective than the credit they have 
usually been given. In Chapter 6I will assess in more detail the 
evidence for the pattern of public health expenditures, to begin 




HEALTH POLICY-MAKING IN INDEPENDENT INDIA: STRUCTURES AND 
EXPENDITURES 
The most obvious feature of public sector health 
expenditures in India remains how little, in absolute terms, is 
spent directly on providing health services for the people. 
Taking the budgetary categories of 'medical' and 'public health', 
and ignoring problems of definition, generates a total figure of 
about Rs20 per head in 1979/80, or about 2.75 of total public 
expenditure (revenue and capital), about 1w of per capita 
national income. Most discussions of the pattern of health 
expenditure in India have gone little further than noting the 
size, trends through time, and inter-State variations (e. g. 
Ramasubban, 1984). 
In part this is because there is little material on the 
distribution of these expenditures. The most readily available 
sources are the Five Year Plans: these deal in 'outlays', or 
proposed expenditures, and offer only a haphazard record of 
actual patterns in the previous Plans; and they say nothing 
whatever about non-Plan expenditures. As Table 1 shows, the Plan 
has never accounted for more than 60% of public sector health 
expenditures, but non-Plan expenditures are hidden in the budgets 
and accounts of the individual States. The Reserve Bank of India 
published summary statements derived from these accounts, and 
this source provides most of the information on inter-State 
comparisons. But this source does not go beyond the major budget 
heads. Barnett attempted to fill in some of the baps, and he 
described this modestly as a short note and an initial analysis 
(1977: 2); more recently, Khan and Prasad (1985) have analysed 
Sixth Plan expenditures, but only for Gujarat and Maharashtra. It 
is not clear how much data and analysis of past, State-level ano 
non-Plan expenditures are available m J. Uj the Government. 
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TABLE 1 
PUBLIC HEALTH-RELATED EX PE;; DITURE 
First Second Third Plan Fourth Fifth 1979- Sixth 
Plan Plan Plan Holiday Plan Plan 1980 Plan', 
(1951-6)(1956-61)( 1961-6 6)(1966-69)( 1969-74 )(1974-79) ( 1980-5) 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES Rs Millions 
PLAT 980 2,163 3,565 3,133 1 1,566 23,450 7,290 21,000 
NON-PLAN 933 11410 3,024 3,342 8,552 17,630 5,261 12,075 
TOTAL 1,913 3,673 6,589 6,475 20,120 41,080 12,551 33,075 
Plan percentage (51 %) (59%) (54%) (48 ) (57%) (57%) (58N) (63% ) 
ANNUAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES Rupees 
Current prices: 
PLAN; 0.5 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.7 7.7 11.2 15.4 
NON-PLAN 0.5 0.8 1.4 2.3 2.0 5.6 7.8 8.8 
TOTAL 1.0 1.9 3.0 4.4 4.7 13.3 19.0 24.2 
1960-61 prices: 
PLAN 0.7 1.2 1.9 1.3 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.2 
NON-PLAN 0.7 0.9 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.8 
TOTAL 1.4 2.1 3.6 2.7 3.6 4.2 4.9 5.0 
Sources: Plan documents (G. O. I. 1956; 1961; 1967 ; 1968a; 1968b; 1 973; 1 978b; 1981a; 1983); Ovens in Lipton & Stree ten (eds. ) (1968) ; Reddy (1972: 218); Barnett 
(1977). _ 
N. B. Sixth Plan total expenditur e figu res for the outlays; per capita figures 
are based on the first two years expenditures only. 
These figures are not strictly co mparable and the c lassification of total health 
expenditures changes in 1974 with impac ts which ar e not k nown. Fifth Plan Plan 
expenditures exclude nutrition. 
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This chapter, then, is designed to answer two main 
questions: what can usefully be said about how much money is 
spent on public health in different categories, and what 
processes within the Government affect its distribution? The 
origins of health planning before Independence and the roles of 
the Planning Commission and of the Central Council of Health have 
been discussed in the Introduction to Part B. Here I will deal 
with the nature of Plan expenditures in health and the processes 
by which Plan proposals are agreed and implemented; and the 
pattern of health expenditures within an individual State 
(Orissa) during the 1970s, with some comparative material on 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. 
As will become clear, although this account goes beyond that 
previously available, it is by no means complete. For non-Plan 
expenditures the gaps are most glaring, with few grounds for 
assessing the typicality of Orissa, and no information from the 
1950s and 1960s. In addition, the sources on Plan expenditures 
are not adequate to provide the necessary detail for more than 
occasional glimpses of the processes involved. Further, it is 
utterly dependent on the reliability of Government accounting 
procedures, and describes the budget categories under which money 
was spent - which may be very different from what the terms are 
usually taken to mean. However, the exercise is worthwhile, if 
only for the doubt that it casts on the unthinking acceptance of 
the received view, of a major distortion of expenditure towards 
'tertiary' services, which I outlined in the Introduction to Part 
B. 
Health policy in India is not a unified concern. There are 
several Central Ministries which provide health services - 
notably the Ministry of Education (its Social Welfare Department 
handles most of the nutrition policy); the Minstry of Labour 
(responsible for the Employees Social Insurance Scheme and for 
overseeing other health srvices for industrial workers); 
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responsibility for water supply and sanitation is not solely a 
Health Ministry concern; and the Railways and Defence Ministries 
also provide medical services for a large number of people. These 
divisions in the Central Government are usually mirrored at State 
level. The Planning Commission has been the major means by which 
these divisions are supposed to have been overcome, but it has 
not been able to resolve all the problems of co-ordination. In 
what follows I shall be focussing on those aspects of health 
policy which are the responsibility of the Health Ministries, but 
some discussion of social insurance and nutrition is also 
necessary. 
Social insurance schemes in India abound, with some 
restricted to individual industries, either in the private sector 
(e. g. plantations), the public sector (e. g. coal mines) or for 
Government servants (such as the Central Government Health 
Scheme), and the largest one serving employees from a large 
number of industries, the Employees' State Insurance Scheme 
(E. S. I. S. ). Some of these are covered by legislation (like the 
Plantation Labour Act) while some employers run their own 
schemes. Those covered by legislation are mostly the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, and are by now quite 
substantial enterprises. For example, the E. S. I. S. covers over 7 
million workers and 21 million of their dependants, or some 4% of 
the total population; the railways employ 1.6 million people with 
another 6 million dependents also entitled to some medical care. 
The total budgets of these institutions are also substantial, 
with E. S. I. S. paying out some Rs85'0 million directly and to State 
Governments for medical care and expenses in 1 981 -82, and the 
Railways medicare budget the same year being Rs540 millions 
(G. O. I., 1984: 146,246). Although the E. S. I. Commission is 
usually represented at Central Council of Health meetings, it 
seems clear that the development of facilities for industrial 
workers proceeds quite separately from those of the Health 
Ministry, with duplication of urban medical services common 
(Jeffery, 1976). They have also tended to be restricted to 
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medical provisions, narrowly defined: the current head of 
E. S. I. S. has admitted, for example, that it is only recently that 
it has taken any interest in public health matters (Singh, 1983). 
The other problematic area is that of nutrition services. 
Prior to the changes in orientation of the 1970's, nutrition had 
a very low profile within Government. Food aid was regarded as a 
famine prevention measure rather than a feature of routine 
Government services. When nutrition became more significant, as 
part of the Minimum Needs Programme, it was still provided as 
part of Social Welfare, but often in the context of school meals 
or feeding programmes, thus also involving Education (usually 
part of the same Ministry). The current attempts to integrate 
nutrition and maternal and child health services, particularly in 
the Integrated Child Development Scheme (I. C. D. S. ) pose difficult 
issues in collaboration which do not seem to have been resolved. 
In what follows, neither social insurance nor nutrition services 
will receive the attention they perhaps deserve, because my focus 
will be on the services provided under the direct 'Health' 
umbrella. 
PLAN EXPENDITURES IN HEALTH 
Any account of the bare bones of planning gives little clue 
to the significance of planning and the process by which Plans 
are formed and implemented. The significance of Plan expenditures 
varies from one sector to another, and has changed over the 
course of the Plans. It is difficult to trace these changes even 
in health with much accuracy because the categories used for 
accounting for government expenditures in the States and the 
Centre are not identical to the Plan categories; and in addition, 
they have changed from Plan to Plan, and in a major revision of 
accounting procedures in 1972. Nevertheless Table 1 probably 
gives a reasonable picture of the changing balance between Plan 
and non-Plan expenditures. 
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However this picture is complicated by the different sources 
of funding. In general, there have been three categories of 
expenditures: those paid for entirely by the Central Government 
and disbursed by its own agencies; those paid for (in whole or in 
part) by the Centre but disbursed by State Governments; and those 
funded and disbursed by the State Governments. To begin with, 
central funds were disbursed only under very strict conditions, 
tying the release of funds to specific projects. This procedure 
was time-consuming and, as Hanson points out, came to replace the 
process of proper planning. Procedures were liberalised in 1958, 
though the category of 'centrally sponsored' remained problematic 
- here the Centre provided the funds but the States were 
responsible for implementation. In reality some of this Central 
control was undermined by the ability of State Governments to 
spend in a different pattern from that proposed by the Planning 
Commission. There were only weak procedures to police State 
expenditures, and State Governments were able to recover any 
Central funds withheld by getting a miscellaneous development 
loan at the end of the year -a loan which eventually became a 
grant. Alternatively, States have reclassified some of their own 
expenditures in order to take advantage of Central funds. Elder, 
for example, suggests that in U. P. the State government 
reclassified its malaria workers as 'family-planning-cum-malaria 
workers' when central aid for malaria workers in 'maintenance' 
areas was withdrawn in the late 1960's (Elder 1974: 324). In 
family planning, totally funded by the Centre but implemented by 
the States, the desire of the Central Government to keep an eye 
on State activities has led to the creation of Regional offices 
in State capitals. 
The ability of the Centre to offer to pay for a particular 
part of public expenditure has remained a powerful inducement for 
State governments to follow Central policy proposals, and any 
attempt to reclassify a particular topic from Central to State 
funding is always greeted by howls of protest. But the offer of 
Central funding is not necessarily enough to. ensure that a policy 
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is followed. For example, in the implementation of the community 
health workers schemes under the Janata Government after 1977, 
several States (notably Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Kashmir) refused 
to introduce the scheme, arguing that they had no need of it 
because they had alternative ways of meeting the health needs of 
the rural population. State Governments are also wary of the 
conditional, time-bound support offered by the Central 
Government. When Central funding runs out the States will be left 
with a cadre of workers they did not necessarily want, but they 
would have no politically acceptable way to sack them. As early 
as 1980 there were indeed moves to transfer some of the costs of 
the Community Health Workers scheme onto State budgets. The 
Central Government was not able to enforce its policy on the 
States in this case, despite bringing political pressure to bear. 
Similarly, the Centre is unable to prevent some policy 
initiatives by State governments which contradict Central policy 
if the State is prepared to pay for them - as in the recent 
opening of short courses for training rural doctors in West 
Bengal, or the opening of a new postgraduate teaching hospital 
outside Lucknow. 
Thus the Centre is able to overcome only some of the 
consitutional restrictions on its making policy, in 'State' 
spheres such as health, through the offer of Central funding. 
Family planning has always been a completely centrally-funded 
area, as were the campaigns against communicable diseases until 
the Fifth Plan. On the other hand, nutrition and water supply and 
sanitation have always been largely State funded. The pattern of 
'outlays' (proposed expenditures) by these categories has changed 
from Plan to Plan; in the health sector (excluding family 
planning and water supply and sanitation) the role of the Centre 




HEALTH OUTLAYS BY FINANCIAL CATEGORIES 
Third Plan Fourth Fifth Sixth 
Plan Holiday Plan Plan Plan 
Rs Millions 
Central 148 168 535 758 4,325 
(11) (6.6) ( 12.0) ( 12.3) (9.5) (23.8) 
Centrally Sponsored 55 111 1,765 1,770 3,638 
(%) (2.4) (7.9) (40.7) (22.2) (20.0) 
State/Union Territory 2,056 1 9122 2,035 5,432 10 , 247 
(%) (91.0) (80.1) (46.9) (68.2) (56.3) 
Total 2,259 12 401 4,335 7,960 18,210 
Source: G. O. I. 1973 Vol. 2: 23 2; G. O. I. 1981b: 382. 
N. B. This table excludes family planning (100% Central or Centrally 
Sponsored in each Plan) and water supply and sanitation. 
Unfortunately the pattern of actual expenditures probably 
differs from the distribution of outlays, and data on this is not 
readily available. As Barnett points out, during the course of 
the Fifth Plan, the sectors which were Centrally funded were 
allocated far more than the other categories, so that in the 
1976/7 Annual Plan the State share had dropped to 54ö. (Barnett 
1977: 8). This pattern of allocations has been repeated in the 
Sixth Plan, as it was eventually adopted under Congress, but 
detail on actual expenditures by financial category remains 
elusive. In general terms, the evidence does support the argument 
that Central dominance in health planning has increased, 
especially since 1965. 
THE PROCESS OF HEALTH PLANNING 
There are three kinds of information available on how health 
planning has taken place within the Government apparatus, none of 
them ideally suited to the task at hand. The first are the Plans 
themselves. They have the advantage that they represent of ficiai 
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statements of policy objectives and some of the rationales for 
chosen policies. They are readily available, and have provided 
most commentators with much of their material (e. g. Ramanabha, 
1984). Their main disadvantages are that they are silent about 
the processes by which these policies were chosen from amongst 
competing possibilities being discussed at the time; they say 
virtually nothing about how priorities led to the actual 
distribution of allocations; and they offer relatively little 
information, even retrospectively, about what actual expenditures 
or their impacts were. 
The second source of information is the minutes of the 
discussions in the Central Council of Health on the Plan 
proposals. For the Third and Fourth Plans in particular they 
allow a glimpse into the processes by which proposals from the 
Ministries of Health are modified in negotiation with the 
Planning Commission. The disadvantage is that they are by no 
means complete - similar material is not apparently available for 
the Fifth and Sixth Plans. 
The third source of material is the background papers 
prepared for the Planning Commission by working groups; I have 
been able to consult only some of these for the Fifth Plan. While 
these reports allow more insight into the kinds of arguments and 
claims being made by different sectors in health, they say very 
little about how these competing claims were balanced. 
These three sources still leave unanswered what impact these 
expenditures had on health status (perhaps a Utopian request) but 
also on some aspects of health personnel (especially nursing and 
other paramedical personnel) and other parts of the health 
infrastructure. The rest of this section, then, will attempt to 
demonstrate why the formal claims of the Plans - to be moving 
towards a rural-based health service, making full use of para- 
and non-medical personnel to provide preventive and public health 
services as a priority - have had such limited and uneven 
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implementation. It must be remembered that non-Plan expenditures, 
in fields like medical education and medical provision in 
particular, far outweigh Plan expenditures in those categories. 
The formal claims of the priority to be accorded to rural, 
preventive health care using lower-level personnel appear in all 
the Plan documents, with greater or lesser force. All the Plans 
call for a rural bias: rural areas 'should receive much greater 
attention' (G. O. I. 1952: 197); they are 'the most urgent need to 
be met in the second five year plan'(G. O. I. 1956: 5341); the 
expansion will reach 'progressively larger number of persons, 
specially in the rural areas' (G. O. I. 1961: 653); rural areas will 
be the 'emphasis' (G. O. I. 1968b: 309) or the 'accent' (G. O. I. 
1973: 234). Similarly the preventive bias was urged: in the First 
Plan 'additional resources should be concentrated on preventive 
work rather than curative facilities' (G. O. I. 1952: 197); in the 
Third Plan they were to receive 'increased emphasis' (G. O. I. 
1961: 651) and in the Fifth minimum public health facilities were 
the 'primary objective' (G. 0, I. 1973: 234). The expanded numbers 
of paramedical or non-medical personnel received a more muted and 
changing emphasis: early proposals saw their rapid expansion as 
'necessary', and the Second Plan was most forthright about the 
need for 'accelerated and sustained action' on ancillary training 
if 'even elementary services are to reach the mass of the people 
in any adequate degree' (G. O. I. 1956: 538). But the Third Plan 
merely 'recommended' a new scheme for medical assistants, the 
Fourth Plan talked only of doctors and the Fifth Plan of raising 
the quality of training, career paths and so on. As we shall see 
in Chapter a, the Community Health Worker scheme was introduced 
outside the normal process of Plan construction. 
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TAELE 3 
PLANNED OUTLAYS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR 
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth 
Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan 
HEALTH: 
Control of comm- 16.5% 28 .4 20.61 11.0; 6.2; unicable diseases 
Medical Education 13.3 7.4% 3.5 } 
and Research } } 
}15.4 16.4% } 








of medicine 0.3 1.8% 2.9% 1.14% 1.0% } 
Other programmes 14.4ro 2.7 3.3% 2.4% 1.5A 
} 
} 
TOTAL HEALTH: 64.5% 64.9% 61.3% 37.5% 29.1% 26.0; 
FA1ILY PLANNING: 0.5w 1.3% 7.9p 27.3% 18.8" 14.4% 
NUTRITION: - - n. a. n. a. 14.8 p 3.4 . 
WATER SUPPLY AND 
SANITATION: 35.0% 33.8% 30.8% 35.2% 37.3% 56.1 
TOTAL HEALTH-RELATED 
(ES tMILLIONS) (1,400) ( 2,250) (3,415) (1 1,555) ( 27,376) ( 69,910) 
Sources: Plan documents. Nutri tion was not separated from health programmes in 
the Third and Four th Plans bu t was retrospectively identified (in the Fifth 
Plan Draft Outline) as having been allocated Rs 594 million (5% of the health 
related budget) in the Fourth Plan, of which Rs 370 milli ons was spent. 
1. This figure is f or 'Minimum Needs Programme for Rural Health'. 
2. This figure is for 'Hospi tals and dispens aries, me dical education and 
research, traditional systems of me dicine. and h omoeopathy, and o ther'. 
N 
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To some extent, these formal commitments are borne out by 
the planned outlays contained in the Plan proposals, as can be 
seen from Table 3, and the evidence on actual expenditures, 
collated in Table 4. However, the major trend discernible in 
planned outlays is the declining allocation to the control of 
communicable diseases (of which malaria took the lion's share) 
after the Second Plan and the concomitant rise in planned outlays 
for family planning. To some extent the shift to family planning 
is misleading, in that the family planning budget has paid for 
infrastructure and staff at the primary health centre level, and 
family planning workers are also increasingly expected to carry 
out tasks in maternal and child health. However, the simple 
conclusion is correct: these trends represent a reduction in the 
commitment to controlling disease and an increased commitment to 
controlling the numbers of people - made particularly clear in 
the Emergency of 1975-77. 
One other notable feature of Table 3 is the small allocation 
of Plan funds to the indigeno us systems of medicine. There is 
something of a rising trend u ntil the Third Plan, and a decline 
since then. The decline is partly because of the rising 
significance of nutrition, fam ily planning, and water supply, in 
which the indigenous systems play no part. But the indigenous 
systems have also received a declining share of Plan allocations 
within the narrower 'health' category. Very little detailed 
information is available on how this money is allocated and 
spent, nor on the patterns of non-Plan expenditures. Since the 
expenditures on the indigenous systems form such a small part of 
the overall total I shall not consider it in more detail here. 
However, I will return to this subject in Chapter 7. 
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TABLE 4; 
OUTLAY AND ACTUAL PLAN EXPENDITURES 
First Second Third Annual Fourth Fifth 
Plan Plan Plan Plans Plan Plan 
Rs millions 
HEALTH Outlay 903 1 , 460 2,093 n. a. 4,333 6,820 Actual 652 1 , 408 2,259 1,402 3,355 7,608 [Deflated] [1,920] [1,402] [2,720] [5,960] 
(A as of 0) (72 ) (96i%) (1080 (n. a. ) (78%) (112%) [Deflated A as % of 0] [92p] [n. a. ] [63%] [87%] 
FAMILY PLANNING : 
Outlay 7 29 270 n. a. 3,155 4,970 Actual 2 22 249 704 2,779 4,918 
[Deflated] [198] [704] [2,602] [3,824] 
(A as r of 0) (29iß) (73%) (92%) (n. a. ) (88%) (990/0 )[Deflated A as % of 0] [73%] [n. a. ] [82%] [77p] 
WATER SUPPLY AND 
SANITATION : Outlay 490 760 1 , 052 n. a. 4,067 9,710 Actual 326 733 1,057 1,027 4,589 10,916 
[Deflated] [870] [1,027] [3,805] [8,628] 
(A as ' of 0) (67 %) (96%) (100%) (n. a. ) (113% ) (112%) 
[Deflated A as % of 0] [835] [n. a. ] [94%] [89p] 
TOTAL HEALTH- 
RELATED: Outlay 1 , 400 2,250 3,415 n. a. 11,555 21,500 Actual 980 2,163 3,565 3,133 10,761 23,442 
[Deflated] [2,988] [n. a. ] [9,127] [18,412] 
(A as % of 0) (70%) (96%) (104%) (n. a. ) (93%) (109%) [Deflated A as 010 of 0] [87%] [n. a. ] [79%] [86$] 
Sources: Plan documents; G. O. I. 1975,1978a, & 1983. 
Note: Fifth Plan figures exclude nutrition. 
'Deflated' rows refer to Actual expenditures (A) expressed in the prices 
ruling at the time the respective Plan document was issued, i. e. in 
Outlay (0) prices (1950/51 for the First Plan, 1955/6 for the Second, 
1960/1 for the Third, 1968/9 for the Fourth and 1973/74 for the Fifth). 
The all-India wholesale prices index has been used as a deflator. 
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There are several complications in interpreting these 
figures as indicators of the priorities of the various layers of 
Government. A major difficulty arises from the differential 
impact of inflation. This becomes increasingly important after 
1963, when relative price stability gave way to steady increases 
in prices. This means that the apparent ability to meet spending 
allocations which is noticeable for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Plans is probably misleading, since the Plan documents are based 
on prices ruling when the Plan was drawn up, whereas the 
expenditure figures are in current Rupees. The 'deflated' rows in 
Table 4 are an attempt to indicate the impact of inflation, 
though it is not clear whether the wholesale prices index is an 
adequate deflator. An additional complication with the Fifth Plan 
is that the Janata Government produced its Sixth Plan to start 
before the original Fifth Plan period was completed, and the 
Congress Government which was elected in 1979 retracted the 
Janata Plan and replaced it with its own, starting at the end of 
the old Fifth Plan period. 
In some respects, it makes more sense to compare health- 
related expenditure with other parts of the Plan. In general, the 
health sectors have been less successful at spending their 
allocations than have either the social services (education being 
a major component) or the public sector of the Plan as a whole. 
Another way of looking at the importance given to the health 
sectors is to compare their percentage allocations in each Plan: 
as can be seen from Table 5, while the share of outlay declined 
over the course of the first three Plans it rose in the Fourth 
(largely because of the boost to family planning outlays) and 
maintained this level in the Fifth (affected by the allocation. Co 
nutrition). Actual shares have been below this. It should also be 
remembered that Table 1 showed that Plan expenditures on health- 
related subjects have barely kept up either with the growing 




HEALTH-RELATED PLAN OUTLAYS APED EXPENDITURES 
(as ',, age of total public sector Plan) 
First Second Third Annual Fourth Fifth 1979- Sixth 
Plan Plan Plan Plans Plan Plan 60 Plan 
OUTLAY: 
HEALTH 3.6 3.3 
FA? LILY PLANNING 0.03 0.07 
NUTRITION - - 
WATER SUPPLY etc 2.0 1.7 
ALL HEALTH-RELATED 5.6 5.0 
EXPENDITURE: 
HEALTH 3.3 3.0 
FAMILY PLANNING 0.01 0.05 
NUTRITION - - 
WATER SUPPLY etc 1.7 1.6 
ALL HEALTH-RELATED 5.0 4+. 6 
2.8 - 2.7 1.7 - 1.8 
0,4 - 2.0 1.3 - 1.0 
- -- 1 .0 - 0.2 
1.4 - 2.6 2.5 - 4.0 
4.6 n. a. 7.3 6.5 n. a. 7.1 
2.6 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 n. a. 
0.3 1 .1 1 .8 1 .3 1 .0n. a. 
- - 0.0 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1.2 1.6 2.9 2.8 3.2 n. a. 
4.2 4.7 6.9 5.9 6.0 n. a. 
Sources: Plan documents; G. O. I. (1 983: 1 1 3) 
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THE PROCESS OF HEALTH PLANNING 
The final set of information about the planning process 
comes from more detailed sources on the Third and Fourth Plans. 
These come largely from the special sessions of the Central 
Council of Health which discussed the Plan as it related to 
health, and for these two Plans, also displayed some of the steps 
in drawing up the Plan and allow for a comparison between the 
distributions of expenditure proposed by different sections of 
the health planning procedure - largely the Central Ministry of 
Health and Family Planning/Welfare on the one hand and the 
Planning Commission on the other - and the pattern of expenditure 
which actually took place. 
In general the procedure of detailed planning appears to be 
as follows. Firstly there are discussions in which State 
Ministries liaise with Central Ministries over proposals and 
projects which are put to the Planning Commission. The Planning 
Commission collates these proposals and evaluates them in terms 
of a number of criteria - such as the foreign exchange 
requirements which are implied, the overall volume of physical 
and financial resources which is expected to be available, and 
other decisions on priorities between sectors and States. These 
major decisions are formally the responsibility of the National 
Development Council, consisting of members of the Planning 
Commission and chief ministers of the States, and usually chaired 
by the Prime Minister. The Planning Commission then translates 
these essentially political decisions into consistent policies 
which form the final Plan, and then draw up annual plans which 
provide the justification for State and Central Ministry budget 
decision-making, and allow State governments to claim back 
expenditures which fall within Plan allocations. 
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In the case of health, the first stage appears to include 
the establishment of working parties and expert groups (dominated 
by doctors) looking at specific issues such as medical education 
or the control of communicable diseases. Each group works 
independently, and is thus tempted to expand the number of its 
proposals as far as possible. Similarly, the Ministry of Health 
as a whole is under pressure to submit an exaggerated list of 
proposals to the Pla nning Commission, knowing that it is likely 
to have its total cut, whatever is proposed. The eventual Plan 
may lose much of wha tever rationality it had, because of the need 
to cut the total to a level acceptable to the Planning 
Commission, and to divide it into topics and by State in ways 
which derive from political decisions made in the National 
Development Council. Looking at these processes, then, gives some 
idea of the 'real' priorities - which parts of the Health 
Ministry's proposals are cut and which aspects of allocations are 
turned into expendit ures over the following five years. 
During the course of the Second Plan the Central Health 
Ministry looked at the pattern of expenditures and singled out 
medical education and family planning as areas where allocations 
were not being spent fast enough. This kind of information was 
fed into discussions on the Third Plan allocations. State Working 
Groups were established, who submitted proposals to a Central 
Working Group, which reported to the Central Council of Health in 
1959. Their proposals form column A in Table 7 below. At the same 
time the Planning Commission was preparing it*s own Draft Outline, 
which appeared in June 1960 (column B) and allocated only 1+3 of 
the C. C. H. proposals. This Draft Outline was then discussed with 
the States and the Central Ministries, and the size of the Plan 
was increased as a result of political pressures of this kind, 
beyond what many members of the Planning Commission felt was 
reasonable. Two revised sets of proposals came out of this 
process (columns C and D) before the Plan was finalised ant 
appeared in August 1961 ( column E). The pattern of actual 
expenditures is shown in column F. 
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A similar sequence of events can be identified for the 
Fourth Plan, though matters are complicated by the fact that the 
original proposals for the Fourth Plan were shelved in 1966 and 
reviewed only in 1968-9, because the Fourth Plan period was put 
back by three years. Discussions began before the end of the 
Third Plan period, in order to draw some conclusions from the 
pattern of progress. Working groups, established by the Ministry 
of Health in 1963, laid out a set of priorities. They were: to 
remove shortages of trained manpower and materials; to reduce the 
birth rate; to supply safe water, drainage and sanitation to 
cities and to scarcity rural areas; to promote integrated and 
adequate health facilities and to narrow down inequalities; and 
to expand services as far as possible to the entire populati on, 
concentrating on domiciliary and preventive services 
(G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 1965: 21). 
Once again, the simple process of adding up all the schemes 
which the Health Ministry thought 'desirable' generated a figure 
(Rs 27,280 million) far above that which the Planning Commission 
were prepared to accept. The Planning Commission's figure (Rs 
10,900) was divided as in column A of Table 8. (I have been 
unable to discover the distribution of the Ministry of Health's 
proposal. ) The next two rounds of proposals (in September 1965 
and October 1966) produced similar distributions of a smaller 
total (Rs 9,600 million); the latter appears as column B of Table 
8. The process restarted in 1969, in a much more restrained 
context. The Health section of the Ministry re-established a 
working group and sub-groups. The sub-group proposals called for 
Rs 5,756 millions (excluding family planning, water supply etc. ) 
which the working group reduced to Rs 5,125 millions. The 
Planning Commission cut the total to Rs 4,370 million and this 
figure was cut again to Rs 4,340 by the time the final Plan was 
agreed and published in 1970 (column C). Taking the health- 
related sector overall, the discussions led to a slightly larger 
total allocation (Rs 11 , 420 million). 
The actual pattern of 
expenditures during the Fourth Plan appears as column D. 
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TABLE 6 
ALLOCATION'S AND EXPENDITURES FOR THE THIRD PLAN 
ABCDE 
N of H PComm Negotiations outlay 
1959 1960 1960 1961 1961 
01 Rs iw Rs C1.1 Rs Rs % Rs p I in Mn Nn Mn Nn 
HEALTH: 
Control of commu- 
nicable diseases 1200 17 
Medical education 
training &: research 750 11 
Hospitals and 
dispensaries 1370 20 
Other health 910 13 
FAMILY PLANNING : 300 4 
WATER SUPPLY & 
SANITATION: 







460 15 390 12 570 17 560 16 661 19 
460 15 500 15 630 18 617 18 495 14 
300 10 170 5 230 7 210 6 124 4 
250 S. 90 3 300 9 270 8 228 7 
Urban 2000 28 630 21 1240 38 890 26 
1053 31 1045 30 
Rural 500 7 20 1 40 1 120 4 
TOTAL 7030 100 3040 100 3270 100 3440 100 3415 100 3531 100 
Source: For columns A-D: G. O. I. (C. C. H. ) 1961; for column E G. O. I. 1961: 651; 
for column F, G. O. I. (C. C. H. ) 1966: 145. 




ALLOCATIONS AND EXPENDITURES IN THE FOURTH PLAN 
A B C D 
P Comm P Comm Outlay Actual 
1965 1965 1969-74 1969-74 
Rs mill i Rs mill h Rs mill w Rs mill % 
HEALTH: 
Control of communi- 
cable diseases 1,250 12 870 9 1 , 270 11 993 9 
Education, training 
and research 2,250 21 1,780 19 980 9 860 8 
Hospitals & dispensaries ) 890 8 827 8 
12,500 23 1,810 19 
Primary Health centres } 760 7 343 3 
Other health 550 5 460 5 440 4 437 4 
TOTAL HEALTH: 6,550 60 4,920 51 4,340 38 3,460 32 
FAMILY PLANNING: 950 9 950 10 3,150 28 2,779 25 
WATER SUPPLY AND 
SAN'ITATION' : 
Urban 1,450} 
} 31 3,730 39 3,920 34 4,738 43 
Rural 1,950} 
TOTAL HEALTH-RELATED 10 , 900 100 9,6 00 100 11,420 100 10 , 977 100 
Sources: G. O. I. (C. C. H. -) 1965 & 1969; G. O. I. 1964,1970 ,& 1973. Note: This table excludes nutrition, and differs from t he figures in Table 
4, which were revised in the ligh t of later information but are not 
available in a disaggregated for m. 
Key: P Comm= Planning Co mmission 
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In the course of these changes there were some apparently 
radical changes in distribution, with heavy cuts to education, 
training and research, and in hospitals, dispensaries and health 
centres being handed over to family planning and to water supply 
and sanitation. This appearance is slightly misleading, since the 
total for family planning includes some expenditures directly 
relevant to the health sector - as in the training of Auxiliary 
Nurse-Midwives, some of whom worked in 'health' or 'medical' 
positions. Provision for the training of these personnel might 
originally have appeared under'the State total for Training, but 
a reclassification under a Centrally-sponsored heading such as 
family planning would increase the chances of implementation. 
Some changes, then, might be little more than cosmetic. 
Nonetheless, once again a detailed look at the process of 
planning suggests the difficulty of sustaining the simple 
criticism that the Government has not been concerned with 
preventive, rural-based services. Although these services 
obviously have quite a low priority within the State Ministries, 
and even perhaps within the Central Health Ministry, the Planning 
Commission priorities seem fairly clear-cut. Wherever possible, 
the Planning Commission in both the Third and Fourth Plan 
discussions emphasised preventive and public health programmes at 
the expense of medical education or hospitals and dispensaries. 
However, since the Planning Commission can only restrain 
expenditures by State Governments (rather than being able to 
insist on spending) the actual patterns of expenditure in each 
case are different again. In the case of the Third Plan (Table 7) 
the over-riding factor seems to have been the need to increase 
expenditure on the malaria programme, which probably accounts for 
most of the extra expenditure under this heading. In the Fourth 
Plan (Table 8) declining Central control is indicated by the 
under-spending on communicable diseases and on Primary Health 
Centres, compared to hospitals and medical education and 
research. (Training, i. e. of paramedical workers, also suffered. ) 
This is slightly obscured in Tables 7 and 8 in the percentage 
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distributions, because of the inclusion of water supply and 
sanitation, often the responsibility of a different Ministry, and 
usually able to spend more than its allocation (see Table 4 
above), but is more clearly evident if the actual cash 
expenditures are compared with outlay figures. However, since 
these are in current prices, and there are no estimates of any 
differential impact inflation may have had, it is impossible to 
distinguish 'price' from 'real' changes. 
A further way of looking at the changes in health priorities 
is to take an individual State and see how its health 
expenditures have changed through time. Unfortunately there are 
no good sources available for such an analysis. The Reserve Bank 
of India publishes a breakdown of public sector expenditures 
which is restricted to a division between major budget headings - 
Medical, Public Health and so on. This shows a considerable, 
fairly stable, spread of per capita expenditures for the 
different States, ranging from very high figures in the 
mountainous northern States and Union Territories (Nagaland, 
Himachal, and Jammu and Kashmir) to very low figures in the 
Ganges plain (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh). (See Table 8). This 
pattern does not only reflect differences in the priority given 
to health and other social services expenditure (e. g. the 
relatively high figures for Kerala, a relatively poor State). It 
also reflects the way in which States get access to financial 
resources, partly from their own tax base but also in different 
ways from the Central Government. As George and Gulati (1985: 292) 
show, 'low income' States like U. P. and Bihar have not received 
Central funds sufficient to outweigh their poverty, but the 
'special category' States (basically the hilly ones on strategic 
borders, like Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Tripura etc. ) 
have received per capita payments between 2.25 and (in the case 
of Nagaland) 9.5 times the national average. 
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TABLE 8 
PER CAPITA REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON MEDICAL, FAMILY PLAýý l; INc AND PL LIC HEALTH: 
SUBJECTS FOR IýAIN STATES 
Current Prices 

























D: Special Category States 
Himachal Pradesh 






Average of listed States 
1970/71 Prices 
1972/3 to 1975/6 to 
1974/5 1976/7 
11.9 16.8 8.4 9.6 
9.7 11.8 6.9 6.7 
11.5 13.1 8.1 7.5 
9.2 11.6 6.7 6.6 
8.4 12.8 5.9 7.3 
10.0 13.0 7.1 7.4 
9.4 12.6 6.7 7.2 10.1 14.8 7.1 8.4 
6.6 9.0 4.7 5.2 
7.6 9.4 5.3 5.4 
7.5 11.4 5.2 6.5 
6.8 9.7 4.8 5.6 
8.0 11.2 5.7 6.4 
4+. 7 5.5 3.3 3.1 
10.9 13.8 7.8 7.9 
7.3 8.3 5.1 4.7 
4.1 4.5 2.9 2.6 
5.8 6.8 4.1 3.9 
15.8 19.8 11.2 11.3 
14.4 17.0* 10.1 9.8* 
13.3 15.1 9.3 8.6 
19.0 23.9 13.6 13.6 
59.2 76.4 40.6 43.6 
10.9 13.7 7.8 7.8 
16.4 20.2 11.7 11.5 
7.9 10.2 5.6 5.8 
Source: For 1973/4 to 1976/7: G. O. I. 1979: 23; for 1972/3, Barnett (1979: 16) 
Note: The categorisation of States is taken from George & Gulati (1985) and 
group per capita figures are weighted averages using 1971 census weightings. 
The expenditure figures have been deflated by the wholesale prices index to 
give 1970/71 prices. The system of classifying budget data changes between 
1973/4 and 1974/5, introducing an unquantifiable element of uncertainty into 
these figures, which should be reduced by taking a three-year average. 
* Figures for Jammu and Kashmir are only available for 1972/3 to 1975/6. 
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Barnett attempted to move beyond these gross figures of 
health expenditure to look at how health budgets and actual 
expenditures in the States were distributed amongst more 
meaningful categories, but he was able to gather material on only 
a few States, mostly for budget estimates not expenditures, and 
only for a few years (Barnett 1977). Tables 9-11 present data 
from one State - Orissa - for a restricted number of years, 1971- 
2 to 1978-9, using the annual administration reports for the 
Health Ministry. These are not apparently available before 1971- 
2, they appear several years in arrears, and they are no longer 
being published (G. O. O. [H. & F. W. D. D. 
In the absence of reliable national figures it is difficult 
to assess how typical Orissa is. As Table 8 shows, only U. P., 
Assam and Bihar had lower per capita public expenditure on 
medical and public health categories. This reflects the poverty 
of Orissa : most indicators of State Domestic Product place it 
as one of the four poorest States (see, e. g. Panikar, 1980; Tata 
1982). (It appears in Table 8 as 'middle income', mainly because 
of the potential tax base provided by its large industrial 
sector). On the other hand, Panikar quotes 1965 figures which 
show that it has one of the most rural distributions of hospitals 
and hospital beds of all States (only Kerala and West Bengal have 
more rural hospital beds). I have drawn on Barnett's analysis to 
make what comparisons are possible between States on the 
distribution of expenditure. Table 9 summarises the main data for 
Orissa. One problem with Orissa's data is that the source gives 
no figures for indigenous medicine, included (fcr example) in 
Barnett's figures for Maharashtra. 
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: ABLE 9 
HEALTH-RELATED EXPENDITURES FOR ORISSA STATE, 1972-1979 
(ANNUAL AVERAGES IN RS MILLIONS) 
1 97 2/ 3 to 1 97 4/ 5 





Paramedl. training 1.1 
Medical relief 56.8 
Prevention/control 
of disease 5.1 
Public health, 
sanitation and 7.0 
water supply* 
Family Planning: 
1975/6 and 1976/7 
Non- Plan Total 
Plan 
1977/8 and 1978/9 
Non- Plan Total 
Plan 
2.0 10.2 12.5 0.4 12.9 12.8 0.6 13.4 
0.1 1.3 1.9 0.0 1.9 1.9 0.0 1.9 
0.9 2.0 1.3 0.2 1.5 1.5 0.3 1.8 
9.5 66.3 93.9 9.6 103.5 102.5 19.3 121.8 
16.9 22.0 
0.3 7.3 
9.7 23.7 33.4 11.6 23.0 34.6 
11.0 0.0 11.0 13.0 0.0 13.0 
Compensation - 3.0 3.0 - 21.1 21.1 - 11.8 11.8 Paramed training - 0.8 0.8 - 0.7 0.7 - 5.0 5.0 Other - 17.9 17.9 - 25.8 25.8 - 29.4 29.4 
TOTAL 79.5 50.2 129.7 130.3 81.5 211.8 143.3 89.4 232.7 
(COLUMN (61.3)(38.7) (100) (61.5) (38.5) (100) (61.6)(38.14) (100) 
Sources: G. 0.0. (H. & F. W. D. ) for the relevant years. 
Note: Administration expenses for the medical directorate are included in the 
total for medical relief; for family planning in ' other'; and for the public 
health directorate in public health, s anitation and water s upply. 
* Most expenditure under this sub -heading is carried out by different departments and so does not appear in these sources. 
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There are several points with respect to Table 9. Firstly, 
expenditure on paramedical training is divided between that which 
appears under the Medical budget, and is paid for by the State 
Government, and that under Family Planning, paid for by the 
Central Government. Not all of the latter is actually in family 
planning, since the Central Government contributes to the 
training of nurses and to retraining under the multi-purpose 
worker scheme after 1977, but I have kept these two categories 
distinct. Secondly, some other distinctions relate to budgetary 
categories which might be much less distinct on the ground, as 
for example in the separation of expenditure on medical college 
hospitals (in the medical relief category) from the expenditure 
on the medical colleges themselves (under medical education). 
Thirdly, there are other departments in Orissa which undertake 
most public health engineering works (water supply, sanitation) 
and I have been unable to collect comparable data on their 
expenditure, so this total is an understatement of Orissa 
Government expenditure under this heading. This makes inter-State 
comparisons very difficult. As Table 11 demonstrates, Barnett's 
data on Maharashtra show very different distributions for 1972-5, 
because there the Health Department includes such expenditure, 
totalling nearly 30,0 of all health-related State expenditure 
(Barnett, 1977). 
It is difficult to disaggregate these data much further, so 
only relatively simple conclusions can be drawn from these 
tabulations. Three points are, however, obvious, especially from 
a consideration of Tables 9 and 10. Firstly, they show the 
stability of the distribution of expenditures over this period - 
not very surprising over a relatively short time. Secondly, 
Table 9 reinforces the message of Table 2 above, that the role of 
Plan expenditure is particularly crucial in family planning and 
the prevention of disease (and, not shown in this table, in water 
supply and sanitation); the distribution of Plan expenditures is 
thus a poor guide to the distribution of total expenditures. 
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TABLE 10 
DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH-RELATED EXPENDITURE BY MAJOR CATEGORIES 
ORISSA MAHARASHTRA 
1972/3 to 1975/6 and 1977/8 and 1972/3 to 
1974/5 1976/7 1978/9 1974/5 
%AGES %AG ES %AGES %AGES 
MEDICAL EDUCATION: 
Undergraduate 7.9 6.1 5.8 } 
Postgraduate 1.0 0.9 0.8 }6 
PARAMEDICAL TRAINING 1.5 0.7 0.8 } 
MEDICAL RELIEF 51.1 48.9 52.3 25 
PREVENTION/CONTROL OF 
DISEASE 17.0 15.8 14.9 14 
PUBLIC HEALTH, SANITATION 
AND WATER SUPPLY 5.6 5.2 5.6 28 
FAMILY PLANNING: 
Compensation 2.3 10.0 5.1 5 
Paramedical training 0.6 0.3 2.1 } 
Other 13.8 12.2 12.6 }9 
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE 
SCHEME 13 
TOTAL ( 100) (100) (100) (100) 




DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES BY LEVEL OF CARE, 
ORISSA 1972/3 TO 1978/9 
[Annual averages in Rs millions] 
1972/3 to 1975/6 and 1977/8 and 





























Sources: as for Table 9. 
3.0 4.2 4.0 
2.4 2.8 3.0 
5.8 9.1 10.2 
1 .33.3 2.6 








27.7(21 .1 %) 37.5 ( 17.25') 39.9 (17.1,? ) 
25.1 43.8 49.3 
1 .9 3.8 6.8 
27.0( 20.5%) 47.6 (21.8%) 56.1 (24.8) 
24.8 36.0 40.4 
14.2 25.8 26.1 
3.0 17.5 11 .6 
12.6 17.5 17. U 
3.6 7.0 9.1 
5.8 9.6 10.3 
0.3 0.5 0.5 
64.3( 48.9%)113.9 (52.2%)116.0 (49.8%) 
131 .5 211 .8 
232.7 
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Thirdly, Table 10 gives some idea of the significance of 
compensation for sterilisation operations, which rose from 25 of 
the total health-related expenditure in the early 1970's (in both 
Orissa and Maharashtra) to 100AD' in the two years of the Emergency, 
and is still running at over 5`ý of the total in 1977/8 and 
1978/79, 'poor' years for sterilisations. Indeed, of the apparent 
increase in per capita 'real' C 1970/71 prices) Health Department 
expenditures in the Emergency over the preceding years over 254 
can be explained purely as the increase in compensation payments. 
Finally, it is also possible to recategorise expenditure by 
whether it is essentially intended to provide 'primary', 
'secondary' or 'tertiary' care. In brief, primary care is 
designed to meet the major common health problems of the 
population, whether curative, promotive, rehabilitative or 
preventive in focus; secondary care provides more specialised 
services, usually after some referral from a primary facility; 
and tertiary services are the most specialised and least 
accessible. 
There are problems with this analysis: most discussions of 
the categories are not conceptually clear-cut (see, for example, 
Cole-King 197o). It is particularly difficult to allocate 
expenditures on education and training, which may produce staff 
who are to work in all three sectors. In addition, a facility 
like a medical college hospital, which is nominally designed to 
provide highly specialised referral services may actually provide 
primary care services to the surrounding population. A further 
problem is that expenditures nominally in one category might more 
reasonably be located in another, as in cases where staff are 
paid from one budget head (say, Primary Health Centres) but are 
on secondment elsewhere (say, in a medical college). In general, 
I assume that this will not involve large sums, and that 
accounting controls are sufficiently tight to ensure that most 
money is spent in the category to which it is allocated. Table 11 
summarises Orissa Health and Family W,. e1 fa re Department 
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expenditures for 1972/3 to 1978/9 using this categorisation, but 
ignoring the distinction between Non-Plan, State Plan and 
Centrally Sponsored Plan expenditures in each case. 
In terms of the discussion with which I started this 
chapter, it would seem that some caution is necessary in 
concluding straightforwardly (as Cassen does) that public 
expenditures in health are concentrated on big urban hospitals - 
though since 'large' is undefined, there is room for some dispute 
on this. The actual total to be regarded as 'true' primary care 
is also disputable: many would argue that family planning (in the 
Indian context at least) is too coercive to be regarded as 
'health care', and even those favourably inclined towards family 
planning might acknowledge the dubious status of compensation 
payments. Nevertheless, in an international context, these 
figures seem to show that Orissan health expenditures are less 




This chapter has been concerned with patterns of expenditure 
and the administrative processes through which they arise. 
Several conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis. 
Firstly, in health planning it has been the Planning 
Commission which has championed the preventive, public health 
aspects of health expenditures. In both the 3rd and the 4th 
Plans, the Health Ministry proposals would have given far more 
weight to medical education (especially post-graduate education): 
this would have had implications also for medical relief (through 
the extra resources going to medical college hospitals), but the 
Planning Commission radically altered the balance of Plan 
proposed expenditures towards primary care. Why the Planning 
Commission played this role is not immediately obvious, though I 
would speculate that medical personnel have been dominant in 
policy proposals within the Health Ministry but have had to 
contend with more powerful economists and administrators when the 
negotiations have been outside their own direct sphere of 
influence. There is, also, as we shall see in chapter 8, the part 
played by foreign sources of advice, backed up with assistance, 
in reinforcing the pressures for preventive, single-disease 
control programmes which were so significant in the 1960's. 
Secondly, the balance between major categories of health 
expenditure has shifted dramatically towards family pianninc-. 
This has happened partly because family planning spending has 
been a channel under the closer control of the Central Ministry 
of Health than other aspects of health expenditure, and partly 
because of the ideological commitment to population cot-1trol. The 
shift is most marked (somewhat misleadingly so) in Plan 
expenditures, and some parts of the family planning budget have a 
rather ambiguous status (e. g. compensation, and paramedical 
training). Nonetheless, this shift has been a real one. 
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Finally, as we have seen in the case of <Orissa, the tctal 
share of the State budget going to health-related issues seems to 
have declined steadily over the course of the 1970's. 
Nonetheless, the distribution of health expenditure between 
functional categories has remained remarkably solid, with at 
least 40h in primary care, and on some definitions, nearer 50 Z. 
In addition, the evidence about expenditures on indigenous 
medicine (both under Plan and non-Plan budget categories) 
suggests that this has remained very low. 
However, there are two major caveats to the picture 
presented in this chapter. The first is that figures for health 
expenditures are meaningless without some realistic assessment of 
what services they bought, and how effective they were. These 
issues will be addressed in Chapter 9, dealing with health 
personnel; and Chapter 10, which assembles material on processes 
in health institutions. The second is that I have so far talked 
about health policy as if it were a matter solely for Government 
personnel. In the next two chapters I will look at the wider 
context of health policy-making, by looking at the politics of 
medicine in India and the international context. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE POLITICS OF MEDICINE IN INDIA 
So far I have presented medical policy-making in India as if 
it takes place almost entirely within official circles, or in 
Alavi's fourth level of the State. In this chapter I want to 
focus on the messages which this official framework receives from 
outside - from clients, politicians, and organised pressure 
groups within India. I shall argue that these messages generally 
tend to reinforce many of the preferences of those within Health 
Ministries - in other words, they share a 'doctor-oriented', 
'curative-services', view of health problems and solutions. 
However, there are conflicts, particularly over the role of 
people practising Western medicine without an Western medical 
qualification. The conflicts between those who have supported 
unregistered practitioners and those who regard them only as 
'quacks' have been strenuous and remain basically unresolved. I 
shall use these conflicts as a case study, because these disputes 
illuminate political processes very clearly. 
In general, I shall mace two points in the course of this 
chapter. The first is that health services are not central to 
class interests in India, either as benefits to be fought over or 
as important elements in the reproduction of a class-based 
social structure. The main protagonists have been medical 
practitioners, who have fought over the share of the cake that 
they are able to corner, rather than in terms of the role of the 
public sector or other 'ideological' concerns. The second point 
is that the Indian Medical Association the maim 
representative body of doctors, has not been notably successful 
in the campaigns that it has waged, either to protect its narre'.; 
interests or to influence policy in other ways. In other words, 
health planning has been relatively impervious to interral 
pressures. To begin with, I shall discuss the routine pressures 
from clients and politicians, before loot: in at 'inter-system 
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disputes' (between groups of Western and indigenous 
practitioners) and the role of the I. M. A. and other medical 
pressure groups. 
THE POLITICS OF OFFICE 
Those wishing to influence health policy have to contend 
with the division of powers between the Centre and the States, 
outlined in the Introduction to Part P and in Chapter ö above. 
These institutional forms set a framework for outside political 
pressures, and I will begin by outlining this framework before 
turning to discuss some of the forms these take. 
The major changes of the immediate post-Independence period 
were the end of the I. M. S. as an elite corps of medical 
clinicians-cum-administrators, and the introduction of the 
Planning Commission, controlling access to most 'additional' 
funds. The Health Ministries, both Central and State, are still 
divided (as under the British) into a 'secretariat', headed by 
members of the Indian Administrative Service (the heirs to the 
Indian Civil Service) and the 'directorate', headed by doctors 
but including some nurse administrators. Almost all commentators 
agree that the secretariat is dominant: it controls access to the 
sinister, with files passing through it and finance depending on 
it. its formal dominance is reinforced by the ability of he 
'generalist' administrators to talk as colleagues to the heads of 
other Ministries in which they may have recently worked, 
particularly those concerned with financial and planning : Natters, 
whereas the doctors are restricted to a_ career within the one 
Ministry. The doctors can use their technical skills as ä 
political weapon, either by claiming decisions as technical ones 
or using their control over medical resources to get political 
credit directly from politicians. However, every Ministry is made 
up of three groups in potential conflict: the Minister, 




The State Ministries also have to contend with the Central 
Ministry, which exercises its power largely through persuasion 
and the control over 'Plan' funding. Persuasion is exercised in a 
variety of ways, the most public being the annual meetings of the 
Central Council of Health. The issue of the role of the C. C. H. 
was raised at the second meeting in 1 95 4, when the Central 
Minister (Rajkumari Amrit Kaur) complained that the decisions of 
the first meeting had not been implemented. Several Ministers 
immediately pointed out that since Health was constitutionally a 
matter for the States the C. C. H. could not bind its members in 
any way: all 14inisters would need support from their State 
Cabinets in order to get finance for any proposals, and a new 
Ministry would be free to change any decisions (G. O. I. [C. C. H. 1, 
1 95L.: item 1). This has been the formal position ever since, and 
it has rarely been challenged. 
The abolition of the I. M. S. has meant that the Central 
Health Ministry does not have its 'own' men in senior positions 
in the State Ministries, in the way that the I. A. S. provides a 
link between Centre and States. Attempts to establish an All- 
India Health Service, as a replacement to the I. M. S., have been 
discussed periodically since 1950. The States have generally 
argued that they would not like to employ doctors who would look 
to the Central Government for their promotion, since the States 
would not have full control over their destiny (G. 0. I. LC. C. H. ] 
1952: item 7). Additional problems raised have covered the need to 
compensate doctors for a loss of private practice facilities, and 
the difficulty of matching staff to the wide variety of clinical 
or other posts which they might fill (G. O. I. [ C. C. 11. ], 1973: 366- 
8). No such service has yet been created. As a result, the 
medical advisers to the Central Government are all drawn from a 
small Central Health Service. This is recruited to fill positions 
in the health: facilities provided by the Central Government for 
its own employees or for a few hospitals and medical colleges, 
mostly in Delhi. The last of the ex-members of the I. N. S. have 
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now retired, and recent Directors-General of Health Services have 
thus been taken straight from a senior clinical position (often 
as a surgeon) with no experience of medical administrative work 
in the rural areas or small towns. 
The other agency attempting to co-ordinate State and Central 
policies has been the Planning Commission. The Central Health 
Ministry has been able to operate most effective control where it 
has been able to offer financial assistance. The constitutional 
division of responsibilities has largely restricted this to the 
use of 'Plan' funds as a bait, which has depended on the Health 
Ministry's ability to persuade funds out of the Planning 
Commission. State Governments routinely call for innovations to 
be funded by the Central Government or else they will not take 
place; and the Central Government is forced to place its priority 
subjects on the 'Centrally-funded' or 'jointly-funded' list as a 
result. As Chapter 6 has shown, the Planning Commission has not 
played a neutral role, since it has refused to fund some 
proposals from the Central Health Ministry ( for example, those 
concerned with medical auxiliaries in the 1950's, discussed in 
Chapter 9) or it has offered funding for areas on which the 
States have not wanted to spend money. 
The other tactic used by the Central Government to affect 
State policies has been to redefine issues which are 
constitutionally its own, in particular family planning, to 
include aspects of maters al and child health. These then become 
eligible for direct Central funding. These various possibilities 
have formed the substance of rauch discussion involvinV t'he 
Central and State Ministries and the Planning Commission, not 
just when a new Plan has been drawn up but also throughout 
the 
life of a Plan. Changes have been made in the status of projects 
during a Plan period, and it is thus very difficult to state 
whether a particular subject has been Centrally- or State-funded. 
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CLIENTS AND POLITICAL PRESSURE 
The clients of medical facilities are not usually well 
organised to promote a particular point of view about the nature 
of their medical services, and the Indian case is no exception. 
'Patienthood' is usually a short-term, undesired status, and 
generating an institutional base on the back of this kind of 
experience is very difficult. Organisation is more likely as a 
result of the experience of long-term, disabling disorders 
(blindness, deafness) or by those demanding the encouragement of 
new forms of treatment which offer a solution to life-threatening 
disorders (heart surgery, cancer). It is much more difficult to 
organise client pressure in favour of a particular form of health 
service structure, or for changing the balance of expenditures or 
personnel: organisations with this kind of focus are usually 
dominated by medical personnel themselves, with their interests 
as employees. 
In India, there is also a weakness of all kinds of consumer 
pressure groups which compounds the general case. Most consumer 
pressure tends to be sporadic, local, and specific, and to 
disappear very quickly. Typical examples would be the pressure 
generated over the siting of a Primary Health Centre. In Such 
cases, politicians can mobilise local support in favour of a 
decision which will favour one village over another, and 
sometimes this support can be sustained through an apparently 
unfavourable decision, using the courts and higher party 
persuasion. An unknown number of P. H. C. s have been delayed in 
their construction, or built in the 'wrong' place, as a result. 
But the ability to maintain pressure to ensure that the P. H. C. is 
properly funded, or staffed, or organised to mane the most use of 
its limited resources, is way beyond local political resources. 
The major medical issues which enter into local politi cal 
debate are therefore strictly limi ted ones with some gene ral 
local appeal. Firstly there are issues which involve the 
123 
expenditure of money in one locality rather than another - the 
building of hospitals, dispensaries, P. H. C. s or sub-centres. That 
is, given a higher decision about the amount of money to be spent 
on health matters under different heads, then each State, and 
each district within the State, and each town and village in the 
district, will compete for the money to be spent there rather 
than elsewhere. A politician is known for his comparative skill 
in such battles, and electorates expect to be rewarded for their 
loyalty to a successful politician by rewards from the health 
budget as much as from the education, industry or railway 
budgets. These kinds of allocative decisions are not restricted 
to capital expenditures but can also be found in recurrent 
decisions. Examples would include whether or not to fill vacant 
posts, to move staff, to supply new equipment, to release funds 
for drugs, or to redistribute equipment, vehicles, and so on. 
Those living in a Minister's constituency can expect the major 
social welfare schemes to be implemented according to the plan; 
those living in the constituency of an opposition M. P. can expect 
at best a second-rate service. 
Secondly, there are individualistic pressures on 
politicians. These take two forms: access to medical services on 
behalf of clients; and interventions in the careers of 
'suppliers', the medical and paramedical employees. There are two 
main types of clients: those wanting to be patients, and those 
wanting to be doctors. The supply of medical services is grossly 
inadequate, as it is in most parts of the world, but there is no 
formal mechanism to ration access to those services which are 
provided. At the bottom of the medical hierarchy, the P. H. C. or 
sub-centre, far from competition for scarce resources, the 
facilities are often under-used. Patients routinely by-pass the 
P. H. C., either using private practitioners who cluster round 
about in competition, or going directly to district or medical 
college hospitals. There are no 'professional' gate-keepers to 
these services; there is no referral '. hierarchy'; and financial 
rationing (charging what the market will bear) can only be done 
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surreptitiously. In these circumstances, would-be patients search 
for intermediaries to bolster their case for admission, or for 
cheap or free access to essential treatments for their condition, 
in the knowledge that the decision to admit one patient rather 
than another is rarely made on technical criteria alone. Local 
politicians write letters of introduction for their clients; or 
telephone to hospital administrators in their support; or 
accompany them to the hospital. 
At the highest levels, politicians may use Parliament or the 
State Assembly to marshal their attacks against doctors who have 
failed to give in to their orders (see, e. g. Lok Sabha debates, 
16 May 1972 and 31 July 1972). On other occasions doctors working 
in the clinics and hospitals for Government employees may find 
themselves criticised during budget debates. A politician may 
propose a motions to cut the Health budget by a certain amount 
because of the behaviour of doctors in a particular clinic or 
hospital, and use the opportunity to try to settle scores in this 
way. Delhi doctors are well aware of the vulnerability of their 
position because of the number of 'V. I. P. s', not personally known 
to the doctor, who are liable to demand favourable treatment for 
themselves or their clients (interview notes; Delhi Medical 
Association Annual Reports). As one doctor put it, in the Diamond 
Jubilee Celebration Souvenir of the Delhi Medical Association, 
"even the senior doctors ... are often blackmailed and even 
humiliated by the incompetent bureaucrats and corrupt 
politicians" (Jain, 1974). 
Admissions to medical colleges are the other major medical 
resource which doctors control. As I shall argue in Chapter 9, 
the paramedical positions have not been particularly popular, 
largely because there is a much weaker private market for their 
skills, and less opportunity for emigration. The female 
categories - nurses, A. N. MMt. s and L. H. V. s - have often been short 
of applicants. Medical education, by contrast, has always been 
over-subscribed manyfold. At some tires, there has been a 
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collective response: private groups (usually politically well- 
connected) have established medical colleges in some States 
(notably Karnataka and Bihar). Concerted pressure by Delhi 
parents also led to the creation of a fourth medical college in 
the capital in 1972. The strength of this pressure can be 
indicated in the amounts of money which parents are prepared to 
pay as entrance (or 'capitation') fees to private colleges. Not 
surprisingly, evidence of corrupt practice in the admissions to 
government medical colleges are frequently made but rarely 
substantiated. Formally, admissions are made on merit, and this 
probably accounts for most entrants. However, many colleges have 
a reservation of places for nomination by the Governor, and these 
are the subject of considerable pressure, quite apart from any 
candidates who may improve their chances in other ways. 
In the case of the pressures concerning the appointments of 
staff, the crude distinction between clients and suppliers breaks 
down. Medical staff want 'desirable' appointments, defined 
according to a number of criteria such as access to towns (the 
bigger the better), or to a home area, or near a spouse's 
appointment, and so on. Politicians use these preferences as part 
of their political stock-in-trade, offering to medical staff 
support towards meeting these priorities in exchange fcr money or 
political allegiance. 
At the lower level certain posts may have a reputation f cr 
'costing' a certain amount of money (I. -Yade, 1934). At the higher 
levels (posts such as those which can affect admissions to 
medical colleges, or grant other kinds of power) the element to 
be traded is more likely to include the granting of equivalent 
favours back -a tacit agreement to help the condidates of one 
political party or faction when requested. The two kinds of 
pressure thus interact: staff want some posts more than others 
and politicians want some posts filled more than others, and more 
importantly, by their own appointee rather than someone else's. 
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In this kind of structure, staff perceive the desires of 
some clients more powerfully than those of others. Some clients 
have influence over postings while others do not. In general, the 
wealthy have such influence, and their support (or at least, the 
absence of any hostility) may seem likely to be crucial if the 
member of staff is engaged in a dispute with a patient or a 
superior, or threatened with an unwanted move or denied a wanted 
one. 'Defensive' strategies thus mean that staff look over their 
shoulders to their relationships to their wealthier clients, even 
in the absence of financial incentives (e. g. through their 
payments as private patients, whether legal or illegal). Thus, 
for example, Banerji notes how female paramedical staff tend to 
visit only the homes of the wealthier villagers: he explains this 
partly in terms of their own comfort (more pleasant company, 
better hospitality), but maintaining good contacts is also a 
necessity for those who want some say over their career 
possibilities (Baner j i, 1972). 
One exception to this kind of process is if staff members 
can maintain good relationships with superiors on the basis of 
their ability. However, in only one field can this be done with 
any measure of certainty: the meeting of family planning targets. 
Staff throughout the health ministry hierarchy are routinely 
threatened with transfer or dismissal for the failure to meet 
such targets, and offered support for promotions and desirable 
transfers for success. This kind of pressure reached its heights 
during the Emergency, but it has been part of everyday practice 
for much longer (Vicziany, 1983). 
In general, the higher-paid posts receive much greater 
prominence. No-one is much concerned with the new appointment of 
an A. N. M.; but the appointment of doctors in general, to higher 
administrative or teaching medical posts in particular, are 
issues which arouse considerable political dispute. Staff 
themselves expect to spend time negotiating for good posts or 
avoiding bad ones, and politicians spend a lot of time supporting 
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candidates for posts or (if in power) responding to such 
pressures. Indeed, pressures from clients and from employees, 
either directly or mediated through other politicians, tend to 
dominate the lives of Ministers. Dr Sushila Nayar, Central 
Minister of Health in the early 1960's put it to me like this: 
Q: As Health Minister what political pressures were you 
under? 
A: Mostly pressures from my colleagues on appointments - I made some costly mistakes as a result of this, until I 
realised what was going on. Then they wanted me to open 
new medical colleges in their areas; they wanted me to 
get people admission in medical colleges; and there were 
pressures over the purchase of equipment. I managed to 
ignore most of these. (Interview, 1976). 
The prom inence of doctors, and the absence of ideological 
dispute about medical p olicy, are both enhanced in the process. 
The relative absence of ideological dispute is all the more 
surprising because of the opportunity offered by competing 
medical systems, It is not, of course, totally absent. There have 
been vigorous attempts by the proponents of the indigenous 
systems of medicine to assert their claims to larger shares of 
Government expenditure, Government employment, or official 
appointments. These campaigns have had supporters as high as the 
Central Cabinet: Nayyar reported that she had colleagues who 
wanted equal treatment for indigenous systems of medicine, some 
for 'political' reasons and some because of their convictions 
(interview, 1976)(see further below). 
The structure of constitutional divisions described above 
also limits the forms of conventional political pressure, throu h 
parliamentary activities. In the Lok Sabha, the major opportunity 
for debate is usually the presentation of the budget of the 
Ministry; opponents put down 'cut' motions, calling for the 
budget to be reduced because of the failure of the Ministry to do 
certain things. These debates in New Delhi are often dominated 
by lists of inadequacies in the Central Government Health Service 
(the facilities provided for Central Government e- plcyees, often 
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also used by members of Parliament as well). Other topics usually 
relate to claims for improved facilities in the politician's own 
part of the country, or general complaints about shortfalls in 
facilities. There are very rarely clear and consistent criticisms 
of health policies from any particular angle, nor debates 
sponsored by the opposition on medical topics. Only two 
exceptions from this generalisation are significant: support for 
the indigenous systems of medicine, produced on almost every 
possible opportunity by some members and usually ignored; and 
requests for more doctors to serve in rural areas (see Chapter 
9). While the absence of informed political debate is noticeable 
in the Lok Sabha (or Central Parliament), and could be explained 
by the constitutional divisions, it also seems to be true for the 
State Assemblies. Most political activity with respect to health 
takes place outside the Parliamentary forum. 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
The main 'external' pressure groups which attempt to 
influence health policy are occupational groups - representative 
associations of public sector doctors, integrated practitioners, 
Western doctors in private practice, indigenous practitioners and 
so on. The avenues for occupational groups to affect policy are 
varied, and favour some more than others. Allopathic doctors have 
one great advantage, for some of their members are on the 
'inside' in positions of influence, though divisions within the 
occupation (between specialists and generalists, self-employed 
and employees) mean that they are less able to use this advantage 
than might have been expected. 
Almost all medical and paramedical personnel have some form 
of association to join, but those for paramedical staff are much 
weaker than those of doctors, 'gestern or indigenous. 
The most 
political of the medical associations is the 
Indian Medical 
Association (I. M. A. ), but there are several other associations of 
Western doctors. The most notable of these are the associations 
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of specialists (surgeons, physicians etc. ) and of doctors in 
specified employment (by the E. S. I. S., coal mines etc. ) There are 
also other (less stable) groupings for the 'integrated' doctors 
(those with a joint training) as well as for Ayurvedic and Unani 
practitioners, and even one for those who practice Western 
medicine without formal qualifications to do so (the Private 
Medical Practitioners Association of India). By far the best 
documented is the I. M. A., and in most of this section I shall 
concentrate on its history, organisational form and mode of 
operation. 
Early organisations of doctors in India either restricted 
their membership to European doctors, or were dominated by them, 
and were often affiliated to the British Medical Association 
(B. M. A. ). A Bengal branch of the B. M. A. established in 1863 broke 
up in 1867 over the reading of a homeopathic paper; several other 
attempts to create Indian branches were short-lived, until 
separate membership for officers in the Indian Medical Serrvice 
became popular in the 1890's (Johnson and Caygill, 1973: 198-209). 
But there were also medical societies of a more academic nature. 
In Bombay in the 1880's there was a Grant Medical College Society 
(open to Indian and European doctors) and a Bombay Medical and 
Physical Society (apparently restricted to members of the I. 1 . S. 
and. R. A. M. C. ) which predated the Bombay branch of the B. -i. A. 
(1889) (Curset j i, 19,34: 255-62). 
Indian doctors began to establish alternative societies, 
(e. g., the Bombay "Medical Union dating from 1883), which also 
received fluctuating support. These societies often took an 
active stance in political issues, presenting memorials and 
sending witnesses to appear before Royal Commissions which 
considered medical matters in London or in India. They lacked a 
stable all-Indian organisation until regular All-India Medical 
Conferences were held in the mid-1920's and the I. H. A. was 
founded in 1928, as a coalition of local medical associatio s. 
Its original membership of 200 doctors grew steadily to over 
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3,000 ten years later. 
The I. M. A. was closely linked to the nationalist movement. 
M. A. Ansari, a member of the founding Executive Committee, had 
been President of the Congress Session of 1921. The address given 
by Dr Sir Nil Rattan Sircar to the All-India Medical Conference 
in 1928 made no secret of the speaker's view of the causes of 
medical backwardness in India. 
'The secret of this unfortunate situation is not hand to 
discover. An alien trusteeship of a people's life and 
fortune is almost a contradiction in terms. For among 
the governing factors in all sanitary reforms and 
movements are the social and economic conditions of 
life, the environment, material as well as moral, and 
above all the psychology of the people - and an alien 
administration, out of touch with these living 
realities, will either run counter to them and be 
brought up against a dead wall of irremovable and 
irredemiable social facts or, wearying of fighting half- 
understood obstacles in the path, grow timid and fight 
shy of all social legislation even in the best interests 
of the people's lives and health. ' (Ray, 1929: 5) 
These sentiments were repeated by speaker after speaker at 
this conference, with the most hostile comments reserved for the 
Indian Medical Service, seen as dominated by racist sentiment. 
B. C. Roy, also a prominent member of the Congress Party, used 
similar terms in his Presidential address in 1929 when he spoke 
of the 'determined and systematic efforts (which) have been made 
in the past to keep us in a perpetual state of inaction and 
stagnation' (Roy, 1964: 276). For these doctors, the complaint 
against the British was that they had not developed medicine in 
India far enough. However, because of the link between cultural 
renaissance and Indian nationalism, it was necessary for the 
leaders of the I. M. A. to offer co-operation to indigenous 
practitioners. Sircar's address included the assertion of his 
view that 'we must put ourselves 2L-a_; LL with the genuine 
; living representatives of the ancient medical art' (Ray, 192 9: 9) 
and Roy wanted to open membership of the I. i . A. to those who 
'honestly believe in their own system of medicine and practice it 
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with real sincerity' (Roy, 1964: 275-6). But there seems to have 
been little support for these views, and they were pushed on one 
side during the course of the disputes over the international 
recognition of Indian medical degrees. 
The proximate cause of the establishment of an all-Indian 
Medical Association was the claim by the General Medical Council 
in London that Indian medical degrees were no longer adequate as 
sufficient evidence of a doctor's ability to practise in the 
United Kingdom, and by inference, to be a member of the I. M. S. 
(Jeffery, 1979). The G. M. C. said that it would withdraw from this 
position if an Indian Medical Council was established. But it was 
clear that such a council would only be respectable in British 
eyes if it had a membership largely nominated and official. This 
led to the medical of the 1920's and 1930's. The 
I. M. A. accepted the desirability of a national Medical Council, 
to co-ordinate the work of the Provincial Councils, established 
since 1912, but argued for the inclusion of licentiate doctors on 
the all-India register, and for a larger elected, non-official 
element, in line with more general nationalist arguments. The 
early sessions of the I. M. A., and the editorials of its Journal, 
are dominated by this issue until 1933, when the new Indian 
Medical Council was established. 
With the change in Congress policy in 1936, from opposition 
to the reforms of the 1935 Government of India Act to a 
willingness to contest elections and enter Assemblies, the I. M. A. 
also became involved with the work of the new I. M. C. A major 
actor in this arena was B. C. Roy, a member of the Council who was 
by 1945 arguing against the maintenance of licentiate 
qualifications though he maintained the view that they should be 
registered along with graduate doctors (Roy, 1964: 290-1). But 
throughout these arguments it was clear that close association 
with indigenous practitioners would be incompatible with 
international recognition, and the desire to maintain this point 
ensured that barriers between Western and indigenous doctors 
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would be reinforced. 
Medical politics were not the sole activity of the I. M. A.: 
it has published a Journal since 1931, with the bulk of the 
material being academic articles, and Branch meetings also have 
academic sessions. But it is difficult to avoid the impression 
that the political activities of the I. M. A. have been dominant. - 
THE I. M. A. IN INDEPENDENT INDIA 
From its origin, the I. M. A. has been seen by both its 
membership and the Government as the mouthpiece of the private 
practitioners, particularly those in general practice. Prior to 
1933 there was an attempt to ensure that Government servants did 
not join, on the grounds that the I. M. A. would recommend its 
members to vote for certain candidates (presumably Congress) and 
that this made it a political body and therefore out of bounds to 
Government servants (IN. A. I. File 18-6/37-H). This bar was dropped 
when I. M. A. rules were changed to delete those clauses which 
urged to support candidates sponsored by the I. M. A., but the 
image of official disapproval has remained, and some doctors have 
claimed that their I. M. A. activities have been a cause of 
problems in their careers. The benefits offered by the I. M. A. 
also tend to be directed towards private practitioners. 
Membership of the I. M. A. has, at different times, meant 
preferences in the allocation of telephone connections, cars, or 
motor-scooters; Government doctors have separate access to these 
scarce resources. 
These are probably some of the reasons why the I. M. A. is 
unable to attract a membership of more than about 35') of the 
total number of %estern doctors in the country. Membership at 
Independence was about 10,000, reaching 18,000 in the mid-1950's, 
rising to 26,000 in 1965 and 41,000 in 1975 (I. 1i. A. [Anr. ual 
Reports] various years). 1-iost local Branch activities ar e 
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organised with the convenience of private practitioners in mind, 
taking place in the afternoons when most clinics are closed but 
when doctors in employment may still have to attend to their 
duties. In the 1960's the I. P. A. attempted to draw the 
associations of specialists into a closer relationship, 
preferably under its own Specialty 1d ing but this was largely 
unsuccessful. Although doctors in employment have occasionally 
sought the assistance of the I. M. A. and have acted togtether (as 
in the agitation against 'quackery' and for improvements in 
service conditions in 1969) they have resisted attempts by the 
I. M. A. to establish a longer-term relationship. 
Thus both Government and doctors seem to concur in seeing 
the I. M. A. as representing only the general, private practice 
fraction of Western doctors. Nonetheless, the I. M. A. has been the 
largest association of doctors, and it has attempted to present 
its views on medical policies in as many fora as possible. The 
headquarters were moved from Calcutta to Delhi in 1948, to bring 
the association nearer the centre of power, and the I. M. A. has 
worked constantly to be 'taken into confidence' by politicians 
and medical civil servants. It has representatives who attend a 
wide range of committees - the Annual Report for 1973-4 lists 18, 
all with some form of Governmental involvement. The most 
prestigious of these are the meetings of the Central Councils of 
Health and Family Planning/Welfare. The I. M. A. President is 
usually invited to attend, but not as a full member. 
However, I. M. A. officials generally complain that Government 
does take them into 'confidence' in medical decision-making. 
During 1960's a concerted attempt was made to i: rprove the 
effectiveness of the I. N. A. as an influence in decision-making. A 
Public Relations Standing Committee was established in 1963, 
stating its rationale as a result of the progress of modern 
medicine and the enlightenment of laymen. It argued that the 
I. M. A. should study proposed legislation and that its views 
should be put forward in the press and 'through personal approach 
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to the legislators or Health Department Officials, administrators 
and others directly concerned' (I. M. A. [Annual Report]: 1963/64). 
The main objectives of the committee included communicating 
medical news and information, and presenting a positive image of 
the profession by preventing internal conflicts and 'presenting a 
true, realistic picture of the medical men (sic) of today' 
(ibid. ). The apparent failure of this approach was increasingly 
stated in the late 1960's, particularly over Government plans to 
regularise the practice of medicine by unqualified personnel. 
This led the I. M. A. to follow a strategy designed to generate 
public support for their position, using Protest Days, marches, 
and a more concerted attempt to use the Press as a vehicle for 
its views. (See further in Chapter 9 below. ) However, this 
strategy was largely abandoned by 1975 (when the Emergency made 
public protest illegal) and the I. M. A. returned to its former 
methods of influencing events. I. M. A. office-holders visit 
Ministers with Memoranda about policy proposals; they hold 
conferences on topics such as Rural Medical Relief and invite 
politicians to open or close the proceedings, and medical civil 
servants to give papers or chair scientific sessions; and they 
use other contacts (such as doctors who are also MP's) to improve 
relationships with Government. I. M. A. office-holders still 
believe that they do not have the kind of access and 
relationships which can be turned into policy influence. 
One reason for the political weak ness of the I. M. A. is its 
dependence on the very Government it is trying to influence. The 
I. M. A. is not a wealthy organisation: it does not employ any 
doctors full-time, and is dependent upon the committment of 
working private practitioners to give up afternoons in off ice 
work in the Delhi headquarters, or to attend meetings and 
conferences during working hours. Ma ny of its proposals for 
action (such as the involvement of the I. ':. A. in school health or 
family planning activities) are only viable if they are 
underwritten by Government funds. It is clear that only an 
increase in income from this source would permit the I. M. A. to 
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expand its H. Q. staff and employ doctors or other professionals 
in an executive capacity. The major sources of patronage 
available to the I. M. A. - access to priority allocations of 
scarce goods - are provided by the Government. Its prestige 
activities - conferences, buildings, overseas tours - also depend 
on Government funds and permission. 
Another source of its political weakness is its tendency to 
internal disputes, mentioned above. These disputes can be 
aggressively pursued: for example, the President of the I. M. A. 
for 1970-71 was prevented from taking office because of a legal 
dispute over whether Bombay was entitled to Branch status 
separate from that of Maharashtra State. In several years legal 
expenses in respect of litigation, usually connected with 
elections to the 'prestige' offices of President and Vice- 
President rather than the 'working' offices of Secretary or 
Assistant Secretary, have taken over 5%, of I. M. A. income. The 
posts of Secretary and Assistant Secretaries have rarely been 
contested and have stayed in the hands of a small group of Delhi 
G. P. s. There have only been six holders of the post of General 
Secretary since 1948, and several of them have only had 
licentiate qualifications. Further disputes have been generated 
over matters such as attempts by office-bearers to discipline 
I. M. A. staff, whose cause has been championed by some I. M. A. 
members. These disputes have largely been caused by factional 
political divisions within the I. 1"'I. A., and have weakened its 
ability to act decisively. 
A third reason for political weakness is the li. ited spread 
of doctors into rural areas. This probably made little difference 
to doctors, other than causing them embarrassment when they were 
accused of being unwilling to go where they were most needed, 
while political policy was largely the preserve of the urban 
intelligentsia (as under Nehru). But with the changing structure 
of Indian political life, described by some as a 'ruralisation of 
politics', this has become much more significant ( osent al, 
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1970). Doctors have been much less well placed than unregistered 
practitioners to arouse rural public support or factional 
followings, and these kinds of political resource have become 
much more important to political success, except during the 
Emergency of 1975-77. 
The I. M. A. thus demonstrates several of the general features 
which Johnson considers typical of professional associations in 
post-colonial states, and which, he argues, makes it 
appropriate for them to be regarded as essentially different from 
their counterparts in the ex-colonial metropolises (Johnson, 
1973). He argues that their activities tend to be limited in 
range, their membership low, and advancement and prestige within 
the association mostly sought by marginal practitioners. 
Johnson's model includes two other criteria, to which the I. M. A. 
has conformed less clearly. Johnson argues that ambitious young 
doctors would use an organisation such as the I. M. A. as a route 
to advance in public careers; and that international networks 
would be of crucial significance. The first of these was true for 
the period around Independence: several leading politicians were 
active in the I. M. A. and then moved onto a wider political base, 
the most notable being Dr Bidhanchandra Roy, an early President 
of the I. M. A. and later an elected member of the Medical Council 
of India. He became Chief Minister of West Bengal for many years 
in the 1950s. Another example is that of Dr Jivraj Mehta, also 
prominent in the I. M. A. and then the first Secretary of Health 
and Director-General of Health Services in Independent India, 
before becoming an ambassador. By contrast, in the 1960's such 
links seemed to be waning. For example, in 1970 ten doctor-`P's 
were invited to attend a meeting of a committee concerned with 
monitoring legislative proposals, but only one turned up. 
The role of international networks is also difficult to 
substantiate. The I. M. A. is certainly proud of its membership of 
international associations like the World Medical Association, 
and the Commonwealth Federation, and hosting internaticnal 
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conferences of such bodies is undoubtedly prestigious. In 
addition, in a situation where foreign exchange is difficult to 
obtain, attendance at conferences abroad could be a prized right. 
However, this has been of fluctuating significance. On occasion, 
doctors attending such conferences have had to pay all their own 
expenses, and there has been little competition to go - rather, 
doctors who happened to be in the right country at the right time 
have represented the I. M. A., and have played no apparent further 
part in its activities. 
Many of the other medical associations share these 
characteristics with the I. M. A. Associations of specialists have 
not tended to be active in attempts to affect medical policies, 
except for relatively technical issues, such as the conditions 
for the import of medical equipment. They have also had to depend 
on the Government for financial support. On the other hand, they 
are more likely than the I. N. A. to be dominated by doctors in the 
public sector, with official posts usually held by Professors 
from the senior medical colleges; and factional disputes are less 
likely to erupt into public or legal arenas than is the case for 
the I. M. A. 
The general dependence on Government can also be illustrated 
through the history of the Indian Academy of 1:. edical Sciences 
(I. A. t-1. S. ). This was sponsored by Dr K. N. Rao when he Was the 
Director of Health Services in Andhra Pradesh in the 1960's, and 
taken up by him again when he was Director-General of Eealth 
Services in New Delhi. The I. A. M. S. was to play a role somewhere 
between the British Royal Colleges and the Soviet Academies of 
Science, but Rao's strategy was entirely dependent on Government 
sponsorship. He managed to achieve the formal establishment of 
the I. A. i-i. S., but it was totally restricted to the granting of 
honorific titles until 1975. In that year, Indian medical 
qualifications were aain 'derecognised' by the G. - . C., and in g 
retaliation, the Government of India insisted that British 
qualifications would no longer be recognised in India. `ý': e 
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Government chose to use the I. A. M. S. as a vehicle for providing 
medical qualifications in India, separate from the University 
sector, to provide an equivalent to British Royal College 
qualifications since these were no longer to be recognised. 
CONTROL OVER "QUACKERY": A CASE STUDY 
One further way to understand the nature of medical 
politics, the tactics of the various participants and the values 
they are trying to establish, is to look at a case study. There 
is no doubt that the primary issue which has exercised the I. H. A. 
since 1947 has been policy towards practitioners unqualified in 
Western medicine. Prior to Independence, the expressed attitudes 
of doctor-politicians were not very hostile. In the 19301s, as I 
have shown above, several Presidents of the I. M. A. called for a 
rapprochement between allopathic and indigenous practitioners. 
Even so, the hand of friendship was only offered to 'sincere', or 
'genuine' practitioners who maintained a 'pure' practice of the 
ancient arts. But I. I. A. policy since 1947 has been consistently 
to draw a clear line between allopathic graduates and licentiates 
on the one hand, and all other practitioners, usually called 
"quacks". Under pressure the I. ii. A. has admitted that trained 
vaids and hakims should be permitted to continue in their own 
line, but it has protested vehemently against 'integrated' 
practice (combining training and treatment from : ore than one 
system) and the use of allopathic treatments by untrained 
personnel. The Public Relations Sub-Committee expressed it in 
this way in 1963: 
"Quackery is rampant in our country. It would be the 
duty of the Association to acquaint the public and 
educate the illiterate masses about the same with a view 
to elicit their co-operation in rooting out this 
menace. " 
Unfortunately for the I. M. A ., the public a nd : zany 
politicians and civil servants do not see the matter in t ,o same 
way. Propaganda against travelling sellers of cures, usually 
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totally fraudulent, has been undertaken by the Government, but 
neither it nor most patients see established practitioners with 
dubious qualifications, nor the use by vaids and hakims of 
allopathic medicines, as the same kind of issue. Whatever the 
overall doctor-population ratios might say, it is clear that in 
many areas trained doctors are few and far between. The 
Government has therefore argued that the unqualified practitioner 
is entitled to earn his living in this way as long as he is not 
an actual threat to his patients, at least until there are enough 
trained doctors to replace him. This view is held despite the 
existence of legislation designed: 
(i) to restrict the spread of unqualified practice by 
registering existing practitioners and then outlawing any future 
additions to the register (following a Bombay Act of 1938 as a 
model); 
(ii) to prevent any medical practice by those unqualified in 
modern medicine (enshrined in a clause of the Act which amended 
the constitution of the Medical Council of India, in 1956); and 
(iii) to prevent the prescribing of drugs contained on a 
list of dangerous drugs (enshrined in the Drugs Act of 1940). 
The I. M. A. has frequently tried to insist that this 
legislation be enforced, but it has usually been ignored. This 
may be because, at the local level, the relevant agencies 
(District Medical Officers, or the police) prefer to maintain 
illegal practices for considerations, or as part of the network 
of favours and obligations which are the everyday currency of 
political life. However, when it has been proposed that policy 
should change to over-rule aspects of this legislation, `she 
I. M. A. has managed to prevent most of these changes being 
implemented. The 'bare-foot' doctor scheme of 1972-3, and the 
proposal by the Kerala Government in 1974-6 to establish a common 
register for qualified and unqualified personnel, were two cases 
where sustained 'trade-union' action was successful, in 
combination with other factors, in preventing a change. Eut 
opposition to the schemes developed since 1975, again based on 
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'bare-foot doctor', has not prevented the establishment of 
Community Health Volunteers. The rural populism which 
characterised the Janata Government led it to over-rule medical 
opposition, and the new Congress Government of 1980 eventually 
decided to maintain a commitment to implementing the scheme 
(Joubert, 1985). 
The associations of indigenous practitioners have also been 
concerned with policy in this area. As Brass has shown, these 
associations have been divided into two opposing camps - those 
who have insisted on a 'pure' Ayurveda and those in favour of 
some integration of Western and indigenous practice (Brass, 
1972). Most education in Ayurvedic and Unani colleges prior to 
the 1960s was 'integrated' with modern subjects, such as anatomy 
and physiology, but this led to increasing stresses after 19147. 
Students in general tended to want more Western medicine, since 
they were often taking courses in indigenous medicine as a 
second-best option, having failed to get into Western medical 
colleges. They then used their training to claim that they were 
entitled to employment on the same pay and conditions as Western 
graduates. But the political case for indigenous medicine rested 
on its suitability to Indian culture, diet and climate, and on 
its claim that it was providing services in the rural areas which 
Western medicine was unwilling and unlikely to supply. The 
contradictions in this situation were resolved by decisions in 
the early 1910 0s which removed 'modern' science fror:; the 
curriculum of most indigenous medical colleges and followed the 
'pure' line. This line which was also preferred by gestern 
doctors because it might lead to a clearer delineation of the 
distinctions between the systems of medicine, and a clearer 
ability to step 'outsiders' (those without full Western 
qualifications) from encroaching on Western territory (G. O. I., 
1961'6, ) . 
But this dispute has not died. There remain ýeep 
contradictions between the representatives of 'pure' Ayurveda and 
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the actual practices of most graduates of the indigenous 
colleges. The practitioners routinely use aspects of Western 
medicine, and usually insist on their right to prescribe any 
legal drugs. The logical problems of attempts to synthesise an 
integrated 'system' of medicine are usually regarded as 
insurmountable; but at the level of everyday practice, many 
practitioners and clients are willing to move between these 
incompatible systems. In addition, the indigenous graduates have 
been almost as unwilling to work in rural areas as have their 
Western counterparts. The debates over high policy have thus 
tended to be carried on at considerable remove from everyday 
reality. 
These processes have thus led to a weak form of medical 
oligopoly. Not only do indigenous practitioners continue to 
exist, they also have a measure of State patronage for their 
colleges, with some public employment prospects for their 
graduates. Most recently, graduates of indigenous medical 
colleges have supposedly been employed as the third medical 
officer at Primary Health Centres. In private practice they also 
prescribe Western medicines with varying degrees of impunity, and 
run successful clinics in urban as well as in some rural 
settings. Since 1977, the Western doctors have also had to accept 
the creation of a new group of healers, also with some State 
patronage, in vast numbers. In I. M. A. terms, this is a 
sponsorship of 'quackery' which they have been powerless to 
prevent. 
CO NC L US 10 H 
The I. M. A. has been generally unsuccessful in its camp. ---i ns. 
Its office-bearers feel they are excluded from the informal 
policy-making process, and formal attempts to influence policy 
have been of li'mited success. It has not followed a clear-cut 
policy of promoting private medicine: for a period during the 
1970s it favoured a complete nationalisation of L;; edical services 
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as a way of dealing with the problems of over-crowding in 
medicine. Other organisations of practitioners have been even 
less successful, whether they have been paramedical practitioners 
or those from the other systems of medicine. The main strength of 
the Western doctors has come from their representatives within 
the official hierarchy, where they have been able to trade on 
their control over scarce, desirable resources - access to 
hospitals and medical colleges. Health policy-making has thus 
taken place in the absence of sustained ideological debate, 
whether over the system of medicine to be supported, the role of 
private medicine, or the distribution of resources between uses. 
I shall now turn to look at international pressures on policy- 
making, which have involved some of these issues. 
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CHAPTER 8 
INDIA IN THE WORLD HEALTH ECONOMY 
It was obviously impossible to understand health policy in 
India before 1947 without looking at the role of the British 
Government. Indian health and health policy since 1947 must also 
be seen in the context of a world economy. This has had a number 
of implications, some of them very general. For example, the 
Indian economy has been influenced by its access to technology 
and world markets which has not been true, until recently, of 
China. The cultural implications of this access have been to 
present a picture of a desirable future to the Indian elite, 
which has influenced decision-making in a number of fields. And 
the role of multinational corporations has been to affect the 
generation of internal capital and investment decision-making. 
However, as I argued in the Introduction to Part B, these forces 
have not been as powerful or substantial in India as in many 
other peripheral capitalist economies. In this chapter I shall 
'bracket off' concern with the wider context (and I shall return 
to it in the Conclusion) in order to focus in turn on three areas 
where the links to health and health policy are more direct. The 
first is health sector aid; the second is the migration of health 
sector personnel; and the third is the operations of multi- 
national corporations, as employers, producers, and sellers - 
particularly of pharmaceutical products. 
HEALTH SECTOR AID 
Health sector aid to India has not been the subject of much 
discussion apart from the special area of family planning. The 
most recent critic - D. Banerji. - argues that donor agencies are 
actively supporting moves to reintroduce compulsion in fa:, ily 
planning, in spite of the apparent shift in health sector aid 
programmes after 1975 (Banerji, 1981; but see also Kocher, 19(0). 
The basis of Baner j i's critique is af am il iar one. e ar . ues 
that 
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health policy (in this case, maternal and child health and family 
planning) must be understood in the context of an international 
political economy. Health policies supported by the World Bank or 
other capitalist institutions must, in this perspective, be seen 
in the light of the interests which they serve, and Banerji 
predicts that the new resources are not 'really' for maternal and 
child health but merely a facade to cover the planned return to 
compulsion in family planning. This argument, however, can only 
finally be settled by the course of events in the next few years: 
in this section I am concerned with the patterns of aid in the 
period between 1947 and 1980. 
For the purposes of this chapter I shall define health 
sector aid as 'international assistance to the health sector'. It 
may or may not have any impact on health, and aid to other 
sectors may have more impact (for example through raising female 
literacy). 'Aid' and 'assistance' are of course contested terms, 
but I shall use them for simplicity. The only substantial work on 
health sector aid, using the same basic definition, has been 
carried out in the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex, 
(Cole-King, 1976; White, 1977) but this concentrated on assessing 
patterns of activity by donors while I am concerned here with the 
pattern for one recipient country. 
Health sector aid has not attracted the same hostile attent- 
ion paid to other aspects of 'official development assistance': 
the general aura of disinterestedness which surrounds the doctor 
and nurse has carried over to the international aid which is 
supposed to train, employ, equip or house them in underdeveloped 
countries. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of critical 
literature, dating from the mid-1 97C's, and many of the 
criticisms have been accepted by key decision-makers, both in 
donor agencies and in Health Ministries in the Third : orld. 
There is a powerful argument against focussing' attention on 
health sector aid, since this may well have a far less si; Jnifi- 
cant impact on the health of Indians than other aspects of the 
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world-economy. But health 'aid' should not thereby be ignored, 
but be seen in a context set by other transactions - the focus of 
the second and third sections of this chapter. 
LllTSflLIiL QZ ýLll5lu LZLILL IlL 
Few people have argued that all health sector aid should 
cease; rather they have argued that the form it has taken has: 
(a) led to increased dependency relationships; 
(b) been an inappropriate use of techniques and models; and 
(c) been informed by conscious or unconscious Maithusian 
intentions. 
ltc 
.2 Q-f 4A -=Ljj 
Gish's pioneering work on flows of doctors and other medical 
personnel between the U. K. and other countries provides one of 
the earliest examples of the ways in which health sector aid 
could be said to benefit the donor rather than the recipient 
(Gish, 1971). Some of the doctors and nurses brought for training 
to the U. S. and the U. K. stayed behind after their training and 
helped meet manpower shortages there. A considerable literature 
has developed which attempts to measure the benefits reaped by 
countries receiving flows of doctors and nurses in this way, with 
a number of proposals to tax these benefits for transfer to the 
countries losing medical personnel (Gish, 1976). 
It is clear that in the case of India, at least, this 
'brain-drain' has been t unded mainly by the doctors involved 
themselves ( relatively few Indian nurses are abroad) and not by 
aid agencies. Nevertheless, some critics have argued that these 
flows are only possible because of the professional links 
maintained partly by foreign support for the training; of medical 
educatcrs abroad. As a result, medical colleges in India have 
remained oriented to Western models of medical training, at the 
expense of appropriateness in terms of local pa tteri so Iý, isea e 
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and services (see Jeffery, 1979 and Chapter 9 below). In this way 
'medical dependency' is reproduced: not only flows of trained 
personnel but also orders for medical equipment and 
pharmaceuticals tend to divert benefits back to the donor 
countries (Doyal, 1979; Cleaver, 1977). 
A major weakness of this kind of analysis is its focus on 
the external partner in an aid or trade relationship. (For 
general discussions of dependency theories, see Roxborough, 1979; 
Foster-Carter, 1978; 1.1orsley, 1980. ) It sometimes appears as if 
'metropolitan' countries are totally dominant, and need take no 
account of class formations and State apparatuses within the 
'periphery'. But there are good grounds for believing that 
internal factors will affect the kind of assistance which is 
acceptable or requested. Some countries, notably, in this case, 
India, have developed considerable sophistication in manipulating 
donor agencies. 
As with other aspects of dependency analysis, there is a 
need to specify the period under discussion: there may well be 
differences between the immediate post-Independence period and 
later on. In addition, the material benefits to the donor are 
seldom quantified. It may well be that supporters of health 
sector aid point to material benefits in order to persuade donors 
to provide support, but the supposed benefits (e. g. a more 
profitable environment for multinational investment) may not 
materialise, nor may they affect the decisions taken after the 
assistance has been sanctioned. ihile it is valuable to debunk 
the claims that health aid is purely philanthropic, it is also 
necessary to bear in mind the relative insignificance of health 
aid. 
One area of analysis which has not been much developed is 
the part played by medical aid in the maintenance and 
reproduction of the mode (or modes) of production in 
underdeveloped countries. This is not perhaps surprising, given 
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the lack of agreement about what characterises the mode of 
production in these countries or the way in which several modes 
of production might be said to interact (articulate) in any 
specific historical example (Alavi, 1975 G_ 1981). In the case of 
India, there is dispute at least between those who interpret the 
situation as one where there is a post-colonial mode, and those 
who see articulations between an expanding capitalist mode and a 
semi-feudal mode (Thorner, 1983). 
Without entering into those debates, it is possible to make 
two relevant points here. The first relates to State structures: 
most health aid is channeled through the State, and thus helps to 
expand the resources available to the State and those who control 
it. Health sector aid thus tends to strengthen the position of 
ruling groups in general, as well as supporting particular groups 
such as public sector doctors over those in the private sector, 
and modern bureaucratic cosmopolitan medicine over informal, 
indigenous or traditional systems. The second point relates to 
the particular significance of medicine as an ideological form - 
one of the ways in which poverty and exploitation can be 
explained away ( or at least those responsible for it can deny 
responsibility - see Frankenberg, 1981 ). The provision of 
individualised medical (and other) services by the State helps to 
defuse pressures for change in the underlyin social structures 
ultimately causing the patterns of morbidity and mortality 
(Jeffery, 1978). Health sector aid channeled through the 
Government tends to support these processes. 
There is also the argument that the f ünding of health 
services from outside the community tends to weaken its capacity 
to provide for itself, which can be seen as an important aspect 
of development itself. However, if the alternative is that the 
poorest groups are left with the job of managing their own 
the poverty then it is not clear that external assistance worsens 
situation (Briscoe, 19 C). Some v riters have argued that ec ioai 
services, even those organised originally from outside, can also 
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have liberative effects, especially among the rural landless or 
the urban slumdweller (Baner j i, 1978). Indeed, some health 
projects, especially the voluntary, innovative ones, threaten 
established powerful groups. Perhaps this is possible because 
health is rarely perceived as central to a pattern of domination; 
but attempts to make significant changes in the health status of 
the poor can easily lead to confrontation (Chowdhury, 1978). - 
(b) 
This criticism of health sector aid is the most familiar, 
and is in some respects just a less 'political' version of the 
dependency argument. Much medical aid in the past has been used 
to establish large hospitals, to install expensive equipment, or 
to train high-level personnel. The maintenance costs of such 
large projects can swallow up a considerable proportion of the 
budgets of poor countries; they have rarely served more than a 
small proportion of the population (the elite, urban groups); and 
they have been designed to cope in an expensive way with diseases 
which bulk relatively small in the morbidity pattern of the 
country as a whole (Bryant, 1969). Health sector aid has thus 
tended to move resources out of primary care into secondary and 
tertiary care; away from rural areas into urban ones; away from 
preventive, community health and into hospital-based curative 
facilities; and away from female healers and towards male ones 
(Doyal, 1979). The legacy of inappropriate institutions - for 
training, or hospitals, or in the skills of available staff - 
makes change very difficult to achieve. 
A further version of this critique applies hindsight to 
large aid projects and argues that their failure can be explainer; 
by the absence of any attempt to adapt to local economic, social 
and cultural conditions (Newell, 1975). The most obvious example 
of this is the malaria eradication programme, which was planned 
on the model of experience in other parts of the world but which 
failed to adapt adequately to Indian conditions, notably the 
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inadequacy of its basic health services (Sinha, 1976; Aggarwal, 
1978; Harrison, 1978). Another example would be the early 
clinic-based approach to the supply of family planning services, 
which was totally inappropriate to a largely rural country 
(Banerji, 1972; Demerath, 1976). In both cases, Western 
experiences were applied, on the assumption that narrow technical 
issues determined success, and the failure to allow for local 
cultural, social and economic patterns was ultimately disastrous. 
The general case is that health sector aid has assisted a 
wholesale borrowing of techniques and institutions from the West 
in a naive 'modernisation' framework which has taken inadequate 
note of the differences between donor and recipient society. 
Some critics go further and argue that the Western solutions can 
never serve underdeveloped countries, because they are not 
effective in the . -Test; while others take the more radical view 
that these services are counter-productive in health terms, 
because they generate dependencies which are antithetical to 
people's ability to manage their own lives (Illich, 1976). 
The major weakness of this kind of criticism is that it is 
rarely located in a political economy of decision-making. 
The assumption is that such errors are a result of ignorance (and 
that knowledge will bring resolution) or because of the 
particularly narrow form of medical education, which can be 
balanced by the introduction of community elements into decision- 
making. However, it is perhaps this focus on technical issues 
which has made it most acceptable to decision-makers, and it is 
this critique which has had most influence in changing the 
policies of donor agencies. 
(c) 
This set of criticisms most obviously applies to population 
programmes, and specifically refers to the assumption (explicit 
or implicit) that the cause of a country's poverty can be f rund 
in the size or rate of growth of its population. The idea that 
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world affluence was threatened by population growth in poor 
countries provided a clear justification for assistance to family 
planning programmes from the mid-1960's onwards (Piotrow, 1973). 
This was led by the Fort Foundation and U. S. A. I. D., who continue 
to support these programmes on a substantial scale, but other 
donors also became involved at different levels. Critics focus on 
the potential for such programmes to become another way in which 
the poor are blamed for their poverty. Resources which could be 
used to assist them are instead put into programmes which the 
poor do not want and which meet few of their perceived needs. 
Concern for preventing births is not matched by concern for those 
already born, and some critics interpret this as essentially 
racist, and anti-feminist (Doyal, 1979). However, many writers 
are also aware of the ambiguities involved: the ability of women 
to control their own fertility in a safe way is increasingly 
regarded as a basic right; and the extent of illegal abortions is 
witness to the number of women who are having unwanted 
conceptions, or are unable to 'space' their conceptions as they 
would prefer. There is a fine line between providing services 
which allow men and women to control the number of children they 
have, and forcing them to have fewer than they want. 
LID IL 
Detailed investigation of a case study demonstrates some of 
the problems with the analyses presented above. To be in W ith, 
there is the problem of what economists call 'fun, gibility'. The 
provision of aid for one project (say a new hospital) re. eGses 
local funds for other projects (say a new hotel). Since we cannct 
know what would have happened in the absence of the aid, w,; -- 
cannot know the extent to which the aid 'really' funds the 
project to which it is linked on paper (Singer, 1965). it is 
also difficult to classify health sector aid, since any 
particular project may have both appropriate ant inappropriate or 
Malthusian features - such as training in the biology of human 
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reproduction for paramedical workers. I shall have to assume here 
that it does make sense to talk about the projects nominally 
funded by health sector aid, and where the data exist, I shall 
use crude classifications of aid on the assumption that this is 
meaningful. Table 1 summarises the main sources of foreign 
assistance to Indian public sector health activities. 
In quantitative terms the major donor has been the U. S. A., 
providing technical assistance to health and sanitation amounting 
to $107 million between about 1950 and 1973 (see Table 2). After 
the U. S. Government's 'tilt to Pakistan' in the Indio-Pakistani 
War of 1 971 , the U. S. Government ceased new assistance to 
India. 
However, a new loan to malaria control was negotiated in 1978, 
and since 1980 new grants have been made to the area development 
programmes in five States (see further in Chapter 11). The 
earlier assistance was almost entirely on a grant basis, and 
health took about 3M /o of technical assistance to India in this 
period. In addition, a grant of $20 million made in 1969 was not 
tied to specific imports or advisers, but was granted on the 
understanding that of the extra resources made available to the 
Government of India, 50 would be spent on improving the delivery 
of rural health and family planning services. 
The final category of U. S. assistance is PL-80 rupee 
counterpart funds. Grain supplied as 'aid' by the U. S. : "ras 'paid 
for' in rupees; the Indian Government could only spend these with 
the agreement of the U. S. Government. 1 early Rsl, 000 million 
(approximately $166 million) went in loans to the health sector, 
and Rsl, 250 million (about $200 r4i1lion) went in grants. Contrary 
to some of the expectations derived from the literature cite 
above, the major share of the technical assistance an, PL-480 
funding was to malaria control and eradication (76r of technical 
assistance and 47' of PL-480 funds) and water supply and sanit- 




MAJOR SOURCES OF HEALTH AID 1947-1979 
1947-9 1950-4 1955-9 1960-4 1965-9 1970-4 1975-9 TOTAL 
millions 
U. S. Government 
Technical aid 21 46 25 12 2 107 
PL-)480 70 136 160 366 
Other 10 15 25 
U. N. I. C. E. F. 0.3 8 10 20 26 40 30 1344 
W. H. 0. 0.2 2 5 6 6 11 23 53 
U. N. F. P. A. 5 37 42 
World Bank: 
Population 6 15 21 
Water Supply etc. 1 69 70 
Ford Foundation 3 4 3 1 10 
Rockefeller Fndtn. 0.1 0.2 2 1 2 0 - 5 
Swedish I. D. A. 2 9 11 
Norwegian I. D. A. 4 24 28 
U. K. (O. D. A. ) 6 6 
TOTAL 0.6 31 133 191 210 84 229 878 
(excl. PL-480 0.6 31 63 55 50 84 229 512 
4 
Sources: For 
- U. S. aid, see Table 2; F1nz1;. G1. Aa1 8. L. P. QZI z12g I'QLý. ULIz U. N. General Assembly Official Records, New York, 1950-1976. 
(Because of changes in classification and the expansion of activities to include education, the 1970-7)4 and 1975-79 figures are estimates); ljujjj,. Ajjj 2'9j; 
-Qr Qi ýý ýg'a. 5 irr ýý, U. N. F. P. A. , New York, 1979; ID Ley ý ýa., 5. j L1ä. 1.2a$z13fa7 W. H. O., New Delhi, 1968; j WgLj y y'CAar. Z IL '5. gyjh 
LLs. 1 L. Zia. J. 2 1.2Z3, New Delhi, 1 97 3; ZILLL'Qla1 12;. Qrlz, W. H. O., Geneva, 1973-77; Rockefeller Foundation, relevant years; EQr Ford Foundation, New York, relevant years. (Details provided change from year to year and the 
absence of payments information from seven years means that there may be some double-counting); Norwegian aid: personal letter, June 1985. 
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TABLE 2 
U. S. PUBLIC SECTOR ASSISTANCE IN HEALTH AND SANITATION; 
Technical PL-480 
Assistance Grant s Loans 
(US $ mill) (Rs million) 
Malaria control/eradication 83.3 852 210 
Filaria control 2.4 * 
Smallpox control/eradication 103 27 
Other communicable disease 
control programmes 0.4 
Water supply 6.4 587 
Medical education 2.8 
Nursing education 1.2 * ý" 
Family Planning 6.2 
Miscellaneous 3.9 
TOTAL 106.7 1249 999 
Sources s: z 
Office of Controller, U. S. A. I. D., 1 976: 259; Shenoy, 1974: 2-143, 
1 w categories are not separately recorded. 
Note: The jjz. 2. z gf -jj; 
d 
. 
I)L , Qý reprints press 
releases from the U. S. Embassy in several editions from the r. -. id- 
1950's onwards until 1969-70. This incomplete listing gives some 
evidence on the timing of this assistance, and notes Rs29 million 
to A. I. I. 111-. S , Rs134 million to primary ý. eýl th centres, ant. ßs; '4 
million to the training of medical educators before 31 'arc;,: 
1966. 
Reserve Bank of India, lists 
loans from 1969/70 onwards. A loan from U. S. A. I. D. for malaria 
control was agreed in 1978, and Rs120 millions ($15.4 millions) 
was spent in 1979/80 under this head. 
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There has been something of a division of labour between 
U. S. aid and that o f the W. H. O.: while material supplies have 
come from U. S. aid, techni cal adv isers (many of them American) 
have been prov ided under W. H. O. 's auspices. Indians were also 
trai ned on U. S. government funds: for example, 249 between 1952 
and 1960 were trai ned in health subjects, roughly 10', ) of the 
total (Shenoy, 1974; Times of Indi a, 1951-67). 
U. N. I. C. E. F. has provided substantial assistance to Indian 
health programmes, often in collaboration with W. H. O., 
particularly to maternal and child health services, tuberculosis 
and leprosy control programmes, the production of vaccines, and 
to the applied nutrition programme. Over the period 1947-70 
U. N. I. C. E. F. provided over $64 million, mostly in the health 
sector, though in recent years it has diversified its assistance 
into education. This excludes emergency relief. India is also a 
contributor to U. N. I. C. E. F., including $15 millions as a member 
since 1950, so this is not 'net' assistance. A detailed breakdown 
of U. N. I. C. E. F. assistance to India by purpose is not available, 
but the largest share was in supplies and equipment - anti- 
malarial and anti-T. B. materials, milk for child feeding, jeeps 
for primary health services and so on. 
Since 1971, the U. N. Fund for Population Activities 
(U. N. F. P. A. ) has provided substantial assistance, with $43 
million allocated up to 1979. Smaller grants have been handled by 
W. H. O. or I. L. O.; larger awards have , been managed direct by 
U. N. F. P. A. or by the U. '. Development Programme. Some of this 
assistance has been firmly within the family planning programme 
of the Government of India, such as $1 4 million for the e:,:,., -,,.,  
of the sterilisation programme; others have been concerned to 
strengthen training for paramedical worls<ers ýiho do more than just 
family planning work, as in the grants of x20.5 million fcr 
training indigenous midwives and paramedical , ', or'kers, aid for the 
employment of nurse-midwives and female health . gor? <: ers. 
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W. H. O. has also been a substantial donor, with a total of 
over $40 million between 1948 and 1976. As with U. S. aid, this 
assistance has been spread over most parts of the Indian 
Government health programme, with substantial proportions going 
to malaria control and eradication (135), smallpox eradication 
(24ä) and tuberculosis control (8%). Suport to communicable 
disease control programmes (including technical advisers and 
fellowships for Indians to study abroad) has taken roughly half 
of total assistance, while education and training has taken . 
While other countries in the region are increasingly encouraged 
to send their medical personnel on J. H. C. T; fellowships to India 
for training, 90% of Indian fellows study outside the region. 
W. H. C. provided 1184 fellowships between 1948 and 1972, mostly in 
public health (570), malaria eradication (83) and control of 
other communicable diseases (161), but a further 208 were for 
medical education and 162 for clinical subjects. This category 
included a link between Baroda Medical College and Edinburgh 
Medical School; Baroda has the distinction of a graduate 
population about 50 % abroad in 1976 (Bhatt et al., 1976). 
W. H. O. has also been a source of technical advice, both 
formally and informally. W. H. 0. advisers attend and sometimes 
contribute to meetings of the Central Council of Health, as did 
U. S. A. I. D., Ford and Rockefeller advisers prior to the mid- 
1 960's. They have provided assessments of plans and projects; and 
their support was crucial in the establishment of the malaria 
control and eradication programmes in the 1950s, and the smallpox 
eradication programme of the 1970s. Their 'non-political' status 
has probably given their advice more acceptability than that of 
the Americans, though in practice they worked closely with 
U. S. A. I. D. in the heyday of American assistance, before 1966 
( 11 eyer, 1967). 
With the exception of the U. S., health sector aid f rom, other 
countries or institutions has been less substantial and less 
regular than the involvem ent of the U. Y. agencies. 
Th as e U. -:. h 
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in many years been the largest bilateral donor to India, but in 
the field of health its contribution has been small. It has taken 
four forms. Firstly there has been assistance known as 
'maintenance aid', in which the Government of India imports what 
it wishes from the U. K., funded by a sterling credit. Here the 
influence of the British Government is small, but some of the 
goods so imported (about $720,000 a year in the 1970s) have been 
medical in nature (White, 1977). The second category is aid for 
specific projects. In the 1 970's this amounted to very small sums 
in the health sphere, for example $120,000 in 1974, nothing in 
1975, and $250,000 in 1976 (O. D. A., 1 971 ; 0. D. M., 1978). The 
third area is technical co-operation, the funding of fellowships 
in the U. K. and the provision of technical advisers. In part this 
has been handled through the Colombo Plan, with 50 fellowships a 
year going to Indians in the sphere of health in the 1960's. 
Other visits to the U. K. have been provided by the British 
Council (10 or so a year in the 1970's) and under Commonwealth 
schemes (50 or so a year in the 1970's) (Colombo Plan, 1969). 
There was also a scheme in which the Post-Graduate Institute of 
Medicine in Chandigarh was linked to the Postgraduate Medical 
Federation at the Hammersmith Hospital in London. The fourth 
category is an isolated grant of $6 million in 1977 to equip 
operating theatres at Primary Health Centres and sub-divisional 
hospitals, largely for sterilisation operations, which was a rare 
example of British aid available for expenditures in rupees prior 
to 1979. 
Other bilateral donors h ave provided specific assistance for 
projects and for training abroad. New Zealand provided S2 
millions for the All-Indi a Institute of i di cal Sciences 
in Idew Delhi in the mid-195 0's; and in the 1970's 
has provide; 
assistance to a post-partum family planning T,, 
Swedish Government provided w10 million to the :. . ü. f ;r 
smallpox eradication in India in the early 1970s, ano co-finances 
a major project with the 1 on d Bank. Other courtries have been of 
COQ 
less significance. However, as Table 1 shows, whereas until the 
1960's the major part of health aid was provided by U. S. sources, 
the inputs from other donors have become far more significant 
since 1975. This can be in part understood as a result of the 
changes in aid orientation discussed in Chapter 11. 
Most private sector aid has not been handled by the 
Government sector in India. The exceptions are the major 
foundations, Ford and Rockefeller. The Rockefeller Foundation 
began assistance in India in 1920, with aid to health programmes 
in Mysore State, and provided '675,000 to the All-India Institute 
of Hygiene and Public Health in Calcutta before Independence. 
Since 1950 major grants have gone to the Virus Research Centre in 
Poona (over $1.2 million by 1973); to the A. I. I. H. S. (over $1.2 
million) and its rural training centre at Ballabgarh (over 
$250,000) and to selected medical colleges - the Christian 
Medical College at Vellore, Trivandrum Medical College, and the 
King George's Medical College, Lucknow, in particular. 
Rockefeller assistance has tailed off since 1967, whereas 
Ford Foundation aid dates from 1959 and reached a peak in 1970. 
This was concentrated on rural sanitation to begin wit-h, but then 
on population programmes run by the Government of India ($3.7 
million) or by the research/action centre at Gandhigram (nearly 
$1 million). An early and continuing interest has been to help 
research in reproductive biology (nearly $2 million, with one- 
third going to A. I. I. M. S. ). Both Ford and Rockefeller have also 
supported Indian Council for Medical Research research 
fellowships, as well as off erin research fellowships abroad. 
Rockefeller reports list over 250 fellows in medical subjects who 
completed their study programme between 1917 and the end of 1968 
-a list which includes most of the prominent nurses and doctors 
in India in this period (Rockefeller Foundation, 19172). 
The other private sector ag encies are so numerous, anc they 
provide so little documentation of their activities, th at it is 
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impossible to summarise their involvement, but only to provide 
indicators of their scale and form. For example, the Federal 
German Republic has provided assistance through charitable 
agencies to voluntary hospitals and other health facilities, 
amounting to DM 66.4 million (roughly $23 million) between 1950 
and 1980. The major U. S. sources have been C. A. R. E. and the 
Catholic Relief Services, both heavy users of U. S. surplus food. 
The Catholic programme handled around $30 million of PL-480 food 
in India in 1978-9, while C. A. R. E. has handled over $830 million 
worth of food in India from its inception up to mid-1979 
(Catholic Relief Services, 1979; C. A. R. E., 1980). There is 
considerable dispute about whether this should be seen as 
nutritional aid or even as aid at all, on the grounds that major 
beneficiaries have been U. S. farmers, and the import of food has 
tended to have adverse effects on local food production. This 
aid has been handled by the Department of Social Welfare, and not 
the Health Ministry. The Catholic programme also provided nearly 
$2 million of medical supplies. In 1973/4 roughly a quarter of 
all British voluntary agencies' health sector aid went to India - 
about $2 millions (Cole-King, 1 0,476). 
In quantitative terms voluntary aid, apart from food aid, 
has not been very substantial, but at various times it has 
supported the employment of foreign doctors and nurses, provided 
basic supplies, and on occasion funded sizeable Medical 
investments, such as much of the advanced equipment at , he 
Christian liedical Colleges in Ludhiana and Hellore. It has also 
helped to maintain a number of rural hospitals; the voluntary 
sector ( mostly church-related) in India accoun is f cr a 
substantial share of the hospital beds in the country, and many 
of these depend on outside support. Finally, some of the main 
innovative health schemes in India (see Chapter 11) have had con- 




HEALTH AID TO INDIA 
1947-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 
($ millions) 
1. HEALTH AID 1 31 133 191 210 84 229 
2. " Exc PL-480 1 31 63 55 50 84 229 
3. TOTAL AID UTILISED { 443 } 2,95+ 5,973 3,956 4,763 7,682 
4. Line 1/Line 3 { 7.0% } 1+. 5% 3.2% 5.3ä 1.8% 3.0 
5. Line 2/Line 3 {7 . 0% } 2.1% 0.9% 1-3%, 1.8$ 3 . 0ti 
6. HEALT H EXPENDITURE 108 353 668 1,230 1,280 2,767 6,092 
7. Line 1/Line 6 1% 8.8% 19.9% 15.5% 16.4% 3.0% 3.8% 
8. Line 2/Line 6 10 8.8 ä 9.1+% 4.5°% 3.9% 3.. 0% 3.8% 
Sources : Lines 1&2: as Tab 1e1; Line 3: lajý9r 
Reserve Bank of India, various years: 'Utilizations of external assistance'. 
Line 6: Reddy, 1972; Barnett, 1977; and R. B. I. (op. cit. ) for figures after 
1975. 
Prior to 1965/6 an exchange rate of Rs)4.76=$1 has been used; afterwards the 
rate assumed is Rs7.8=$1. 
lk 
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A number of points can be made about the significance of 
this pattern of aid. To begin with, while it has formed a small 
part of total aid to India, at some tires it has accounted for a 
considerable part of public sector expenditures on health (see 
Table 3). 
The malaria programmes were heavily dependent on outside 
assistance after 1952. Meyer reports that in the next six years 
the U. S. contributed over half the cost of the control programme, 
and nearly 40% of the cost of the eradication programme in the 
next three years (Meyer, 1967). The loss of this aid was followed 
by a considerable reduction in Indian expenditure on malaria 
control. Similarly, the family planning programme has received 
substantial aid, permitting a much larger programme than would 
otherwise have been possible, even though population assistance 
has not been the largest item of health sector aid. Aid to 
medical education has not been substantial, but because it has 
been concentrated on 'elite' colleges (notably A. I. I. %. S. ) and 
their hospitals, its impact has probably been much larger than 
the figures would suggest. These institutions have trained a 
considerable proportion of leading Indian doctors, both educa crs 
and practitioners, and the concentration of funding has probably 
meant that these institutions have been markedly cif Brent from 
the other Indian medical colleges. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the pattern is by no means the 
straightforward disaster story which some might su est. In 
particular, it is clear that hospitals and medical education have 
not taken the dominant role which might have been predicted. 
Using crude indicators, the balance of aid to different sectors 
can be seen in Table 4+, which shows that some 75') of aid can be 
roughly allocated to primary care (rural health services, water 
supply and sanitation, communicable diseases programmes etc. ) 
27 2 
TABLE 4 
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The second general point is that, apart from the fields of 
family planning and smallpox and malaria control/eradication, it 
is difficult to show clearly policies which owe their origin or 
nature to the i ; pact of foreign aid. Population policies 
supported by external agencies were clearly important in 
expanding the size of the family planning programme and affecting 
its nature, but it is also clear that local bureaucrats were able 
to minimise the significance of many innovations wich the 
foreign advisers attempted to introduce into the family planing 
programme (i inkier, 1977). But in the rest of the health sector, 
it seems more reasonable to argue (as in the Introduction to Pert 
P) that very little in the health plans of Independent In; a was 
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not fore-shadowed in the plans and structures established by the 
British (Hanson, 1966). 
A third point of some relevance is that the scale of health 
sector aid to India has been totally inadequate for coping with 
the scale of Indian health problems. Of course, health sector aid 
is not necessarily the most effective way of dealing with health 
problems, but, even so, it is clear that India has not been 
treated very favourably in terms of assistance to match its 
needs. Donor agencies appear to have shared the views of Indian 
planners (see Cassen, 1978) and regarded health sector 
expenditures as a social rather than economic area, and health 
has never been seen as a core part of donor agency discusssions. 
However, the growth of the notions associated with the 'basic 
needs' approach to development led to India's 'minimum needs 
programme' in the Fifth Plan, at the same time as aid to health 
took on increasing importance in the eyes of donors like the 
World 
-Sank. This shift has generated the new programmes in health 
sector aid which I discuss in Chapter 11. 
Finally, the pattern of assistance to India has probably 
been affected by the constitutional distribution of functions 
between the central government and the States. The Indian 
Government has generally restricted aid to areas for which it is 
responsible - the control of communicable dise ses, famm1 ily 
planning, the maintenance of standards of medical education, and 
medical provisions in the Union Territories. Most aid has been 
distributed through the Plan, under the control of the Planrin, _, 
Commission. One contribution to new possibilities of assistance 
was the Janata Government decision in 1977 to include maternal 
and child health in the central tasks of the Family Planning 
section of the Union Ministry, then renamed 'Family Welfare'. 
This recognised that much of the basic rural health service was 
being funded under this head by the Central rather than the State 
Governments, and also reflected the ambivalence about family 
planning in the immediate post-Emergency period. It alao, 
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perhaps, opened the way to the new aided projects discussed 
in Chapter 11. 
Health aid must, of course, be seen in the context of 
overall aid policies, which are undoubtedly perceived by donors 
as an extension of foreign, industrial, and trading policies 
designed to benefit the donors. This sets limits on what aid is 
acceptable to donors, and provides a lever which can be used to 
prevent other policies of which the donors might disapprove. But 
it does not thereby mean that the aid which is provided is 
precisely attuned to the meeting of the interests of capital, 
broadly defined. It seems more reasonable to argue that the 
institutionalised form in which aid is given and used is one 
which permits some freedom for the exercise of professional 
judgement. This judgement is amenable to reasonable analyses of 
the major problems and the best ways of dealing with them. These 
analyses and proposed solutions are of course limited by the 
scientific and administrative paradigms which are part of the 
learned environments of the 'experts' involved; but this does not 
preclude learning from past mistakes, and it is difficult to 
conceive of a situation in which such limitations could be 
avoided. The limitations do, of course, have political 
consequences: they rule out some solutions because of a narrow 
definition of 'the medical', and these are likely to be the 
solutions which imply radical changes in the organisation of 
society. The exercise of professional judgement might only be 
permitted because the appearance of autonomy is useful to 'global 
capital' (Johnson, 1978). 
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But even with all these caveats, it remains reasonable to 
argue that the pattern of health sector aid to India after 1947 
suggests that major threats to health given pr that 
, appropriateness' enter into decisions about the trainin 
needed; and that the proposed solutions plausibly connecter _ 
to the problems identified. On the other hand, the scale anc, 
timing of this assistance bears little relationship to the 
developing needs of health policies and programmes, so that 
assistance to malaria tailed off just when it was most seeder:, 
and the resources put into smallpox eradication did not matc its 
importance as an Indian health threat. Similarly, donor agencies 
were (are? ) unable to redirect Indian priorities sufficiently to 
ensure that 'Local expenditures take over 'l en assistance ceases. 
This is perhaps an inevitable feature of the aid relationship, 
though it also reflects the inability of the Indian Government to 
control State expenditures in terms of its own stated policies 
(see Chapter 6 above). 
MIGRATION OF HEALTH PERSONNEL 
Any discussion of the TM igra tic n of !I perconnel lr 
India has to worlik with data which are highly unreliable. : ̀ bile it 
can be argued that trained personnel who e:, i: grat 'cost' Incia aý 
substantial amount, it is almost impossible to quantify this 
loss, or to see v. , hen it occurred, or w at trencs now exist. leere 
are, in addition, conceptual problems. Since it is argued, Yý th 
so e justice, that it is the very inappropriateness of edic- 
education which Oma es doctors able to :ýi ; rate, 
it is too 
simplistic to assert that those who do migrate ww? ould rave Mace Ü 
great contribution to health care in India had they s ayec 
ben nd. Rather, the r:; 41 -ration of doctors and oder -_, ed cap 
personnel must be seen as a symptom o failures to rely -e jo' 
content and professional training to local needs, anc t is 
i iý a failure imposes costs w, -lh i ch are much broader thn 
thesec 
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loss of personnel through migration. However, the context for 
such a discussion should be set by a consideration of what is 
known of the extent, direction and trends in emigration. 
HOW MAY Y MIGRATE? 
The historical roots of medical migration f roan India were 
set almost from the beginning of medical education in India, when 
a group of graduates from the Calcutta Medical College 
accompanied one of their teachers to London for further 
training (Johnson and Caygill, 1973). The idea trat local 
education Yeas 'incomplete' rather than 'different' was probably 
fostered by the staff at the Indian medical colleges, who 
measured their teaching against standards derived from their own 
training. Until the First World '. ar candidates for the I. M. S. had 
to travel to London to take the admission examination, and many 
took additional cualifications while they were preparing for 
this. At this period it is probable that few doctors travelled to 
Britain, and most of them returned to India after relatively 
short stays - but this has to be conjecture since there is no 
reliable source of current residence information for doctors. 
Other sources give some partial idea of the numbers involved; for 
example 177 doctors with Indian names and coming from India 
received the 'Triple' qualification from the Scottish colleges In 
1 900-09, another 83 in 1 91 0-1 99,73 in 1022-20 ana 43 in 19 0-36 
(ibid: 115). 
i fter the First World War, with travel to Britain quicker 
and cheaper, more doctors with Indian qualifications t. ýere 
red istering With the General i edical Council. Ly 1 93 , for 
example, some 10) of all graduates from, Indian medical colleges 
in 1921-3 had registered with the 0.1. C. on the basis of their 
Indian qualifications. But it is not clear ho,. '., many of t em 
re isteredW. Ij ithh_ the expectation of 
travell in ut not c in . so), 
nor how many more registered themselves on 
time Cas1S o 
additional quali ications gathered in Lrit(-_ i n. There is also 
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migration to other parts of the world. Indian doctors probably 
followed some of the same routes as other Indian emigr ants - to 
Burma, Malaysia, the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean - but it 
is presumed that relatively few did so. How many went to other 
parts of the Comm onwealth is equally unknown. 
How this situation changed with Independence is not clear. 
As we have seen, major international institutions (Ford, 
Rockefeller, ':, f'. H. O., the Governments participating in the Colombo 
Plan) began to introduce schemes to take doctors to Britain and 
America for higher training. No formal count seems to have been 
made of who went where and when, nor whether they returned. The 
only evidence available is that from analyses of passport 
applications (dependent on the occupation listed) and on surveys 
of the stock in a recipient country at a particular point in 
time. It would appear that no figures are available from passport 
applications before 10160, when 1000 doctors were issued with 
passports; this figure had risen to 2000 in 1970 (I. A. ý. R. 1974) 
Once again there are no guides to the numbers who use these 
passports to travel abroad, nor for how long they do so. 
Estimates of the stock of Indian doctors in different 
foreign countries become more frequent and more reliable fror 
a'boui the middle-1 60's. For example, the changes in she 1-i: on 
immigration to the U. C. meant that of ter 1 962 doctors wishing to 
enter the U. K. to work had to apply for vouchers; in the next sin 
years nearly 6,400 Indian doctors applied for vouchers and 
roughly half of these were probably taken up 
(Johnson anc 
Caygill, 1973: 69-70). This total is equivalent to roughly 20ý cl 
the output of Incian medical colleges in this period receiving 
vouchers, with perhaps 10,17 taking them up. In 1963 a U. ;. survey 
of medical personnel abroad estimated 9,000 Indians, 2/3 res of 
them with higher qualifications. Their location . ras not 
specified, but a further source - in e sche: m:: e run t .ý zh 
India-; 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research tc rov, ce 
temporary posts for returning r: 3 i rants - suggest. hot cý týl 
27E 
doctors applying to join the scheme in the six years 1963-69, 
almost 70`) were currently in the U. K. with another 25'j in the 
U. S. A. The U. S. share was much larger towards the end of the 
period, but we know very little about migration rates between the 
two countries (Me j is et. al, 1979: 293; see also 
Vol. XV No. 3, March 1973). The earliest data from the U. S. A.. 
concerns a survey carried out by the American Medical Association 
in 1970, which reported 3,957 Indian doctors, followed by a 
survey two years later which reported 6,303 (Mejia et al., 
1979: 29M. Data on doctors in training schemes in the 1970's 
showed that India was the largest supplier of foreign medical 
graduates to these schemes (see Table 5). 
TABLE 5 
ORIGIN OF FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES O TRAINING SCIEMES IN THE U. S.,. 
31.12.72 31.12.74 31.12.76 31.12.77 
India 2988 3900 4009 2782 
of which Bombay 336 397 n. s. 248 
Baroda n. s. 269 n. s. 179 
Total F. i-'. G. s 17,712 22,301 15,097 10,108 
(`' India) (16.9 )( 17.5; x) (26.6) (27.5: x) 
Source: ýýý ýäl 4I t, sýar gýý 
Vol 226 8: 39; 
Vol 23 413: 1 356 ; Vol 240 26: 2837. 
WHERE DO THEY GO? 
The combination of rilore-or-less reliable source:: o 
information suggests that the number of Indian doctors abroaa in 
1 970 was 1 2,000, and in 10.75 it was about 157000 (L; e j is et a 
1979: 277; 291-2). The period of most rapid growth in the nur: bers 
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abroad was probably the late 1960's and early 1970's, when the 
numbers entering the U. K. and the U. S. A. were about 1 , 000 a year 
in each case. However, there is very little evidence about the 
lengths of stay, or the number of doctors who move from one 
country to another, so that while about J40ö of the Indian doctors 
entering the U. S. A. in 1970 had not come directly from India, we . 
do not know if that was typical or not. Similarly, the data on 
return flows to India is restricted to the information from the 
C. S. I. R. scheme mentioned above, and then only for the late 
1960's, when on average 220 a year entered the scheme. These 
figures suggest that, if anything, the 1975 figure of 15,000 
abroad quoted above is an underestimate. 
Since 1975 the situation has probably changed considerably. 
The main receivers of Indian doctors, the U. K. and the U. S. A. 
have both made entry by Indian doctors much more difficult. The 
General Medical Council in London withdrew recognition from the 
degrees of Indian medical colleges granted after May 1975, so 
that thereafter Indian doctors wishing to work in the U. K. would 
have to pass tests of 'linguistic and professional competence' 
unless their degrees predated this decision. There would thus 
have been a phased effect on immigration of doctors from India : 
in the early tests only about 40`11 of Indian candidates passed 
(F1ejia et al., 1979: 278). In the U. S. A. new legislation was 
introduced in January 1977 which was designed to restrict the 
inflow of doctors there, and the effect was probably more rapic 
than for the U.,,, %. As Table 11 above shows, the nu gibers of foreign 
medical graduates in training schemes dropped sharply between 
1976 and 1 9171 7, and Indian doctors were affected b the ssn. e 
processes. It is likely that current emigration of Indian doctors 
is smaller than 10 years ago, and also directed tc arils different 
destinations - in particular the oil-rich nations of the 
Middle 
East and iigeria. The predominant form of such f lo s is also lore 
strictly lited, in that doctors are importe on -fi terr: nn 
' ch imply no 11 contracts, ich may or may not be reneV. ied, ; ut w 
longer-term rights of residence or citizenship. 
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The er igration of doctors is not something which all i medical 
colleges contribute to. In part this probably reflects both the 
social origins of the student body and the closeness with 
the medical faculty is able to tailor the education they provide 
to standards current in the West. As Table 5 shows, Bombay and 
Baroda contribute disproportionately to the numbers in the U. S. A. -. 
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF EMIGRATION? 
The costs of this emigration have been variously assessed. 
In percentage terms, it seems likely that in both 1970 and 1975, 
about 10'0 of the stock of Indian doctors was abroad. In each 
year, this would have represented about 1.2-1.3 years output from 
the medical colleges; had these doctors rer ained, they would have 
raised the doctor-population ratio from about 2 per 10,000 
population to about 2.3 (Pie j is 1979: 166). India is the largest 
contributor of emigrant doctors, but several indicators suggest 
that the impact of this emigration on India is less than that on 
many other 'exporting' countries. India is 22nd in a ranking in 
terms of the impact of emigration on ro : es . ic stock of 
doctors, 
and 29th in terms of the time it would take to replace the 
emigrant doctors at current level of output (ibid). Ii re 
outflow in 1975-80 was reduced because the main importing markets 
contracted, as suggested above, then the iripýct wi 11 now be even 
less: the total stock of Indian doctors by 1; 80 was probably 
above 210 000, of whom perhaps 17 , 000 were abroad. 
If the impact is measured in terms of the loss of return or 
the investment in each of these doctors, the calculations rcce 
rather different results. One estimate is that it costs S9, 
ý0 0 
44 (Rs75,000) to educate a doctor, or a cost to India of )1 
million for educating its doctors abroad in 1975 
(-iej ia, 
1979: 28"). It is also possible to estimate the benefit lost to 
India by a neo-classical economic analysis based on earnings 
figures, which generated an estimate of , -, 44,000 per e: ý_ 
i rs t 
doctor to the U. S. for 1970 (U. N'. C. 1. A. D., 1975: 8). 
281 
However, any strictly financial calculation has to take into 
account the remittances of these doctors back to India (unknown, 
though remittances in general have been very significant to the 
Indian economy since 1975) and the employment the doctors would 
have had if they had not emigrated. In economic terms there is 
probably a surplus of doctors in India, relative to the ability 
to pay them at the levels currently accepted by employers anc 
doctors, so it makes little sense to attempt to value the 
contribution the doctors might have made had they stayed. In 
addition, the skills of these particular doctors were probably 
even less appropriate to the tasks needing to be done in India 
than the skills of those who stayed, so it is possible to argue 
that Indians benefited more from their absence than their 
presence. Clearly, it would have been better if other forms of 
personnel had been trained, or if the individuals emigrating had 
paid a higher proportion of the costs of their training. But 
these are all inter-related factors: the demand f 'or mecical 
education (which led to the rapid expansion of medical colleges 
in the 1960's and early 1970's) was in part fuelled directly by 
parents who saw the chances of emigration for their children. 
Emigration has also helped to reduce medical unemployment and to 
keep medical salary levels higher than they might otherwise have 
been. 
In general, then, the emi7ration of doctors and other 
medical personnel from India has had contradictory effects on 
rý edi cal pol icy-making. Emigration has probo'oly tent' ed to re: ice 
medical unemployment, rather than to create shortages of valuable 
skills; an lt Ciä had unintended ."ef 
its in teri s `'i 
remittances and a reduction in political pressures to increase 
employment prospects in 'high-technology' medicine. On the ogler 
hand, it has fuelled the demand for medical education, 
contributing to te neglect of the other forms of personnel; it 
has kept medical salary levels higher than they mig :t ot'r: eru"rise 
ne pr r """ - ave peen, 1:: c it h. as reinforced t- ýh ressurefoec; cal 
education to be organised so that doctors can continue to be 
CcG 
acceptable abroad. The balance on this issue has probably been 
altered quite dramatically by the barriers to migration which 
have developed in the past 10 years, but it may be too late: 
systemic inertia may now ensure that the costs continue to be 
felt, while the benefits are of declining significance. 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
Multinational drug companies are obviously powerful. Sixty 
large pharmaceutical companies dominate the supply of drugs, with 
about 607) of non-socialist country production in the early 
1970's, and these companies are almost all based in one of seven 
countries - France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the U. K. 
and U. S. A. (Lall, 1977: 22). They are often diversified companies, 
with interests in a variety of chemical-based industries, and 
they vary considerably in the range of products produced, in 
their major markets, and in the kinds of strategies they follow 
with respect to the Third World (Stoker, 1984: 115-8). Three 
factors, it is said, give these companies considerable influence: 
the size of the major companies; their apparent dominance over 
different sectors of the market for pharmaceutical products; and 
the significance of drugs bills in health budgets. This influence 
affects the supply of drugs, the type of drugs available and 
promoted, and the health policies of all countries, but 
especially those of underdeveloped countries (Khaliq, 10; 7o: 5; 
iluller, 1982; Melrose, 1982; Medawar, 
1982). 
The major criticisms of the activities of these companies 
in underdeveloped countries are as follows. To begin with, it is 
argued that the cost of drugs has been auch higher than need be. 
Companies are able to maintain high prices through patent 
protection, which reduces competition; through aggressive 
marketing and using brand names; through control over the supply 
of raw materials; anc by policies which are designed to maxi, iise 
profits, such as transfer-pricing (shifting profits to 
log; -ta.: 
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countries). Secondly, the drugs supplied have usually been 
designed with the disease-pattern, socio-economic conditions and 
drugs market of advanced capitalist economies, leading to a 
concentration on the drugs suitable for sale to the relatively 
wealthy in urban areas, with far less emphasis on the provision 
of low-cost basic drugs for common diseases. Thirdly, some -. 
companies appear to be less concerned with the interests of 
patients in the Third World than they are forced to be in some 
developed countries, failing to show the same concern with 
accurate prescription and warnings of side-effects and contra- 
indications. Fourthly, some companies have attempted to stop 
Governments who have tried to alter this situation, as well as 
making it very difficult for local companies to be establishes 
(Lall, 1977; U. N. C. T. C., 19,83). 
A number of U. agencies (Týü. H. 0., U. N. Conference on 
Transnational Corporations, U. N. Industrial Development 
Organisation) have attempted to influence the pattern of drug 
development, production and marketing and to suggest ways of 
limiting what they regard as undesirable patterns (U. ý7. C. T. C., 
1979). In particular, has led efforts to encourage 
countries to draw up lists of essential drugs, to use generic 
names, and to follow purchasing policies which will cut costs anc 
lead to drug purchases more clcsely related to dominant disease 
patterns (UI. H. O. 1977). Several agencies have argued for the neec 
to produce more pharmaceuticals in Third World countries 
themselves, on the grounds that this will lead to a reduction in 
costs and a greater ability to match health needs and drug 
supplies (U. r:. I. D. O., 1980). W. H. O. also started efforts to 
control the quality of drugs entering international trade, to 
remove the possibilities for companies to export out-dated drugs 
or those banned because of adverse react ons, and to standardise 
marketing information C. I. H. O. 1978). Finally, attempts have also 
been made to encourage research, development and the training of 
staff to produce more drugs to help in the control and treatment 
2uä 
of six major diseases mostly found in tropical countries - like 
malaria and leprosy (W. H. O. 1976). 
However, it has become increasingly clear since the early 
discussions that different Third World countries are not all in 
the same position with respect to pharmaceutical producticn ane . 
marketing. Thus both U. N. I. D. O. (1978) and U. N. C. T. C. (1983) have 
produced classifications of production situations, placing 0 
countries in one of five or three categories respectively. In 
both cases India is one of very few under-developed countries in 
the highest category - and is by far the poorest in this 
category. Indian companies can manufacture from bulk drugs most 
of the intermediate products used in the country, and the local 
chemical industry can make some bulk drugs from simple ch: er icals. 
The pharmaceuticals companies also carry out research and 
development activities of their own. As a result, Indian 
companies import relatively small amounts of raw materials, and 
are involved in exporting intermediate products, r r, aterials 
and production plants to a number of other countries (U., . C. T. C., 
1983: 88-92). 
This situation did not, of course, materialise overni ht, 
nor is it free from many of the problems identified for -many 
other countries. In the rest of this section I shall aescribe how 
Government policy has contributed to the development of the 
Indian industry, describe the current position of production and 
ownership, and some of the problems which remain. Finally I will 
assess the extent to which the pattern of drug production and its 
ownership, drug marketing and consumption, has affected health 
Policy and health in India since 1r--. 47. 
THE PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY Jr, INDIA 
The manufacture of medicinal materials for widespread use is 
a relatively recent phenomenon, thou h for a long Lin` 
practitioners have produced medicines on a snail sc21:. or ý: -_eir 
285 
own use and sometimes for sale. In India, raw materials were 
shipped to Britain for processing in the 19th century, and, the 
first substantial production locally was in Government factories 
in Madras and Bombay, for quinine and later for a wider range of 
drugs (Stoker, 1984: 295). Production by Indian capitalists is 
usually dated from 1901 , when P. C. Ray established -Dengal 
Chemical and Pharmaceuticals in Calcutta, and the Alembic company 
was established in Saroda soon afterwards (Hathi, 1975: 16). Few 
foreign companies had production facilities in India before the 
Second World War. It would seem that in 1939 only 13°% of total 
consumption was produced in India (ýhaliq, 1976: 131; Rangarao, 
1975: 3-4). 
The disruption to trade caused by the War made a dramatic 
difference. There was sufficient basic knowledge and capital 
available in India that the decline in imports and the growth of 
Government demand stimulated a large growth in local production. 
By 1943 this met some 705 of consumption, and the country was 
nearly self-suficient in some areas like sera and vaccines 
(Stoker, 1984: 296). Production was largely in the hands of a few 
large British and Indian companies, who were already established 
before 1939, but there were also probably many small-scale flirr, -. s 
as well. 
Pharmaceuticals production in India did not change much 
immediately after the War, but after independence tine pace of 
change has been much more rapid. There are three major processes 
at work: technical change, associated with massive e . pendi ; tyres 
t.; est in the on research an: develop: ent; support for o 
sector production; and public policy with respect to the -rivate 
sector (to affect the balance between public ano private 
production, the ownership of companies, and attempts to promote 
the production of certain drugs and to control their prices). T 
rill describe each of these briefly in turn. first I ill ýr fl 
sketch the development of multi-national pharmaceutical T _rtis. 
2 VÜ 
The modern pharmaceutical industry is largely a creation of 
the period after 19 45, since many of the drugs on which it is 
based were only discovered or fabricated after 19-30. The first 
major group were the sulpha drugs, developed in the 1930's, 
followed by antibiotics, (penicillin and then others), discovered 
and produced in the 1940's. By the early 1970's some 30,000 drugs 
were estimated to be available, some of which were little more 
than variants on others, and some 8,000 were regularly prescribed 
(Stoker, 1984: 88). Most of these are 'new', and have been 
discovered in laboratories run by the larger firms, with their 
production processes patented not only in the country of origin 
but elsewhere as well. The research and development expenditures 
for these drugs are often considerable, and companies point to 
these costs to justify controlling production and prices through 
patents in order to gain sufficient profits to recoup their 
investment and pay for new research. However, critics suggest 
that many 'new' drugs are really little more than minor 
variations on existing patented drugs; and that the process of 
technical change is artifically managed in the interests of 
maintaining higher profits (Lall, 197 7: 2 5). One particular 
feature of the medical market in many parts of the world 
reinforces the companies' ability to do this. -ost drugs are 
purchased on the advice or prescription of a doctor, and 
pharmaceuticals advertising and marketing is thus focussed on the 
doctor, not on the final 'consumer'. In general, the cc st oa 
drug is not very salient for doctors, and other considerations 
(including the perception of 'quality') may be more significant. 
The attempts by Governments to affect prescribing patterns are 
also hindered by the desire of doctors to maintain clinical 
freedom of choice, based on their own assessment of the drug 
which will suit the individual patient. 
The extent of technical change is thus probably exaggerated 
by figures on the numbers of drugs, or by assessments of clinical 
prescribing patterns. Nonetheless, technical change does favour 
large producers over small, and helps to create a market : hic'. is 
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divided into a very large number of small sub-markets in which 
competition may be artificially restricted, and production runs 
are small. All these make it difficult for many countries to 
organise local production in order to replace foreign imports, or 
to support local producers against the competition of foreign 
multinationals. 
In India, several factors have combined to make the impact 
of technical change in pharmaceuticals production different from 
that in other countries in the Third 1,1orld. To begin with the 
existing production capacity had already been developed during 
the Second World War, both by Indian and by foreign producers. 
Secondly there is the size of the market, in which the absolute 
numbers of consumers with substantial purchasing power makes them 
a profitable market, despite the fact that they may make up only 
5 or so of the total Indian population. But in addition, the 
existence of public sector drug companies, and of an active 
Government policy towards foreign-owned companies in general and 
pharmaceuticals companies in particular, have tended to reduce 
the effect of this pressure. 
The public sector has been involved in drug production in 
India since the 19th century, but post-Independence India took 
this involvement to a greater depth. In 1951 a Penicillin Enquiry 
Committeewas established, which 'marked the beginning of 
Government entry in the modern drug manufacture' (Rangarao, 
1975: 4). A Pharmaceutical Enquiry Committee reported in 1954 in 
favour of the creation of large-scale public-sector manufacturing 
of penicillin and other drugs, in order to reduce prices and 
conserve foreign exchange ([athi, 1 975: 5 4). Following this 
proposal there were considerable negotiations between the Indian 
Government, Western firms and the Soviet Union, described by 
Kidron (1 965). It would seer, that Western coy mercial interests 
used diplomatic and other pressures to ensure that technical 
advice for Hindustan Antibiotics Limited was purchased f roe.: hem 
at higher prices and with less control over technical data tin in 
r. r 
G co 
the U. S. S. R. was offering. The reason announced publicly ;: as 
'technical superiority', but the extent of diplomatic pressure 
exerted suggests that technical considerations were not the only 
ones involved. However, the second public sector company, Indian 
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited, was based on Soviet advice, 
but completion of its major plant in Hyderabad was delayed until 
1968 (Stoker, 1984: 320-6). 
Public sector production of pharmaceuticals has not been 
impressive. The two main companies involved have had considerable 
production difficulties, and have been unable to produce as much 
as they are licensed for. Profitability has been lower than for 
most foreign and many private-sector Indian companies, with H. A. L 
making a loss for much of the 1970's, whereas foreign-owner 
companies routinely make a higher profit than the averages for 
Indian industry (Stoker, 1984: 304). Nonetheless, by 1980 the 
public-sector companies were producing about 26 of bulk drug 
production, and 6.5 of formulations (U. NN. C. T. C., 1983: 88). But 
it may be that Government production has had more political 
significance, demonstrating that the Indian Government is 
prepared to reduce its dependence on imports and on foreign-owned 
companies. In addition, I. D. P. L. is now in a position to export 
technology on a wide range of drugs, mostly to 1-liddie Eastern 
countries, as are several private companies, suggesting that a 
significant technical barrier has been overcome (ibid: 89). 
The Government has also attempted to control the private 
sector by influencing the terms on which foreign multinationals 
are able to worn in India. Thus in the 1950's, high tarriff 
barriers and other restrictions on the import of finished goods 
led most companies to establish manufacturing plants within: the 
country. However, this was mostly for formulations, with the bul: 
drugs being imported: only after 1970 did the Government of India: 
award production licenses on condition that there : ias a 
commitment to some production of basic drugs: as a result, the 
foreign sector share of the bulk : harket rose fro : about 1i it 
289 
1972 to about 407o in1980(Stoker, 1984: 308; U. %. C. T. C. 
1983: 88). 
In 1970 there were also changes in the protection afforded 
by patents, with the period of patented protection reduced to 7 
years and compulsory licensing of production by other companies 
after three years. At the same time the Government also moved to 
systematise the control of drug prices, introduced in 1962 at the 
time of the war with China. A Drug Price Control Order was issued 
in 1970, setting maximum prices for 17 bulk drugs and attempting 
to control the prices of formulations by limiting 'mark-ups'. In 
addition, the 1973 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (F. E. R. A. ) 
stipulated that foreign equity must be reduced. Drug companies 
were originally placed in the 'core' sector and excluded from 
these controls (Stoker, 1984: 309) but by 1978 policy had hardened 
and most companies had to dilute their shareholdings, with only 
two (Roche and Parke-Davis) being allowed as much as 7 45, the 
rest being restricted to smaller shares (ibid: 310-1 1 ). There is 
no evidence that the expansion of shareholding has influenced 
policy or made these companies more accountable to 
Indian 
pressures, but companies regarded in this way as 'Indian' find it 
easier to -et licences for new production (ibid. ). 
These pressures on drug companies in general, anal foreign 
ones in particular, were strengthened by the Ha thi Committee, 
which reported in 1975. This committee proposed some Unexpectedly 
radical measures, including the national isa Lion of all foreign 
drug companies, the establishment of a National Drug Authority, 
the phased abolition of brand n, ---, , l and ac ante in t: ± fcr:,; of 
drug price control (Hathi, 1975: 84-5,96,104,180-38,257). The 
Report provo. -: ed a heated debate over the ne t e,,. ý, ears, 
complicated by the change in Government in 1977. The most radical 
proposals w"; ere watered down under stron. lobbying, f rcom the drug 
companies and the medical profession: there : as nc similarly 
well-organised support fcr the proposals (i asan, 1 930). The one 
partial exception is that the organisation representing t: 
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larger Indian firms (Indian Drugs Manufacturers Association, 
I. D. M. A. ) supported the nationalisation of foreign firms, 
believing that this would improve their market position. The New 
Drug Policy which emerged in 1978 took a markedly less forceful 
line on foreign ownership (allowing the maintenance of equity 
holdings above 40`I), on the removal of brand names (making. the- 
process more gradual) and on the National Drug Agency (not - 
created, but replaced by a number of smaller statutory bodies 
with fewer powers)( Stoker, 1984: 366). On the other hand, some of 
the price control, research and development, and procuction 
policies were more far-reaching than Hathi had proposed (ibid. ). 
Political debate did not, of course, ' cease with the issuing 
of the policy document and the passing of a new Drug Price 
Control Order in 1979. The introduction and implementation of 
several elements of the proposals have been delayed, or seem to 
have failed to have the desired impact. Thus legal moves by 
companies have delayed the abolition of brand names, and foreign 
companies have claimed that the New Drug Policy has led to a 
decline in the growth of drug output, because of uncertainty and 
poor profitability as companies have lost some elements of market 
protection (U. N. C. T. C. 1983: 50,91). However, for my purposes I 
want to concentrate on answering three questions: 
a. how far do foreign companies now dominate Indian 
pharmaceutical production? 
b. how far does the structure of Indian drub pro uction 
hamper the development of appropriate health policies, and to 
what extent can this be traced to the impact of the f creign 
producers? and 
c. what evidence is there of other ways in which crug 
companies (Indian or foreign) have intervened in health policy 
formulation, and with what effect? 
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A: FOREIGN DOMINATION 
A simple indicator of foreign domination (but one which is 
nonetheless difficult to construct) is that of the share of 
production. Estimates of total output are not very reliable, 
because of the large number of very small companies whose 
reporting is infrequent and likely to be inaccurate. However, the 
best estimates of U. N. C. T. C. for the production of 'allopathic' 
drugs and their distribution by major producing category, are 
given in Table 12. 
TABLE 12 
PRODUCTION OF DRUGS IN INDIA BY COMPANY OWNERSHIP, 1979-81 
(Annual averages, U. S. $ million) 
BULK DRUGS FORMULATIONS TOTAL 
Companies: 07 i V 
Foreign-owned 71 (22) 568 (43) 639 (39) 
Local private 163 (52) 669 (50) 832 (51) 
Local State 82 (26) 87 ( 7) 169 (10) 
TOTAL 316 ( 100) 1324 (100) 1640 (100) 
Source: U. I. C. T. C. (1983: 88,154). 
The major weaknesses of this as an indicator is that it 
takes no account of the sizes of compaKnies in each sector, and it 
gives no clue to the extent to which the nature of drug 
production in all sectors has been influenced during an earlier 
period when foreign cor.. panies were more dominant. Thus the 
foreign-owned sector (in this case defined as companies with more 
than 40 of equity owned by one foreign company) includes only 26 
firms, five of which are amongst the ten largest pharmaceutical 
firms in India, with retail sales in 1980 of Rs1271 millions, or 
$163 million, about 105 of the total. The five lamest Indian- 
owned companies had sales of about Rs1004 millions, or 12 
million, about 8 of the total (U. . C. T. C. 1 983: 1 52). ut teere 
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are very large numbers of small Indian producers - Stoker 
suggests there are 3,000, not all of which are active (1984: 317). 
In addition, the foreign companies concentrate more of their 
activities in formulations, where market conditions are more 
favourable. Thus the market power exercised by the average 
foreign company is likely to be much greater. than that of. the_-. 
average Indian company. One further indicator of this (again, net 
_ perfect) is profitability: in the mid-1970's 30 foreign companies 
reported gross profits of 1ßt. 3"' of sales, whereas a sample of 11-L 
Indian companies reported gross profits about half that level 
(Stoker, 1984: 304). Finally, there are problems of definition, 
with some companies defined on these criteria as Indian but with 
a controlling share interest (say 25ö or more) held by one 
foreign company, and others sharing in production arrangements 
with foreign companies (at least 26 Indian companies received 
foreign know-how between 1962 and 1972, e. g. through technical 
collaboration agreements [Stoker, 1984: 341]). 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that despite nearly 
30 years of attempts by the Indian Government to control the 
operations of foreign pharmaceutical companies, they are still 
the most substantial element in the pharmaceuticals market. In 
addition, they have set the framework for the industry in the 
period when they were far more influential still. There are 
several indicators of this. As the U. N. C. T. C. report puts it, 
'the product mix of both kinds of firms [local and foreign] tends 
not to reflect social priorities' (1983: 89). Both kinds also have 
fought to protect the competitive advantages provided by brand 
names (ibid: 91) and in general product information is spread to 
doctors by an active network of company representatives and by 
company advertising, rather than by a more 'arms-length' method.. 
All these are typical of pharmaceutical company organisation in 
advanced capitalist countries, and seem likely to outlast any 
future declining direct influence of multinational corporations 
in India. 
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B: DRUG PRODUCTION: THE IMPACT ON HEALTH 
The two major criticisms of drug production in 
underdeveloped countries are that the drugs are too expensive anc 
that the wrong ones are produced and made available. As we have 
seen, the control of the price of drugs has formed a growing part- 
of Government policies since 1962. However, it is not easy to 
assess the success of these policies. Certainly, informed opinion 
before 1970 was that Indian drug prices were high, but it seems 
likely that they were not as high as in some other parts of th e 
world. In part this was a result of the system of import 
licences, which reduced the possibility of transfer pricing. 
Companies were forced to make at least a pretence of justifying 
the prices they paid for raw materials - with Hoffman-La Roche's 
ability to overcharge for Librium and Valium a notable exception 
(Stoker, 1984: 378-9). On the other hand, the policy of insisting 
on production in India as far as possible may have increased 
general price levels above what they might have been in a world 
market. The position is complicated by the unknown, but very 
large number of formulations, often very similar and probably 
more expensive than they could be if they were all sold by 
generic names. 
The Hathi Commission claimed that prices had declined, 
relative to world levels and their previous Indian levels, after 
the introduction of the 1970 Drug Price Control Order (1975: 174). 
The industry has certainly claimed that prices have continued to 
all since the strengthening of these controls in 1979 (Stoh: er, 
1984: 372). Unfortunately, the only drug prices inoe:: in Ins is is 
probably a poor guide to general price levels, being constructed 
from common drugs which are out of patent protection. Thus the 
apparent stability of drug prices shown in Figure 1 ray 'be 
misleading. Very generally, then, one coul conclude that Tntian 
drin: prices are probably not notably high, and may well 'e 
relatively low, and that this should be attributed to dir-c- 
Government policy, to the existence of an indi encus 
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manufacturing capability in both the public and the private 
sector, and probably to the size of the Indian market which 
permits economies of scale and competition which are not always 
possible elsewhere. 
The picture for the product mix of. drugs is less 
satisfactory. As already noted, the U. N. C. T. C. argues that 
remedies for the diseases which afflict the mass of the 
population are not produced in the same quantity or variety as 
those which suit the purchasing preferences of the relatively 
wealthy (1983: 89). Thus vitamin preparations, cough and cold 
preparations, tonics, and 'health restorers' made up some 25 % of 
all sales covered in one survey in 1978 (Stoker, 198 +: 399). 
Furthermore, most of the 'essential drugs' listed either by 
W. H. O. or by Indian writers on the subject are produced in India, 
but production is well below both installed capacity and 
consumption (ibid : 4014) . 
In addition, as some have argued, the failure to implement 
the controls over drug quality, laid down originally in the Drugs 
Rules (introduced in 1945 on the basis of the 1940 Drugs Act) 
means both that many drugs remain on the market despite little or 
no evidence of their efficacy, and that the products of many 
small Indian producers are of dubious quality (U. i. C. T. C., 
1983: 89). All the legislation has said nothing about the efficacy 
of drugs, being concerned only with the methods by which they 
were produced, standards of hygiene etc. In general, the prime 
concerns in the development of drug policy have been economic anc 
political - the harbouring of scarce foreign exchange, control 
over the prices which affect the riddle class r are-, e t, and the 
nationalistic desire to foster local industries. Policy has been 
the concern of the Ministry which has included Cher: icals, with 
the Ministries of Commerce, 'Finance and Industry more clcsel 
involved than the Health 'inistr,, y. It T: ould seen that 
drub 
policies have been relatively uninfluenced by heap th policy 
concerns. 
-iJ 
In sum, it would seem that drug production has hindered 
health policy developments by failing to provide basic, crucial 
drugs in the quantities and at the prices which could be 
possible. This is as much the result of the structure of the 
Indian market, and the location of Indian purchasing power, as it 
is of conscious decision-making by individual 
. companies or the 
industry as a whole. There is, however, a glaring exception to 
this generalisation: the activities of some American companies 
during the establishment of the public-sector companies in 1956. 
Several American companies attempted to prevent the establishment 
of sizeable basic drug production facilities outside their 
control, and may thus have prevented the establishment of a more 
appropriate structure of production. However, the record of the 
Indian public sector is such that it is difficult to be sure that 
much difference would have been made however soon it started 
production, and on whatever scale. 
C: DRUG PRODUCERS: THEIR IMPACT ON HEALTH POLICY 
There is very little evidence of attempts by drug companies 
to affect health policy ; ý-L Evidence abounds of their 
attempts to influence the more narrow sphere of drugs policy 
itself - to restrict Government intervention, to limit the more 
radical proposals, with the most obvious examples being their 
opposition to controls on equity shares (and the ex tree, 
nationalisation) during the 1970's (Stoker, 1984: 356-71). Despite 
the importance of Government purchasing in total drug sales, it 
seems that most companies have been content tc work to maintain. 
or increase the share of this market (throug advertising anc 
intensive marketing) rather than to increase the size of the 
total market by pressing for larger health budgets or a larger 
share within them of drugs purchasing. Possibly the companies 
have realised that since Government drugs budgets are totally 
inadequate to meet the demands of Most patients the best 
contribution to overall sales is through a ecting t :e 




patients from commercial pharmacists. Alternatively, they have 
focussed on affecting the distribution of Government drug 
purchases by bribing those who control the drug purchase 
committees. But this has to be speculative, since there seems to 
be very little evidence on this subject. 
DRUG COMPANIES: AN OVERALL PERSPECTIVE 
The major criticism of the operations of pharmaceuticals 
companies in India is probably the least tangible: the creation, 
or at least support in the maintenance, of a perspective on 
health policy in which technical interventions in the bodies of 
individuals (using drugs, or surgery) are regarded as crucial 
contributions to the health of the nation. In looking after their 
own interests they draw attention away from environmental, 
social, political and economic contributions to improved health. 
In this way, they have probably helped to generate a climate in 
which Ayurvedic and Unani preparations have become seen in the 
same way, helping to generate the growth of the indigenous 
pharmaceutical companies along similar lines. Their liaison with 
doctors is close, but they also spread their products through 
networks of practitioners without formal qualifications in 
Western medicine, by competing to offer these people profitable 
opportunities. Some benefits have undoubtedly been produced by 
these means: it remains unclear that they have outweighed the 
costs. 
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CONCLUSION: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
I have considered three areas of international impact on 
health policy in India. In each case, there is evidence to 
support the claim that the Indian experience does not neatly fit 
the models derived particularly from 'dependency' analyses. _. 
Health sector aid has been concentrated on primary care, 
particularly the prevention and control of diseases; medical 
migration has not been sizeable enough to place constraints on 
health policy-making; and local production of pharmaceuticals has 
permitted the establishment of controls over the operations of 
multinational corporations so that their excesses have been 
curbed. But in more insubstantial ways the international context 
has tended to support a view of health services which has limited 
their effectiveness: the dominance of medical education over that 
for other medical personnel; the greater symbolic importance of 
individualised drug-based therapies over environmental 
improvement; and a health sector oriented to international 
standards and relating rather poorly to the concerns of the mass 
of the population. In the next two chapters I shall discuss some 




MEDICAL AID PARAMEDICAL PERSO NEL 
The discussion of patterns of expenditure on heal th 
services, which formed the basis of Chapter 6, gives little 
impression of the impact of the money spent. This chanter, anu 
chapter 10, will discuss the consequences: firstly it 
looking at the numbers and kinds of health , orkers trained and 
working in India; and secondly in discussing what is known about 
what work they do, in what kinds of -settings. The further 
question - what impact has this had on the health of the 
population - has been discussed briefly in Chapter 5, and I will 
return to it in the Conclusion. 
There are obvious problems in looking at the numbers of 
people trained in different health skills: in particular, we 
cannot assume that, for example, someone with ; yore traininv (a 
consultant cardiac surgeon, say) has more and greater impacts on 
ealth than someone with less train ing- (as a co: m -. unity heal th 
worker, say) because these skills may be imperfectly learned, or 
irrelevant to the major sources of illness, or based on 
inadequate knowledge, or used unsati sfactorily. Similarly, n ei*.: ' 
builcings do not necessarily provide better conc itions for care 
or cure than do old ones. 
le ýe This chapter will not address these issues, but w,, ill 
them on one side for reconsideration in the conclusion. here 
shall be concerned with tow r, any people have been trainee, in 
which categories, and at what times. To e in : aitý , s: ra ±i 
discuss the factors .. ich seem to have ai 
f ected the balance of 
personnel trained - not just the policy debates 
but also the 
constraints fror. outside tine Government s here; any: then tale 
each categgory in turn to see , hat has happened. to the staff sc 
trained - who has employ, ed them, under 
t ,_-. s of condi i '31  
so on. The underlying reason for ioc in at nose kinds of 
data regains the attempt to ans er some o 
the -ýestions outlined 
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in the Introduction: to what extent can policy decisions about, 
health personnel be understood as the outcome of the interplay of 
class-based interests? To what extent does it make more sense of 
the material to include the role of ideas (existing mocels of 
desirable patterns of health services) and of cultural factors 
more generally (such as views on the polluting nature of 
'nursing'), even if these in their turn depend in part on the 
structure of Indian society? These issues will be addressed at 
the end of this chapter. 
THE BALANCE BE-TWEE 1 DIFFERENT CATEGORIES 
It is clear that over the past 35 years India has seen a 
dramatic expansion in the number of medical and health-related 
personnel, and in the variety of specialised positions which have 
been developed. But some categories have grown faster than 
others, and a discussion of the contribution of policy to this 
balance must be set in a broader context of the Government's 
ability to control who has been trained. In addition, some 
categories have not been trained at all, or not bei ore the late 
1970's, and I will also consider the debates over these 'non'- 
personnel. 
To begin with, it is possible to see two different types of 
health workers - those for whom there exists a private as well as 
a public market (in particular, doctors) and those who : are 
virtually dependent on public sector employment - though. the 
categories are not clear-cut and unchanging. This relates to 
different kinds of outcomes: 1 or the first category the 
Government has largely responced to pressure from potential 
applicants, whereas for the second changes have resulted more 
direc , ly from Government recruýitr:: ent policies. 
It r.: ig ýt be 
expected that, as a result, attempts to achii eve a desira ; le -L ix 
of health personnel would not be very successful. In f act, 
although the number of doctors trained has routinely exceeded the 
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planned expansion, the number of paramedical personnel has grown 
much more quickly, though in a m ore discontinuous fashion. 
Official plans, of course, assume that only trained 
personnel are of relevance, and that those trained actually 
practise what they have been taught. But substantial numbers of 
people have acquired some form of training unofficially (e. g. as 
assistants to doctors, or by correspondence course) or have 
received one form of training (e. g. as an Army medical orderly, 
or as a pharmacist) but practice in a different capacity (usually 
as an independent practitioner). There are no worthwhile 
estimates of the numbers involved here. The inclusion of the 
training of personnel outside the allopathic system introduces 
yet further complications. Training in indigenous medicine has 
been solely for the equivalent of doctors - there are now several 
degree and diploma courses for Ayurvedic and Unani practitioners, 
but not for supporting personnel. This reflects the absence of 
Government demand for such workers. However, many of these 
graduates attended courses with substantial '4. esters' components, 
and even those from 'pure' indigenous courses may actually 
practice using the allopathic pharmacopeia. 
The major health policy documents since 1947 have all 
stressed the need to expand the numbers of allopathic personnel 
rather than practitioners of the indigenous systems of medicine 
( including homeopathy); and within the allopathic sector, to 
increase the numbers of auxiliary personnel more rapidly than 
doctors. o attempt has been made to define an overall desirable 
number of indigenous practitioners, nor to set tar is for 
achievement in individual plan periods, and the discussions o i: ' 
allopathic personnel ma=de no reference to any form of integration 
with indigenous practitioners until the late 1'70's. s shall 
therefore deal with the indigenous sector separately, any: here 
focus on allopathic personnel. 
From 1947 or earlier.. here was a forr-: al co, -, i,., 
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need to expand the number of 'non-medical' health workers. The 
Bhore Committee called for the number of doctors in 1971 to be 
four times the number in 1941 , but it wanted one hundred ti, -, -; es as 
many nurses and health visitors, and twenty times as many 
midwives. (G. O. I. [C. P. H. B. ], 1948: 102).. The rationale was spelled 
out in the meeting of Health inisters and Secretaries in 194 6: 
they can carry out a variety of tasks "under the direction and 
supervision of doctors" such as inoculations, anti-malarial work: 
or sanitation; they are cheaper to train and employ; and they are 
more suited to work in the rural areas (ibid). This emphasis as 
repeated in the Five Year Plan documents. The First Plan 
specified nurses, midwives and , @1 
(traditional birth -&d I 
attendants) as categories which could be trained more rapidly in 
existing institutions (G. 0. I., 1 951 : 203) , while the Second Plan 
noted that "shortages in personnel other than doctors have been 
more marked and are likely to persist longer than in the case of 
doctors" (G. O. I., 1956: 538). Similar sentiments are expressed in 
the succeeding Plans. 
The practice was slightly different from th is. To begin 
with, the discussion of the problems of training more doctors 
always precedes that of the other categories. This symbolic 
precedence was matched by a financial precedence: policy-ma : ers 
accepted the argument that medical education must be expensive, 
in order to maintain 'standards' (see furt1h, er below) , and 
therefore financial allocations favoured the medical colleges 
over paramedical training. The financial balance between the two 
is difficult to establish very precisely. The Planning Co mission 
has usually included the two together (along w its research), 
distinguishing the outlays unter the two hears only in 
Second, Fourth and Fifth Plans, and the Draft Plan for 197b-b3. 
In these Plans, Medical Education and Research was allocate:: 
between four and seven times as much as Paramedical Training. 
Actual Plan expenditures are only available for the Fourth Plan, 
when an outlay imbalance of 6.5: 1 in favour of the doctors (Es. --, 
million to ß's129 million) was translaý. ed 
into an ex en, ir 
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imbalance of 10.8: 1 (Rs790 million to Rs73 million)(G. O. I. 1969; 
G. O. I. 1975: 22). These are, of course, only a partial guise tc 
actual public expenditure: Table 1 summarizes the figures for 
Orissa for most of the 1970's and shows by how much me ical 
education dominates training concerns within the Government , when 
non-Plan expenditures are included. 
TABLE 
A ; NUAL AVERAGE EXPENDITURES ON tNNNEDICAL AND PARAMEDICAL EDUCATION' 
AND TRAINING, ORISSA 1972/3 to 1978/9 
Rs Millions 
CATEGORY : ion - State Central T OTAL ('Jage-) 
Plan Plan Plan 
Under-graduate 10.8 1.1 - 11.9 (73`0) 
Post-graduate 1.6 0.1 - 1 .7 c) 10 
Paramedical 1 .3 0.2 1 .3 2.8 ) ( 17'5 
TOTAL 13.7 1 .31 .3 16 .3 100") 
(%age) (8 4ö) (8%) (8%) ( 100 ) 
Source: Orissa Department of 
Health and Family Welfare, Bhubaneswar. 
Note: Medical figures exclude expenditures on the Medical College 
Hospitals. Paramedical figures include expenditures on Regional 
Family -Tel fare Training Centres, which also train coctors. 
g ? {bile some reliance can probably be placed on the i iu. ýre s 
for expeneitures, the data for physical targets anc achievements, 
expressed as numbers in practice or in service and summarised in 
Table 2, are much more uncertain. There are problem 
involved in estimating total numbers of doctors, nurses etc. in 
the workforce: some of these are teal t L-1 ith in more detail la ter 
in this chapter. But in addition, it is rather suspicious that 
many of these targets appear to have been precisely net; one 
some cases it is clear that planners have uses 'lixcely' cr 
rtua' ly 'estimated' f 1gures for 'achieve n4v' en te nai v _41 
no data to go on. Thus as late as 1 972 the Direcora to cf 
iarpoý, rer ( sic) said that 'there are no stock estimates o health 
visitors worked out on a systematic basis' (p46). T 1ere are othor 
inconsistencies betýaeen the fi;: ores procuced cv ci cnt 
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agencies, and the Planning Commission itself has provide 
contradictory figures for 1950 and 1955. Therefore, Table 2 
should be regarded as only a guide to rough magnitudes and 
proportions. 
TABLE 2 
PLAN TA RGETS AND AC HIEVEMENTS IN NUMBERS OF HEA LTH PERSONNEL 
(thousa nds) 
BASE- FIRST SECOND THIRD ANiN1UAL FOURTH FIFTH 
LINE PLAN PLAN PLAN PLAG' S PLAN PLA 
1951 1956 1961 1966 1969 1974 1979 
Ach. Tgt. Ach. Tgt . Ach. Ach. Tgt. Ach. Tit. Ach 
Doctors 56 . 
65 77 70 61 86 102 138 138 176 178 
Nurses 17 19 2L 27 45 45 61 88 88 123 113 
A. N. l`. 's - - -3 22 34+ 54 54 r. a. 58 
L. H. V. Is 0.5 1 32 44 4 7 n. a. S 
Nurse-dai s- 6 41 12 0 25 (no further figu res ) 
S. I. Is 4 76 19 18 20 32 33 n. a. 
Pharmacis ts n. a. 42 48 48 51 66 66 n. a. 
,, otes : In each case these are figures for those estimated to be in 
practice or in service in the country. In some Plan periods, no 
physical targets seem to have been set for some categories. 
A., %7.1, %=Auxiliary i'urse c iQwife, now Health ; orker (Fer ale) 
L. H. V. = Lady Health Visitor, no: ": Health Assistant (Female) S. I. = Sanitary inspector, including Health [issistsnts (-. ale) 
Sources: Columns 2,4 & 5: G. 0. I., 1961: 653; Column 3: G. O. I., 1956: 61 
538; Columns 6,9 10: G. O. I., 1975: 23, except fcr Col. 6 fo 
L. H. V. 's, which is from G. O. I., 1964, and for A. ;. rý. 's, mi w fives, an 
nurse-dais, which come from G. O. I. (C. C. H. ), 1973: 214; Column S: 0.0. I. 
1969: 291, except for midwives, which comes from -e gw Qr a 'Q 
"1 9 
Tt is possible, through rather heroic assumptions, to 
suc, arize Ta'ole 2 in terms of the proportions between äi_ß Brent 
personnel as in Table 3. ,: hat this suggests is that the balance 
of personnel around 1920 was probably far more 'appro ; ria 
(less Heavily de penden t on doctors) than it was around 1950. 
3 QL1 
TABLE 3 
PROPORTIONS OF MEDICAL AND PARAMEDICAL PERSONNEL 
1950 1960 1970 19,00 
Doctors 100 100 100 100 
Nurses 25 39 60 60 
Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives -4 35 30 
Sanitary inspectors 69 20 - 
i'ulti-purpose personnel 
(male ant female) not applicable 70 
Source: Table 2. 
Note: For more detail on multi-purpose personnel, see further below in the section on Feldshers. This total includes tale and Female Health Assistants and Health loW, orkers. 
In dealing with the course of proposals and patterns of 
health personnel I shall reverse the normal order and deal first 
with Community Health Workers and then health assistants or 
paramedical workers (mainly male) under the heading of eldshers, 
then with nurses of various categories, and finally with doc, ors, 
allopathic and then indigenous. 
COM'"'1UNITY HEALTH WW ORKERS 
As early as the N. P. C. and : shore Corr, raittee reports it r_ad 
been argue d that the existing categories of person nel might not 
suit the kinds of tasks which were regarded as the most 
essential, and th at some new categories should be trained. Two 
kinds of proposa ls were made: for what we T.. oul ü nou.. call 
comm unity health workers; and for a medical auxil iary cate, or 
akin to th e F'ussian . Cftf . 
The N. P. C. provided as good a description any: justi ication 
of the potential and role of a cormunity health worke r as any to 
be found in the international policy, documents of the 1070s. 
Because of the dearth of trained medical personnel, t ;e realty. 
needs of India could "only be riet It s- train i nE. speci ally a ve r 
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large body of men to perform some of the simpler tasks" and "thus 
the cornerstone of the scheme we recommend is a Health Worker. " 
(N. P. C. 1946: 43) The Health Worker was to be an intelligent 
young man or woman selected from the villaVre itself, sent fcr 
nine months training in community and personal hygiene, first 
aid, common ailments and simple remedies, and then returned to 
his or her village to "spread the gospel" (ibid: 41+). 
"The health worker will be one of the villagers 
themselves, only somewhat better trained than 
themselves. He will not appear to the villagers as a 
strange imposition of a strange system, but their ni th 
and kin who desires to help them ." 
The proposal involved retraining after five years, with the 
prospect that in 20 years some of these workers would be of 
degree standard. There were several problems with this proposal: 
no thought was given to the problem of finding trainers; of 
selecting candidates in villages divided along caste, class and 
religious lines; of supervising his/her activities; nor of the 
possible unavailability of worsen of suitable education and age to 
meet the requirements and able and willing to attend a long 
training course away from their home or marital village. Further, 
the financial implications of the proposal were encrr; cus, 
involving more than double current total levels cl h_alth 
expenditure just to pay salaries of health workers. 
However, the main reason why no attempt was made to 
implement the proposal was the perspective used in the later (any: 
more official and 'authoritative') Ehore report - which focussec, 
on 'top-do-an' planning based on health centres manned by ccctors 
and ancillary staff. In addition, several States were running 
schemes to encourage doctors to settle in rural areas, usinv 
subsidies for the establishment of Dispensaries, or offering 
honoraria. There were also arguments about, whether to ccnLinue 
the training of licentiate doctors (see further below) on ýhe 
rounrs that they were more willing; to settle in rural areas 
(though there was no evidence for this); and supporters cf 
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indigenous systems of medicine also argued their case in part on 
the same lines. The issue of rural medical relief was thus 
sidetracked into discussions in three directions, and away from 
the idea of a new category of worker at the village level. The 
concept of the Health Worker fell because it was argues that the 
villagers should not be offered an inferior standard of care fror 
that of the towns, and that medical standards in India should be 
modelled on those of Britain and America (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ], 
1951_: 24). 
For whatever reason, it is impossible to find new proposals 
for village level health workers before the early 1 970's. At this 
time, international thinking on development in general was 
critical of the previous belief that the benefits of economic 
growth would 'trickle down' to the poor, in urban or rural areas. 
There was increasing evidence that the efforts of the preceding 
twenty years still left most villagers with little access to 
State medical services, and it was increasingly argued that one 
reason for this was the slavish adherence to mocels derived from 
the colonial period and based on copying structures from the 
I. lest. In this period the Chinese resort to 'bare-foot doctors' 
after 1966 received a great deal of positive comment and 
analysis. The critique of the 'orofessional' r,, ocel of health 
services found a crusading voice in Ivan Illic:, who counted in 
his circle of supporters several ca? 11-Place, l ! n,: ians, 
particularly V. Ramalingaswa: my, the director of the All-India 
Institute of 1'edical Sciences [A. I. I. -. S. anc J. P. aik, the 
Member-Secretary of the Indian Council for Social Science 
Research [I. C. S. S. R. J. 
These ideas were brought together in the 1 ; 975 report c the 
committee chaired by J. B. Sri vas tav (G. O. I. 1975a) on the future 
of medical education -a committee originally estEolis red bt e 
Health Mi nister (Dr. Daran Singh) as a res, of a bruising 
strike of Delhi junior hospital oectors 
in 1574. The rivastav 
Committee report was presented. at a very inauspicious time - t'--; 
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Emergency had just been declared, and grass-roots political 
initiatives in general were unwelcome. Further, within a year the 
whole of the health sector was to be dominated by the attempt to 
make a dramatic breakthrough in the sterilisation proJramme. 
While the Report was accepted, no moves were made to implement it 
until the Janata Government was elected in 1977. The Janata 
Manifesto mentioned community health workers, and the new Health 
Minister (Raj Narain) adopted the proposal as a personal 
commitment (Leslie, 1 981 ; Joubert, 1985). Unlike the 1938 N. P. C. 
proposals, the C. H. W. was to be offered training in the 
indigenous systems of medicine as well as allopathy; and for 
training purposes an additional doctor was to be appointed at 
each Primary Health Centre. The course was reduced in length to 
three months, and the stipend offered was based on the assumption 
that this would be a part-time activity. 
Much to the surprise of many commentators, the C. H. W. scheme 
was indeed implemented with effect from late 1977. Progress was 
slower than planned, and was delayed further when i1rs Gandhi wwas 
re-elected in 1930. It took several months before the Congress 
Govern, m, was prepared to continue a schere which was so clearly 
identified with the opposition, particularly with ', -'a j : ý'arain. 
Eventually just a change in title (fror; U, Uorker to Volunteer, or 
Village Health Guide), a new emphasis on appointing wor en where 
possible, an a few other small changes rý ere soff icier: .cr rý 
the scheme to continue, and efforts were made to coclplete te 
training of C.:. Vl. s for all villages by the end of i-: arohh 1: -, -4. 
the chequered history of the C. E. U. has posed sore , rocle,,: s 
for orthodox is rxist interpretations o health policy in India. 
It is relatively easy to explain the failure to use this means of 
providing heal the care prior to 1977: it fits with a model of 
health service provision which is dominated by the interests of 
urban propertied classes, allied to the medical pref ssicr. s 
desire for dominance over the mecical division of labour nü 
protection from competition. How then can we explain t ne c ar. 
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in policy? It certainly does not fit easily into a 'labour's 
demands/capital's needs' view of reform: it is not clear that 
'improving villagers' health' will safeguard capitalism, and 
villagers themselves have never articulated a demand for this 
kind of service. Attempts to dismiss the significance of the 
scheme (as merely a smokescreen, or designed to buy off cer; anas 
for a doctor in every village) seem equally unacceptable (though 
correct as a measure of realism about the uncertain importance of 
the change). Joubert (1985) argues that this policy is populisr 
and it seems that a confluence of forces have 
come together to support the move, of which the emerging 
'agrarian populism' and clientelism of the Indian State, the 
potential for using these workers for population control, and a 
changing international climate are the most important. I will 
return to consider these points at the end of this chapter. 
FELDSHERS 
Proposals for feldshers emerged in the 1950's and 19e0's. 
The first meeting of the Central Council of Health, in January 
1953, considered whether to reintroduce licentiate training as a 
way of solving the shortage of medical personnel in the rural 
areas. The meeting resolved against licentiates but in favour of 
medical auxiliaries, and the central government proposed a scheme 
in 1954 to produce a cadre of people to live "in the midst of the 
villagers" and trained in environmental sanitation but also able 
to attend to minor ailments (G. O. I. [C. C. I-H. ] 1954). The discussion 
was heated, with the . major objection being that these people 
would set themselves up as doctors if they had any curative 
training. While the proposal insiste that the medical 
auxiliaries would be under the supervision of a coctor, it : -fas 
argued that in practice this was highly unlikely: the 'auxiliary' 
would thus become a 'quack'. Nonetheless, there was majority 
support, and Planning Commission promised money. Lut the 
followings year a revised scheme was announced, apparently as a 
result of pressure applied through the Planning Commission, to 
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reduce the curative training to the level of first aid only. At 
this point, the representatives of several States reiterated 
their belief that the new category would overlap with the 
Sanitary Inspectors (G. O. I. [C. C. 1, -. ] 1955). 
Although the scheme did appear in the Second Plan, very few 
States seem to have followed up the proposal. There seem to have 
been Health Assistants trained in Nagpur, and in Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar, and Rajasthan, (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 1963: 191) and possibly in 
U. P. (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 1964: 286) and some of these were given jobs 
as medical officers in Primary Health Centres. The idea was 
reintroduced in the ninth meeting of the C. C. H., in 1961 , as a 3- 
year course. Once again reference was made to experience in 
Russia and other countries, and again it was suggested that the 
new 'health assistants' should work under the supervision of 
doctors and not be able to set themselves up as independent 
practitioners - and the same criticisms were made as before. A 
sub-committee reported favourably the following year, and the 
matter was discussed again in 1963, when some opposition was 
reported from the international agencies, who were more in favour 
of Sanitary Inspectors (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 10, r, 4: 284-31(-, ). Ey 1965 
W. H. O. and U. N. I. C. E. F. were in favour of the scheme for training 
health assistants (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 1966a: 70-72) but by 1967 a new 
version of the scheme was being mooted - for E. Sc. courses in 
Public Health and in Maternal and Child Health. Finally, in the 
early 1970's the attempts to integrate the different specialist 
cadres - Sanitary Inspectors, Family Planning, . alaria and 
Smallpox workers etc. - began to bear fruit with new proposals 
which calledforMulti-PurposeHeal thl orkers(i-:. P. u. . s) 
(G. O. I. [C. C. H. C] 1973: 368-9). After 1975, when the i. P. `;;. schemes 
were joined by the resurrection of the Community Healt W:: orl>er, 
and backed by international agencies, there was finally a 
completely new loo{ to health personnel training, in India. 
The exact course of thes e fluctuating proposals, and to 
reasons for their elr. ost total non-implementation riot c1 7 7, 
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are not clear. However, what seems to have happened is that te 
'problem' of rural medical relief was seen as the absence of 
doctors. Discussion and effort thus went into schemes to persuade 
graduate doctors to work in rural areas, and proposals to use 
different personnel never received the same kind of support - 
there was no existing cadre whose training could be expanded. 
There was no political benefit to be gained from promising 
villages an unknown, incomprehensible, health assistant, but 
the claim to be able to provide a doctor evoked a stron¬ 
response. The final proposals evolved through two routes, both of 
which did address themselves to the existing patterns of health 
personnel - the indigenous practitioners, and the existing cadres 
of 'uni-purpose' health workers (for smallpox, T. E., family 
planning etc. ). 
attempts to bring the indigenous practitioners into 
Government service have a long history, which I have already 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 7. More detail on the post-1947 
debates on the role of indigenous healers will be provided later 
in this chapter. Here I shall concentrate on the major attempt 
made to integrate indigenous healers as health auxiliaries, :,. acle 
in 1972, during the first flush of the Congress Government 
elected in 1971 on the 'abolish poverty' slogan. 
The 1;. 72 proposals arrived and disappeared very rapidly. As 
late as the 1971 meetin ; of the Central Council of Health the 
'master Plan' to provide health services to rural areas followed 
previous patterns in being based on improving facilities and 
incentives to encourage staff tC serve in rural or eas 
G. C. I. [C. C. H. ] 1972: L1-71). After the 1971 elections a 
completely new set of proposals was introduced, to rive substance 
to t-Mrs Gandhi's election promises. In 1972 the new Minister c 
State for Health, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, proposed a at` o1 al 
Health Scheme for Rural Areas', first announced in the Loy-, Sad'%a 
to in i- ay and passed at a conference (not a full meetin ; of 
Central Council of Health in July. The Government apparently gave 
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this scheme a very high priority, considering the rapidity wit: 
which further meetings were held: in July the Planning Comr ission 
approved pilot projects, and the sub-committee set up in July 
reported in time for modifications to be made in : overmber and a 
public discussion in December. 
The intention was that pilot projects should be started in 
1972/3 and the scheme itself in 1973/14. Press comment suggested 
that the Prime Minister had put her own weight behind this scheme 
as "an earnest of [the Central Government's] desire to react 
(sic) social services to the rural communities" (Statesman 
27/7/72). The scheme itself envisaged using the estimated 300,000 
registered medical practitioners from the indigenous systems of 
medicine, to train them for four months in simple treatments fror. 
'Ayurveda/Unani, Homeopathy and Allopathy including first aid' 
(J. I. 11. A. 1973,2: 77) and then employ them at R. sl50/- per month, 
providing them with a Medical Kit with simple allopathic, 
homeopathic and Indian medicines. In this way it was argued that 
medical relief and care could be provided to rural areas rather 
like the way Russia and China had solved similar problems 
(ibid : 76) . 
But it soon became clear that powerful forces were rangec 
against the proposals. The Indian ', Medical Association predictably 
called it a "cocktail" of system s which would legitimise quackl,,,. ery 
and discriminate against doctors at a time when increasing 
numbers were unemployed. T ne President of the I. i . h. used his 
position on Planning Commission subcommittees to argue for 
amendments to the proposal, (I. . A. 
[Annual Report], 19-71/2). The 
Planning Commission itself began to suggest problems, such as the 
difficulty of integrating different medical systems a ter a short 
course of training, when there were no trainers who understoco 
all three; and once again it was argued that it would 
politically unacceptable to offer the rural population a level oý 
practitioner below that to be fcunc in the towns (1`4-indl- -Stan 
Times, 1/10/72). In addition, soy, e States oppo ec t Sc. eme 
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Punjab, for example, argued that it had sufficient allopathic 
doctors, and Rajasthan sponsored discussion of its 'Problem of 
increasing numbers of unemployed doctors'. 
This coalition was sufficient to prevent the scheme from 
being implemented, even in a pilot form. Although Mrs Gandhi 
addressed gatherings of ULj, ýZ and in 1973 and talked of 
the need to use all available medical resources (J. I. º-f. A. 1 973, 
6: 211), Chattopadhyay left the Ministry. Without his personal 
support the proposal died, and the I. M. A. was able to call off 
its proposed 'Black Day' of action, April 16th 1973. But this was 
not the last attempt - similar proposals reappeared in 1977 - and 
the alternative means of producing feldshers was implemented, 
albeit slowly, over the next five years. 
The alternative route to feldshers was through the 
retraining of the existing paramedical staff. The previous 20 
years had seen the expansion of a whole series of categories 
linked to the so-called 'vertical' carIpaigns against specific 
diseases or for family planning. In the mid-1960's it was thought 
that malaria would soon be conquered and this gave rise to some 
discussion about what to do with the malaria workers. This 
'problem' disappeared with the resurgence of malaria, but the 
approaching elimination of smallpox reintroduced the issue in the 
early 1970's. In addition, some argued that the separate 
campaigns were hindered by their isolation one from another. They 
were unable to call upon the workers from the other campaigns at 
moments of urgency in epidemics, or at seasonal peaks of 
activity such as spraying against mosquitoes). In addition, there 
was (if work schedules were conscientously followea) a great 
duplication of visiting, and time spent in travel was a major 
source of 'unproductive' time. Thus, it was argued, the full 
potential of the existing staff was not being realised. The 
proposed solution was to integrate the different cadres to 
provide the full range of preventive and public health service3, 
and, after 1977, to include basic curative train; g as t;: ell. 
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I shall now turn to a more detailed con icieration of the 
expansion of nursing education, which in part complements what I 
have just said, since the junior nursing cadres - Lady Health 
Visitors and Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives - provided the sources for 
the female ' feldshers I under the Multi-Purpose Workers Scheme. 
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I shall now turn to a more detailed consi ceration of the 
expansion of nursing education, which in part complernents what I 
have just said, since the junior nursing cadres - Lacy Health 
Visitors and Auxiliary purse-Midwives - provided the sources for 
the female ' feldahers' uncer the Multi-Pur. cse `;, 'or : ers Sch: er. e. 
THE SUPPLY OF NURSES 
Comparec to doctors, nurses have been sy: ernatical1y 
relegated to a minor position in the organisation anc funding not 
only of training but also of employ Tent. This is, of course, 
common to many countries, but the problem is probably more 
extreme in India. Nurses have a low status in the cc-, munity. They 
re mostly women. They are either draw. fro r:: ar, inal or 
disadvantaged social classes becau -- e of the 'polluting' rg 
connotations of their work, or from the one group who clearly 
reject this conception of nursi ' activities - Christians, mostly 
from Kerala. They have failed to exert forceful pressure to raise 
t heir Standing. As a result, 1<ey aspects of rational health 
policies (in particular, for r aternal and child health. ) have 
remained under-sta fed and ir, adeauate, despite a frequent 
formally-expressed commitment to increasing the nur ber of nurses 
and i proving the conditions of t Heir education an : employ cent. 
Nurse training was not well developed under trie British. 
ersing for the Armed ed r orces : ras largely a male al mir, with the 
first nursing sisters arriving in cm'cay in 1388. In 1914 nurses 
were, for the first time, recruiter it lr. _a 
for r, ' 
purposes and e; ire formed into an radian lllitary 1: ur in. Service 
. in 1927 (t l inson, 1958: 11). i. ursing schools in Go: lerr::; e. nt 
Civil 
Hospitals were established in the 1 870's (in ar ras) and th 
1880's (in ýombýy an, Calcutta). o , 'day, Poc., ü 21 n Calcut ý 
the early nur e training was done by Anglican : is . ers, and 
a.. 1 ; i; lssion ýýaitals trained more nu rs. es tiTian Government 
did, also using Euro ; ean or American nurses as trainers. 
,1 J 
Nursing students in Government and mission hospitals were 
originally 'Anglo-Indian', and later mostly Indian Christian 
girls (alrm. ost the only groups willing to become nurses until 
quite recently). Nursing education was increasingly standaräisec 
after 1909, when mission hospitals in North India est`blisrec a 
common examining board (ibid: 32). In the 1 920s the first step- 
were taken to establish a category of Lady Health Visitors, w -: ese 
focus was to be on public health work (Seal 1975: 433). A Trainee 
Nurses Association of India was es tablisL ed in 1922, brie in 
together two regional associations, and Acts to register 
qualified nurses were passed, first in i adras in 1926 and by 19J Jý 
in most Provinces (ibid; Nandi, 1981: 158). 
At Independence, there were two categories of r. istere: 
nursing personnel - about 15,000 general nurses, who mid: ' t also 
havea midwifery qualification, and so ße 500 Lady Health 
Visitors. There were also traditional birth attendants - ýýý - 
some of whom had received some trainirv ano might be employed as 
subordinate nursing staff (see further below); and an un', nowr: 
number of others doing duties which could be defined as nursing:. 
The Bhore committee recognised that the nursing situation: in 
Ins is ryas totally unsatisfsctcry. It oinIt ec cut that ccnditicr: s 
for nurses were "deplorable" ( G. O. I. 19G, 11: 336), and went or: 
tc list stih at it saw as the main probýer:. s. no professional status 
by which it meant gazetted rank in Government service); lc w pay 
for senior nurses; understaff eä hos vita 1 _säin ; to cverT. or 
nurses; deplorable living condit i ors, ciet and leisure 
_ acilities; and no pension right. 
The _ or a re. ort ar 
ha t 
all of these were within the power of Government to remedy, but 
even so, it was not hopeful that enough Domen would come _ or":; . rc 
for training to meet its long-term goal of one nurse for ever,, 
500 population. In marked contrast tc iI, s vie: on cc, cr:, t'n: - 
committee proposed two braces of nurse - junior and senior - .: itý 
Lnenu'n. dereesassoonasposs1.. e, a. ý.. 
.: ý. a GGlti 
o 
Icn of ., ter i 
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specified the proposed curriculum, standards of training centres 
and so on. Almost as an afterthought, the Committee refers to 
male nurses, notes their role and the difficulty of recruiting 
men to nursing while pay rates were so low, and suggests that an 
expansion of the number of male nurses for male wards will 
release the female nurses for other work - presumably (though- 
this is not stated) female wards and out-patients. 
One indicator of the low priority of nursing is the very 
poor quality of information about how many nurses there are, or 
what kind of work they are doing, and this rakes it very 
difficult to assess the significance of changes since 1947. The 
study carried out by the major organisation of voluntary 
hospitals in India, the Co-Ordinating Agency for Health Planning, 
notes that the Indian Nursing Council registered only 87 of the 
general nurses trained between 1951 and 1 971 , 69 % of L. H. V. s, and 
62% of A. N. M. s but the Census errs in the other direction by 
including 'untrained and unqualified self-styled nurses' 
(C. A. H. P. 1975: 9). In addition, double-counting is a serious 
possibility, since recruitment to higher grades has often been 
from the ranks of lower ones. Using the results of a 2, sample of 
registered nurses, figures for graduation from nurse-training 
institutions, and estimates of mortality, mi J_ration, and 'pre- 
retirement resignations' the C. A. H. P. study estimated a nurse 
population in 1 971 as in Table 4. 
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TABLE 4 
STOCK OF NURSES AT THE END OF 1971 
After estimating 
Category loss from mortality 
General Nurse 








from mortality, migration 
retirement and resignation 
3,977 
64,275 
41 , 522 
5,914 
Source: C. H. H. P., 1975: 10,14. 
The C. A. H. P. study also provides one of the few estimates of 
how nurses experience interrupted work careers if they marry. 
eased on an admittedly small sample, they suggest that about 11; j 
of all nursing personnel were not currently in work, for 
'temporary' reasons, while another regarded themselves as 
'permanently' out of the nursing workforce (ibid. :1 2-3). Medical 
administrators resist the appointment of married nur: es oirtly 
with their husbands if they are also employed by the Health 
Department, because this reduces their i reeaom to use job 
transfers as the main means of disciplining staff - but it is 
also not clear how many nurses might return to Goer erc ent 
e employment if service rules were to r;, ane their employe ent mor 
compatible with their marital cdli ati_ýns. in ; neral, litýle 
reliable information exists about the numbers of trainee nurses 
of cifferent grades .,,, Inc) are in employm: mert, or might 
be availab, e 
for employment. The C. A. H. P. survey found most of its ' L. H. V. anc 
. 4.7 .T employed respondents wore ing fcr 
the Government (c,, 7`, anc: 
085 respectively) but far more Generalkurses in Churc -related 
(1) or private (13 ) employment. Te Re port also suggested 
estimates of 'unemployed' nurses, provided by t'he " inistry cf 
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Labour, were probably highly unreliable. These estimates included 
large numbes of male A. N. 11. s and L. H. V. s (! ), and many ernplcyea 
staff nonetheless register as unemployed, in the hopes of 
bettering one's position (C. A. H. P. 1975: 19-21). 
The most basic level of nursing worker has remained the dai, 
the nursing orderly and the ayah. Virtually nothing is known 
about who they are, how many there are, what tasks they routinely 
carry out, what education they have and so on. As we shall see, 
there are relatively few trained nurses for hospital anc health 
centre work, and so much of this is carried out by these 
untrained personnel. Only in the case of the dai has there been 
any attempt to provide training. The Bhore Committee acceptee 
that this category, however undesirable, would inevitably remain 
necessary for a period, and it described a successful training; 
scheme from the North-Vile-st Frontier as a model (II: 398-402). The 
Shore Report did not propose the replacement of the indigenous 
midwife by trained birth attendants from outside. Instead, it 
suggested the improvement of the methods used by dais, by 
offering help and advice particularly to the "younger wogen of 
the dai community" (ibid: 402). Such women were indeed employed 
in P. H. C. s as Trained Dais durin the 1950's, and many are still 
in post today - though once again there are no national 
estimates. They were replaced by A. 1N. 1-1.3 in the 1960's, but more 
dais have been brought into Government service since 1977 as 
assistants to A. N. i, ̀. s working in sub-centres. 
This move has been part of the shift in orientation cf 
health services described above. In the case of t: e dais it s 
involved attempts to train at least one from each village, to a 
total of 1 : 500 population, over a3 week training ccurse . elc st 
a local sub-centre. This target has been achieved, thou: the 
longer-term goals of maintaining contacts anQ supervision o. re 
less likely to be reached. The dais are not e 1o'ed after 
train ing (except for perhaps one to help the A. ; . ), but they 
are offered a small inducement to report women . anc are pregnant 
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to the A. N. ý1. to allow for ante-natal visits. No assessment of 
the dai training programme nationally has been publishes, but 
reports fror U. P. suggest that very few dais there, trainea. or 
untrained, have any regular contact with any health person nel 
(N. I. H. A. E., 1980; Jeffery, Jeffery and Lyon, 1904b). It is 
probably a result of the fear that dais have that they will be 
involved in family planning activities, which reduces contacts to 
a low level. This will be discussed in more aetail in Chapter 10. 
For the more established grades of nurses, there have been 
two main changes in the course of the last 40 years. One 
substantial new category has been introduced - that of the 
Auxiliary Nurse-Midwife - and nursing colleges have been 
established, and have trained staff for a number of positions as 
nurse-tutors, public health nurses and so on. Table 5 summarises 
the available data on numbers in each of the larger categories. 
3 20 
TABLE 5 
STOCK ANfD SUPPLY OF NN. IURSING PERSONNEL 
1 951 1961 1 971 1981 
Graduat es 100 385 1,100 
(Annual outturn) (21) (43) (108) 
General Nurses 17,000 35,000 72,600 115,000 
(Annual outturn) (1,105) (2,663) (5,778) (5,000) 
Health Visitors 500 2,475 6,400 
(Annual cutturn) (55) (369) (377) 
A. N'. 141. s - 6,550 44 , 000 
(Annual outturn) - (2,085) (5,036) 
Source: For 1 951 , 1961 and 1971 figures, C. A. H. P., 1975: 10-16. For 1951 and 1961 I have taken the out-turn figures quoted there, 
added to the estimates of- stock in 1950, and adjusted downwards 
by 2.5 to allow for mortality (probably an over-estimate, 
especially for A. Ni. i=. s, a young group especially in the early 
years), and rounded. G. 0. I. ( 1972) estimated the stock of 
general nurses in 1971 at about 70,000, of L. H. V. s at 6,000, and 
of A. N. i"1. s at about 45,500. 
Note: Stock here refers to out-turn figures adjusted only fcr 
estimated mortality. 
11. i I training was introduced in 1 , 952 as a way of expancing 
the number of junior nurses, mainly for public health work: their 
two-year courses accepted women with eight years of schooling. 
By contrast, the general nursing course takes three-years, with a 
MI minimum entry recui rem ent of ten years of school in z. ý. is.: re 
also less well-trained than the Shore-proposed 'junior 
certificate' nurses would have been. ) The numbers of A.: ý. ý s 
qualifying rose steadily until 1970 but since then they have 
varied from year to year according to the estimates by St to 
Governments of the number of jobs they will have to offer the 
successful can idates. Thus in 19öß there were - ; out 10,000 
admissions but in 1970 this figure dropped to about 7,750 because 
some States closed down training institutions, believi. t at 
they had a surplus - and only about 500 new posts were fillet in, 
the two years 1'369-71 (0.0. I. 1972: 41, '-52). The original tar-et 
was to provide one A. I . i1. for every 
10,000 people, and this was 
ap proximately achieved in most States by he miG-1 9701 s. gl:: ce 
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1977, with the move towards multi-purpose health workers, the 
A. N. M. has provided the bulk of the new category Health orrcer 
(Female); and current attempts to meet targets of 1: 5,000 
population (with 1: 8,000 as an interim measure) have lea to a 
reopening of training schools. 
matters have been complicated still further by the role of 
the Central Government, through the Family Planning programme. 
The A. N. M. has family planning as well as health 
responsibilities, and therefore some of the training schools have 
been established and funded by the Central Government, and some 
by the State Government. Some A. N. M. s (not necessarily those 
trained in Central Government institutions) were then employed 
under the family planning programme, on funds from the Central 
Government, on slightly better terms than those under the 
maternal and child health programme, on State Government funds. 
Under the multi-purpose schenke, terms and conditions should be 
equalised: even though the variation in background and training 
of the A.. i?. s is small, this process has been long drawn-out. 
For the male workers it is far from reaching a resolution. 
In the field of public health nursing, there are two cadres 
of nurses. The first, established in the early 1920's in Delhi on 
the motel of health visiting in the U. K., is the Lad J Health 
Visitor (L. H. V. ). The second is the Public Health urse (P. H. 1;. ), 
an additional one-year cual if ication available to nurses or to 
L. H. V. s, introduced in the 1950's. The Ehore Com11 mittee was 
scathing about L. H.. ý v. ý, saying that none of then, were ren c ering 
that type of service to the individual, family and commmuni c 
which is considered necessary in health progranrnLes today" (C. C. I. 
1946, II3914), and it called for the establishment of P. H. H. 
training, but the category has not been popular. T'h re v. iere e 
posts for P. H.,;. s until the late 1 970s and no obvious oenef its to 
a staff nurse from undergoing the training. For example, bef cre' 
1 °75 there were only two sanctioned posts for r. H.:. s in the 
Orissa Government service, thou-h there were apparently nearly 50 
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women with the qualification available 1980: 314). The main 
category of public health nurses has thus been the L. H. V., now 
retitled Health Assistant (Female) under the Multi-Purpose 
Scheme. Their position has been very unclear, with two States' 
Nursing Councils (in Madras and Kerala) apparently having no such 
category. The Planning Commission has argued that the estimates 
of stock are so unreliable that it has not given any (G. O. I. 
1972: 46 -7). - 
The first courses for senior nurses, and for degrees in 
nursing began in the 19140's. A Nursing College was formally 
established in Delhi in 1946, the inheritor of intensive training 
programmes created during the Second World War as a result of the 
demand for administrative nursing staff in military hospitals. 
Courses for nurse-tutors and nursing administrators were also 
4 held in Madras and Vellore before Independence, and of ter 1 ý' 7 
there has been a considerable growth in such courses. Those 
trained on these courses have gone on to take up most of the 
senior nursing positions, with holders of nursing degrees most 
likely to progress within the administrative hierarchy. However, 
there are strict limits on their chances of wielding any 
significant power. There are very few high positions and in ai 1 
cases the nurses remain subordinate to doctors. 
Policy towards the nursing categories has thus been 
contradictory. On the one hand, with support from Western and 
international agencies, there have been altem, pts to 
? rofessionalise nursing by lengthening training courses, 
establishing nursing coile-es, and providing new posts for career 
nurses. On the other hand, the nurses have remained divic ec in. o 
separate cadres (unlike the doctors) and have failed to gain any 
substantial support in their everyday attempts to raise t ei r 
position and to overcome the 'polluting' legacy attac: nec tc their 
work. As women, most nurses remain very vulnerable to sexual 
harrassment if th ey ar` un arriec or separated from . heir 
husbands. Nursing education has remained unequal to the task of 
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providing women with the self-confidence which marks women 
doctors, probably because the recruits have not come from high 
enough social backgrounds. There has been no tradition of elite 
women going into nursing. It remains to be seen whether there 
will be any material change as female education improves, and the 
value of female employment changes. This is, perhaps, the feature 
which most sharply distinguishes nursing and medicine: nurses 
have to be employed, whereas doctors can earn a living in their 
own clinics as well as in Government or private employment. I 
will now consider the difference this has :; jade to policy on 
medical education. 
THE TRAINING OF DOCTORS 
? Medical education has been affected by three kinds of 
pressures. To begin with, the Indian elite has attempted to 
ensure that its doctors are the equal of those elsewhere in the 
world, and able to supply them with medical services similar to 
those available to the elites of other countries. Secondly, the 
elite has demanded access to medical colleges for its sons and 
dau--titers, and has therefore pressed for a steacy expansion in 
the numbers of colleges and their intakes. Thirdly, the medical 
establishment has attempted to relate the numbers and kinds of 
doctors being produced to their perception of India's needs. 
These pressures obviously generate conflicts, and it is the 
resolution of these conflicts which underlies the patterns which 
have emerged. 
The insistence on 'seeping; up standardst was carriea over 
fror, colonial policy proposals from before the Second , orld Var. 
The major medical-political cause of the inter-I. -or period was 
precisely on this issue - the maintenance of the recognition b; - 
the General t.,, edical Council in London of Indian medical degrees. 
In order to achieve this the Government of India establishes a 
Medical Council of India in 1933 which excluded from, its 
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registers the holders of 'inferior' qualifications (i. e. those 
not recognised in London as adequate for British registration). 
In this way the All-India council differed from its Provincial 
counterparts, who registered all those with Wvr'estern medical 
qualifications. Even the political doctors of the Indian i, edical 
Association who opposed the founding of the M. C. I. were prepared 
to work within it and to follow policies designed to maintain 
international recognition. This had two consequences: an 
acceptance of the long-term desirability of raising the standards 
of licentiate qualifications to degree standard; and an 
opposition to any involvement of indigenous practitioners in 
Indian medical colleges. 
The Government of India's leading medical advisers - ]British 
and Indian - won general acceptance of the phasing out of the 
medical schools in 1938. The existence of large-scal` medical 
underemployment was used to counter the arguments of those who 
were unhappy about the inevitable consequence of recucing the 
numbers of doctors trained every year. Over the following eight 
years several medical schools were closed or up-graden to medical 
colleges, but the process was not complete when the Lhore 
Committee submitted its report. 
The Bhore committee endorsed this policy in 194i, -) , though not 
without some dispute amongst its members. The final report argued 
that the country should focus its limited resources on zhe 
training of only one kind of doctor "and' that the highly trained 
type of physician whom we have termed the 'ba sic ccctor'll ^ (0-0- Is 
1946, IV: 60). However, six ; members of the Committee argues teat, 
because of "the overall shortage of coctors", this policy sr. ouic 
not be implemented immediately but that the tr aining of all types 
of medical personnel should be expanded as fass, as possible 
(ibid. The majority view won te day and the policy was finally 
implemented during the first 10 y ears of , er independence. 
However, the issue has not disappeared: as I shall show later, 
prominent ron- al pofisymGý .. kers have coýyit rý: edic 
t,, -, e , ýr. u , e- to 
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desirability of a lower level of medical personnel to meet rural 
needs - and in the early 1980's the ', lest Bengal Goverr. ment 
attempted to produce a three-year trained doctor for this reason. 
Pressures for 'raising standards' were not abated by the 
abolition of licentiate training, but were then channelled into 
attempts to ensure the second basis of international recognition 
- freedom for Indian medical colleges from any taint of Ayurvedä. 
The 1948 Central Provincial Health Board meeting had a note i rom 
the Government of India to the effect that they should consider 
whether "the establishment of higher and more desirable standards 
in existing colleges" was not more urgent than expanding the 
output of doctors (G. O. I. [C. P. H. B., 1948: 98). This was part cf 
the response to the Chopra committee report, which was submitted 
in 1948 and which had proposed that all students of medicine 
should be taught both the Western and Indian systems. However, 
the 'modernisers' in Government - including the Prime i-iinister, 
Nehru, and the Health Minister, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, followed 
the advice of the allopathic doctors in the i, %inistry, especially 
L. C. K. E. Raja and A. L. ludaliar (G. O. I. [T. H. M. C. ], 1950: 31-3). 
Raja, then Di rector-General of Health Services, reported to 
the Third Health Ministers' Conference in 1950 that there was a 
real danger of confusion, since the various systems were not 
reconcilable, and he brought in the country's obligations to the 
',. H. O. to support his argument that all r: edical practitioner- 
should have allopathic medical degrees first, and should then be 
free to specialise or practise in an Indian system if they wishes 
(ibid: 15-30). This was a line also promoted by i, 'ehre in his 
speech to the conference, pointing to the British system as 
model (ibid: 6-7). 
A. L. i, ': udaliar, 
development of rnedicý 
in his support of the 





chair the major review of the 
in India in 1959, was prominent 
of licentiate training before the 
committee, and chairman of its 
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Professional Education Advisory Committee, he embodied a major 
link between medical policy-making before and after Independence. 
He was appointed chairman of two committees in 1948, one to draw 
up plans for an All-India Medical Institute (eventually the All- 
India Institute of Medical Sciences, or A. I. I. i, '. S. ) and the other 
to strengthen existing teaching departments. He argued at the 
first meeting of the Central Council of Health in 1953 that the 
undergraduate education at A. I. I. M. S. should be "along the most 
modern lines that are accepted in International circles"; and 
"It is very important fcr us to realise that we must 
look to international standards. .. When it comes to a 
question of helping in the cure of the sic: and the 
general welfare of the community you cannot afford to 
forget international standards or lower your standards 
below the international level. If you do that, you will 
be the worse for it" (G. C. I. 
_[C. 
C. H. ], 1954). 
The major issue which dominated policy in the 1950's was how 
to produce more doctors without compromising on this minimum 
level, defined as 'basic' by the Bhore Committee - that is, an 
internationally-acceptable I I. B. B. S. degree. 
The Bhore Committee also established a tradition of defining 
medical need in terms of a doctor-population ratio. This 
procedure has a number of well-established weaknesses. It tends 
to assume away the impact of the uneven distribution of doctors - 
that is, the national average can be reached yet many areas may 
have very few doctors while others have an apparent sur, lus. It 
tends to ignore differences among doctors, (e. g. by 
specialisation, or linguistic limitations) so t gat there may be 
shortages of some kinds and surpluses of others. It also tends to 
ignore the role of other medical personnel, :, focussir on 
doctors rather than (say) the provision of clinical care. In this 
way it draws attention away from alternative providers of care 
(trained or untrained in allopathic medicine) and from the 
;ýo may be nee-ec if doctors support staff (nurses, pharmacists) r 
are to be as productive as possible. Finally, reliance on docý, or- 
population ratios also tends to ignore issues 0f he 
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employability of the doctors who have been produced. All of these 
problems have characterised the history of policy with respect to 
medical training in India since 191+7. 
TABLE 6 
SUPPLY OF DOCTORS 
1947 1951 1961 1971 1981 
Medical 
colleges 22 30 57 95 106 
Annual 
admissions 1983 2489 6446 12500 12500 
Annual 
out-turn 959 1696 3900 10449 11500 
(S female) ( 22 %) ( 24; %) 
Sources: Row 1 I. A. M. R., 1967; Rows 2 and 3 from ;; 
ýgýg g XVI, 9-10,1974 with 1981 figures from 
Row 4 from 1967, using 1965 
intake figures to estimate female outturn percentage in 1971. 
Table 6 sumEarises the available data on the numbers of 
doctors trained and the expansion of medical colleges. The 
sources for these data are fairly straightforward. The main 
problems are posed by the establishment of medical colleges by 
private associations in. ý the 1960's and 1970's, which gave rise to 
disputes about their standards and thus conflict over whether 
they 'really' existed. The further complication posed by the 
existence of medical colleges offering 'integrated' degrees - ir, 
Ayurvedic or Unani medicine but with substantial components of 
allopathic medicine - is sidestepped: these colleges are not 
included in the above totals. 
The expansion of medical education took place in two main 
phases. Once the initial confusion of Partition had been 
overcome, a dozen new medical colleges . were esta lis-ýe, ý 
by 
grading medical schools - the last being those in i, adhya PradeEh 
in 1955. New medical colleges were also opened, in a ste y 
trickle of three or four a year up to 1962. Then, duri: ýý I<<- ., ar cm, 
with China, the Armed Forces found great difficulty in recrý, i ti 
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doctors on short-term contracts to supplement their own medical 
services. They called for a dramatic expansion in the number of 
medical students, and 46 medical colleges received Rs40 million 
in emergency central government funding to admit 2000 more 
students in 1963 than in 1962 (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ], 1964: 560). The 
M. C. I. was persuaded to consider reducing the length of an N. B. 
B. S. course, and it was forced to waive its norms on staff- 
student and bed-student ratios so that existing colleges could 
admit more students. In addition, 22 new medical colleges were 
opened in the four years 1902-65. 
For all the formal insistence on international standards, it 
is clear that this rate of expansion was much faster than should 
have been permitted if the available number of medical educators 
had been a prime consideration. The Government had been aware of 
likely shortages immediately after the Second World Har, and had 
established a scheme to send doctors abroad for higher training. 
In the four years 1945-48,183 were sent at Government expense, 
and travelling fellowships were also provided for senior teachers 
(G. O. I. CC. P. H. B. ], 1948: 100-1 ). In addition, the U. S. Government, 
the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, W. H. O. and the Colombo Plan 
have all provided fellowships, some of them specifically for 
medical education purposes. 
Ly 1 953 official policy was to discourage overseas training, 
and i'ludaliar stated that it was time that India was self- 
sufficient, with A. I. I. 1.. S. to play a major role in achieving 
this (G. C. I. [C. C. H. ], 1954). But, as the Secretary to the ti. C. I. 
pointed out in 1958, the expansion of medical colleges called for 
320 new teachers every year (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ], 1959: 41). i os t 
medical colleges still depended on part-tii: e teaching by local 
specialists, except in the pre-clinical posts. They found great 
difficulty in recruiting staff, especially where there was no 
possibility of private practice opportunities, as in the non- 
clinical cepartments. Thus in 1956 only one medical college was 
.,; as staffed in its Pathology Department, and there a total 
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shortfall of over 1900 teaching staff (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ], 1961: 96). 
The l-ludaliar committee estimated a shortage of 4400 teachers in 
1960. In 1964 roughly 221o of all teaching posts were vacant, with 
28! of pre-clinical posts empty (G. O. I., 1972: 14-5). These 
shortages did not inhibit plans in the late 1960's to open new 
medical colleges, using the Mudaliar Committee's proposed 'norm' 
of one college for every 5 million population as justification. 
(G. O. I. [C. C. H. ], 1969: 119). Of all medical teaching posts in 
1970,18; j were vacant, but the vacancies were not evenly spread - 
the Madhya Pradesh colleges were short of 363 teachers, (out of 
an unknown total) and it is difficult to understand quite how 
medical education was carried on in these circumstances. 
The main solution to these shortages was to increase the 
pool of potential teachers by expanding post-graduate medical 
education. Some Departments in existing medical colleges were 
given extra funding to permit them to open courses at Master's 
level, and several of these received substantial amounts from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to train staff and to provide equipment. 
In addition, new post-graduate institutes were opened in Punjab 
(Chandigarh) and in Pondicherry as prestige institutes by 
politicians jealous of the pre-eminence of Delhi's ý. I. I. ýý. S. 
Those in favour of the expansion of specialist training were able 
to point to the shortages of medical teachers and to use the 
argument that medical education in India should be available at 
all levels at the standards of Britain or America. Thus, a sub- 
committee on post-graduate education preparing a Perspective Plan 
for Health in 1962-3 managed to get the lion's share of the funds 
for education and training earmarked for post-g; radu_Aate education 
(Rs750 million out of a total for all health workers of Rs1830 
million) and to propose a Medical Education Grants Conmr. ýitte. This 
Committee would have had access to foreign exchange, clearly 
stated by the sub-committee as essential but inaccessible 
(G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] , 1964: 570-4). 
These recommendations were not ir, ýplementea (partly because 
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of the collapse of the Planning system between 1965 and 1966), 
but there was a steady expansion in the number of places and 
scholarships for post-graduate students. By 1969, there were 
6,000 places a year (as against 11,000 undergraduate places) - 
but only about 3,500 of them were taken up. This did not inhibit 
the expansion of post-graduate places by another 1,600 or so 
during the Fourth Plan (G. O. I., 1972: 14). The apparent surplus of 
specialists in medicine and surgery, noted during the discussions 
preceding the Fifth Plan (G. 0. I., 1971a: 25) finally led to a 
curb on the expansion of post-graduate education. 
The issue of foreign standards was highlighted by the 
dilemmas posed by Indian doctors who travelled abroad to receive 
higher training (see Chapter 8). Here it is worth pointing to the 
attempt to encourage such doctors to return to India to fill 
empty teaching posts. From 1958 a 'pool' scheme had been in 
operation, by which doctors who returned received an honorary 
post and a salary while they looked for more permanent positions. 
This had very little appeal to doctors: those who came back to 
the pool often returned abroad again on the grounds that they 
were not being offered posts at the right level. Those who hac 
received Indian training were often better placed to get higher 
posts (because of their contacts and sponsorship by Professor: 
and politicians) and resented the attempts by those returned from 
abroad to leap over them. (G. O. I. CC. C. H. ], 1 967: 40-1 ). In the : is 
1970s the journal reported around 10 doctors a 
month being offered places in this pool, of which only half tco : 
up the offer, so the contribution to the return of Indian doctors 
was fairly insignificant. 
Control by the M. C. I. over the standards of medi cal 
education was made more difficult by th e estatlishment o1 new 
'private' medical colleges. iýiost medical colleges in . India were 
founded by the State, with staffing and hospital provision all 
part of the normal State health budget. In ae ca ses 
(especially in Uttar Pradesh) the medical college glas part ti e 
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University, and thus funded by the State education budget (in 
Lucknow, Aligarh, and Varanasi). There are also private medical 
colleges, some Christian foundations (Ludhiana, Vellore), some 
established as part of medical nationalism before Independence 
and based on colleges of physicians and surgeons in Bombay and 
Calcutta, and some Municipal colleges in Maharashtra and Gujarat. 
However, after Independence a new form of private medical 
college was established, with funds being subscribed to 
committees dominated by politicians, who expected to control 
admissions to the college both for financial and. political 
rewards. Here admission was based largely on ability to pay, 
rather than on merit, and there was strong pressure to cut costs 
and standards in the interests of profitability. The Minister of 
Health from 1959-62, Karmakar, argued in favour of these 
colleges, saying that they would save Government funds. He also 
argued that such colleges should be permitted to start in a 
modest fashion and then be given time to improve, and that 
prominent medical men could be used as teachers even if they were 
not qualified to the level required by the Q . C. I. During his time 
as Minister over Fs6 million was given to five private Medical 
colleges in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Bihar and Kerala 
(G. O. I. [C. C. H. ], 1964: 155). A committee set up by the new Health 
Minister, Sushila "ýayar (T, lho had been a physician to Mahatma 
Gandhi), reflected a shift of power towards the medical 
establishment. It reported in 1964 that no ne; "1 colleges should be 
established and existing colleges should be tagen over by the 
State, with Central Government assistance, to root out corruption 
and low standards. Nonetheless, shoe reporter oressýres on her 
from her Cabinet colleagues to open ýý, edical colleges in their 
areas - pressures which she managed to ignore (i nterview, 1 76). 
But under her successors four more private medical colleges were 
opened in Bihar, and, three n Uttar Pradesh:, f rcr: 1 961-72 
(G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] ,1 965: 125-8). In f act, the 
Government decided 
that it 1x7ould be too expensive to take all of them cvýr, ut 
official disapproval was reiterated in 1 971 (G. ü. l. [C. C. _:. ], 
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1 972: ü) . 
The M. C. I. is essentially unable to control this kind of 
college and its standards. The M. C. I. can inspect a college after 
it has been running for two years, and make recommendations, but 
only makes a final decision when the first graduates pass out. At 
that stage, it is the University degree which is recognised, not 
the individual college. If the college has gained affiliation to 
a University the M. C. I. has to threaten students from other 
affiliated colleges with non-recognition of their qualification 
as well. But by then it is too late, in practical political 
terms, to act: students can organise to ensure that their degrees 
will be recognised, and they have strong support from. the 
political heavyweights on the college managing committees. 
Finally, it is not the M. C. I. which acts, but the Government of 
India which receives proposals from the N. C. I. which it is free 
to ignore. This has been the position since the 1933 Act was 
passed. When Rajkumari Amrit Kaur was Health Minister in the 
early 1950s she overruled the M. C. I. in its attempt to delay the 
recognition of the -degrees of 5 medical colleges, and she 
retained this power when the M. C. I. Act was amended in 1956 (Lok 
Sabha Debates 10/12/56). When the i . C. I. attempted to withholc 
recognition to nine medical colleges in 1974, again the 
Government of India did not support it Cý ýý ý1 ý, 19 =r 
21/3/74) . 
The Guru Gobind Singh college, 'established' in raridabac, 
just South of Delhi in 1971 , was the most blatant example of 
political profiteering. The sponsors ýT ere res pond in t unmet 
demand for medical college places amongst the Delhi ;i dle 
classes. The Government itself had bro<en its own resolve to open 
no new medical colleges by capitulating to student and p : rem: ý 
pressure in1 97 1, forcing Delhi Universi typ to open a University; 
medical college and then attaching it to one of the Central 
Government hospitals in 'New Delhi, Saf darjang. Laut the ari2 ac 
college had no hospital facilities at all. The managing committee 
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were all relatives of the Congress Party's Chief Whip in the 
Punjab State Assembly, and the students went on hunger strike 
when the promised facilities did not materialise. The issue was 
resolved by the college moving (with all its paid-up students) to 
Faridkot in Punjab, and being allowed to continue in existence 
(Lok Sabha Debates 19/12/72; 
_Uýý 
J ý, ýý 28/4/73), Since 1973 
there have been no new medical colleges opened in this way, but 
proposals were made in 1984 to do so in Maharashtra. 
Policy on medical education has thus not been entirely in 
the hands of doctors, despite the nominal power of the I. I. C. I. The 
subordination of the authority of the M. C. I. by politicians was 
p. robably going on in the 1960s, but did not surface into public 
debate. It also provided the manifest grounds for the General 
Medical Council in London to refuse to recognise degrees from 
most of the medical colleges established in India after 1947, and 
for the final break in 1975 when the G. M. C. decided that it would 
admit no Indian medical degree as sufficient evidence of 
competence for practice in Great Britain. The Marketability of 
medical shills, both within India and abroad, has been maintained 
by the restrictions on the growth of medical education. But those 
restrictions have continually been challenged, and on several 
occasions successfully undermined, as a result of the returns 
available to those with medical qualifications. 
PATTER: 'S OF EýiPLOYi1ENT OF DOCTORS 
There is really very little reliable information available 
on where doctors moo, how they practise and what typical careers 
are like. One source which is frequently used is the 1 ,71 Special 
Census of qualified personnel but this provides information on 
less than half of the total estimated number of doctors available 
in India at the time. There is no reasonable way of telling hog: 
this sample relates to the whole population, nor whether it. 
includes or excludes some marginal practitioners (e. g. with 
'integrated' degrees). In Table 7,1 have therefore reliec on 
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more indirect estimates of the total stock of doctors, and their 
distribution by employment category, and this represents the 
result of a complex set of assumptions. 
To begin with, different authorities provide estimates of 
total stock which vary quite considerably, ranging from 51,000 to 
56,000 in 1951 , from 70,0 00 to 81,000 in 1 96 1, and from 115,725 
to 141,000 in 1971. In part these variations are a result of 
different methods and sources: for example, the P. C. I. provides 
estimates based on the numbers of doctors registered with it, but 
since no annual fee is payable, there is a tendency for doctors 
who have died or retired to remain on the list and M. C. I. 
estimates tend to be high. The attempts to estimate the effects 
of death, retirement and emigration have not produced clear 
agreement among the other providers of estimates (the Planning 
Commission, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
and the Institute for Applied Manpower Research). The figures in 
Table 7 thus represent an approximate average of the estimates 
which include doctors who may be abroad, but attempts to exclude 
doctors who have retired or died. 
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TABLE 7 
DISTRIBUTIO! OF STOCK OF DOCTORS 
1 944 1 961 1 968 1 971 1974 1978 
Public sector 13,000 29,000 39,000 43,000 45,000 50,000 
Self employment 43 , 000 57 , 000 67 , 000 73 , 000 82 , 000 
Private employment 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 
Abroad "" 8,000 9,500 13 , 650 21 1000 
Rest 3,000 3,000 3,500 10,350 38,000 
TOTAL 47 , 400 75 , 000 1 13 , 000 130 , 000 160 , 000 200 , 000 
Sources: 1944 figures from G. O. I., 1946: 12, referring to British 
India; 1961 figures from Mathur, 1971; 1968 figures from 
I. A. M. R., 1970; 1974 figures from I. A. N. R., 1974; 1978 figures 
from I. A. -i. R. , 1974, and Ramaiah and Bhandari, 1975. Note: 'Rest' ( Row 5) is a residual, including doctors who are 
attempting to establish private self-employment, practising part- 
ti, -,. e, in employment with pharmaceutical companies, in post- 
graduate training, temporarily out of the labour force, etc. 
These estimates suggest that, despite some fluctuations, 
about 25-30', o of doctors have been in public employment of one 
kind or another - Central, State, or local Government, E. S. I. S., 
Defence, Railways, Coal i°iines and so on. In some places (such as 
Delhi) (Jeffery, 1976) the share has been much higher and I have 
assumed that most of those in 'genuinely rural' areas have also 
been in public employment. The most dramatic feature of Table 7 
is the rise in the number of those in the residual category. I 
would not place great reliance on this figure, since the margins 
of error in the other categories are considerable (there seers to 
be no national figures even of employment in the public sector). 
It does seem unlikely that public sector employment, private 
sector employment and emigration have, together, risen It 
enough to cope with the level of output of doctors since 1971. 
Most of these doctors are probable self-ei-, iployed, at varying 
levels of income, along with the different elements of the 
residual. Since demand for medical education remains unabated, 
and there have been few accounts of serious unrest amongst th e 
'u n-' or'und er - 'employee: do ctors, it may be that them rke t _ýcr 
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medical services has been growing faster than the row th in 
national income. But there is little to suggest how this might 
have been happening, beyond isolated reports of an expansion of 
private qualified medical services in rural areas, reported from 
some States. 
INDIGENOUS PRACTITIONERS 
Policy with respect to indigenous practitioners has already 
been briefly discussed in Chapter 8. In general, policy has been 
restricted to issues concerning the formal education of 
practitioners, and the attempts to produce social closure of the 
category by making all future indigenous practitioners undergo 
training. The outcome of the battles between 'pure' and 
'integrated' courses of training has probably been to slow down 
the growth in the number of indigenous medical colleges and 
schools, and in their intakes. Table 8 presents some indicators 
of the trends. 
TABLE 8 
SUPPLY OF INDIGENOUS IEDICAL PRACTITIONERS 
1962-3 1972-4 1977 
I. S. iii. Homoeo- 
pathy 
Practitioners: 
Qualified 30,000 50,000 130,000 20,000 
Registered 87 , 000 1 50 , 000 
1 42 , 000 74 , 000 
Enlisted ? ? ? 51 , 000 
In practice 200,000 ? ? 
TOTAL ? 400,000 ? 
Colleges: 95 115 108 116 
Annual Admissions: 1 , 375 
4,1 99 `' 
Sources: 1 962-3 fi gures from Brass, 1972: 348; 1972-4 figures fron; 
Gwvratkin, 1974: 90 and Djukan ovic and i'iach, 1 975: 85; 15 7 figures 
from G. 0. I., 1 979a : 47 , 53. 
2J J 
These numbers are not mutually compatible, since more see~ 
to be added to the 'qualified' category than are trained every 
year. Some people probably are counted two or three tires, 
because they are registered in more than one State (each of which 
has different rules); others are able to be registered on the 
basis of 'postal' education, usually in homoeopathic colleges, 
not listed here; and others may have found different ways of 
gaining access to the 'qualified' registers. The estimates of the 
total numbers in practice also vary accorcing to the principle 
used. For example, the U. N. I. C. E. F. / :. H. 0. joint study quotes 
figures which are said to include (amongst the 200,000 untrained 
and unregistered) dais - but at 1 dai for every 1 , 000 people (the 
Government estimate in 1977) there would be 650,000 dais. Gwatriin 
grosses up the 1961 census estimate in order to produce his 
figure of 250-300,000 who would report them'se1 ves as 
practitioners, but notes that the Narangwal-based estimates would 
expand that figure many-fold. Finally, estimates of the 
proportion of the total who are 'qualified' vary from about 25- 
33`-) (Gwatkin, 1974: 90; Ch uttani et al., 1973: 996). All these 
estimates depend critically on assumptions about who to incluce 
as a healer: those who are registered, if-led, financially 
dependent on practice, full- or part-time engaged in practice, or 
known locally as someone with particular expertise. If all these 
categories are included, the number of 'healers would be not less 
t1zan 1.5-2 million. 
Very little is known about the whereabouts or ec; ; loy rent of 
indi 
I'D 
enouS practitioners from tC! ese different cate cries. G', Jat lr. 
(1 '7'4: 90) reports one estimate f Cr 1 9! C Cf 'cer iI le ' 
(qualified? ) practitioners being in Government employment. This 
seers to be unduly generating a figure of about 20` of -11 
Government doctors ; ein` 'integrates' or 'pure' inui.. =,:. nous 
scarce: graauates. Leyond Government employrmen', ,; OOH seer, 
tG be 
other reports are concerned solely : dith those : with their own 
clinics, or working from their own ý omes (e. g. /lexancer arc 
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Shiva swarly, 1 971 ; Neumann et al., 1 971) . 
CONCLUSION; 
In this chapter I have been concerned to trace out policy 
with respect to different categories of medical personnel, and 
the effects this has had in terms of the numbers trained and 
their employment conditions. In general, the introduction of 
grades similar to 'feldshers' and to community health workers, 
in the late 1970s, was not the result of new ideas, but rather of 
the combination of social forces which made it possible finally 
to implement old ones. These social forces were rural populism 
(personified by the Janata Health iinister, L'k aj:; grain); 
international agencies; and the pressures for job improvements on 
the part of the employees of the erstwhile 'vertical' disease 
programmes. These changes have had different impacts on men and 
women: : per. have generally taken advanta ,e 0f the new 
opportunities, and are establishing themselves as new kinds of 
healers, formal and informal. Women have been much less of fected, 
either as nurses or as dais, and have usually been excluded from 
the positions of comr: unity health workers. The other major 
changes since 1947 have been twofold. Firstly, there is the loss 
of international recognition C or Indian medical de Jrees, to a 
considerable extent because of the impotence of t .eI. -. C. in the 
face of political pressures to expand medical colleges anti to 
turn a blind eye to those who ignore its regulations. Secondly, 
there has been the growing significance of the nu:, bers of 
practitioners with some legal protection for their status outside 
the control of the Western medical profession, ant; the failure of 
the attempts to 'close' the occupation of medicine. 
The implications of 
these 
changes are as follows. lncia now 
has an infrastructure of personnel which is in principle capable 
of implementing health policies in every village of incia. Its 
peripheral workers should have supervision and support t , rough a 
graded hierarchy of male and female workers 11h710 have r°: e `ie. W 
ý2G J -ý J 
integrated training, able to deal effectively with some of the 
major health problems - environmental hygiene, infectious disease 
control, nutritional advice and support. However, the reality 
seems to be significantly different from this. There are 
potential difficulties caused by the employ14ent of personnel 
trained according to very different medical theories, but i, ,e k<: ow 
nothing of how these work out in practice. But there are also 
problems posed by the ethos of working styles, organisational 




STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN HEALTH SERVICES 
The purpose of this chapter is tc look at : now the health 
services have developed and the way they work. I will organise 
this chapter by taking different levels of health services ant 
discussing their mode of working in the light of the most common.. 
criticisms, starting wfiith the medical colleges and then 
hospitals, before looking at material which relates to the 
Primary Health Centre an. its peripheral workers, anc the way t ,e 
'clients' perceive what they are offered. 
MEDICAL COLLEGES 
The major criticisms of >>ecical colleges revolve arounc 
their supposed inability to relate to the main health problems 
facing the average Indian. This is usually ex , lained by the 
dominant ethos of college teaching staff, who are said to mimic 
the staff of British or rmerican medical colleges. Those colleges 
are often accused of concentrating on hospital medicine, and 
with in Ch a 
t, on unusual cold i. L ion s. this üv e3 l1L V1 e tc pr er a re 
tne , TM ec t everyday wore; of the general ` l cal student f or 
practitioner. Indian medical colleges are said to cc pound these 
problems of 'irrelevance' by focussing on the hospital medicine 
of ^rita1n and merica, thus doubly distancing. themselves from 
the common problems of the mass of the Indian population. 
It cannot be laic that these issues havý 'sca -eG i 
attention of the higher medical policy-na. ýer s, .. or 
gnat of t'r. ` 
,'C1.1 a_ter e,:,, icaI CCuI. Icil of Ir i.. ovil e1r, aý 
concern with 1 , maintaining international 
s:. andards' has us aI ' 
cver:. w': _elrreu 'ensurin 
that doctors fit local con iii rs', as tý: e 
Central Health . sinister, Pajnumari 
Amrit 'r: aur, (escrioec the 
T foals in 1 54 G. O. I. ir. e rest iOfl %, as that 
these two coals were compatible: as sr e sai it 1956 
3 .1 
'We must take full note of these developments [ in the 
rest of the world] as well as our own special neecs anc 
then attempt to solve our problems in respect of medical 
education to suit the conditions prevailing in the 
country' (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 1957) 
The Medical Council of India has frecuently revised the 
medical curriculum to stress the significance of 'social and 
preventive medicine' (S. P. Ni. ), and to insist on periods of rural 
residence for 'interns' (who have completed their medical 
training but have to complete a year's e: _ erience for full 
registration) and, latterly, of medical students as well. 'otabl 
absent has been any sustained effort to ensure that these changes 
are implemented in the actual practice of medical colleges, or to 
monitor their impact. Similarly, there has been little attempt to 
change the views of medical educators, or in other ways to raise 
the status of staff in S. P. 'i. Departrm: ents or corking in rural 
posts. in this section I will begin with the attempt to change 
the orientation of medical college student.. by the sponsorship of 
social medicine, before going on to look at rural 'exposure' and 
then the attitudes of medical college staff to these innovations. 
SOCIAL A :D PREVENTIVE I1EDICI ýE 
One of t', h. e earl f est alte opts to cý: ünýe the 'socjai 
orientation of medicine' in India came through the establishment 
of departments of social and preventive -, e, -icine. F or exa:;, ple, in 
the Central Provincial `r ealtn Committee meeting of 1948 there 
a re-ort on a survey of medical education w ictý rev ealed that 
'the emphasis laid on the teaching of preventive 
i. edicine and public Health is quite i: iade wate' 
( C. C. 1. 
[C. P. H. C. ] 1949: 97). 
Similar sentirý eats were r epeated in t_ eetings of the 
Central Council of in Healthy the speeches of 
, Ili'' Central ealý_ , 
linisters or in tie resolutior. s adopted. T ,e icai Jc cation 
Conference held in D elhi in 1955 called for the siren tneninv of 
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departments of Preventive and Social i'edicine, as a way of 
raising the prestige of preventive medicine in th nealt'r 
services generally, and these recommendations were turned into 
regulations of the Medical Council of India in 1961 (Taylor et 
al., 1976: 7). 
There were two m ain fallacies in the discussions. The first 
was in the claim that the cause of the low status of preventive 
work can be traced to the colonial heritage; and the seconc was 
the idea that this status could be raised by changes of a minor 
kind within medical curriculum but without changes in career 
opportunities and rewards for medic al practitioners. 
Throughout the world, the prestige rankings of medical 
specialisms seem to show a common pattern. General surgery and 
other surgical specialties are almost always rear tie top, while 
public health, social and community medicine, or the preclinical 
specialisms are usually at the bottom (Taylor et al, 1970). 
Indian medical students surveyed in the 1970's consistently 
ranked Preventive and Social Medicine at the bottom of ar astige 
hierarchy, and showed little interest or knowledge in, i or 
example, Primary Health Care C. ichter, 19 1: 226; aý, lalir as arg i 
Shyam, 1980). 11adan (1980: 93) describes 
'the received image of preventive any: social i-i: ec'icire -az 
a "soft choice", something that only the second-rate 
medical students specialise i. -J' 
which was held by most of the doctors he interviewed at the All- 
Incia Institute of 1`edical Sciences. aver, i (10-": 2) Graues that 
this is not merely a matter of 'i,: a e': .: yen týýe new departments 
of social and preventive medicine were created alter In epe cence 
the teaching positions were taken by 'discards', trose who fell 
off the udder to senior positions in rcre prestigious 
specialities. One indicator o the low status of social an c 
preventive medicine is that in many medical colleges, posts are 
held by . lomen, who often find access to medical anu sun ical 
specialities more difficult fielt (_'har ýu, 1 63). 
2! 
Jý 
An exag gerated concern for curative specialties, in (D 0 
particular those with the masculine glamour of the 'activist' 
model of surgery (passive patients in a life-or-death situation, 
rescued by dramatic knife-work) is not restricted to India. 
However, it takes on an additional pathos in a context where 
'generalist' skills are repeatedly called-for, in policy state- 
ments by politicians and senior medical bureaucrats, as the most 
pressing needs. Most doctors at the All-India Institute took the 
view that national concerns might require social and community 
medicine, but not all doctors should follow that model and that 
they, in an elite institution, should be the first to be exempted 
(Madan, 1980: 94). 
RURAL ORIENTATION 
The 1 955 medical education conference also called for the 
establishment of rural field practice areas attached to medical 
colleges, in order that undergraduates and interns woulü be 
exposed to rural conditions and health problems. It took the 
Medical Council of India nine years to respond by making, three 
months of such experience mandatory for interns, and revisec 
recomriencatlons were drawn up in 1971 (Aggarwal et al., 1975: 277- 
8). In 1961 only half the medical colleges had active rural 
internship programmes, and of the sever. colleges in one 
(drawn from those with 'better' programs mes) only two had a full 
month programme (Taylor et al., 1970: 4, ). 'nen ti gars,, al et al. 
10,75: 2821-5) studied the situation in 1974 , b05 of the 47 , ecical 
col leg es who replied to their inquiry reported that rural in z, ern- 
ship lasted less than 2 months, with one-third reportin less 
than 1 month. Only three colleges ,,; ere able to claithat they 
were following the objectives of the rural internship programme 
as defined by the 1M edi cal Council of Ins ia. 
ollowing the Srivastava Committee report of 1X75, roýosalý 
were a Gin º ace to 'Re-Grien t ericai 
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1978 medical colleges were each given responsibility fcr the 
health care services provided by three P. H. C. s. icney was 
provided under this scheme to build hostels for medical students 
to use while receiving rural orientation as part cf their 
training. In most cases, responsibility for the P. H. C. and for 
rural training has been vested in the Departments of Social and 
Preventive ciedicine. There have not been any consistent attempts 
to evaluate the progress of this scheme. In Orissa, at least, it 
would seem that there may be some difference in the way trat the 
P. H. C. s are organised, since they have a resident Associate 
Professor from the Medical College, and occasional visits by the 
Professor of S. P. P . But in no case does the work of the P. Q. C. 
figure largely in the training of undergraduates or o in-erns, 
most of whom never spend a night in the ROME hostels. 
Two assumptions have underpinned these efforts. The first is 
that 'exposure' to rural conditions will leac to an awareness of 
rural problems and a desire to help solve them. The second has 
been that r etting more doctors to ;; pork in rural areas is th best 
way to solve rural health problems, and that persuasion is a 
desirable way to achieve this, at almost any cost. 
There have been some attempts to evaluate the ei fect of 
rural f expossure? on orientation to rural work. The ost : ustcinieo 
attempt, by Taylor and his colleagues (1 976), was based on their 
experience and: research linked to the i äran wG1 Project in 
Punjab, but drawing material also from ysore (ý2rn tar-a) and 
ether States. They argued that doctors were, if ar given a 
orientation toi arils rural work from their :; ecical 
collec7 e training. There was scr: -: e evidence to sud. 0est ; cat vies,: 
before rural 'exposure' were more favourably inclined towards 
rural wort: than afterwards, when t -e fill extent of 
isolation and 
working conditions were made manii est. In -. general, since the 
dominant ethos of the me ica1 college ., as cased rcunc i rya; 
hospital work it is unlikely that two or three ý.; onths s- ant in a 
P. H. C. will make ': räch dif I erence. 
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The assumption that 'the medical problems of rural areas can 
be solved by increasing the number of doctors prepared to wore: 
there' is one which predates 1947. The discussion is se by an 
almost unchallenged further assumption that it is not possible to 
direct doctors to rural areas. No such direction exists, nor has 
it been tried, for non-medical personnel, and it was only 
regarded as a serious possibility under the terms of the rational 
Service Act, passed in 1972. This Act provided that qualifie 
people under the age of 30 would be liable to be cal led for up to 
four years to serve wherever required by the State. However, the 
Act has not been implemented, in spite of occasional threats to 
use it as a means to deal with the problems of filling empty 
rural posts. As a result of the refusal to consider compulsion, 
the only options open to the State have been financial incentives 
(positive and negative), career incentives, and the attempt to 
change the 'orientation' of the doctor towards rural life. 
Positive financial incentives have been tried in a number of 
ways throughout the period, either to encourage private practice 
by paying a supplementary income or to encourage the acceptance 
of a rural posting by offering a rural allowance. ? acre 
sophisticated proposals have involved additional educatiorai 
allowances for a doctor's children. tone of them can be 
,: yr.: 0, It, ra It e. .. ýC 
to ; r, ý i"a'ec., 1 
teSý. i r:;, raC ... . 
Se rl'.. _aI_J f ä. =, ..: 
,. - 1Sý; l 
been. pointed out Many tines, doctors are arawn f rc^ t urýai 
fiedle ar: c upper classes, and expect to live in a sirs _l ar ay 
when they have qualified. This means not jusý a sufficient inc-. -., - 
but access tC social and physical 
ir. r-, trUCLure uch as 
electricity supply, Sanitation, schooling, an I- sc on. ' nevitaýl , 
the rural areas will have a lower standard of such provision t. -, ---n 
the towns. The problem. will not be solved, in the short-run, 
raising the quality of rural amenities, since so m, e of :. hes e are 
'positional goods', v, hich gain their value no from th r 
:1r. Cr: oc1i. intrinsic r erit but because they are in short `U 
is the prime example: it is not enough just to improve rurai 
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schools, because urban schooling improves faster, and it is the 
differential advantages of elite schooling which court for 
getting ahead, and this seems to weigh very heavily with young 
married doctors. Additional pay can provide access to urban 
schooling only if the children are sent to the towns for their 
education, and this does not create the kind of willingness to 
accept rural conditions which is supposed to result. 
Negative financial incentives have been restricted to the 
taking of 'bonds', in which medical students face the loss of 
quite substantial sums of money if they do not honour promises to 
work for the State Government in a rural posting for two or three 
years after graduating. These have rarely had any i. -.. pact. Often, 
more doctors graduate each year than there are jobs in State 
employment in rural areas. There are also a number of escape 
clauses which allow most new doctors to avoid any financial 
penalty for not taking up jobs (which often do not exist) or to 
take up the post 'formally' but actually to avoid working in the 
rural areas at all, or for more than a very brief period. 
Career incentives have also been tried, particularly bºY 
restricting access to post-graduate courses to those with rural 
experience, or preventing promotion for those without it. These 
constraints obviously only apply to those in Gov: rr ent service, 
and suggest something of the difficulties faced by aominiSLrators 
who attempt to control their medical personnel. 'here is no 
realistic assessment of the success of these barriers: many 
doctors cynically suggest that t' i with 'pull' can leap therm 
with ease, anc that only those without contacts s_ fY er their full 
force, cu , evidence of a more substantial 
kind is lacI-. i^: . 
The vast majority of Indian doctors, then, leave medical 
colleges with a preference for clinical (rat e r "' air, ub1ic 
health) worst i or abroad ( rather n urban settings t gun in rural , 
posts). Given te recorc of : octors el sew : ere in ti=ý crl U, i 
would be very surprising if matters were any dif ere-nt. 1^ýeec:, 
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the most surprising feature of the situation is that politicians 
and socia l scientists have contin ues : -pith sh e view that acme 
change in this orientation could be pro uced th rough exhortation 
or 'rural exposure'. In turning to l oop: at the c onditions of work 
in urban clinics and hospitals, I want to stress two more 
features of medical work: the nature of hospital power 
structures; and limitations to the autonomy of private clinical 
practice. 
HOSPITALS 
There have been very few sociological studies of the working 
of Indian hospitals. Two of these (Kirkpatrick, 1970; i-iinocha, 
1974) focus on the nature of discrepancies between staff and 
patients in patterns of expectations, deriving much of their 
theoretical focus from American sociological discussions of 
doctor-patient relationships and the nature of 'sic :' roles. In 
general, while doctors seem to want to approximate the kinns of 
social relationships with patients which characterise medical 
roles in Western Europe or North America, patients attem ;t to 
bring very different patterns of expectations to bear (see 
further below). The most pervasive of the patients' e:: pectations 
relate to the attempt to turn the relationship into a more 
personal one (cf. Gould, 1965). Co-operation, flattery, or 
providing a financial inducement are all used to improve the 
quality of treatment received f rom doctors (L: ir patric1"., 
1970: 161). The financial payments may be open, such as consulting 
the surgeon or oh; 'sician privately before attenc ink oý 
or by making it clear that successful treatment will ce : c: lle"ec 
by a substantial intim, or 'voluntary thur, 75). 
Cr she 
payments may be covert, in the form of various kinds of briJes tc 
ensure access to the 'hospital, particularly hýere pr vate 
practice of hospital doctors is illegal. 
Junior doctors seen to find terse social process s 
unpalatable, co plai ning about 'illi terate, stupic, i nora"t' 
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patients, and attempting to restrict their relationships to a 
formal, medical plane (',, 'inocha, 10,74: 192-4; athur, 1975: 100-9). 
More senior doctors, by repute, are more willing to become 
involved in these relationships, usually, it would seem, because 
they cream most of the financial or other benefits to themselves 
(I'lathur, 1975: 170-1; Venkataratr. am, 1979: 180). Junior hospital 
doctors thus find themselves subject to pressures both from-, 
patients and senior doctors which they are unable to affect. 
Their patients rightly assume that their treatment will be 
affected by the kind of relationship they have with the medical 
staff, but the junior doctors they usually see and can influence 
are not the ones who count. The senior medical staff obviously do 
adapt their working behaviour to financial and other pressures 
from patients, but expect their junior staff to obey unquestion- 
ingly while gaining very little from what are seen as 
'unprofessional' activities (Venkataratnam, 1979: 253). 
This situation can be described as one where 'professional' 
values are adhered to, at least formally, by doctors, but in 
practice the structural conditions necessary to implement them 
are absent (Jeffery, 1977). While doctors have many of the formal 
trappings of professional organisation (a ; edica1 Council, 
university-level entry, a privileged positions in State 
employment etc. ) the State does not, in fact, guarantee 
professional privile es. Further, i:: the private sector, 
competition from 'outsiders' (indigenous practitioners, or 
unqualified competitors from within the gestern roue) is fierce, 
leaving individual doctors subject to strong pressure to 
saf eL; uard t : ei_r incomes at the cost of their ethical coces. Taus 
doctors have no independent base from which alternatives to State 
employ. ,, ent m iaht em erve to enforce changes in public sec for 
employment conditions. There are, of course, private hospitals in 
the larger cities, and successful private clinics. gut these are 
the exception, rather than the rule, and show little tendency to 
become the dominant mmoce of private practice. 
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It is difficult, then, to find any mechanisms by which 
medical autonomy is maintained, beyond the very narrow field of 
actual diagnosis. Decisions on hospital admission or different 
kinds of out-patient treatment seem to be very vulnerable to the 
personal characteristics of the patients. 'Extra-medical' 
concerns enter into the heart of the medical encounter, in part 
because career advancement or security is not under the control 
of doctors alone. Doctors have failed to stake out and protect a 
'professional' sphere, and collegial control is insufficient to 
permit the development of collegial norms. The evidence for the 
extent of this is limited; but there are few who doubt the 
significance of wider political or financial interests in all the 
important occupational decisions. Within this 'taken-for-granted' 
understanding of the medical world it is difficult to show that a 
particular doctor was promoted because of the quality of his or 
her work, or where degree candidates were impartially examined. A 
widespread cynicism is one result, a cynicism which also affects 
those working in other Government positions, and it is those in 
Primary Health Centres that I will turn to now. 
PRIMARY HEALTH CENTRES 
The concept of the Primary Health Centre was first 
elaborated in the Report on health services in England produces 
by a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Davison of Penn in 
1920 (Dawson Report, 1920). It was not taken up in a suostantial 
way in Britain until the 1960's, but the idea had already spread 
to other parts of the world, being discussed at -a Far astern 
Conference on medical Relief in 1930, at which India was 
represented. The Bhore Committee endorsed the idea of a basic 
unit of health service provision wich T, oulc combine curative anü 
preventive services, but it was 10 years later, under the 
Community Development Programme, that of forts were 1 irst race to 
establish such centres for each Co, -,, munity Development Clod:, With 
its population oý' about 60,000 people. The Bhore pro csal hao 
called for a P. r. C. for 20,000 population by 19vß, Jug thaw 
ac date many Blocks (now with populations nearer 100,000) rot 
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been provided with the basic P. H. C. facilities. 
To begin with, the P. H. C. building was often -ere ya 
dispensary renamed, and most of the'activities were indeeoo 
curative in focus; but as time has gone by, more and more staff 
have been added, more P. H. C. s have purpose-built facilities 
according to a national or State-wide design, and the f ccls of 
their activities has shifted to include family planning as one of 
the central tasks. The standard P. H. C. should have 6 beds for in- 
patients: more recently a quarter of all P. H. C. s have been 
designated 'up-graded', eventually to have 30 beds and attaches 
specialist obstetricians and paediatricians. Originally each 
P. H. C. was to have 5 or 6 sub-centres attached, with a female 
health worker (A. N. i"!. or Trained Dai); current targets call for 
12 or 13 sub-centres (1 for 8,000 people), as a step towards 20 
or more (1 for 5,000 people, or 1 for 3,000 in tribal areas). The 
increasing proble :s of supervising such a large number of sub- 
centres has led to new proposals for the up-grading of some sub- 
centres, or the establishment of sub-P. '-. C. s. In this way it is 
hoped that, perhaps by the year 2000, the population served by a 
P. P. C. will come down to about 20,000. 
The most common criticisms of the P. . 
C. programme have 
s sifted sor: ewhat since the first P. H. C. s Jere established it 
1952. Four main sets of problems have been voiced in the Central 
Council of Health, or other national fora: 
1. in the actual working of the P. I1. C., clinical, curative 
concerns have predominated over the intended Sias to r 
preventive work; 
2. staff have been unwilling to work in P. H. C. s, leading tc 
understaffing and/cr poor motivation; 
3. tc. e balance O_ e: 1pencitüres has ceen eavly tc'; -rs 
sal tries and wages, leaving very little for dr- s, trans ort or 
1nýer nce; anc 
ynVC,.. 
-- 
1 4. here islittleornOeviden Ce 
Off ý'` o°ýV 




is reflected in a general under-utilisation cf 
In addition, a fifth issue has been identified but is less 
often voiced in authoritative settings: the undesirable 
consequences for health services of their integration with family 
planning or contraceptive provisions. 
Of these problems, the first two were identified as early as 
the 1959 Central Council of Health meeting, when two basic points 
were made: staff were unwilling to work at P. H. C. s; and there was 
a danger, as the Health Minister put it, that the P. H. C. s would 
"degenerate into glorified dispensaries" because they neglected 
preventive : corn (G. O. I. [C. C. S-?. ] 1960: 30,99-102). At the 1967 
Central Council of Health the major problem was expressed in 
almost identical terms: a shortage of staff, caused by a 
reluctance of doctors and nurses to serve in these posts because 
of an absence of housing for them, poor schooling for their 
children, the absence of incentives for rural work and low pay 
scales in State Government Health Services (G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 
1968: 22). The concern to improve conditions for P. H. C. staff has, 
indeed, dominated all official discussions of the problems of 
P. H. C. s. 
As staf f have been appointed and the rate of vacancies 
declined , however, other problems have been 
highlig hted in 
addition. In 1968- the Director-General of Fealth Services pointed 
again to the greater load of clinical work and the lack o 
attentio n to prevention (G. C. I. C. C. H. ] 1969: 27). In 1 96 the 
insuffic ient drugs and transport budgets were noted (G. 0.1. 
[C. C. H. ] 1970 :1 10). However, only more recently has one point, 
made in 1959 by the Director-General of Health Services (Bartrat 
? Yarain), been followed up: the argument that 
'the people's participation. is essential hich can only 
be secured by the new r;, ethodoloc, of approach, - cal i it 
extension technique, health education or social 
education' (0.0. I. [C. C. H. ] 1960: 101). 
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It has been pointed out that the existing facilities are largely 
underused and that a major reason for this is the predominant way 
doctors work: they wait for patients to come to them, rather than 
attempting to take their services to the people. 
In this section I will follow through these themes by 
looking at three 'levels' of P. H. C. work, dealing first with the 
Primary Health Centre itself (or the 'headquarters'), then with 
the work of field personnel - A. N. M. 's and male health workers, 
and finally with the newly-created categories of trained dais and 
Community Health Workers (or Volunteers, also known as Village 
Health Guides). Table 1 gives the basic information about the 
number of P. H. C. s and their sub-centres, as a way of setting the 
context for this discussion. 
TABLE 1 
ESTABLISHMENT OF PRI -! ARY HEALTH CENTRES 
1956 1961 196 6 1969 1974 1 97 8 
-; o. of blocks 1564 3137 4724 5265 512 3 5005 
: 0. :h PH CS 67 2565 4631 4909 5283 5400 
108 (per cent) 4 82 98, ý-, 93 ' 103 % 
, o. of sub-centres 1649 22826 33509 38115 
Drs. in post 5294 
Sources: G. O. I., 19791: 19,05; G. O. I. [C. C. H. ] 1;, 70: 51 
Note: data as at 31st i'larch in each year. Comparable data are ct 
available for each year. 
At headquarters 
The staffing at a P. H. C. has always focussed around a 
doctor. To begin : with, one doctor : aas to be attached, but by 1956 
planned staffing levels were increased, so that each P. Q. C. was 
to be staffed by two doctors, one a generalist and one 
specialising in family planning. In I '-, 17E it , as decided t at eac ý 
P. H. C. should have a third medical officer, specifically o Teal 
With the training of community health ýr+orkef s, and pref rabl7 a 
t 
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graduate in one of the indigenous systems of medicine. However, 
these posts have taken a long time to be filled. As late as 1972, 
only about half the P. H. C. s had their full complement of doctors. 
On March 31st 1978, it would seem that 61 P. H. C. s had no doctor 
at all, 771 had only one doctor, and the remaining, 4568 had two 
or more. There were 115 P. H. C. s still to be established, though 
some Blocks had more than one P. H. C. (G. O. I. 1979: 66-7). 
The P. H. C. s which are less fully staffed are, not 
surprisingly, the more remote and less well equipped ones. In a 
study which involved interviewing 39 P. H. C. medical officers in 
the early 1960s, in addition to inadequate salaries, poor living 
facilities, inadequate P. H. C. s and social isolation were reported 
as the most important obstacles to the recruitment of doctors for 
rural work (Takulia et al. 1 967: 49). In a study in central U. P. 
in 1971-2, P. H. C. s were classified into three categories, 
according to location (closeness to urban centres), facilities 
(electricity, water supply) and local amenities (schools, markets 
etc. )C''isra et al. 1981). The 19 most accessible P. H. C. s in their 
survey had 54 supervisory staff in post, whereas the 8 most 
remote ones had only 10 supervisors. T'nere is, however, a 
distinction between 'in post' and 'present and working'. As Misra 
' 
et al. point out, those posted to remote P. H. C. s , may devote all 
their energies to achieving a transfer to a more desirable 
P. . C., which means that they may visit the 
district or State 
headquarters for long periods to lobby or by other means persuade 
senior staff to change their posting. The manipulation of leave 
facilities, or the deputation of staff" to other positions, are 
both means by which posts may be 'filled up' tut staff may be 
almost permanently absent. A possibly extreme example, during the 
post-Emergency collapse of the family planning programme, is 
provided by a study in a P. E C. in U. P. in 1977-78, when five 
members of staff spent 75, S of their time absent or on personal 
business (Sutherland, 1978: 42). 1 
When staff are available, two things seem to be clear about 
-5 
the work they do. Firstly, despite the emphasis given to public 
health, preventive and promotive functions in job descriptions, 
most time is spent on curative work. One study carried out in 
1968 in Punjab and ; lysore (Alexander et al. 1972: 1852) weighted 
staff-time by salaries and estimated that about 60% of staff-time 
at the P. H. C. headquarters went on 'illness' services, 25', ) on 
family planning and 12% on the control of communicable diseases. 
The rest of the time was spent on maternal and child health, with 
no time spent on environmental health. In Takulia's study, P. H. C. 
doctors estimated a median of about 27 of their tine spent on 
preventive activities, with half the doctors saying lack of 
interest was the main reason for spending little time on this 
work (1967: 37-39). 
Even within this clinical focus, the quality of care seers 
to be poor. 'Quality' is of course difficult to assess, and 
relatively few studies have produced more than anecdotal 
evidence. Most patients spend a very short time with the doctor; 
two studies at the end of the 10,60s estimated the median time 
spent with the doctor at týao r: inutes or less (Hurt by and Parker, 
1973; Seth, 1973). There is no reason to think that average ti es 
have risen since then. Sutherland (1 978: 37) reported that in a 
P. H. C. in Varanasi District (U. P. ) in ante-natal consultations, 
woman were never weighed nor were haemoglobin levels determined; 
instruments were not sterilised and blood pressure was not always 
recorded. A number of other small-scale studies in the same 
P. H. C. demonstrated inappropriate prescribing, little or no 
advice given by the doctor, and a minireal level of care (ibid: 
47). 
One reason for 'poor quality' is probably the skor gage of 
funds available with the P. H. C. staff for services to patients. 
Studies of the patterns of P. H. C. expenditure are rare. One, by 
Alexander et ai. (1972: 18-52) estimated that 1O of total an ual 
expencitures went on drugs for the heaüquarters and ý: le sub- 
centres, 714Y going on salaries and allowances for 3 ta I. ätpatiy' 
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(1978) estimated that of the total Chiraiöaon P. H. C. budget cf 
Rs332,000 in 1977,85) went on salaries, leaving 9.4`-) for drugs, 
1.15 for transport charges, and 41 on all other items. There is 
an interesting comparison with the pattern of expenditures on 
medical care for the population insured under the Employees 
Social Insurance Scheme; Singh (1984: 28) reports that some 0;. ý of 
this expenditure goes on 'medicines', wich are the fastest- 
growing category of expenditure between 1975/6 and 1979/80. 
The drugs budget for the population served by P. H. C. s has 
grown very slowly, having been fixed at Rs20,000 per P. H. C. in 
1965 (Reddi, 1983: 273), irrespective of its population or out- 
patient coverage. since 1980 the budget has increased, more 
rapidly, largely because of the sums allocated to an increasing 
number of sub-centres and to C. H. -1. s. Thus, in 1903, a common 
annual drugs budget for a P. H. C. was Rs12,000, with a further 
Rs3,000 for each sub-centre and Rs600 for each C. H. 'v;. In a 
'standard' P. H. C. there would thus be a total drugs bill of 
Rs30,000 for 10 sub-centres, Rs60,000 for 100 C. H. W, J. s, as well as 
the Rs12,000 at headquarters, giving a total of Rs102,000, or 
about Rsl per head of population nominally served per year. [Lach 
person insured under the E. S. I. scheme receives, on average, 
medicines worth about Rs13 per year (Singh, 19eß: 28). ] David 
arayana (1983: 48-60) report that in Crissa, delays in the 
release of funds, in the acceptance of tenders, and in the 
placing of orders, combined with an excessively long list cl 
permitted drugs anc poor ordering and stocking arrangements, 
meant that few P. H. C. s hac a drug supply which Matched the 
demands on it. Reddi (19--6 : 275-6), using -. aterial from : ýarna tatca 
and Andhra Pradesh, gives a similar picture. Reports of P. ': i. C. s 
suggest that most prescriptions require the patient to purchase 
the drug from the market, because only a very small range of 
basic drugs is provided fror P. H. C. stores. The only exception to 
this general pattern - and a very significant one - is t at 
the 
aruc s required for tubectom ies or vasectomies are provides from a 
special allocation and patients do not normally have to buy -rufs 
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themselves. 
The second feature of P. H. C. work is that, because of its 
clinical focus, it reaches a relatively small proportion of its 
nomir'al c? ientele. As in other parts of the world, patients do 
not travel far to consult a doctor except in emergencies, or in 
chronic cases when patients may make very long trips 
(Ramachandran and Shastri 1 983: 1 85). fast of the patients 
attending a P. N. C. come from within 2 or 3 miles [8O`ß or more in 
three studies cited by Takulia from the mid-1 960's (19607: 28)]. In 
a 'teachings block associated with Banaras Hindu University 
(Chiraigaon) in the mid-1970s Marwah et al. (1 978) estimated 
that no more than 7.3% of pregnancies mere than 2 miles from the 
health centre were registered for ante-natal care, compared with 
about 25, ") below that distance. Staff find it difficult to travel 
far from the P. H. C. 'headquarters' to hold clinics in sub-centres 
or in more remote parts of the Block because they have inadequate 
vehicles and fuel allowances. Often doctors tour their Blocks, if 
at all, on their own cycles or motor-cycles. Once again, the main 
exception is that a special allocation for transport is made from 
incentive money for family planning sterilisations. A P. H. C. with 
a large number of sterilisations to its credit receives an 
additional allocation for transport costs. 
Even within the population which does use the P. H. C., 
according to aner ji (1 973: 2263) the 'poor and - ýe oppressed' are 
discriminated against. He suggests that these groups use the 
P. H. C. less than wealthier groups. Other sources sug est a 
different picture, in which use-rates may not vary very much by 
socio-econo ic back round (e. g. Seal an ose, 197B: 64; 
Ramachandran and Shastri, 1933: 101-3). However, teere is little 
evidence about the kind of treatment received at the P. r. C. - tree 
extent to which wealthier clients are able to ' jump' queues, 
receive loner attention from, the doctor, or gain ýrivileýec 
access to the scarce drugs held in the P. H. C. 
57 3 
Field staff 
As I discussed in Chapter 9, the male and female field staff 
have rather different histories, because the women were 
originally family planning personnel while the men were employed 
in the various 'vertical' campaigns (including family planning) 
before the 'multi-purpose' reforms of the late 1970s. I shall 
therefore deal with these two groups separately. 
1-Male Staff 
Prior to the introduction of the Multipurpose Worker scheme 
male health workers were organised in a bewildering range of 
positions. The various National Programmes (Malaria, Smallpox, 
Leprosy, T. B., Family Planning) all had separate hierarchies. In 
addition, there were school health workers, Sanitary Inspectors 
and subordinate public health staff. Each P. H. C. had a different 
group of field staff, depending on local conditions, historical 
accident, or State policy and provision, and these staff would be 
paid from different budget heads and on different pay scales. As 
a result of this complexity, the rationalisation into a multi- 
purpose system has not progressed smoothly, and in most States 
substantial incor:; e differences remain, and workers still tend to 
identify themselves with the single-purpose programme where they 
began (Narayana and Acharya, 1980: 90). 
The male health staff have not been the subject of much 
study, except for those in the Family Planning cadres (e. g. 
Elder, 1974; Misra et al., 1981). These accounts accord : riti'i that 
of 1; arayana and Acharya 
(1980: 102-3) in suggesting ii the 
commitment to health and family planning work ", r L-, but rather 
an economic orientation to work. In addition, these male para- 
medical workers are subject to conflicting lines of auf . oritý; , 
with many of them naming four or Hore direct supervisors. .- ow- 
t own ; ith 75% sayi'1g the ever, they work very rý; uch on th ei ,J, -hey 
meet a supervisor once a week or less of ten (ibid.: 1 1 4-5). In 
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this context, 'supervision' tends to focus on an assessment of 
the written records kept by the worker. All his supervisors will 
request repcrts on their particular area of concern, and recoro- 
keeping has come to be a major use of time by these workers. Thus 
Alexander et al. (1972: 1853) estimated that over 401) of 
expenditures could be regarded as 'administrative' (record- 
keeping, travel, liaison with other agencies etc. ) and a further 
17-20 'non-productive' or 'personal'; unfortunately they do not 
classify this information by staff category or distinguish 'head- 
quarters' from 'field' operations. 
A major issue in supervision is that of transfers and 
promotions. This is a well-established feature of the Indian 
bureaucracy at all levels, with frequent transfers explained as 
the only way to prevent a number of corrupt practices. But for 
these workers, a knowledge of the villages where they work may be 
crucial, so the system of transfers every three or four years 
militates against this. On the other hand, those able to stay for 
long periods usually do so with the help of local political 
influence, which may be unrelated to job performance. 
The introduction of multi-purpose working was partly 
justified as a way of reducing the time spent travelling between 
villages, and so that any one visit could be used for several 
purposes. Most workers seem to welcome the chance to reduce the 
population they were expected to serve. However, while the family 
planning workers welcomed the chance tc add health duties to 
their work, the other workers were less happy about their 
increased family planning responsibilities (ibid.: 132). ; or<ers 
who 'motivate' a 'case' for sterilisation are expected to spend 
a lot of tigre with that person, going with them to the operating 
site, to look after their needs and to make sure that the o 
through with the operation, and that the worker gets the cr-tit 
for the 'motivation'. Since 1977 most sterilisations have been cl 
women, and these are more often provided by female %, orkers, so it 
is not clear how significant this has been in the ever cay 
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working patterns of most male workers since then. 
hale workers have a number of problems in their work, most 
notably with access to houses. In general, there has been 
resistance to aspects of public health work such as the 
collection of blood slides for malaria surveillance, or attempts 
to ensure complete coverage of immunizations. On occasion 
minority groups have resisted the entry of workers from other 
sections of the population: Muslims, under-represented in the 
health work-force, are most likely to restrict access. Some 
workers also face difficulties because they come from 
'untouchable' origins (ibid.: 126-7). But more general criticisms 
have focussed on the capacity of the workers to maintain their 
level of working at a sufficient level to produce results; 
Harrison's account of the problems of maintaining motivation and 
performance in malaria control has already been cited (10,78). In 
general, these are the key workers in most preventive campaigns, 
and their achievements do not generate much confidence that these 
campaigns will now begin to overcome the limitations which have 
reduced their effectiveness so far. 
2. Female Staff 
The position with respect to female health staff is rruc'n 
simpler than for the men. Essentially there are two cadres of 
female staff - Auxiliary Nurse- ? "i-(rives a nd Lady Health Visitors 
- who were originally employed as either family planning or 
maternal and child health staff. Since reorganisation into a 
ý, 
e ý. lu-., multi-purpose sch..: ýe rg'e, 
they have ey x.:. 11 teen r'e gssif i. -d' as galt 
: porkers (previously A. >>:. ii. s) and, Assistants (previously L. . I. s) . 
One early study of the work of A. ,... s stressed several main 
points ýýhich have been frequently repeated . eis 
{1 ýý : 1 , 55) 
argued that the range of duties expected s too vastý at it 
was impossible for the worker ro cover the geo rapý_ 
ical area 
assigned to her and that the time spent in travelling gas 
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disproportionate (about 25), 3); that the time spent on record- 
keeping (about 20'o) seriously interfered with the time available 
for work; and that family planning work was the most difficult 
aspect of their jobs. The estimates of Alexander et al. (1972) 
cited above are in line with these figures. 
An additional problem for these female workers is their 
vulnerability in rural settings. They complain most bitterly 
about housing provisions - not just their availability but their 
security - and the dangers of travelling unchaperoned from 
village to village 1980). In many places they have the 
reputation of being 'loose women', and repute also suggests that 
they come under heavy sexual harrassment, from their superiors or 
from locals, if they are not protected by the presence of some 
male kinsmen or a husband. 
Finally, these are the workers most seriously affected by 
the family planning campaigns. 'Motivation' of family planning 
'cases' has always been a substantial element in their training 
and work, with varying importance at different times. It is 
overwhelmingly dominant during family planning 'drives' - arcunc 
the time of 'camps' (when special operating f acili ties are 
established), durinn, 1976-77, or during the annual one- or t o- 
month periods of special family planning periods. Despite recent 
attempts to wider. e job description to spend more time or 
ma the  terray and child health, it remains true that n° on y 
criterion by which staff serf ormance is seriously measured is 
their ability to provide sterilisation 'cases', any: this is 
re flecedinto hn eemountof ti "", e and _= f or t they' s pC nclrfmy ý äýý., .: ,ý 
planning work (I. I. t"':. 1980: 97-103). Under the Congress Govern ent 
of 1980 onwards, a number of health elements appearee in t he ; e: a 
20-Point Programme'. In the case of family planning, this meant 
that 'sterilisation achievements' z or each unit had to e 
collected and checked and passed up the bureaucratic system so 
that one month's figures could be on the Prime ` inister's üesY. b 
the 1 5th of the ä olles,, ný month. o other national ,°1t 
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programme has the same kind of central surveillance. Village 
women are well aware of the significance of sterilisations to 
health workers, and as a result are cautious of becoming indebted 
to these staff and thus vulnerable to moral pressure to be 
sterilised (Jeffery et al. 1985). 
Village-level personnel 
Health departments had no 'village-level' personnel before 
1977. Prior to this, under the Community Development Programme, 
Village Level Workers were supposed to be concerned with some 
health matters, though it seems that they concentrated on 
agricultural development. But they were not really 'village- 
based' in the way that term has come to be used. 'Village-level' 
now usually means that the person is a long-tern; resident in the 
area; has no more than part-time employment; is subject to some 
form of control by village institutions; is trained outside the 
framework of formal training institutions; and is without a 
marketable qualification. By contrast, the V. L. W. (and other 
health staff) are usually prevented from servin in their own 
village and are subject to regular transfers to prevent local 
identification and interests developing. The two categories of 
'vi? lage-level' health personnel (in the recent usage) who were 
the focus of the 1977 policy were called community health workers 
and dais, anc were organised in different ways and gor different 
purposes, so I will deal with them separately. 
i. Comcunity Health porkers 
Unli ce all other health personnel, the C. ýj. '. '. ; gas to be 
nominated by the village and the P. H. C. iNNedical Officer would 
merely select trainees from amongst those nom ina ed. The 
successful candidates would t en undergo a three-month training 
course, held at the P. r. C., ,,., Then the trainees would receive a 
stipend of Rs200 per r on th. On successful completion of t1c, e 
course they would return to their own village. Ther they woul: 
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merely be paid Rs50 per month as a retainer or honorarium, and 
would be provided with drugs and dressin s to the value of ßs50 
per month. They would be expected to spend two to three hours per 
day in health-related activities, but would not be under the 
formal bureaucratic control of the District i° edical Officer. 
Dismissal could only follow a formal request from the village, 
and this was discouraged by making the village institutions 
liable to pay the training stipend if they wanted a replacement. 
In general, the tasks to be carried out, and for which training 
was given, would be first aid, preventive medicine, anti communiý, y 
hygiene (N. I. H. F. W., 1 978: 1 -3). 
The scheme was introduced in 741 .L . C. s in 1977. Almost all 
Elocks were to have been included in the programme by the end of 
the Sixth Plan in March 1985. The programme has changed thrc' h 
time: sometimes in response to findings based on research carried 
out on the first Blocks covered, while other changes were 
introduced when Congress returned to power in Delhi and in most 
of the States in 1980. But the basic principles remain unchanged. 
The programme has been politically very sensitive, with doctors 
or anised to oppose it on the grounds that it ir4cre sec 
'quac eery' and exoosed villagers tc second-class services. 
pýT'h, aps or Lh isreason, there have been several social science 
research studies, so ,. je know a fair amount of basic information 
about who the C. r. V. s are, how they were selected, anc scm ethin. 7 
about Perceptions by health staff and others of their worn. '. e 
are less well served with accounts of '.. hat the C. . V. s sally 
do, nor what ma,; v be the major factors which affect this. 
C. H. ost V. s ar e rel ý ivy 1y ouný 
(t e modal aoe- . rou is 
20-29 in most studies, in line :,; itr the official guidelines) and 
with education to secondary school, With very few illiterates r 
only 30 or so with only primary schooli ;. 1. i.. ng ..,. 
appenc In the northern : testes of L: t ýý, U. . 2C. C' 
Punjab, a sizeable minority (17-25; x) of the first two datcý. ea :ýc 
Some college 11 ' os C education (ibid. ). are .` .` .s alp, ýes= -n i .` 
363 
the evidence from voluntary projects that women are better suited 
to the work, particularly in services for the priority categories 
of mothers and children (Hardiman, 1984). The percentage of women 
in the first two batches was 6%, with a regional variation from a 
high of 265 in West Bengal and surrounding Eastern States and no 
women at all in Rajasthan, one each in Haryana and Madhya 
Pradesh, and 4 (0.7%) in Uttar Pradesh (N. I. H. F. I, %T 1978: Appendix 
V[b]). Recruitment guidelines for later batches stressed more 
strongly the desirability of choosing more women. 
The method of selection actually followed was radically 
differen- from the model outlined by the official documents, and 
demonstrates very clearly the nature of village level 
institutions and the political process in rural India. In 
principle, the village councillors (the Panchayat) were to 
nominate several candidates from each villa e, and the medical 
officers er, e to assess their suitability in choosing amongst 
them. In practice, matters were very different. In general 
Panchayats seer, ed to prefer to nominate only one candidate - the 
;. _.:... a. o ýh 2C H' fror, Trr study eu 
(i did. 41) noted that 47 fe 99 
the first two batches they studied said that there were no 
competitors for the post, and. N'arayan and Acharya (1 980: 176) 
found 62; of the 127 C. H. J. s in their study had had no 
competitors. It might be thought that the coctors would prefer to 
select the more appropriate candidate from a range of optier. , 
but it seems that the reverse is the case. r: ost doctors by ncw: w 
prefer a ? least-risks' option, insisting that the Panchayat comes 
up with only one name, on the grounds that the political prcble: s 
of k posed for the doctor by unsuccessful applicants ; aye the tas 
selection one the doctor would prefer to avoid. i 
politicisation of selection probably went farthest in : le t 
Bengal, where the Communist Party 'Government ensured that mo o 
candidates came from their own mass peasant crganisation 
(Jooert, 1985: 15). Far frog, the procedure . ýeing open, anu 
involving villagers in discussion about the natur o ý: e 
programme and the benef its of reliable candi sates, in most place: 
.; 
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it became merely a question of one more, minor, political favour 
to be distributed, 
ii. Dais 
By contrast with the interest shown in the Community Health 
Workers, there have been very few studies of the new schemes for 
training traditional birth attendants and integrating their work: 
into that of the maternal and child health services. Narayana and 
Acharya (1980: 134-64) report that the training was generally 
carried out in inaccessible language, and little more than a 
stress on cleanliness and hygiene was actually unc: erstood by the 
dais they interviewed. There was little evidence of any change in 
the everyday practices of the dais, and after the training was 
completed there has been little further support from the P. H. C. 
staff . 
P. H. C. staff (especially the A. N. M. s) tend to use the 
trained dai as an intermediary with th e village, to allow them to 
find ante-natal or potential family planning 'cases', but very 
few dais receive the kits or incentive payments to which they are 
entitled (Jeffery et al. 1 985 ; Gandhi and Sapru, 1980) . 
HEALTH SERVICES : THE LAY PERSPECTIVE 
How do different patients, or potential clients, understand 
the range of medical options open to them? Posing the question in 
this way helps to avoid sorge of the difficulties thrcwn up by 
asking about choices between medical systems, wich is how his 
kind of cuesti on is sometimes framed. There has been a rather question 
unproductive debate along these lines. Banerji (19 1), and 
Djurfeldt and Lindberg (1 975) , have argued that where 
ww estern 
medicine is available, cheap, and of good qualitýý, it will be 
invariably pre-If" erred, despite its inability to deal effectively 
with the major diseases of poverty. The continuance of indigenous 
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medicine, in this perspective, is a result of the inadequacies of 
Western medicine. By contrast, Nichter (1 931) and Van der Veen 
(1981) have pointed to the continuities between the categories of 
indigenous medicine and those of everyday thought - with prime 
examples being the use of humoral concepts ('hot', 'cold', 
'windy' etc. ) in everyday discussions of the ch. aracteristics of 
climate, food, personality or body type. In addition, they point 
to the social context of indigenous therapy, which is usually 
more sensitive to local social norms than are Western-style 
clinics and hospitals. Thus Gould (1 957) and Marriott (1956) note 
how important for most patients is a personal relationship with 
the healer - unlikely (and disliked by staff) in large urban 
institutions. Carstairs (1956), Khare (1963) and Marriott (1956) 
also point to contrasts in healing style, with indigenous healers 
more confident in prognosis, less dependent on detailed 
questioning for diagnosis, and more likely to refer to their 
personal qualities as a sign of the likely success of their 
treatment. Patterns of expectations derived from these models 
tend to be used as yardsticks to understand and evaluate . -estern 
medical practice, which tends to be very different. 
Whatever else the discussion of this question in the past 
fifteen years has sh oi: n, it is that nobody (neither in ncia, nor 
elsewhere) 'chooses' a system of medicine, not for one episode of 
illness, nor for all lorms of illness, nor for one kind of 
patient or another. The question is sometimes f raved in that ; gay 
in order to demonstrate the superior attractiveness to the Indian 
populace of one system or another, or to argue that those f ho 
'choose' one system are more rational, educated or whatever dran 
those who choose another. gut rese rch results Using is 
approach have not roüuced clear-cut dis, lnc: ions. Thus . acan's 
11 that t: ýere .ý ere no si-ni icar. t early study in Ghaziabad conclude 
differences between those expressing a 'preference' 
for `. estern 
over indi enous medicine, with respect to urban or rural origin, 
aye, income, or education ( 10,69: 1483-4). He also notes that fcr 
Some people, the most significant factor seems to be the fr e 
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availability of Western medical services for those with some form 
of occupational health insurance. 
Leslie ( 1983) suggests that the layperson's search for 
therapy in India can be characterised as a pluralistic one, in 
which people guide their behaviour using sets of ideas which may 
appear logically incompatible (such as those of 'humoral balance' 
as well as a 'germ theory' of disease). Using this knowledge, 
which they often accept is incomplete, people have to act, and 
they do so in a pragmatic way. Specifically, they tend to assume 
that most events have more than one cause, and that different 
types of treatments may be appropriate to these different causes. 
The decision about who to consult, or what treatments to use, 
will be guided by the past history of p_tients, their 
relationships with different available healers, costs and other 
benefits involved in consultations, as well as by a theory about 
what 'causes' illnesses of this kind, and what 'treatments' are 
therefore most suited to treat them. 
Thus very few people in India make an ideological commitment 
to a system of medicine. They . gay, as Djurfeidt and Lindberg 
(1975) suggest, make commitments to individual healers, who are 
seen as especially useful for particular patients. But these 
commitments are unlikely to depend on that healer's choice of 
therapies, nor will they necessarily be passed onto whoever 
replaces that healer. i any healers do not make rigid distinctions 
between therapies, making use of medicines from more than one 
system in conjunction, and most patients do the same. urther- 
more, it is difficult tc trace out consistent patterns cf 
'hierarc hies of resort', or tendencies to consult certain kinds 
of healers first and then others, for some illnesses or some 
patients. Gould (1957) described a pattern of consulting 
indigenous medicine for 'chronic, non- incapaci tatirr 
dysfunctions' and '., 'estern ,,, edicine for 'acute, incapacitating' 
ones. But he himself later argued that this cg as too simple a 
V rea 
t model (Gould, 1 965) and others have si ilarly fou dr 
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difficulty in linking diseases (as defined by Western medicine) 
to healing choices. This is not surprising, since diseases are 
mediated by social processes and perceived in social terms as 
illnesses, with social meanings already embedded in them. ;: hat is 
slightly more surprising is the evidence of a lack of fit between 
diagnosis and treatment: that illnesses may be seen as 'caused' 
by supernatural means but taken to 'somatic' healers, or vice 
versa (Kakar et al., 1972). 
In general, then, someone consultating a practitioner toes 
not necessarily accept the philosophical bases of the t erapy he 
or she receives. This is true even for the most complete 
submissions to the moral authority of the healer, in hospital 
wards. Thus ? -iinocha (1974: 166-98) discusses the mismatch between 
patients and staff understandings of Western medicine. Patients 
often mistook diagnostic and curative procedures, queried the 
role of blood samples and the use of injections, and restricted 
the information they passed onto the doctor, especially about 
alternative remedies they had used or continued to take while in 
the hospital. Kirkpatrick (1976) describes patients who remain 
oriented to familial expectations rather than those of the 
hospital staff-, and who explain their illness in terms of a 
diffuse variety of causes (bases on karma) despite tin eir 
willingness to undergo surgery. 
Western medical facilities often ignore cultural ýu idel_ nes 
in the way they treat patients, and this may mean ý. ̂  , , 'he 
'healing process' is weakened, and patients fail to comply with 
'doctor's orders'. Conversely, indigenous healers are uc -, ore 
closely in tune with cultural guidelines, and are bets-er abi e to 
bring social and psychological forces into play to assist with 
healing - thou---h there is no evidence that they are any better at 
betting patient cor pliance. But all systems of me-cic-al bei is anc 
practice tend to be seen as 'ei ? icacious' - to produce expected 
results - and the conditions it which they are usC : ma ze it 
ail ost impossible to allocate success or ure cec_si to alp 
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the patterns of treatment chosen. In this sense, India is little 
different from anywhere else. Nonetheless, it wens li . elv tý: a 
the balance of choices of healers and treatments will continue tc 
shift towards the 1iesterrn-31, le. ý;, `esternmedicine , gor., .Ir., e money, 
and symbolic and practical official support, and ideological 
barriers to its use are weak. But this will not mean an end to 
medical pluralism, which in India (as elsewhere) seems to be well 
established (Leslie, 1983). 
C0 CLUSI0 N 
Since 1947, medical institutions have come under 
considerable pressure to orient towards the major health problems 
of týe mass of the population in rural areas. In some measure 
they have responded to this pressure, notably in the 
establishment of single-disease control prc--ra res, and in their 
management through a structure of P. H. C. s. However, they have 
failed to develop an ability to respond creatively to disease 
problems. Field staff have followed bureaucratic guidelines to do 
their ; pork, but initiative has remained resolutely in the -ands 
of the people at the topp. In the case of malaria control, it 
earl that when the focus r, over on, staff re a `d ac Malaria 
returned; in the case cff' smallpox,. it meant t at only when. 
external agencies took a direct interest did the prograrnnme me, -: 
T, its targets. host junior staff follow a 'least - ris< 'strate 
filling their forms and keeping their noses clean, wh le 
collecting enough r one y and political credit to protect 
themselves a: ainst unwantea transfers. 
one of the possible models for er, surin co potent an 
otivated health activities are applicable in ndia. Tiere is ro 
Political party structure ýwhich ill provide local rýatch on 
state off icials to ensure that they carry out it 
satisfactory manner. There is no 'prof essicn al' structure, usi ng 




`. f i1 com l `1. nI y or st 111 .v/ 
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attempt to employ a 'coercive' model, using supervision as a way 
of finding fault. It seems unlikely that this would be well 
suited to health work, but it is not consistently employed. 
Supervisors find their ability to implement this model 
constrained by the ability of junior staff to call upon political 
or financial resources to produce favourable support from higher 
in the system. The legitimacy of the senior staff is further 
undermined by the cynicism with which their motives and decisions 
are usually viewed. How far these conditions are likely to be 
changed by the 'new' models which underly current proposals, 
derived in part from experience in the voluntary sector, forms 
the subject of the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUS IOS; : '' ET: DIRECTIONS IN HEALTH POLICY? 
The picture I have painted so far is one of a Goverrr-,, ent 
aware of some of the key elements in appropriate health services 
for India, given its poverty and disease pattern., but making only 
stumbling attempts to move in the right directions. In this 
chapter I will look at some of the evidence of new appracches to 
the health problems of India, and briefly contrast the situation 
in India with that of its near neighbour, P2kistan. I will 
conclude by assessing this case study in the light of the 
theories of the State outlined in the Introd ction. 
There are two kinds of 'new approaches' to health service 
delivery in India: innovatory schemes mostly outside the nor-mal 
Government provisions; and the impact of 'nes' thinking in 
Government, prompted :a rtl by these 'voluntary sector' sch erm es 
but also by international agency support. I have alr - a"ýdyi 
describes the most eye-catch ing eler, e- is in the Government 
schemes - the introduction of Community Health Workers, the 
attempts to revitalise dal training sche:,, es, Inc the shift iron. 
uni-purpose to multi-purpose health campaigns. sere i shall focus 
il l or the small-scale voluntary sector pro,; ects. Then: Iw 
describe the new patterns in health aid and the contrast bet, 1een 
the Government programmes they support and the voluntary projects 
which nominally draw on the same understanding of the 
possibilities of 'health services. 
There is obviously a ater? ecý i. tr: _ in . abou` 
1 ýf 
sector organisa : ion, and the role of i. Ler national aid, srcurcý 
970. lie old ort ocoxy saw the role o aid to as ti 
'"odernisation' and tie trans er of i nstitutions an`: , 
tecnnolocies. 'Fest pracoices' `rte r arg .' _ rivr. ý.. ü 
S wo I` erý. ý1 to the Geneii:, s uld , rick) 'Jo-, r, t 
es Of :c3ý' . tý. r ý.. ýi o; 
1: T us the -focus 1a_ on i etropcl it_ 
y+ o. = i` 'v aI L. , 1... l. l, or e: _ 
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the belief that patients from a wide surrounding regions ; could be 
referred there for specialised treaty: ent. y1 975, a new 
orthodoxy was established: recognising the need to relate 
technology to economy and culture, it accepted that the existing 
pattern tended to restrict benefits to urban, relatively affluent 
groups, and it called for a new focus on primary care, on para- 
medical workers, on simplifying techniques for use in under- 
developed countries, and on spreading facilities to the mass of 
the population. There were calls to link population programmes 
more closely to maternal and child health programmes, to involve 
communities more closely in the planning and control of health: 
services, and to recognise the value of indigenous practitioners. 
This was accompanied by moves to liberalise aid terms, increasing 
the grant element and reducing, the tying of aid to foreign 
exchange provision (ýýorld Bank, 1975; O. D. iM!., 1975). .. one of this 
was very radical. In spite of an acceptance that the sources of 
ill-health could be fount' in social, political and economic 
arrangements as much as in environmental ones, the new arrange- 
ments nevertheless focussed on changing only the medical in: fra- 
structure. It is thus at least plausible that their impact on 
-ay be marginal; but, their impact on health sector aic 
policies has been more substantial. 
Th e Janata Goverr,,, ent in 1X77 clai e crecit for 
implementing a number of 'new' proposals which derived from plan: 
made under the Congress Government. These policies have been 
c nt by '- Congress oC men' ut ess oninued the e new ev ern 1ý, 
enthusia-::. 'ýcrei-n assistance has supported phis shi t. it is 
arguable that . _ey i eatures of these 'r. ýý". ' approac : es are their 
erC: ' -h Ti°OCle'ý par icir t_on 'intr ,i-,: 
1, L co ric 
C i_ýý of auxiliare health workers. AS I suo estee in ,-p er 10, 
' ecple'S p _rticipation' has een cot_ntia 
l an the aVen.. _. 
discussions of primary health centre: silýce 1 9cC, bu iýsoi 
Acor^ central (=ne ore soph _-t cater: ) si':: ce 1ý7r. lh iy is 
reflected in titles like 'Health By the Peop1 ' ('=. el' 7'5) or 
in hra s1 _'; e 'putting the peo 1 e's health _n to I opie : 
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hands' (quoted in Jobert, 19851). In what follows I shall not 
discuss the theoretical case for the benefits of such a rove, but 
instead, assuming that it is a 'wood thing', as.,,, a set of 
questions derived romp a broader study of ; participation i rural 
development (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). These are: what '. sind of 
participation is involved - in implementation or in decisicr. - 
making? what are the socio-political orientations of the organi- 
sations offering participation - conservative or reformist? anc 
what is the socio-political structure (homogenous or stratified) 
and context of the communities being offered participation? 
'Integration' has also been a key word in discussions cf 
health policy. The discussions in the 1950s and the 1 6Cs related 
to the integration of curative and preventive care, at he level 
of the doctors, or the administrative structure; in the 19j Cs the 
focus was on the integration of the different preventive health 
campaigns, particularly for pa rar edicäl s or ers, who v ere later 
also offered some curative tasks. In both cases, however, 
integration has been restricted to he cl th ,. jorI_er z. T. 7 earl ýT 
attempt (under the Community Develop ent Programme in the 19 03) IrII 
to make health wor part of the .. cri: of rural develop ent is 
reckoned to have -Led to little heal. -., -. work, perhaps because oý 
Deo le do rot _ 1_ce health hive on heir lists of riorit 
new projects tend to attempt integration with non-Dealt.: cevel_o - 
: erL again, ei., her as an opening into the village ( !- accressir 
pile 'felt needs' of i: s r: em ers) or on the rounds that ester 
supply, or poverty, are the main causes of ill-health hick eec 
be concerned to distinaüish t'ne to be addressed. Is gall thus 
kinds of integration involved in the new rojects. 
The use of 2uxiliary health ý,, or 17, ers 
is a final element. lr 
general these re village level -,, or!. ers Gr_;: ýý: rc t- : ili es , a , 
Yahere they v! orýý. : Ut projects : ave va ried accoroi;; tc t1ýe 
U- e: uca t` ii n 1- In e'C: e ' ar e: ir no .et all c aev oral . , 
: ears o sc pooling. There are also is ýol cýical . aria c:: s, r er 
th. os- cork.. itt_c to tý: e use of rtrai 
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demystifying medicine, to those 
auxiliaries only in the context 
personnel. 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR HEALTH PROJECTS 
who see tCle 
of shortages 
virtues of 
of traine ü 
There is a large number of voluntary-sector health projects 
in India. kost of these are hospital or clinic-based, and diffe-r - 
f rem similar Government facilities only in the motivation of some 
of the staff (many of these are Christian or Hindu missions) or 
in the level of funding or staffing. }; ut Rao (cited in Jobert, 
1985) listed 50 which could be considered as ', new' in orientation 
in 1978. They are not equally distributed around the country. 
Pyle (1 979) lists six in aharashtra, four of which are also 
listed in the fourteen studies included. by ar cee and Johnson 
(1982). Other States with well-known projects include Tamil Nadu 
F1 17 1" . Ü. s. f. n. Punjab ( Tar2n. = 1älAndhra Pradesh (Indo-Dutch ( 
Project), Rajasthan (Tilonia S. ý . R. C. ) and i adhya Pradesh 
(Project Poshak). They cover only a small proportion of the 
population: the six projects in Maharashtra covered only about 
500,000 p eoole, or about. 1- of the State's population. 
These projects vary considerably. Some are linked to the 
Goverrment, so that rive o the aharasr: Irian schemes ?: ere 
jointly run, while others are entirely separate. Some derive much 
of their incoe from abroa: , 1' L ile ethers are ;:. ore nearýy sel - 
i inancin Some are designed for research (ne table; the ; saran, j al 
project in Pun jab) and are well-Coco enter, but other keep very 
few records. Seme m : rye 'j cole's participatiJ n' -a central i eature 
of their organisation ( . . ýaý, ý ed, i' 
ha ile 
others (like arang -lal) ; ave ot,, er central concerns. Some ar 
-tte; Iptin to integrate v_rious <: i .. os of ea C, i-I or. _ 
(e. V. 
i, t arangwal), while others see health orogramm: r:: es as part o r: ore 
per eral rural development (e. ý. il c: ia). 
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a. In implementation or in decision-ir akin ? 
In keeping with the varying backgrounds, these voluntary 
sector projects have had varying.; degrees of comr; itrent tc the 
three elements which I distinguished above. Thus participation in 
decision- raking in arangwal, in keeping with its research 
orientation, had very narrow limits. Thus G watkin et a1-- 
(1900: 54-5) sur:. rnarise the organisation as follo s: 
'Community leaders were consulted regularly during the 
project's execution, and community organisations 
provided support and assistance - buildings for village 
health and feeding centres, for example - and financial 
con? tributions to the continued operation of project- 
initiated day-care centres. Principal responsibility, 
however, rested with the project leaders who determined 
what service .- ould be provided, recruited and supervised 
project personnel, and covered well over 90% of project 
costs with funds raised from external sources. ' 
The project :,, lith the most contrasting emphasis is probably 
that at Ja :: heti, where villages only rticipate in the proJramr:: e 
if they are prepared to rake fairly substantial inputs, and in 
return, their priorities :i fect , he pro rare.:: J. U. ells, 
farmers' associations and curative services have been Drovicec at 
least in part because of village cer: anus. Ire ad °7 
7of costs . sere being et from local resources arg; an, 
len 1 . 131 
). i`csIt of the other rc ects ciscLusse h :fef1 
between these two e samples, or Knave involved ev n ie3s local 
participa ýý i cr. than in 1. aran_ 31. hus ii Pad ba, asa end i ra 
(three of the i-'a iarasntra projects) , services are 
delivered 
no reGuirent of village inputs(Pyle15)-6). Si filar y, 
th` larger : rojects i. nc1uded by Farn -e and Jon, sc. n 1222-3) 
have limited participation tC aent or the prov1s1G:. ,f acne 
1 ,e at t basic o ý -ý ýa t eria lý resources. In s1. v .r r1 cases, tý ̀u.. _,., 
I :D involve villages by creating 'health co it tees' ic'= v. _ ee, -: 
; rcü ce ý.. given no resources or power, has faileý to 
Substantial effect (I ld. ). In Tilonia, here is a. I, r:. 
staffing is by young professionals, who offer technical servicea 
17 JIJ 
to villages for payment, but who have also created a network of 
social institutions with considerable local participation 
(Franda, 1979: 162-3). Size, and the decisions of the dominant 
personnel in the project (usually charismatic 'founders') seem, to 
determine the degree of participation involved; and participation 
in i Mplementation seems to be dependent on participation in 
decision-making. 
b. Socio-political orientation. 
The organisations offering participation have predominantly 
a social reformist orientation. The more conservative 
organisations (missions, or those close to ri; ht-wing political 
parties like the Jan Sangh) have not tended to offer 
participation beyond the chance to become a patient. On the other 
hand, organisations with a more revolutionary outlook have nct 
been involved with local, small-scale projects of this kind. The 
exception is that the Left Front Government in `-'esst Bengal, under 
its Communist Party (i, -arxist) leadership, has atter pted tc 
introduce its cadres into the Government health r achinery through 
the Comm unity Health Volunteer scheme (See above). Th. --r have 
been no reports of how much this policy has achived. Once again, 
the least reformist projects are arose closest to tie Govern ment 
or with a research orientation. Thus ', "a ranwal had no policy 
objectives beyond the health sphere; Project Posh sir ilarly was 
restricted to health and nutrition objectives. The Indo-Dutc . 
Project in Andhra atter; cted to stimulate suf f'icient lo : al cý: an e 
to allow the original organisers to u: ithdraw leaving an operating 
ins 
ti tu t lon b eh ind allem 
, v'_1o1.1 li 




(rarugee and Johnson, 1 ; ý02: 6b-9). 
Ot : er projects have zttetoted to produce ci_n es 
i social 
stittions 0ca organisation, either orking throuOh th ll in u 
(Panc a pats) as in anara tetra, 




V r1 e 
or b ef ectivr;, i- i 
rL institutions. c th i ilcnla a ^i. 
r- olj_rS c us. :: c_ r 
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alternative means of access to scarce public resources, such as 
loans and grants, predominantly in non-health spheres. gut even 
the more narrowly health-based projects wor <ing ith the 
Panchayat r:, ay have much wider effects. In Jamkhed, for example, 
Panchayats have been involved from the start, and they did not 
take much interest in the original proposals, seeing health 
issues as non-threatening. But successful village health workers 
have developed political support and provide the possibility of 
alternative perspectives on political issues (Pyle, 1979: 16-7). 
The existence of political protection for these projects then 
becomes vital if they are to continue, despite the absence of 
revolutionary rhetoric or intent. 
c. Local social structures. 
dost projects are working in areas which are social and 
economically stratified, as is most of plains India. All the 
projects which have a reasonable ce`, ree of documentation are 
predominantly in these areas, and they are in States .,; I-. ich are 
marked by considerable inequ21itýI. ( ane of they are i: : erala, 
for example. ) The Palöhar project in iIaharash tra. included 15 
tribal vJ1e3, where inequalities ere usu_ll uc, less, OL D 
there seems to be little discussion of t'; he impact this has had o 
project, success in these areas. i shall discuss t _e crier social 
and political context of t pese sch ernes at the end of this 
chatter. 
the ceýr .^ of int rltion of services 
is 
s rieo ýý f: r 
the indicators of participation. .. Io0st aii 
these rojet ,s , ave 
utter;. Pt e so:.. e in. earation, e oe for four o d, 1 : pct , 
Covere by rugee and Johnson o. alt Gr ' wi . Ci 
n tritlý: i:. cl änß' ha CC: `act= :. ýh 1:: ., 
local ri 
health care services. For arýn ýT; pal, variations rý _ic.. 




integration has been restricted to the health sphere. 
offered the differen texperim ental coups 'head t ed cai , 
nutrition an d family p lanning services in different combinations. 
As in severa l of the ý-' aharashtrian ects, the f ocus : as beer 
on maternal and child health services, because they are re ar ec 
as the most vulnerable sections of the population. 
The most extensive integration is at projects like Jars khed, 
R. U.. H. S. A. and Tilcni a, where heal t., services are of f ere. as a rr, 
of a much broader ^acl: a-e of assistance. Ti 1 cr. ia is net cris: aril 
hýýltr: project, tough its heal th component is an i.., crta nt 
one, whereas Jamkhed and R. U: `r. S. A. see general social' 
evelcp ent in teer s ,; ore of its centric on to health -: oals. hs 
the Aroles, project directors in Jar _hed, cut it in 1975 (cuoted 
in Nardiman, 19,84: 131): 
'Local resources such as bui1tin , .. J-anpower cd agriculture should be used to solve local health 
problems. ' 
Tie development of local resources is thus a health go-i , but can 
take on a priority for the project in itself. it is t: ý se ron- 
heai th evele is which may have the greatest ch a^c o: 
of fe ctin the health status, particularly of the p oorest 
mo st I intevra iJec 




{i th ; powerful local -rcups and individuals. 
~inall y the use oý al uxili ar-, - rsonnýi 
is a feature c- ::..: ün 
to these projects, hut tri Considerable variation 
in tn 
, '1 o 
rsC: nie1ii1Vr1Yeý.. 
"nitar 
cr. nw an 1, 
,.. 
Csv L_ in e e, - ;- er i 
programmes were run c ith r.. _ . 
i'. s and 
L. . U. 3 or their ecui, 
as the lowest levels of auxiliary ýr: or. _L recr. 
i 
o eionly s or chip care (creches). rt t :e other ex ire:. e is 
L J= ec, N(D se vil e teealt ýor'. er_ ave u 
illiterate r fiddle - ec wo Men. Hal an (1 . 132) loin s ou 
`gis :, as not : 2rt ;ýte Ori i ý1 plan:: _ J_ ýr 
Jý... 
_. _: ý. . _. e 
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project founders had intended to use h. 1.. ß .s until they 
discovered problems in recruiting and placing such women in t^e 
project villages. Pyle (1979: 20-1 ) reports that several of the. 
Iiaharashtrian projects discovered that villal5e workers with less 
education perform in better than educated ones; and almost ill 
report better experience with women than wit i men. T is is partl y 
because the focus of many of these projects has- been on maternal 
and child health. 
The use of women of this kind, in part-time . jork with 
relatively little financial reward, is a feature common to most 
of the innovative projects. There are variations in the tasks 
they have been expected to perform: again, this seems to have 
developed through exp rimentation, with the addition of -:, cre 
tasks as workers have become more skilled. In Jankhed, weekly 
discussions are used essentially as in-service training, to 
improve diagnostic and other skills. In general, projects have 
been able to entrust increasing responsibilities to these workers 
without any apparent loss of quality of care. However, it is in 
improving the coverage of serv ices that vill e workers are 
usually reckoned to score heavily over workers w. a o are more 
rißt ly-t - . ed anc exppensive but have less local lic e anü 
f e:: e^ social contacts ; rit, the population to be served. c. ýtensive 
home visits are basic elementsw : ich are slicst impossible 
without a cheap, committed local worý: er, n projects Without 
this -in ý of grogram e (such as Project Pos y : ave reporter: lo.. 
coverage and high drop-out rates (r arugee and Johnson, 192: 2a). 
ih resul.. s cf t1- ese pro,, > ram, mes, with 
tz sir cif f _r 
cegrees and types cf oarticipaticn, inr o: - ar. ' 3e C- 
au;; iliary personne-1, are interesting, t-hcu 
Thus ; aranJ. ýal was successful in ; akinb a consi cerD e iM pct c 
local heal th nc ica tcra at relatively loY,: coat, ceý iý_el 
project narrowly efi^ec in 'health' ter s, "it-l- local 
Participation, considerable inte ra ticr; cf health service. cý 
: ̂ l ith little contact With 1jC er d veloo:; C'^t prG ram:.; e.., ä: i... 
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relying on well-motivated paramedicals not village health 
workers. This may be partly explained by the fact that Punjab has 
high mortality and morbidity indicators given its relative 
wealth, and such an approach might not be suitable in poorer 
parts of the country. The Jamkhed project, by contrast, also has 
had a considerable impact on health indicators, by a programme 
with very different emphases. Faruqee and Johnson (1982: 44) 
conclude that programmes should be tailored to local conditions, 
and no one national model is -likely to be suitable everywhere. 
The other general conclusion frequently voiced is that these 
projects owe their success in considerable measure to the 
individuals who have founded them and committed themselves to 
them. In particular, this creates a spirit within the 
organisation which fosters much higher levels of commitment and 
achivement by the employees than is common in larger 
organisations, based on the enthusiasm of the directors and their 
face-to-face contact with the field workers. This has two major 
consequences: it becomes very difficult to expand the project 
beyond a relatively small area, one which one or, two individuals 
can reasonable be said to cover; and any attempt to integrate 
these new proposals within formal bureaucratic structures are 
likely to be unsuccessful. Nonetheless, through direct example 
and through a change within international agencies, some attempts 
have been made to apply some of the insights from voluntary 
projects to Government operations. The main vehicle for 
introducing change has remained the additional funds made 
available by the Planning Commission, and since 1977 the major 
source of relatively 'free' funds has been through international 
aid, to which I now turn. 
NEW PATTERNS IN AID 
There are two features of more recent aid programmes which I 
Will briefly discuss. The first relates to assistance (largely 
from U. N. I. C. E. F. ) to the Integrated Child Development Scheme 
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and the second to the 'Area Development Programmes'. 
The I. C. D. S. has now been in existence for about 10 years. 
It was designed as a pilot attempt to bring together the health 
services (under Ministries of Health) and nutrition support 
(under Ministries of Social Welfare and Education). Community 
Development Blocks included in the I. C. D. S. have an additional 
doctor attached to the P. H. C., and some additional paramedical 
staff, who work with Social Education Officers in monitoring the 
health and nutrition of the children who attend feeding centres 
run by anganwadi (courtyard) workers - who are village nutrition 
workers. I. C. D. S. Blocks can now be found in every District in 
India, and they have a higher level of funding than do 'ordinary' 
Blocks. However, problems of integration with health services 
remain, with the medical staff often having no real contact with 
their Social Welfare counterparts. Coverage with I. C. D. S. blocks 
is scheduled to expand steadily over the next few years, but the 
scheme does not have a high profile within the Health Ministry. 
The first example of 'Area Development' in aid came in the 
first India Population Project (IPP-1) in six districts in U. P. 
and three in Karnataka in 1972. In that year the World Bank 
agreed to provide loans in 'social infrastructure' with 
substantial amounts going to water supply and sanitation projects 
($70 millions being spent up to 1980) and in health and family 
planning. IPP-1 received its funding from the World Bank, 
amounting to $21 million in loans, and from the Swedish Govern- 
ment, of $11 million in grants. A further $12.5 million was 
provided by the Indian Government as counterpart funds. It was 
'new' in that the project was much bigger than most previous 
ones. It focussed on rural health delivery, the training of 
nurses, improved management systems, and the integration of 
family planning with maternal and child health services. It was 
intended to operate as an example to the rest of the country. 
Relatively little has been published about the project, but it is 
clear that it has formed the basis of a document which lays down 
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guidelines for similar projects developed from 1977 onwards with 
other donor agencies and known as the Model Plan. 
There are now five projects, at'different stages of 
development, which follow the general pattern established by the 
Model Plan. Each project is expected to last 5 years, and depends 
on counterpart funds coming from the Government of India. One is 
part-funded by the Danish Government grant of $35 million in 
selected districts of Tamil Nadu and Madhya Pradesh; a second is 
part-funded by the U. N. F. P. A. in selected districts of Bihar and 
Rajasthan; a third, the Second India Populaticn Project in parts 
of U. P. and A. P. is part-funded by the World Bank for $46 million 
in loans (originally the Swedish Government was to provide an 
additional $23 million in grants); a fourth is part-funded by the 
British Government in Orissa for $25 million; and the fifth is a 
project part-funded by U. S. A. I. D. in districts of five states 
(Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Punjab) for 
$33 million. 
The projects share a common core, derived from the Model 
Plan, though they vary in detail. (For a comparison of three of 
these proposals see Table 1 ). The main principle of the Model 
Plan is to speed up the provision of services along the patterns 
laid down in the plans of the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare in New Delhi; this means concentrating expenditures on 
primary health in general, and on sub-centres (clinics manned by 
a female Multi-Purpose Worker/Auxiliary Nurse Midwife, 1 for 5000 
population eventually) in particular. 
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TABLE 1 







Maintenance and utilities 
Supplies, equipment and drugs 
Transport 
Staff training, management etc. 
Additional staff salaries 
Nutrition 
Communication & Media 
Community Fund, Innovations etc. 
TOTAL (Rs mill) 
Donor share 88% 
5 States 

























Sources: Ega1Lh Ezra jaia. 9 Eaplix iD IMD UZjr. lL, L. Z Df jg. Wjj U. BdU mimeo, October 1980; ýD DgrDýýý 2yral 
ýýýýYl EDýty 1ý31DD ErDý ýý ý. ErDýDD EDDD r USA ID, New De1hi, August 1980; E ýDDDýDý ýrDD EýDgrD ýD , Government of Orissa, mimeo, 1979. 












Much of the money to be spent under these projects will go 
to the building of new sub-centres. Other funds will be spent on 
improving the multi-purpose worker training; on improving 
facilities at Primary Health Centres (e. g. with water supplies or 
new operation rooms and equipment); and on support to family 
welfare education through films and other simple audio-visual 
aids. The main categories of worker supported will thus be the 
lowest level - indigenous midwives, community health workers, and 
multipurpose workers. (However, the aid agencies are not funding 
the honoraria and supplies for the indigenous midwives and the 
C. H. V. s, which is part of the Government of India support. ) 
Equipment support will be at a low level compared to salary, 
training and construction support. 
Because of the common core to these proposals there are many 
similarities. However, there has been some acknowledgement of 
local variations, and differences in approach amongst the donor 
agencies, so that there are differences of emphasis between the 
different projects. Thus the Danish proposal stresses more 
community involvement than do the others; the British proposal 
allows for an extension to the rest of the State after a few 
years; and the American proposal stresses management training. 
All accept as a basic principle that what is needed is more (and 
better) of what is currently being provided. 
In many respects, then, these projects are attempting to 
meet the criticisms outlined above, and to implement some of the 
lessons learned from voluntary projects. The bulk of the 
expenditure is available in local currency, to be spent on 
primary care, with a focus on training and employing female 
health workers, and to improve maternal and child health care. 
Nevertheless the limitations of the changes are also obvious. The 
only community involvement is in the selection of candidates for 
employment and training as community health workers and 
indigenous midwives. Local involvement in planning and executing 
the project is virtually non-existent, even in the Dutch 
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programme which has a 'communi ty chest' to provide funding for 
elements of felt need which are not covered by the programme. 
In addition, while integration of services is an important 
aspect of the proposals, there is some danger that it will be a 
very lop-sided integration. To begin with, these are purely 
'health' programmes, with no measure of integration with other 
aspects of social development. (They do not even have any clear 
relationship with the I. C. D. S. ) But secondly, despite the primary 
goal of the reduction of the high levels of maternal and infant 
morbidity and mortality, the services to be financed have in the 
past been used mainly for family planning purposes, and there are 
{ few ' mechanisms to ensure that they will not be suborned in this 
way in the future. These aspects of the World Bank-sponsored IPP- 
2 were the main butt of the criticisms which led to the Swedish 
Government withdrawing their proposed contribution, and lend some 
support to the claim by Baner ji (1981) that the international 
agencies are lending their support to preparations for a return 
to greater compulsion in family planning work. This is too 
simplistic an analysis, because these donors have all expressed 
public commitments against elements of compulsion, and would be 
under considerable political pressure from domestic 
constituencies to withdraw support if compulsion were to be 
reintroduced. But the fact remains that they may be unable to 
ensure their views are heard once the projects are completed. In 
general, the Indian government has played a fairly forceful role 
in negotiating the terms for this assistance: the donor agencies 
have been forced to accept the terms on which they could offer 
assistance, and the withdrawal of the Swedish contribution 
Suggests an inflexibility on the Indian side. 
Finally', the projects have to depend on the existing health 
structure to deliver most of the services and manage the various 
programmes. As I argued above, two of the keys to success for the 
voluntary-sector projects have been the emphasis on coverage 
through home visits, and the significance of personal direction 
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by a committed leadership. Neither of these can be provided by 
the current Indian governmental structure, which has tended to 
accept the new resources as yet further means of fuelling a 
clientelistic structure - new jobs to be allocated, new contracts 
to be awarded, new benefits available to be offered to favoured 
villages or constituencies. 
CONCLUSION 
It is tempting to conclude, as the critics I discussed in 
the Introduction to Part B have done, that health policy in India 
is so closely dominated by national and international class 
interests that there is little scope for major change. However, I 
think this is too simplistic an analysis. In the first place, it 
ignores the very real achievements of Indian health policy. 
Health planning has shifted resources towards preventive 
medicine, rural areas and paramedical workers. Substantial 
preventive campaigns have been waged against malaria and 
smallpox. Large numbers of P. H. C. s and subcentres have been built 
and equipped, and staff have been appointed. In some parts of the 
country, some of them have worked fairly conscientiously, even if 
these have been the relatively favoured areas, and beneficiaries 
have been disproportionately drawn from the higher classes and 
castes. Paramedical staff may be trained and employed on the 
cheap, but their numbers have continued to rise, and they are now 
in place in numbers which mean that they could supply most of the 
population with something approaching a reasonable health 
service. Some of these services probably have helped to support 
the decline in levels of mortality, halting and uncertain though 
this has been. 
Secondly, amongst the various legs which support class 
domination, health policies, health sector assistance, and even 
the operations of pharmaceuticals companies, do not have high 
priorities. More radical health sector proposals (like the 
nationalisation of drug production) are of course fought hard by 
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those whose interests would be directly affected. Further, 
changes in the local distribution of resources which might be 
needed if inequalities in health are to be overcome, or diseases 
of poverty are to be significantly reduced, will also be fiercely 
resisted. But 
'very few health proposals come at all close to such 
radical ideas. The more notable features of Indian health policy 
are the extent to which it has shifted towards 'appropriate' 
models; and the role of factors internal to the Government and 
political party structure which have limited the implementation 
of even these relatively modest proposals. 
But the Indian Government has been relatively successful in 
what it has achieved, if it is measured against those of its near 
neighbour, Pakistan, with which it shared its historical legacy. 
Prior to 1971 Pakistani health policy clearly allocated public 
sector health resources to West Pakistan at the cost of East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In addition, per capita income levels 
in Pakistan have been very comparable to those in India. So 
reseource constraints have been at much the same levels. However, 
the Pakistani Government has shown much less ability to 
articulate a coherent health policy, or to shift resources 
towards those sectors which it has identified as priorities - 
such as preventive health campaigns using paramedical personnel 
in rural areas. As in India, allocations to health services in 
the Plans have been underspent, but have been at a lower level 
than expenditures for other social services (Shepperdson, 1981). 
In the Third Plan (1965-70) only 59% of the health allocation was 
spent, without taking account of inflation. In addition, within 
the health allocation, hospitals, and medical education have 
tended to take more than they were allocated, but this pattern 
was disrupted by the much bigger reversal in the malaria control 
programmes than in India. Rural health programmes have been 
allocated relatively little and have spent even less (ibid: 13- 
14). Shepperdson notes that "the allocation of development funds 
continues to be mainly inconsistent with general policy 
objectives such as the aim to expand. rural services rapidly" 
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(ibid: 18). 
The differentials in availability of health services are 
much higher in Pakistan than in India. Not only are there far 
fewer health personnel, the imbalance towards doctors is much 
greater; in 1974 there were more doctors (10,000) than almost all 
the other health personnel put together, with only dispensers 
(8,000) showing any similar figure. Similarly, there were only 
130 rural health centres (1: 500,000 population) and 400 sub- 
centres (1: 150,000 population)(G. O. P., 1975: 298). Since the mid- 
1970s allocations and expenditures for rural health programmes 
have begun to rise, in real terms and proportionately. New 
proposals, based on rural health centres for a population of 
about 100,000, have been introduced, but staffing levels in 1980 
even in Punjab (a relatively wealthy Province) were very low 
(only 30% of doctors in post, for example)(A. D. B., 1981: 50).. 
Finally, Shepperdson notes that the massive differentials in 
health provisions from those for Government servants on the one 
hand to rural peasants. on the other have not declined during the 
1970s (1981: 8; see also Jeffery, 1972). 
Compared to the Pakistani experience, then, Indian 
achievements are considerable; compared to the ideals of the 
planners and proponents of the 'new perspectives', India comes 
off much less well. The explanations for these patterns seem to 
me to derive from features of the social organisation which are 
well captured by Alavi's discussion of levels of the State and 
the degree of their integration. It is possible to draw contrasts 
between 'tight' States and 'loose' ones, akin to Myrdal's 
distinction between hard and soft States. 'Tight' States are 
those in which there are consistencies among the different levels 
of the State, and integration is close. In these States, whether 
conservative (Iran, perhaps) or radical (China) the class 
interests which dominate the State are closely in accordance with 
the structural constraints in which they are set, and have a 
bureaucratic and political party system which responds to those 
388 
interests. 'Loose' States are those where integration is much 
less clear, and contrasting pressures are able to operated with 
some effect. 
In India, the tightness of relationships between the levels 
is less than in Pakistan. This can be attributed to a number of 
decisions made by the Indian political elite soon after 
Independence - the creation of powerful Planning mechanisms, the 
retention of State control over aspects of the economy, the 
elimination of zamindari - and to features of Indian social 
organisation, such as the greater size and sophistication of the 
Indian capitalist class, and the more secure base of the Indian 
civil service. This has made possible a political party structure 
more democratic in its organisation than many others, with a 
diversity of parties and competition for local political 
resources. 
Thus, while Indian decision-making has been centralised, it 
has not been consistent, or able to ignore the pressures for 
rural provisions which socialist and Gandhian rhetoric has helped 
to generate. Nor has it been unchanging. In the Introduction to 
Part BI noted the 'break' in Indian polity and economy around 
1964-6, with the death of Nehru and the coming of Mrs Gandhi to 
power, and the crisis in Planning and the apparent downturn in 
industrial growth. In policy terms, the break can be seen (in 
retrospect) as a shift from 'top-down' socialism, to a populist, 
Potentially authoritarian regime. In health policy terms, this 
has meant that the Planning Commission lost much of its 
centrality, and control over key aspects of policy (such as the 
numbers and 'quality' of medical colleges) has become much more 
difficult to assert. I have termed the socialism 'top-down' 
because, unlike Chinese communism, it involved no party structure 
at the village or ward level which could either transmit its 
demands up the political or bureaucratic structure, or act as the 
channel for ensuring that higher-level decisions were taken. It 
has been denigrated as 'Fabian', on . the grounds 
that it was 
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largely a matter of the intellectual classes, with no popular 
roots. The absence of these roots made it vulnerable to the kind 
of changes which have largely overtaken politics since 1965: a 
populism which has been clearly at odds with the 'socialist' 
inheritance in a number of cases, with the C. H. V. scheme the most 
obvious example. 
Thus in India, the thread which links these levels of the 
State is a clientelist political structure. The State has what 
coherence it receives from the flows of resources (usually called 
'black' money) which move between capitalists, landlords and 
their dependents, political parties (especially Congress) and 
members of the Government machinery. These flows are essential 
for the maintenance of the party structure, but they are also the 
flows which ensure the protection of propertied classes. The 
C. H. V. who gains his job through patronage has to repay that 
patronage; the' paramedical worker who wishes to get a favourable 
transfer must please local elites and accumulate financial 
resources which will eventually end up recycled through the 
political machinery; and the creation of rural resources is part 
of the currency of local politics, not the implementation of 
clear-sighted solutions to underlying problems. 
The balance of these forces varies throughout the country. 
The contrasts between Bihar, where the levels seem most tightly 
linked, West Bengal and Kerala, where most separation is 
discernible, or Punjab and Haryana, where the situation seems 
most fluid, have been noted (e. g. by Nag, 1983). Kerala and West 
Bengal do have the makings of a localised party structure, based 
on ideological party commitments and drawing support from the 
poor and landless as well as the landed, though the effect on 
health services organisation and achievements is more marked in 
Kerala than in Bengal. If there are grounds for hope in the 
Indian experience, it is the possibility that such local social 
forces might be able to employ the resources which are finally 
arriving at village level. 
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